What’s happened to social bonds in America over the past century? How do these connections impact our individual lives and society as a whole?
Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community traces the rise and fall of social capital. Putnam shows how American civic engagement peaked in the 1950s before steadily declining, threatening not just our social lives but our collective well-being.
Continue reading for an overview of this groundbreaking book.
Overview of Bowling Alone by Robert Putnam
Robert Putnam’s Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community argues that the social glue holding the US together—its social capital—is breaking down. Social capital—the value of cohesive relationships and networks—differs from the types of capital that economists study (such as financial and physical resources). Social capital enriches people and communities by enabling mutual trust, support, and communication. But, after peaking in the 1950s, the US’s social capital has fallen, even as other forms of capital have risen.
Putnam warns that, if the US’s social glue keeps fraying, the collective social systems we rely on could dissolve. In this overview, we’ll explore Putnam’s argument that social capital is vital to society, and we’ll follow as he tries to solve the mystery of what caused its decline in the first place. We’ll look at whether these social trends have continued into the 21st century, examine different views on what causes social change, and see how various organizations use social capital for the betterment of all.
Putnam warns that, if the social strands binding the nation keep fraying, society could fragment into squabbling factions, breaking down social and democratic norms that we’ve long taken for granted and poisoning our mutual trust until suspicion, cynicism, and selfishness rule the day. Social capital, he argues, is vital for bringing people together across lines of class, politics, and culture. Without it, the collective social systems we rely on could dissolve.
Putnam is the Malkin Research Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University, where he taught from 1979 to 2018. Bowling Alone (published in 2000 and revised in 2020) began a national conversation on the value of civic engagement, and the book is now used as a text in college courses on sociology and political science. His scholarship has earned him numerous accolades, including the Johan Skytte Prize in 2006, membership in the National Academy of Sciences, and the National Humanities Medal, which was presented to him by President Obama in 2012. Putnam has authored several other books, including Making Democracy Work, Our Kids, and The Upswing, which directly follows up on his initial research on declining social capital in America.
In this overview of the book Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community, we’ll explore Putnam’s arguments about why social capital is a crucial foundation for society. We’ll then examine the results of Putnam’s research, which show that the US’s social cohesion steadily declined from the mid-1950s until the book’s publication, with no signs of abating at that time. We’ll follow him as he tries to solve the “whodunnit” of what caused this decline in social capital, ranking the various factors by their impact—urbanization, the spread of television, generational differences, and more. At the end, we’ll touch on Putnam’s suggestions for ways to reverse the US’s growing social divisions.
Why Is Social Capital Important?
Putnam emphasizes the vital role of social capital in American life and the negative consequences of its decline. Speaking broadly, social capital enables collective action, promotes economic growth, and opens people’s eyes to cultural diversity. We’ll look at the forms social capital takes, how it works to hold society together, and its effects on collective and individual well-being.
Before we begin, a note on Putnam’s research: The statistics Putnam draws upon span the entire 20th century, so their numbers don’t come from studies Putnam was able to conduct himself. Instead, he performs a meta-analysis that compiles information from numerous research studies conducted by a variety of scholars, institutions, and government agencies. He acknowledges that the polling methods used by these various sources are woefully inconsistent, but he’s tried to accommodate for their differences by comparing data from multiple sources and identifying any particular biases that may have accidentally made their way into the data.
Do Social Connections Unite or Divide Us?
Not everyone agrees that social capital is an unquestionable good. Putnam acknowledges the most common criticism that deep social ties can homogenize groups so that they define society in terms of who’s “in” and “outside” their bubble. However, Putnam points out that social capital takes different forms that bring people together in different ways. Also, he uses data to show that having more social capital actually increases tolerance and acceptance of others.
Putnam identifies two types of social capital—that which unites us and that which connects us. Uniting social capital (which Putnam calls “bonding”) brings people together around a common interest, belief, or cultural background, the way your local chamber of commerce unites business owners in a particular region. On the other hand, connecting social capital (which Putnam calls “bridging”) brings people with different backgrounds together, such as a public school that’s open to students from every part of the community. Many organizations combine both forms of social capital, such as a science fiction convention that unites people around their enjoyment of the genre while connecting them across lines of ethnicity and income.
Us Against Them
It’s a common stereotype that strong social cohesion leads to bland conformity, such as in the clichéd “white picket fence America” portrayed in many classic sitcoms. Putnam admits the underlying problem—social connections can feel strongest when defined in opposition to an “outsider” group, as when supporters of one football team unite against the fans of their biggest rival. While this particular example is usually benign, the social cohesion of a dominant class has been used to ill effect against marginalized groups throughout recorded history. As if to confirm this, social acceptance of minority groups grew in the US during the very same period that our close social connections began to fall apart.
Nevertheless, Putnam strongly refutes the idea that social cohesion and social tolerance are mutually exclusive. In his research, he discovered that people who are more involved in their communities are also more accepting of interpersonal differences. Likewise, because of the link between social capital and economic growth (which we’re about to cover), increased social connections in communities often runs in parallel with greater economic equality. According to Putnam, the negative perception that social cohesion leads to “us versus them” thinking arises when the two types of capital—connecting and uniting—come in opposition with each other, such as when a group bases its whole identity on hatred of another group of people.
Social Capital as Society’s Glue
On a macro level, Putnam writes that social capital is needed for society to function smoothly, both in politics and economics. In terms of governing, representative democracy works only if people participate, which they’re far more likely to do if they feel kinship with each other. When people organize locally, it helps their voices be heard and their needs to be addressed by those in power. Political involvement brings other benefits too—when people unite, they have to learn to work together, resolve their differences, and develop leadership skills. Social capital doesn’t just speak to power—it lifts up and nurtures the next generation of leaders.
Putnam also argues that social capital gives communities an economic boost by greasing the wheels of financial capital. The underlying mechanism is mutual cooperation based on the trust that if you help someone, one day you’ll be repaid in kind. When this communal trust is strong, people tend to patronize local businesses, wider social networks help people gain employment, and entrepreneurs can secure local funding. Putnam suggests that the trust brought about by social capital mitigates common economic speedbumps, from extending credit to businesses in need to knowing which service providers are the most reliable.
However, when the amount of social capital in a community decreases, so too does its reserve of neighborly trust. Putnam writes that, in the US, social trust has been falling since the 1960s, with each new generation growing up less trusting than the one before it. As a result, we’ve had to rely on the legislature and the courts to enforce the fairness we once expected our neighbors to engage in willingly. As we’ve grown apart from each other, we’ve replaced the hand of friendship with the gavel of government.
Social Capital and a Happy Life
As suggested in the example above, social capital strongly influences the quality of life for both children and adults. For instance, Putnam’s research demonstrates that, even without deliberate efforts to improve education, regions with high social capital have the highest rates of educational achievement. Specifically, high levels of adult volunteerism, organizational membership, and voter turnout all correspond to lower school dropout rates, higher test scores, and fewer childhood behavioral problems. Putnam attributes these communities’ successes to more parent-teacher cooperation in addressing the needs of both students and their schools, as well as more social opportunities for children themselves to learn, mature, and grow.
Social Capital and Health
As we move into adulthood, the richness of our social life is strongly correlated to our overall health. Putnam cites a great many studies showing that the stronger someone’s social network is, the lower their risks of cancer, heart disease, and other forms of illness. Part of this he attributes to the documented differences in how your mind and body react to feelings of community as opposed to isolation. However, another factor to consider is that people with strong social support networks have more resources to draw on in times of illness and distress. Friends and family can provide financial resources, emotional support, and practical caregiving, while communities with high social capital are more likely to organize better health care overall.
It almost goes without saying that social capital corresponds to better mental health and overall contentment. The breadth of psychological research confirms that strong social ties help to negate or reduce feelings of depression and loneliness, while increasing people’s self-esteem. Putnam goes on further to say that when people in studies rate their feelings of happiness, taking part in community groups and activities has the same statistical positive impact as does graduating from college or getting a major raise. Of course, with social capital in the US diminishing, so too have Americans consistently reported lower levels of well-being.
The Great Decline
As alluded to already, Putnam’s major thesis is that, not only is social capital vital to society, but America’s supply of it has been steadily decreasing for decades. Putnam charts the arc of social connectivity in the US during the 20th century while examining the places where we come together and how those institutions have fared through the cultural shifts of the last 100 years.
America’s “togetherness” hasn’t always been declining. Putnam writes that, between 1900 and the mid-1950s, Americans’ investment in civic life grew. This period saw a blossoming of activity in churches, volunteer groups, labor unions, and social clubs. The momentum of this growth carried many of these organizations through the ensuing decades, even as the rate at which they attracted new members declined. The tradition of participating in social life, whether as part of a church, a garden club, or a bowling league was so strong that even at the end of the century, US citizens were more active in their communities than their peers in other countries.
For instance, in addition to helping people meet each other, active membership in community groups has demonstrable benefits to society at large. Putnam cites statistics that people who are active in social organizations are also more likely to give money and time to charitable causes, and even to donate blood more often. One bright spark in the data is that, since 1970, individual volunteerism of this kind is on the rise. However, digging deeper, Putnam determines that this increase is due to growing participation by retiring seniors born from 1910 to 1940. This heightened community participation isn’t reflected in the succeeding “baby boom” generation.
The Erosion Begins
Despite its benefits to society, the trajectory of American community involvement reversed in the decades of the 1960s and ’70s. What strikes Putnam as especially peculiar is that this decline in social involvement appears in every segment of American society, regardless of demographic, economic, or geographic factors. Whatever changed in American life was to a large extent universal. Where the blow hit hardest was in activities that require cooperation with others, such as taking part in community events or being active in local organizations. Civic activities that saw less of a decline were those you can engage in on an individual basis, such as sending letters to public officials (or, in the modern age, posting comments on a website).
Formal social interactions aren’t the only ones to slowly vanish during this time. Putnam’s research shows that informal gatherings have also declined since around 1970. By 2000, studies have shown a 45% drop in the number of times people visit with friends or even hold family dinners. Instead, people have shifted their focus to solitary pastimes as opposed to interactive events. In particular, he cites athletics as an example—attendance at sporting events has only increased, but the number of people playing sports has gone down. Today, we’re more likely to go watch a baseball game than to personally join a local softball league.
Where We Come Together
The slow disappearance of social organizations raises the question of how people connect with each other today and whether they’ve simply shifted from old communal structures to something new. For instance, Putnam writes that, traditionally, churches have been the US’s deepest wells of social capital—not necessarily for religious reasons, but because they serve as gathering places for so many social activities, such as support groups, networking events, community forums, and large potluck dinners. However, even as religious beliefs remained largely unchanged over the time of Putnam’s research, actual church attendance went down, weakening them as social capital generators.
Notably, this drop in church membership—as well as participation in other social groups—is primarily a generational shift. Individuals don’t lose their interest in social participation, but each generation since the 1950s has shown weaker interest in their parents’ institutions. Naturally, this leads Putnam to ask if new institutions have replaced the old ones. For most of the time period in question, this doesn’t seem to be the case, since it wasn’t until the 1990s that the internet became a widespread tool for people to unite around common interests.
Unfortunately, the internet hasn’t become an effective replacement for in-person interactions. During the time of Putnam’s initial research, the internet was still a novelty. But, in his 2020 update he observes that, despite its nonstop connectivity, the internet has failed to recreate the social capital of a century before. Even “digital natives” born in the internet era find in-person contact superior to that online. What Putnam’s continued research shows is that the most effective online networks are those that combine virtual and in-person interactions, whether by serving as an initial meeting place to bring people together later in an offline setting, or as a way to continue communication in between more personal interactions.
Replacing Connection With Money
Putnam highlights another trend that reflects the US’s lower civic involvement—as a country, Americans are using financial capital to replace social capital. What were once grassroots volunteer organizations have increasingly become professionalized, such as political parties and advocacy groups that focus on particular issues. In the past, people came together locally to support causes such as civil rights or the environment—forging community bonds and learning social skills in the process. However, today people are far more likely to write checks to large, national groups that employ professional lobbyists on their behalf. This may be a more efficient way to make an impact, but it negates the side effect of building community around a cause.
The Effect on Politics
As beneficial as “effective altruism” might be, Putnam argues that outsourcing civic engagement to professionals comes with unintended societal costs. For example, while the US’s political parties have become increasingly better funded, actual community participation has dropped—including voter turnout at elections, which fell 25% from 1960-1996 despite initiatives to make voting accessible. Putnam points out that individuals aren’t voting less—someone who voted in 1980 was just as likely to vote in 1992—but each successive generational cohort has a lower turnout rate than the one before.
Putnam writes that another consequence is polarization—as more people withdraw from active politics, the ones who remain are those with the strongest opinions and most extreme views. Civil debate and cooperation vanish, fueling a cycle of noise that discourages even-tempered people from returning to the civic fold.
What’s Killing Social Capital?
Beyond confirming that the US’s social cohesion is on the wane, Putnam’s research has another purpose—namely, to identify the cause. Due to the complexity and the pervasive nature of the issue, Putnam identifies a number of factors that contribute to declining social capital. The unravelling of America’s civic unity results from a combination of modern worklife and suburban sprawl, the spread of mass media entertainment, and differences between generations.
Before diving into what’s causing public disengagement, there’s one excuse that Putnam rejects—namely, that people today are too busy. On the contrary, Putnam’s data shows that the people who are the busiest are also the most active in community groups. While full-time jobs do subtract from how much time you can spend in group events or social clubs, work balances this loss with other forms of connection, such as participation in professional associations and taking part in business activities that promote community growth. The tradeoff between work and private life isn’t equally balanced, but Putnam attributes no more than a fraction of our social decline to being too busy at work.
Life In Suburbia
An argument Putnam finds more compelling is that changes to where we live and work have broken traditional communities apart by geographically distancing aspects of society. For instance, as city workers have steadily moved out to surrounding towns, those suburbs have become increasingly segregated by ethnicity and income level. Putnam also notes that even within these homogeneous suburbs, neighbors tend to isolate themselves and avoid taking part in community activities. The rates of civic engagement are much higher in true “small towns” that have retained their character, rather than those that have been transformed into bedroom communities for big-city commuters.
The commute from the suburbs to downtown is also a problem. Putnam notes that instead of spending time with each other, Americans now spend more time alone in their cars than ever before. As urban sprawl continues, this trend grows worse and worse, increasing personal feelings of isolation and taking away valuable time that we might otherwise spend with family, friends, and other social groups. From data correlating travel time with community involvement, Putnam concludes that every 10 minutes added to a commute decreases a person’s community involvement by around 10%—a number that compounds as you move farther from your job.
Lastly, Putnam calls attention to the fact that suburbanization has separated work, home, and other social settings so that they never overlap. In the era of tightly knit communities, people who worked together also lived near each other, shopped at the same stores, and went to the same events. You’d run into the same people on your lunch break that you’d meet at your child’s football game. However, when you drive into the city or a different suburb for anything you do, there’s no consistency between the people you meet at work, when you’re walking your dog, or when you’re out buying clothes. Putnam argues that suburbia has turned us into a nation of strangers with no communal identity to act as a seed for social capital.
Television Overload
In addition to his case against suburban sprawl, Putnam says that an even greater drain on social capital is time spent in front of the television. He cites studies showing evidence of the harm TV does to community life. It replaces time spent socializing and participating in organized group activities, and continual TV use trains people to be passive and apathetic, turning its users into stereotypical “couch potatoes.” What Putnam finds interesting is that, in general, people don’t consider watching TV to be more enjoyable than social interactions, but the minimal effort it requires makes TV a tempting substitute at the end of a long, tiring day.
In his analysis, Putnam is clear that, though TV-watching seems to correspond with community disengagement, correlation does not imply causation—both could be triggered by some external factor. Nevertheless, Putnam finds it damning that the downturn in the US’s social capital lines up almost exactly with the widespread adoption of TV in American homes. This change happened quickly in the 1950s, and by the 1960s an entire generation of children were growing up with TV as a major focus of attention in their lives. Putnam concludes that despite its benefits, TV has made leisure a private activity, not a community experience.
Generational Divides
When adding up the different factors that might explain the US’s falling civic participation, Putnam suggests that the largest contributor of all is a sharp change in generational attitudes, stemming from the timing of geopolitical events and technological changes across the 20th century. On this point, Putnam takes care to distinguish between changes within generations that take place as a population ages and changes between generations that occur because of experiences one cohort shares that other generations do not. For instance, children of the 1950s and ’60s grew up in a time of rapid economic growth that wasn’t matched by the experiences of their parents or their children, who both grew up in times of economic turmoil.
Putnam states that approximately half of the US’s measurable decline in civic-focused behavior is the result of generational change. In other words, individuals don’t grow less invested in their communities—instead, each generation is less civic-oriented than the one that came before. This, of course, begs the question: What is happening to entire generations that’s making them lose interest in civic life? Putnam’s answer is twofold. One divide was TV; those who grew up before it were accustomed to more social participation in their lives. Putnam also argues that World War II constitutes another generational divide.
The World War II Surplus of Social Capital
Instead of just dwelling on the loss of social capital in the century’s latter half, Putnam turns to the first half of the 20th century and asks what factors caused social capital to rise. He hypothesizes that world-shaking events united Americans for a common purpose more strongly than any crisis we’ve faced since—namely, the Great Depression and, to an even greater extent, the Second World War. The Depression made Americans work collectively through union-building and political action to carry each other through its economic hardships. World War II followed right on its heels, uniting the country to face a common enemy.
More than any conflict since the American Revolution, World War II imbued the nation with feelings of social responsibility and civic duty—even those who didn’t fight on the battlefield did their part on the “homefront” to support the nation as a whole. This involved creating many social and community organizations, both locally and the national scale, to coordinate individual and neighborhood activities, such as collecting scrap metal and rubber, rationing supplies, and providing support for those who lost family members. Once the war was over, this sense of interpersonal camaraderie endured, defining the outlook of everyone who lived through it.
Putnam writes that the generations that followed had no such uniting force. Instead, the defining historical events of the following decades were more divisive, such as the Vietnam War and the Civil Rights Movement. While Americans united in support of these and other causes, many of their neighbors united in opposition, and though the social structures and organizations created during the prior decades persisted, their membership waned and steadily aged as younger generations turned inward with a focus on individual growth and success. Our modern era has experienced a much-needed growth of equality and opportunity, not to mention many technological marvels, but we’ve also lost our sense of common purpose.
What Can We Do?
No matter how strongly some people might wish it, the US can’t return to the structures of the past. Instead, Putnam advocates a new wave of community-building efforts, creating new social structures for the 21st century that will restore and replenish our social capital in ways that acknowledge and make use of the progress we’ve made since the end of World War II. Putnam doesn’t presume to offer definitive solutions to our loss of social connection, but he suggests what sectors of society will have to be involved in addressing the problem.
First, Putnam argues that change must start in school so that new generations can learn communal responsibility similar to that held by their great-grandparents. This would require drastic improvements to the current state of civics education, but it would also include providing students with ways to actively make a difference in their communities. He suggests that involving students in generating ideas for such programs would instill civic values even more strongly. At the time of writing (the late 1990s), Putnam noted an increase in young people volunteering for public causes that might reflect just such an upward trend.
Putnam also points out that churches remain some of the country’s strongest social capital creators and must therefore play a role in reforging social bonds. However, he admits that churches tend to focus on uniting people under one religious roof rather than connecting across the aisles of different faiths. If we’re to find a positive way to restore religious communities, Putnam writes that it will have to take a form that’s inclusive and tolerant of religious differences.
Planning for the Future
Since suburban life plays such a large role in inhibiting social capital’s growth, Putnam says that city designers and urban planners need to build neighborhoods that increase social interactions while reducing commute times. Some such efforts were already underway at the time of Bowling Alone’s publication, but it was too soon for Putnam to draw any conclusions about their efficacy. Acknowledging the role that public policy plays in guiding urban and suburban development, he suggests that this task falls partly under the government’s purview.
Lastly, Putnam writes that any solutions to restoring social capital in the 21st century must involve the internet. When writing in 2000, the social uses of the internet remained unclear, and when updating the book for 2020, Putnam observed that online networks are most effective at creating social capital when they’re used as a binding supplement to traditional networks in the real world. As we move into the future, Putnam suggests that we can choose to use the internet in this way—not as a substitute for in-person interactions, but to build non-virtual communities that extend beyond the internet’s borders.
