The Decline of Social Capital & What’s to Blame (Robert Putnam)

What’s caused Americans to become increasingly isolated from one another over the last several decades? How does this disconnection impact our communities and political landscape?

In his book Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam tracks how America’s social connections have steadily weakened since the 1960s. He documents the decline of social capital across various aspects of society, from church attendance and bowling leagues to family dinners and political participation.

Read on to understand how and why meaningful community bonds have deteriorated.

The Decline of Social Capital

Putnam’s major thesis is that, not only is social capital vital to society, but America’s supply of it has been steadily decreasing for decades. Putnam charts the arc of social connectivity in the US during the 20th century while examining the places where we come together and how those institutions have fared through the cultural shifts of the last 100 years.

(Shortform note: Though Putnam’s data focuses exclusively on the US, the decline of social capital during this period appears to be global, with two notable exceptions: Japan and the Scandinavian countries. In Japan, social capital has remained steady thanks to a growth in civic associations and increased social participation from women in their 30s and men in their 40s. In Scandinavia, there’s much trust in government and societal institutions, though whether this promotes social capital, results from social capital, or both is unclear.) 

America’s “togetherness” hasn’t always been declining. Putnam writes that, between 1900 and the mid-1950s, Americans’ investment in civic life grew. This period saw a blossoming of activity in churches, volunteer groups, labor unions, and social clubs. The momentum of this growth carried many of these organizations through the ensuing decades, even as the rate at which they attracted new members declined. The tradition of participating in social life, whether as part of a church, a garden club, or a bowling league was so strong that even at the end of the century, US citizens were more active in their communities than their peers in other countries.

(Shortform note: Putnam’s emphasis on the positive aspects of American life during this time might evoke feelings of nostalgia for that bygone age, despite the many hardships people faced in that era. Nostalgia has its merits, however, if it’s framed correctly. Harvard professor Svetlana Boym identifies two types of nostalgia—restorative (in which people see the past as a golden age that we should return to) and reflective (which acknowledges the value of the past as a means to inspire change in the present). Looking at the first half of the 20th century through the lens of reflective nostalgia allows us to learn from what was good about that era and apply it to our own without trying to erase the advances we’ve made in the intervening years.)

For instance, in addition to helping people meet each other, active membership in community groups has demonstrable benefits to society at large. Putnam cites statistics that people who are active in social organizations are also more likely to give money and time to charitable causes, and even to donate blood more often. One bright spark in the data is that, since 1970, individual volunteerism of this kind is on the rise. However, digging deeper, Putnam determines that this increase is due to growing participation by retiring seniors born from 1910 to 1940. This heightened community participation isn’t reflected in the succeeding “baby boom” generation.

(Shortform note: Putnam’s gloomy outlook on the future of social engagement may have been premature, since he had no way of knowing that the trend would continue into the 2020s. A poll conducted in 2023 shows that young people born after the mid-’90s volunteer at a comparable rate to baby boomers. This marks an increase from the intervening generations’ volunteerism, and it also marks a shift in how and where people contribute to society. Whereas prior cohorts were more likely to volunteer through social support organizations and work-related initiatives, young people in the 2020s prefer to help with environmental and education-focused programs.)

The Erosion Begins

Despite its benefits to society, the trajectory of American community involvement reversed in the decades of the 1960s and ’70s. What strikes Putnam as especially peculiar is that this decline in social involvement appears in every segment of American society, regardless of demographic, economic, or geographic factors. Whatever changed in American life was to a large extent universal. Where the blow hit hardest was in activities that require cooperation with others, such as taking part in community events or being active in local organizations. Civic activities that saw less of a decline were those you can engage in on an individual basis, such as sending letters to public officials (or, in the modern age, posting comments on a website). 

Formal social interactions aren’t the only ones to slowly vanish during this time. Putnam’s research shows that informal gatherings have also declined since around 1970. By 2000, studies have shown a 45% drop in the number of times people visit with friends or even hold family dinners. Instead, people have shifted their focus to solitary pastimes as opposed to interactive events. In particular, he cites athletics as an example—attendance at sporting events has only increased, but the number of people playing sports has gone down. Today, we’re more likely to go watch a baseball game than to personally join a local softball league.

Where We Come Together

The slow disappearance of social organizations raises the question of how people connect with each other today and whether they’ve simply shifted from old communal structures to something new. For instance, Putnam writes that, traditionally, churches have been the US’s deepest wells of social capital—not necessarily for religious reasons, but because they serve as gathering places for so many social activities, such as support groups, networking events, community forums, and large potluck dinners. However, even as religious beliefs remained largely unchanged over the time of Putnam’s research, actual church attendance went down, weakening them as social capital generators.

(Shortform note: This trend remains unabated—a 2020 Gallup poll revealed that for the first time, less than 50% of US adults were members of a church, while the number who claimed no religion at all rose above 20%. In The Great Dechurching, Jim Davis and Michael Graham argue that the main reason for many people leaving organized religion is practicality—they see church attendance as an inconvenience when they have so many other pressing demands on their time. However, many younger Americans also report leaving religion because they see church culture as overly judgmental and behind the times on many current social issues.)

Notably, this drop in church membership—as well as participation in other social groups—is primarily a generational shift. Individuals don’t lose their interest in social participation, but each generation since the 1950s has shown weaker interest in their parents’ institutions. Naturally, this leads Putnam to ask if new institutions have replaced the old ones. For most of the time period in question, this doesn’t seem to be the case, since it wasn’t until the 1990s that the internet became a widespread tool for people to unite around common interests.

(Shortform note: While Putnam looks at the 20th century’s weakening of institutions as a singular event, it may be part of a larger historic cycle. In Principles for Dealing with the Changing World Order, Ray Dalio argues that civilizations like the US go through stages of increased harmony, when people cooperate and society flourishes, followed by times of disharmony, where civil society weakens and falls apart. When a society reaches its peak, Dalio writes that those born to wealth and power take it for granted and don’t do the work to maintain the social system that supports them. At their most extreme, these cycles end in violence as conflicts break out over cultural values, wealth distribution, and political power.)

Unfortunately, the internet hasn’t become an effective replacement for in-person interactions. During the time of Putnam’s initial research, the internet was still a novelty. But, in his 2020 update he observes that, despite its nonstop connectivity, the internet has failed to recreate the social capital of a century before. Even “digital natives” born in the internet era find in-person contact superior to that online. What Putnam’s continued research shows is that the most effective online networks are those that combine virtual and in-person interactions, whether by serving as an initial meeting place to bring people together later in an offline setting, or as a way to continue communication in between more personal interactions. 

(Shortform note: One reason the internet fails to create real social capital may be biological. In Out of Touch, psychologist Michelle Drouin explains that online interactions engage different hormones in the brain—interactions on the internet produce a mild reward of the pleasure hormone dopamine, whereas meaningful, intimate real-world connections trigger the release of oxytocin, which promotes social bonding and feelings of attachment. Since the dopamine cycle is easier to trigger, constant online connectivity has led us to an era of internet addiction, which in turn has produced what researchers are calling an “intimacy famine” in which people are starved for real social connections because of their fixation on digital devices.)

Replacing Connection With Money

Putnam highlights another trend that reflects the US’s lower civic involvement—as a country, Americans are using financial capital to replace social capital. What were once grassroots volunteer organizations have increasingly become professionalized, such as political parties and advocacy groups that focus on particular issues. In the past, people came together locally to support causes such as civil rights or the environment—forging community bonds and learning social skills in the process. However, today people are far more likely to write checks to large, national groups that employ professional lobbyists on their behalf. This may be a more efficient way to make an impact, but it negates the side effect of building community around a cause. 

(Shortform note: In Doing Good Better, William MacAskill, one of the founders of the effective altruism movement, takes the idea of maximizing philanthropic efficiency to its logical extreme, going so far as to provide mathematical formulae to calculate the most positive use of time and money. However, MacAskill seems to assume that monetary donations are the default way to support a cause. When proponents of effective altruism discuss building social capital, it’s usually in terms of encouraging donations and solidifying the reputation of the nonprofit sector. The community-building side of effective altruism, which Putnam might prize above the rest, is mainly aimed at guiding people toward careers where they can make a philanthropic impact.)

The Effect on Politics

As beneficial as “effective altruism” might be, Putnam argues that outsourcing civic engagement to professionals comes with unintended societal costs. For example, while the US’s political parties have become increasingly better funded, actual community participation has dropped—including voter turnout at elections, which fell 25% from 1960-1996 despite initiatives to make voting accessible. Putnam points out that individuals aren’t voting less—someone who voted in 1980 was just as likely to vote in 1992—but each successive generational cohort has a lower turnout rate than the one before.

(Shortform note: As a result of the decline Putnam discusses, the US has one of the lowest per capita voting rates among democratic nations. The difference is not due solely to American disinterest—some countries implement policy measures to increase voter participation. One strategy is mandatory voting—in countries like Australia, Belgium, and Peru, failing to vote results in fines. Another strategy is proportional representation, in which a legislature’s makeup is determined by the total number of votes a party receives in a nationwide election. This approach negates the practice of creating “safe” legislative seats in noncompetitive districts—and lets voters feel that their votes matter, which polls show many Americans don’t feel.)

Putnam writes that another consequence is polarization—as more people withdraw from active politics, the ones who remain are those with the strongest opinions and most extreme views. Civil debate and cooperation vanish, fueling a cycle of noise that discourages even-tempered people from returning to the civic fold.

(Shortform note: In the 21st century, combative political polarization has further pushed moderates away from civic participation by inducing significant voter fatigue. Pew Research Center polls show increasing levels of voter exhaustion and general frustration with the US’s political system. Young voters in particular report feeling discouraged by the repetitive nature of American elections, the never-ending political news coverage, and the sheer amounts of bad information now prevalent in online media. The result is exactly as Putnam predicted—highly motivated partisans vote in elections while others elect not to participate.)

What’s Causing the Decline of Social Capital?

Beyond confirming that the US’s social cohesion is on the wane, Putnam’s research has another purpose—namely, to identify the cause. Due to the complexity and the pervasive nature of the issue, Putnam identifies a number of factors that contribute to declining social capital. The unravelling of America’s civic unity results from a combination of modern worklife and suburban sprawl, the spread of mass media entertainment, and differences between generations.

Before diving into what’s causing public disengagement, there’s one excuse that Putnam rejects—namely, that people today are too busy. On the contrary, Putnam’s data shows that the people who are the busiest are also the most active in community groups. While full-time jobs do subtract from how much time you can spend in group events or social clubs, work balances this loss with other forms of connection, such as participation in professional associations and taking part in business activities that promote community growth. The tradeoff between work and private life isn’t equally balanced, but Putnam attributes no more than a fraction of our social decline to being too busy at work.

(Shortform note: While busyness may not be a statistical factor in the decline of social capital, the nature of work might play a role in the US’s growing internal divisions. In Bullshit Jobs, David Graeber argues that many modern forms of employment, especially in the white-collar sector, serve no purpose for society. These jobs exist for a variety of reasons—economic, political, and cultural—but their net effect is to make workers unhappy and to sow resentment between social classes. Graeber suggests that for many people, especially blue-collar workers, it’s hard to form social bonds with others if you see them earning higher pay for doing less work than you.)

Life In Suburbia

Putnam argues that modern living arrangements have weakened traditional communities in several ways:

1. Suburban migration has created ethnically and economically segregated neighborhoods where residents avoid community activities, unlike true “small towns” with higher civic engagement.
2. Longer commutes between suburbs and cities significantly reduce community involvement, with every 10 additional minutes of travel time decreasing participation by approximately 10%.
3. The physical separation of work, home, and social spaces prevents the overlap of social circles that traditionally fostered community bonds, turning Americans into “a nation of strangers” without shared communal identity.

These factors collectively contribute to decreased social capital and increased isolation in American society.

Television Overload

According to Putnam’s analysis, television viewing has significantly eroded social capital, even more than suburban sprawl. Research indicates that TV viewing:

• Replaces time spent in social activities and community participation
• Cultivates passivity and apathy in viewers
• Becomes a low-effort alternative to social interaction, despite not being more enjoyable

While acknowledging that correlation doesn’t prove causation, Putnam notes the striking alignment between declining social capital and the widespread adoption of television in American homes during the 1950s and 60s. He concludes that television has transformed leisure from a communal experience into a private activity.

Generational Divides

According to Putnam, generational attitudes account for about half of the decline in US civic participation. He distinguishes between changes that occur as people age versus differences between generations due to shared historical experiences. Two key generational divides are identified:

1. Those who grew up before TV were more socially engaged.
2. World War II created a distinct difference in civic orientation.

Each successive generation has been less civic-minded than the previous one, not because individuals become less invested in communities as they age, but because entire generations have developed different attitudes toward civic participation based on their shared historical and technological experiences.

The World War II Surplus of Social Capital

Putnam explores how social capital in America rose in the first half of the 20th century and declined afterward. He identifies two key unifying events:

1. The Great Depression forced Americans to work collectively through unions and political action.
2. World War II created an unprecedented sense of social responsibility and civic duty across the nation.

These events, particularly WWII, led to the creation of numerous community organizations and instilled a lasting sense of camaraderie among those who experienced them.

In contrast, post-war defining events like the Vietnam War and Civil Rights Movement were more divisive. Though the social structures from earlier decades continued, younger generations became more focused on individual success rather than collective purpose. Modern America has gained equality and technological advancement but lost its sense of common purpose.