#341 Katarina Szulc - Cartels Are Recruiting Drone Operators From the Ukraine War

The CJNG (Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación) has established remarkable control in Mexico through a decentralized organizational model, with semi-autonomous sub-cells led by local strongmen. This structure both fortifies the cartel’s dominance and allows for flexibility in leadership, operations, and succession, unlike more rigid hierarchies.

Cjng Solidified Control in Mexico Via a Decentralized Network of Semi-Autonomous Sub-cells Led by Strong Regional Leaders

Fortune 500-style Organization: Powerful Entities Maintain Independent Operations, Contributing To Cjng Dominance Without Rigid Hierarchy

CJNG’s structure resembles that of a Fortune 500 company, where powerful sub-cells or entities operate with substantial autonomy. Katarina Szulc details how groups like Fuerza Zacatecas Nueva Generación (FZNG) demonstrate this model: the FZNG operates trafficking pipelines, maintains territorial control, and handles localized payoffs to politicians and police, all while ultimately strengthening CJNG as a whole. These sub-cells are capable of rapid shifts in power, with regional leaders climbing ranks quickly and turning cells into violent powerhouses. The result is impressive territorial control and an organizational model that is difficult for outside observers and authorities to fully grasp.

Sub-cells Retain Names to Ensure Loyalty and Leader Accountability, Bolstering Rather Than Fragmenting the Organization

Each sub-cell, such as FZNG, retains its name to signal who led an operation or committed a violent act. This naming convention helps ensure local loyalty and clear leader accountability, preventing fragmentation. When a local faction acts, both CJNG and rival groups know who was responsible—a deliberate approach designed to foster internal cohesion and suppress infighting.

El Mencho's Death Didn't Cause Collapse Due to Decentralized Structure Allowing Smooth Succession to Stepson Without Infighting

This decentralized approach allowed CJNG to weather the death of its previous kingpin, El Mencho, in February. Although there was a period of heightened violence—buses burned, the National Guard attacked—there was no overarching collapse or serious infighting within CJNG. The system continued almost seamlessly, with the organization avoiding the “house of cards” effect that plagued past centralized cartels after leadership losses.

Leadership Successional Power in Cjng Shifts to the Valencia Family, Who Control Military Operations and Strategic Direction

Cerro Tres, El Mencho's Stepson and Cjng Leader, Is an American Born In Santa Ana, Complicating Us Law Enforcement Despite His Designation as a Foreign Terrorist Organization Leader

Succession passed smoothly to Cerro Tres (03), El Mencho’s stepson, who was born in Santa Ana, California. This American citizenship presents unique challenges to U.S. law enforcement as Cerro Tres—though the leader of what is designated a foreign terrorist organization—enjoys different legal protections and intelligence oversight. His status complicates the application of kingpin strategies and international law.

Valencia Family's Rise as Cocaine Exporters With Colombian Ties Poised For Control After El Mencho's Removal

Behind the scenes, the Valencia family—originally the financial power behind CJNG through their avocado export business—has now become both the money and the muscle driving the organization. The family’s longstanding connections with Colombian cocaine suppliers and their established trafficking pathways into the U.S. (in part originating from avocado exports) put them in a strong position to control CJNG’s military operations and strategic direction. High intelligence and operational discipline among Valencia members suggest that CJNG is poised not just for continued operation, but for expansion.

Cjng Commanders Have Distinct Motivations, Creating Subtle Rifts After El Mencho's Death Over the Level of Violence the Organization Should Employ

While succession was mostly smooth, Szulc points to existing subtle rifts among CJNG commanders, generated by differences in philosophy—especially regarding the scale and intensity of violence each sub-cell should employ. Leaders of certain cells have their own substantial followings, territory, and contacts, giving them the latent capacity to split from CJNG and form rival organizations if disputes escalate.

Cjng May Fracture as Sub-cell Leaders Consider Independent Operations, Though Unified Control Remains More Profitable

Two High-Ranking Cjng Figures Have the Control, Followings, and Connections to Form Rival Organizations

Szulc notes at least two high-ranking CJNG figures have enough power, loyal foot soldiers, and independent trafficking contacts (spanning Colombia, Guatemala, the U.S., and even Spain and Canada) that they could successfully break away to form new cartels if desired. These figures already control significant regional operations and have international relationships requisite for independent success.

Cjng Splinter to Involve Bloodshed As Parent Organization Fights to Control Trafficking Routes and Supplier Relationships in Colombia, Guatemala, and the U.S

If such a split occurs, it would likely trigger violent conflict, as the parent CJNG battles to maintain control of profitable trafficking pipelines and international supply relationships. Competition for territorial and logistical supremacy would generate bloodshed, including assassinations, targeted violence against defectors, and possibly attacks on law enforcement.

Unity Under Cjng Offers Commanders More Benefits Than Ind ...

Cartels in Mexico have evolved far beyond drug trafficking, securing dominant positions in various legitimate industries such as oil, agriculture, water, and telecommunications. Their reach now profoundly affects daily life in both Mexico and the United States, implicating both nations in a vast underground economy.

Cartels Dominate Industries, Outearning Drug Profits

Cartels extract immense profits from sectors previously considered legitimate, often surpassing the financial gains of drug trafficking.

Oil Theft Funds Cartels: Pemex Pipelines Tapped, Fuel Sold To U.S. Refineries Below Market Rates

Cartels routinely tap state-owned Pemex pipelines, stealing crude oil in large quantities. This stolen oil is then smuggled across the U.S. border and sold to small American refineries at prices significantly lower than the legal market rate, rendering the commodity effectively black market despite its widespread legal use. One notable case involved a Utah family indicted for knowingly buying cartel-stolen crude oil and smuggling it through the Port of Brownsville to supply their family-run refinery. Even prominent figures have been implicated; the father of Miss Universe Mexico, a high Pemex executive, was accused of trafficking and stealing crude oil—a scandal leading him into Mexico's Federal Witness Protection Program.

Cartel Quotas in Michoacán's Avocado Production Take Up to 80% of Farmers' Revenues, Forcing Many to Abandon Orchards or Flee

Cartels dominate the lucrative avocado trade, especially in the Michoacán region, notorious for cartel activity. Farmers are forced to pay exorbitant extortion fees—up to 80% of their profits—under threat of violence or death. Those unable or unwilling to pay are dispossessed or killed, prompting many to flee lands cultivated by generations. This exploitation occasionally triggers temporary halts in U.S. avocado imports from the region due to surges in violence, but trade often resumes despite persistent threats, suggesting external market priorities often outweigh security concerns.

Cartels Monopolize Water Supply in Mexican Towns, Charging Residents For Access

In addition to agriculture, cartels control and monopolize the water supply in numerous Mexican towns, forcing residents to pay them directly for water access and further extending their economic power over essential services.

Cartels Supply Internet and Wi-fi In Rural Mexico After Cutting Legitimate Connections and Installing Their Networks

Cartels have also established monopolies on telecommunications in many rural areas. They physically sever existing internet and Wi-Fi infrastructure, then install and control their own networks. Residents must then pay the cartel for access, cementing the cartels’ authority and profits in yet another facet of daily life.

US Market Fuels Cartel Profits via Stolen Goods, Implicating Americans In the Criminal Economy

The financial lifeblood of cartel operations stems heavily from U.S. demand for stolen and extorted Mexican commodities.

Refineries Buy Stolen Mexican Crude; Utah Family Indicted For Smuggling Cartel Oil Via Port of Brownsville

American entities play a direct role by purchasing stolen Mexican crude oil. The previously mentioned Utah case illustrates how American refineries create sustained demand for cartel-supplied fuel, integrating U.S. businesses into the cartels’ illicit networks.

Super Bowl Peak Revenue Opportunity For Cartels in Avocado Distribution, as Guacamole Demand Spikes

Cartel control of the avocado trade becomes particularly lucrative during large American events—like the Super Bowl—when demand for avocados, primarily for guacamole, spikes. This results in a peak revenue window for cartels, who funnel avocados into the U.S. market, often regardless of ongoing violence in production regions.

Demand for Human Trafficking Victims in Border Towns Driven by American Consumers, With Most Clients of Tijuana's Sex Trade Being American Citizens

The U.S. also directly fuels the cartels’ human trafficking business. Women and girls, often trafficked from isolated Mexican villages, are moved to border cities like Tijuana and forced into sex work, serviced primarily to American citizens. Victims report that “most of the clientele” in Tijuana’s sex industry are Americans, and those deemed “successful” or attractive are trafficked onward to major U.S. cities, such as San Diego, Los Angeles, Houston, and New York.

CJNG's Profitable, Violent Human Trafficking Networks Operate Between Mexico and the U.S. With Sophisticated Recruitment and Control

The CJNG and similar organizations run extensive human trafficking operations, using both deception and violence.

Traffickers Use "Romeo Method" to Target Sheltered Women From Conservative Mexican Families, Taking Them To Border Cities Under False Employment Promises

Traffickers, sometimes with dual Mexico-U.S. residency, target young women from conservative, religious backgrounds in small towns, using seduction—known as the “Romeo method." They win over the women—and sometimes their families—before convincing the women to relocate to border towns under false pretenses of legitimate work.

Trafficked Women in Tijuana Registered As Legal Sex Workers Through Forced Marriages, Creating a Facade of Legitimacy

Once in cities like Tijuana, the women are confined in group houses and forced to work as prostitutes to meet nightly quotas. Traffickers leverage official channels—such as the local Sanitary Departme ...

Mexico’s deeply rooted cartel influence thrives on government and political corruption, making organized crime a structural pillar of the nation’s economy and governance.

Mexican Political Leaders Depend On Cartel Revenues, Making Crime-Fighting a Threat to Their Interests and Survival

Cartels have become central to Mexico’s economic and political landscape. Katarina Szulc explains that cartels are essentially the third largest employer in Mexico, linking over 50%—likely between 50% and 75%—of the population to organized crime. This encompasses not only street-level operatives but also politicians and law enforcement officials who, by turning a blind eye or actively participating, become part of the criminal ecosystem. She notes that eradicating the cartels would simultaneously devastate the Mexican economy.

High-level politicians and ranking officials are frequently on cartel payrolls or benefit directly from organized crime, creating a powerful incentive to maintain the status quo. Szulc cites President Sheinbaum’s administration as an example of continuing this tradition, maintaining conditions that allow cartel infiltration and suggesting pervasive corruption at the highest levels. Politicians face a grim dilemma: resisting the cartels risks assassination, collaborating makes one complicit in criminality, and operating in persistent fear leads to passivity and harms their constituents. Szulc notes that many politicians play the “game” carefully—any misstep may mean death, while compliance betrays public duty.

Carlos Manzo and Lily Téllez: Rare Mexican Politicians Opposing Cartels and Corruption, Vulnerable to Retaliation

Genuine political resistance is exceptionally rare. Szulc names Carlos Manzo as an example of a politician who took an anti-crime stand as mayor and was murdered by the cartel because of it. She also singles out Lily Téllez, a national figure in the Mexican Senate, known for publicly naming and calling out corrupt officials, thereby directly challenging cartel influence. These examples remain exceptions because when the president profits from organized crime, lower-level officials feel pressured to conform or face retaliation, making clean politics almost nonexistent.

Bribery in Mexico's Oil and Security Sectors Enables Cartel-Friendly Policies

Corruption extends beyond political offices into vital sectors. Mexico was the first country to contract Pegasus spyware from Israel’s NSO Group. Former president Peña Nieto is alleged to have accepted a $25 million bribe from NSO executives in exchange for integrating Pegasus into national security operations. Peña Nieto denied the reports on Twitter, claiming they lacked journalistic rigor, but a video later surfaced showing him with the accused bribe facilitator. An Israeli tribunal documented an executive confronting the facilitator about repayment connected to the bribe, where the facilitator only disputed the amo ...

Mexican cartels have rapidly modernized their tactics and weaponry, leveraging advances in consumer technology and lessons from global conflicts to outmaneuver law enforcement and rivals.

Fpv Drones: Primary Tactical Innovation in Cartel Warfare, Allowing Precision Strikes on Law Enforcement and Rivals While Keeping Operators Distant From Consequences

Cartels have adopted first-person view (FPV) drones as the centerpiece of their evolving arsenal, using them primarily to conduct precision strikes on law enforcement convoys and rival groups. By employing FPV drones to deliver explosives, the cartels keep law enforcement forces at bay from crucial operating hubs. Footage confirms convoys and law enforcement positions being hit by bombs deployed from above, fundamentally altering risk calculations in the field.

Fpv Drones Operate Like Video Games, Accessible to Gamers; Key Tactical Difference: Bomb Attachment, Accuracy

FPV drones function in a manner similar to video games, making them accessible to young operators with gaming or drone racing backgrounds. The critical tactical advantage is their ability to drop bombs: operators attach and remotely release explosives, compensating for payload weight and targeting accuracy, a skill set often honed through legitimate police or military experience.

Remote Operation Disconnect—Drone Camera Feeds Cut At Launch—Lowers Psychological Barriers To Killing Versus Traditional Combat

Operators pilot these drones remotely, often losing the live camera feed after launching a bomb, which creates a psychological distance from the violence they inflict. This disconnect reduces barriers to lethal action, setting FPV strikes apart from traditional, more personal forms of combat.

Cartels Modify Dji Drones With 3d-printed Parts to Improve Payloads and Targeting For Advanced Attacks

Cartels enhance DJI drones by 3D-printing custom components for attaching or securing payloads. While entire drones aren't typically 3D-printed, specialist parts like bomb mounts and release mechanisms are, allowing for rapid, tailored adaptations in clandestine workshops set up in buildings across regions such as Ukraine and Haiti. Video evidence has surfaced showing these modified drones, underlining the technological creativity at play.

Massive Dji Drone Shipment Stolen In Mexico, Hinting At Cartel or Black Market Ties

Cartels also acquire high-end drones through the black market or theft—recently, a large shipment of DJI drones was stolen in Mexico, raising suspicions of cartel or organized crime involvement in these supply chains.

Mexican Cartels Recruit Foreign Fighters Trained In Ukraine's Drone Warfare As Operators and Trainers, Creating a Combat Experience Pipeline

Cartels exploit global conflicts to enrich their tactical expertise, actively recruiting fighters with front-line drone warfare experience from Ukraine. Many of these recruits are Latin American nationals with backgrounds in policing or military service, easily reachable through social media where they post combat videos and share their skills.

Aguilasiete Traveled To Ukraine With False Documents to Train At Drone Facility, Flagged Due to Cartel and Farc Connections

One key figure, known as Aguilasiete (Eagle 7), traveled to Ukraine on forged documents to train at a renowned drone facility and drew attention due to his proficiency and links to Mexican cartels and FARC. Investigators flagged him as symptomatic of a growing connection between Latin American criminal organizations and high-level wartime training.

Cartel Recruits Latin American Fighters For Ukraine via Social Media Combat Videos

Recruitment is mostly conducted through social media platforms—cartel operatives monitor and contact fighters posting war content in Spanish on TikTok and Instagram, offering financial incentives and recruitment packages for them to move straight from Ukraine to the cartel front lines in Mexico, especially in Michoacán.

Colombian Fighter Wore Patches For Colombia, Ukraine, and Mexico in Michoacán, Boasting Service Across Nations and Groups

A notable example involves a Colombian veteran seen in videos sporting patches for Colombia, Ukraine, and Mexico, boasting about moving from Ukraine's battlefields to active service with a cartel in Michoacán. Many such fighters are ex-police or ex-military, transferring their tactical and drone-operating skills into cartel conflicts.

Insufficient Recruitment Funds Fail to Attract Quality Fighters; Ukraine To Mexico Cartel Members Lack Lucrative Backgrounds, Implying Motivation or Coercion

Despite the offer of payment, recruits from Ukraine and Colombia rarely come from lucrative backgrounds; some are motivated by financial need, opportunism, or possibly coercion, as the cartel pay is not considered competitive.

Cartel Training Centers Evolve Into Sites for Forced Combat and Ritual Executions

Cartel training facilities in Mexico have grown more brutal, serving as locations for initiation violence, forced combat, and executions.

"Rancho La Seguera" Near Guadalajara: Cjng Recruitment, Training, and Execution Site With Forced Death Combat and Violence

One notorious center, "Rancho La Seguera" near Guadalajara, operated ...

Katarina Szulc and Shawn Ryan explore the increasingly interconnected nature of cartel operations and U.S. involvement, exposing how American demand, policy choices, and indirect strategies both sustain and complicate the cartel phenomenon across North America and beyond.

Us Is Key to Cartel Products and Stolen Goods Market, Crucial for Cartel Financial Sustainability

Szulc debunks the perception that cartels are solely a Mexican problem by pointing to trafficking routes that bring victims into the U.S., making clear that “this Mexico problem is a problem because of Americans. And now it's becoming an American problem." U.S. demand drives the cartels’ revenue, whether through drugs, stolen goods, or trafficking victims. Without this demand, Mexican cartels would be deprived of their core justification and financial sustainability.

Us Terrorist Designation Fails to Disrupt Cartel Operations

Although the U.S. has designated several cartels as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), Szulc insists these measures don’t impact cartel operations. Cartel members adapt quickly, pivoting operations in response to sanctions, arrests, or even bank account closures. The terrorist designation is met with indifference by cartel members, who see U.S. actions as manageable costs, not existential threats.

Szulc notes that while individuals within the U.S. who profit from or facilitate cartel operations may now be charged as aiding a foreign terrorist organization, the broader FTO designation hasn’t translated into substantive disruption or deterrence for the cartels themselves. Intelligence gathering continues, exemplified by the deaths of CIA agents operating under cover in Mexico, but this occasional direct involvement has little effect on organizational stability.

Us Strategy Targeting Kingpin Elimination Ineffective; Succession Planning, Decentralized Structures Ensure Continuity

Szulc characterizes the U.S. and Mexican reliance on “kingpin” takedown strategies as fundamentally flawed: “It's a hydra, you cut off the head, two more grow back.” The killing of El Mencho, head of a major cartel, changed nothing operationally—within 24 hours, new leadership ensured business as usual. These organizations have robust succession planning and decentralized structures to avoid disruption.

This “hydra” effect repeats with each kingpin elimination, creating temporary power vacuums quickly filled by ambitious subordinates, without genuinely reducing criminal capacity.

Additionally, plea deals and U.S. visas for high-ranking cartel members or their families, such as El Chapo’s sons, reinforce the perception that cooperation with U.S. authorities can be more beneficial than resistance. Szulc argues that the opportunity for a deal in U.S. custody sends a stronger message than kinetic actions or drone strikes, further undermining deterrent efforts.

Us Fragmenting Sinaloa Cartel By Backing Rivals, Sparking Cartel Violence Indirectly

Rather than relying exclusively on direct strikes or boots on the ground, the U.S. increasingly facilitates internecine conflict among cartels as a strategy of attrition. Szulc explains that the U.S. strives to “turn everyone against each other… splinter, fracture, whatever you want to call it.” This indirect approach, such as supporting extremist factions like the Chapitos in aligning with CJNG against the Mayos, promotes internal division, weakening cartels from within.

The indirect method is considered cheaper and, in practice, more efficient than overt interventions. For instance, Szulc alleges that Mexican military and federal forces eliminated El Mayo through an inside setup, protecting the Chapitos. Yet even as the Sinaloa cartel is “dismantled” by these strategies, new groups emerge to fill the void, perpetuating cycles of violence.

Cartel Enforcement Cooperation Remains Fragmented Despite Transnational Drug Trafficking

Enforcement gaps are exacerbated by inconsistent international cooperation:

• Canada: Despite facing a [restricted term] crisis on par with the U.S., Canada shows little commitment to disrupting precursor shipments, minimizes press releases about drug seizures, and generally takes a hands-off approach. Szulc notes that while Canada extradites drug suspects to the U.S., its own agencies are hampered by limited manpower, lack of incentive, and poor communication between federal and provincial bodies.

• Spain and Europe: Spain acts as a major entry point for cartel drugs into Europe, with product distributed further across the continent. The region lacks a coordinated response and even serves as refuge for Mexican cartel associates. Transnational cooperation is limited; no single country can disma ...