In this episode of the Shawn Ryan Show, journalist Annie Jacobsen examines the threat of biological weapons and America's preparedness for biological warfare. Jacobsen explains what makes biological weapons particularly dangerous—their transmissibility, virulence, and resistance to treatment—and discusses how genetic engineering has lowered the barrier to creating these weapons while increasing their potential for devastation. She addresses concerns about DNA collection, gain-of-function research, and the possibility of pathogens designed to target specific populations.
The conversation also covers the U.S. government's classified "devolution" continuity plan, which prioritizes infrastructure preservation and government survival over civilian aid during catastrophic biological events. Drawing on lessons from Covid-19, Jacobsen highlights critical gaps in pandemic response, supply chain vulnerabilities, and the disconnect between government self-preservation efforts and public preparedness. The episode reveals how quickly society could collapse during a biological crisis and questions whether America is ready for such a threat.

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In a discussion between journalists, Annie Jacobsen explains that biological weapons pose one of the most complex threats in mass destruction due to their lethality, potential for genetic engineering, and possible targeting based on genetic information.
Jacobsen emphasizes that biological threat severity depends on three factors: transmissibility, virulence, and resistance to treatment. The most dangerous pathogens are airborne—like COVID-19, which could spread through talking alone—making containment nearly impossible. Virulence measures lethality through case fatality rates, ranging from COVID-19's 1% to pneumonic plague's 100% untreated death rate. The third factor, resistance to treatment, becomes particularly concerning when pathogens are genetically engineered to resist antibiotics, elevating them to civilization-ending threats.
Gain-of-function research increases pathogen danger by making diseases airborne, more lethal, or treatment-resistant. This creates a dual-use dilemma, as genetic engineering intended for defensive purposes can be weaponized. Historical examples include the Soviet Union's chimera weapon—a modified plague that caused encephalitis when treated with antibiotics, demonstrating multilayered lethality designed to neutralize standard countermeasures.
While biological weapons are prohibited under the 1972 Convention, enforcement is weak, and countries like Russia, China, North Korea, and possibly Iran maintain programs under the guise of "defensive research." Unlike nuclear weapons, biotechnology has a low barrier to entry—even high school students can now make genetic modifications with basic equipment. The Defense Department ranks biological weapons as the top WMD threat, exceeding nuclear concerns due to their ease of creation and difficulty of defense.
Jacobsen raises concerns about DNA testing companies whose genetic data could be exploited to create pathogens targeting specific populations. Admiral Brett Giroir confirms credible concern that China may be researching genetic bioweapons targeting specific DNA characteristics. Vulnerabilities in DNA data storage and the private sale of massive databases increase this risk, making ethnic- or population-targeted bioweapons a recognized challenge within security circles.
The U.S. government maintains a highly classified plan called "devolution" to ensure continuity of governance during catastrophic biological collapse. While the name is unclassified, most details remain secret, with the last update occurring at the end of the Obama administration.
Devolution activates at "COG CON 1" during catastrophic biological events with near-100% fatality rates and no medical countermeasures. Pre-selected officials relocate to underground bunkers designated as hot, warm, and cold sites. The successor list includes replacements for the President, National Security Advisor, Secretary of Defense, health officials, and Supreme Court Justices, though all selection criteria remain classified. When activated, the President is isolated in a remote cold site with only an aide and Secret Service, while the Insurrection Act is declared, empowering the military to assume domestic authority and suspending Posse Comitatus Act restrictions.
The military's mission under devolution focuses on protecting critical infrastructure—roadways, power plants, electrical grids, water facilities, and banking systems—rather than aiding infected civilians. The planning prioritizes government preservation over public health response, accepting that civilian casualties will be high. This approach reflects the defense establishment's view that without preserving government authority and infrastructure, total societal collapse is inevitable.
Jacobsen explores how quickly society can unravel following a catastrophic biological event, drawing comparisons to nuclear conflict and disasters like hurricanes.
Research informed by declassified documents shows that biological outbreaks can push America into anarchy in as little as six days—faster than the 72-minute nuclear war timeline. This encompasses disease spread, hospital collapse, supply chain breakdown, and public realization of government impotence.
The terror of infection is visceral compared to abstract nuclear dread. Former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle describes biological war as causing "death of everything we know in America" with "people doing inhuman things to other people just to survive." In a country with over 500 million guns, desperation leads to violence, hoarding, and the abandonment of civil norms. Even hurricane threats—which are regional and temporary—cause store emptying, fuel shortages, and gridlock, demonstrating how quickly order breaks down before disaster even strikes.
Jacobsen identifies major cities, especially those with large homeless populations, as particularly vulnerable. Senior epidemiologists told her that America's 800,000 homeless people constitute a dangerous blind spot for disease surveillance, living in unsanitary conditions where pathogens can spread undetected before exploding into surrounding populations.
The Covid-19 pandemic tested national and global preparedness, revealing fundamental failures in pandemic response, supply chain security, and government transparency.
Jacobsen recalls that the WHO and CDC initially insisted Covid-19 was not airborne—"the most basic, most important, most critical fact." Rather than admit their error when proved wrong, agencies quietly updated guidance without acknowledgment. This false certainty over admitting uncertainty damaged trust. When Jacobsen tried questioning CDC officials about refusing to admit the error, she was ignored.
The pandemic exposed America's overwhelming dependence on China for PPE, antibiotics, and medical supplies. Despite this glaring vulnerability, little has changed in restoring domestic production capacity. Jacobsen also notes that officials failed to convey that N95 masks work for only 15 minutes and only if properly fitted—information that was "common knowledge" in biocontainment settings but never publicly addressed.
Jacobsen describes Covid as a "brilliant situation from which to learn errors," but the reaction was "total denial" or "tribal anger" rather than substantive post-mortem analysis. Additionally, millions of Covid tests resulted in DNA collection and storage, yet the government has been largely silent about how this data is retained or used, contributing to justified American distrust.
Jacobsen and Ryan discuss the stark disconnect between government preparedness and public vulnerability.
Despite HHS's $1.7-1.8 trillion annual budget—nearly double the Defense Department's—and decades of biological disaster war games, there's almost no public education about threats or countermeasures. The government's primary focus is on continuity of its own operations through secretive bunkers and succession plans, rather than large-scale public survival measures.
Since 9/11, BSL-4 labs have expanded from two to 17 in the U.S. and 110 globally, including in conflict zones with minimal oversight. BSL-3 labs have proliferated to about 3,500 worldwide, yet 90% lack formal safety protocols, with no global body monitoring pathogen research.
Los Angeles has only 100,000 bottles of [restricted term] reserved primarily for city officials and first responders, with poorly planned distribution systems. Dr. Jimmy Hara stated that Los Angeles would be completely unprepared for a pneumonic plague attack, lacking diagnostic systems, treatment capacities, and supply chain resilience. This reality reflects broad public ignorance and official disregard for large-scale civilian preparedness, leaving ordinary citizens fatally unprepared while government elites remain protected in hardened facilities.
1-Page Summary
Biological weapons represent some of the most complex and concerning threats in the landscape of mass destruction. Their danger lies not only in their lethality and ability to spread but also in the potential for genetic engineering to increase their potency and evade available medical countermeasures, and in the possibility of their use in targeted ways based on genetic information.
In discussing biological threats, Annie Jacobsen emphasizes three primary factors that determine their severity: transmissibility, virulence, and resistance to treatment.
Transmissibility refers to how a pathogen spreads. The most fearsome pathogens are airborne—they can linger in a room after an infected person leaves, making containment nearly impossible and turning human lungs into the delivery mechanism. COVID-19 exemplified this kind of spread, where talking alone could release infectious particles that persisted in the air. In contrast, diseases like Ebola are vector-borne or require close contact; thus, they are less likely to infect passersby but are deadly to caregivers.
Virulence is the pathogen's lethality, measured as the case fatality rate. During COVID-19, this rate hovered around 1%, while seasonal flu is roughly 0.1%. Some pathogens are vastly more dangerous. For instance, pneumonic plague—when the bacterium Yersinia pestis invades the lungs—is almost always fatal (100%) if untreated, though antibiotics can save lives if administered within 24 hours. Ebola also has an extremely high death rate, killing 85–90% of those it infects without medical intervention.
The third factor is the pathogen's resistance to treatment. Pathogens like plague can be genetically engineered to be resistant to antibiotics. When a previously treatable disease becomes immune to medical intervention, it elevates to a level of civilization-ending threat. These modifications move threats into the category of “tier one select agents” on the CDC’s watch list, as such conditions eliminate humanity’s last lines of defense.
The field of gain-of-function research seeks to increase a pathogen's transmissibility, virulence, or resistance. This has blurred the lines between defensive scientific progress and offensive weapon design.
Gain-of-function techniques are used to make pathogens more dangerous. Scientists can genetically alter bacteria or viruses to become airborne rather than simply droplet- or vector-borne; increase how fast or how often they kill; or make them resistant to all available treatments. Once a disease like pneumonic plague is engineered to resist antibiotics, it becomes almost undefeatable and can rapidly cause mass casualties.
Genetic engineering is fundamentally a dual-use technology—it can be employed for good (such as vaccines or crops that detect toxins) or for harm (such as weaponized pathogens). This dual-use dilemma creates a profound challenge for policymakers because defensive research can easily be detoured for offensive military purposes. For instance, research done ostensibly to understand or counter a potential biological threat can inadvertently facilitate the creation of deadlier biological weapons.
History demonstrates that these technologies have been exploited. The Soviet Union covertly amassed a colossal biological weapons arsenal after signing treaties banning such weapons. Notably, they engineered chimera pathogens—such as a modified plague that, if treated with antibiotics, would then cause encephalitis, creating multilayered lethality and deception that neutralizes standard countermeasures.
Unlike nuclear weapons, which are not illegal for recognized holders, all biological weapons are prohibited under the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). However, enforcement is weak, and defensive research loopholes allow nations to develop offensive capabilities under the guise of preparing countermeasures. The U.S. State Department confirms that R ...
The Science of Biological Weapons
The United States government maintains a highly classified plan called "devolution," designed to ensure continuity of governance during a catastrophic biological collapse. While the name "devolution" is unclassified, most details about the program remain secret, with only the title and broad strokes known beyond those involved at the highest levels. The last publicly acknowledged update to the devolution protocols occurred at the end of the Obama administration, and it now forms the baseline for all future revisions.
Devolution is activated in the event of total societal breakdown following the outbreak of a catastrophic pathogen with a near-100% fatality rate and no available countermeasures. In this scenario, routine government ceases, and a pre-selected group of officials relocate to specially designated underground bunkers referred to as hot sites, warm sites, and cold sites. These bunkers are physically distant and highly secure, intended for the essential personnel required to reconstitute the government after the crisis has passed.
The plan hinges on a classified, pre-chosen list of designees poised to act as successors for every critical office. The positions covered include the President, National Security Advisor, Secretary of Defense, health officials, and Supreme Court Justices, among others. The identities of these individuals and the precise criteria by which they are selected are entirely classified. The sole certainty is that with each new administration, the list is updated to reflect current high-ranking officials and their designated alternates, but the mechanism and selectors remain undisclosed.
All details about who qualifies for devolution, the implementation protocols, and even the definitions of these roles are classified. The set of protocols last updated on the final day of the Obama administration serves as a foundation for subsequent updates and changes. FEMA, a relatively unknown agency to the wider public, holds ultimate responsibility for the administration and activation of the devolution program.
The official trigger for devolution is the achievement of “COG CON 1,” the highest level of continuity of government readiness in a system run by FEMA, running parallel to the better-known DEFCON system for military readiness. COG CON 1 is reserved for situations so catastrophic that standard government function is untenable, such as the release of a biological agent with no effective treatment and a total lethality rate.
When COG CON 1 is declared and devolution is executed, the President is relocated alone to a remote cold site—a bunker far from known command centers—equipped only with an aide (who commands the nuclear football) and a small contingent of Secret Service. The President functions in near-complete isolation, symbolizing the cessation of democracy and routine civilian governance. Concurrently, the National Capital Region (Washington, D.C.) is evacuated, and remaining designated officials are dispersed to other secure sites.
Upon activation, the Insurrection Act is declared, reclassifying the entirety of the United States as a war theater. This empowers the military to assume domestic authority, suspending the Posse Comitatus Act restrictions and authorizing military deployments across all states with wartime rules of engagement. The armed forces become responsible for enforcing whatever government remains, with orders that could include strict control, containment, and even lethal force against civilians attempting to move during the catastrophe.
The "Devolution" Program
Annie Jacobsen explores how quickly society can unravel in the aftermath of a catastrophic biological event, drawing a comparison to nuclear conflict and disasters like hurricanes. She emphasizes that the fear and spread of infection, more so than the abstract threat of nuclear war, can push populations toward desperate, inhuman behavior and widespread chaos.
Jacobsen’s research, informed by declassified government documents and war games, shows that the collapse from order to anarchy can be shockingly fast. Nuclear war, according to STRATCOM, escalates from launch to nuclear winter in just 72 minutes. In contrast, a biological outbreak can push America into outright anarchy in as little as six days. This six-day timeline encompasses disease spread, the collapse of hospitals, breakdowns in supply chains, an information vacuum, and the public’s dawning realization of government impotence. The speed precludes any meaningful government response, instead sparking panic as society loses control and chaos reigns.
The terror provoked by infection is direct and visceral compared to the more abstract dread of nuclear war. As Jacobsen quotes former Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle, biological war causes “death physically, death governmentally, death of everything we know in America, but most horrifying is it will be… people doing inhuman things to other people just to survive.” Jacobsen and Ryan discuss how, during true societal breakdown, people are driven by hunger, thirst, disease, and collapse of financial systems—whether urban or rural—leading to violence, hoarding, and survivalism. In the panic, announcements such as a rumored medical countermeasure in a city like Los Angeles can trigger frenzied mass movement. In a country with over 500 million guns, these scenarios reliably devolve into insurrection and lethal confrontations as people fight for resources or perceived lifelines to survival.
Jacobsen stresses that desperation leads to hoarding and the abandonment of civil norms. People stockpile essentials—gasoline, water, food, ammunition—without regard for anyone but themselves. Ryan describes how, even under the threat of routine hurricanes, people ignore traffic laws, create dangerous gridlocks, and ransack stores at the first sign of crisis. When escalation is no longer temporary or regional—when the threat is a rampant disease with no clear endpoint—cooperation collapses entirely. The pursuit of individual survival over community well-being becomes the new norm, and civilization gives way to lawlessness until all resources are consumed and survival-of-the-fittest prevails.
Jacobsen and Ryan draw parallels with hurricanes, noting that even the mere threat of disaster leads to supply chain collapse. Stores empty, fuel becomes scarce, and ammunition sales surge as people panic and prepare for the worst. This abandonment of cooperation happens before the disaster itself, showing how rapidly order breaks down. While hurricanes tend to be regional and their threats temporary, a wide-area biological event with an uncertain timeline would magnify these effects exponentially, dragging society toward sustained breakdown.
The panic before hurricanes—where stores run out of necessit ...
Societal Breakdown and Anarchy
The Covid-19 pandemic served as a powerful test of both national and global preparedness for a biological emergency. Annie Jacobsen and Shawn Ryan highlight fundamental failures in pandemic response, supply chain security, government transparency, and the long-term impact of surveillance measures.
Jacobsen recalls that at the pandemic’s outset, the World Health Organization (WHO) and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) insisted that Covid-19 was not airborne, which was “the most basic, most important, most critical fact.” This guidance was proved false, but rather than admit their mistake, these agencies later quietly updated their guidance without acknowledgment. When Jacobsen tried to question CDC officials about their refusal to admit the error, she was ignored. The information that Covid was airborne was, for a long time, dismissed by authorities and news outlets as conspiracy theory, despite its factual basis.
Instead of admitting uncertainty, health officials projected false certainty. Jacobsen argues that the healthy side of ego is the humility to say, “I don’t know, but I think it’s this.” However, officials and institutions instead gave the public answers with unwarranted confidence. This stubbornness and refusal to walk back mistaken guidance contributed to widespread mistrust. As Shawn Ryan notes, this unwillingness to admit error has led to a larger “distrust era” regarding government and other major institutions.
These silent reversals and lack of open communication on critical topics further eroded trust in public health guidance. Jacobsen notes that within scientific, military, and health communities, there was often private acknowledgment of these issues, but fear of being ostracized discouraged public statements.
Ryan and Jacobsen point out that the pandemic exposed America’s overwhelming dependence on China for personal protective equipment (PPE), antibiotics, and other medical supplies. China and India hold the manufacturing monopoly for these essential items, particularly for medicines where U.S. patents have expired. China, the country tied to the virus outbreak, was simultaneously the primary source of masks and other critical supplies.
Jacobsen notes that, despite this glaring vulnerability revealed by Covid, little has changed in terms of restoring or building domestic production capacity for key medical supplies. Most Americans were unaware of this dependency until the pandemic, and new manufacturing efforts since then have been minimal. Ryan criticizes the irony of relying on China for masks to protect from a virus that likely originated there, emphasizing the lack of initiative in producing masks domestically.
The discussion highlights a critical gap in public information about masking. Former USAMRIID doctors told Jacobsen it’s “common knowledge” in biocontainment settings that an N95 mask works for about 15 minutes and only if properly fitted. The public received no such clarity: millions wore cloth or dirty masks, often without effect, believing they were protected. No official in authority publicly addressed these mask limitations, and many experts refrained from speaking out to avoid backlash.
Jacobsen describes Covid as a “brilliant situation from which to learn errors,” but notes that the reaction instead was “total denial” or “tribal anger” about pandemic wrongs ...
Covid-19 as a Case Study
Annie Jacobsen and Shawn Ryan discuss the stark disconnect between government preparedness for biological crises and the vulnerability of the American public, highlighting gaping holes in infrastructure, regulation, and public awareness.
Jacobsen points out that the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), an agency most Americans are only vaguely familiar with, holds an annual budget of $1.7 to $1.8 trillion, nearly double the Defense Department's $900 million. HHS oversees critical agencies such as the CDC, NIH, and FDA, and is in charge during a biological emergency, including lab leaks and pandemics. Despite this enormous budget and decades of government war games simulating biological disasters, there is almost no public education about real threats, stockpiles of countermeasures, or efforts to harden infrastructure. Jacobsen observes that the government’s primary focus is on continuity of its own operations—preserving leadership using secretive bunkers and succession plans—over large-scale measures to ensure public survival. Ryan summarizes that, although the government has prepared for its own continuity, they have failed to prepare or educate the general public.
Jacobsen describes how biosafety lab capacity has expanded dramatically since 9/11. Before 2001, there were only two BSL-4 (high containment) labs in the U.S.—one at the CDC in Atlanta and one at Fort Detrick. Today, there are 17 BSL-4 labs across America and 110 BSL-4 labs globally, including in countries embroiled in conflict where oversight is minimal and the risk of breaches is high. These increases pose grave security threats, as demonstrated by the real 2019 explosion at Russia’s Vector lab.
Just one level down in biosecurity, BSL-3 labs—where dangerous pathogens like anthrax and plague are handled—have proliferated to about 3,500 worldwide. Disturbingly, 90% of these labs lack formal safety protocols, and ownership or research tracking is left to non-government actors like scientists and academics, with no official oversight or global body monitoring pathogen research. This fragmented system allows dangerous work to proceed undetected and increases the risk of accidents or malicious use.
When it comes to stockpiling and distributing key medical countermeasures, Jacobsen outlines the severe shortfalls. For example, Los Angeles has a reserve of only 100,000 bottles of [restricted term] ([restricted term])—intended primarily for city officials and first responders. Distribution is poorly planned, with some supplies slated for personnel at places like the zoo or cultural affairs office, and actual dispersal reliant on semi-chaotic, volunteer-run systems. During a crisis, authorities might announce on social media, leading to mass hysteria, hoarding, and violence—a scenario backed by government war game studies. With 500 million guns in America, panic-driven attempts to secure medication can quickly turn deadly, as people, fearing for th ...
America's Unpreparedness
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