In this episode of the Shawn Ryan Show, inventor Andy Lowery discusses Leonidas, a high-powered microwave system designed to counter drone threats through electromagnetic interference. Lowery explains how the technology creates an electromagnetic field that disables drones by disrupting their electronics, and describes the system's capabilities—from detecting threats at ranges of 10 to 20 kilometers to neutralizing entire drone swarms in under a second.
The conversation addresses the growing asymmetry in modern warfare, where inexpensive commercial drones pose significant threats to high-value military assets. Lowery discusses Leonidas's strategic advantages over traditional missile defense systems, including its minimal operational costs and absence of collateral damage. The episode also covers challenges in military procurement and deployment, examining how institutional resistance to new technologies impacts readiness in the face of evolving battlefield realities.

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Leonidas is a scalable, high-powered microwave system designed to defend against drone threats through electromagnetic interference. Andy Lowery, its inventor, describes it as the first human-made force field, creating an electromagnetic bubble that disables drones by coupling voltages into their circuit boards, causing computers to crash and servos to freeze.
The system leverages both wideband and narrowband microwave capabilities, using AI-driven control loops to rapidly shift frequencies and target each drone's unique vulnerabilities. Its phased antenna features hundreds of miniature elements that synchronize to create a single, highly energetic beam. This beam is electronically steered in microseconds—like a spotlight covering 5–10 degrees of sky—and can reposition within a 60-degree area almost instantaneously.
At the system's core are [restricted term] nitride-based converters that transform DC power into sustained, high-energy microwave pulses. This technology delivers continuous electromagnetic disruption far beyond what traditional vacuum tube systems can achieve.
Leonidas integrates a 360-degree radar network with electro-optical and infrared sensors, detecting aerial threats at ranges from 10 to 20 kilometers. The system's modularity enables configurations from toolbox-sized variants with 50-meter engagement ranges to building-sized installations protecting areas at 1.5+ kilometers. Larger arrays could theoretically defend regions spanning several miles.
The system has proven effective against stationary targets, autonomous drones operating without GPS or radio signals, and even 49-drone swarms neutralized in under a second. Detection units operate autonomously or integrate with command networks like Anduril's Lattice, sharing real-time battlefield awareness over Starlink and UHF communication.
Lowery emphasizes that Leonidas operates at frequencies that pass harmlessly through biological tissue, similar to FM radio signals. The electromagnetic beam activates only when targets are confirmed, radiating for just 10–20 seconds per cycle. Because it relies on directed electromagnetic energy rather than physical projectiles, it causes no collateral damage, making it ideal for homeland defense applications like embassy or government building protection.
Operators can choose manual control, human-in-the-loop approval systems, or fully autonomous operation during active threats.
Recognizing battlefield mobility needs, Leonidas can be mounted on autonomous ground vehicles developed by partners including Epris, General Dynamics Land Systems, and Kodiak Defense. These AGVs, equipped with Starlink and UHF connectivity, can autonomously reposition when threats are detected, drive to intercept, and retreat after engagement. The antenna rotates at 30 degrees per second while electronic beam steering enables rapid retargeting, ensuring both engagement effectiveness and survivability.
Shawn Ryan and Andy Lowery discuss the asymmetrical nature of contemporary drone warfare: affordable drones costing $10,000 or less threaten defense assets requiring multi-million dollar missiles to counter. This mismatch favors attackers who can deploy large numbers of inexpensive, off-the-shelf drones.
China's production capacity is staggering, with estimates of up to 30 million drones manufactured annually—output that dwarfs Western military production. As Lowery notes, "there's nothing we can make 30 million of" in the U.S. arsenal, creating a severe magazine depth disadvantage. Additionally, first-person-view drones with fiber-optic tethers enable precision strikes for small teams without advanced infrastructure, while remaining resistant to radio frequency jamming.
Recent incidents underscore these vulnerabilities. At Barksdale Air Force Base, swarms of drones in coordinated waves overflew nuclear storage facilities, completing surveillance undetected. Operation Spiderweb in Ukraine demonstrated how drone swarms can overwhelm even well-prepared defenses, with tactics now spreading to the Middle East.
The next generation of autonomous drones won't rely on GPS or radio signals, making them immune to current jamming technologies. Lowery suggests electromagnetic pulse defenses may become one of the few remaining effective countermeasures.
Modern drone defense requires multiple, overlapping technologies: traditional systems for distant threats, intermediate systems for mid-range, and close-in systems like Leonidas for final engagement. Lowery notes that defensive layers typically neutralize 90% of threats, but the 10% that penetrate—the "leakers"—scale with swarm size. Against a swarm of a hundred, ten get through; against a thousand, a hundred leak through.
Beyond physical destruction, drone threats cause evacuations, airfield closures, and persistent disruptions that degrade military readiness—delivering strategic advantages even when immediate material damage is limited.
Lowery explains that neutralizing a single drone with Leonidas costs merely five to 20 cents in energy. As usage increases, per-drone costs settle into the hundreds of dollars when factoring all operational expenses—dramatically lower than million-dollar missile interceptors. Unlike kinetic weapons requiring expensive, time-consuming resupply, electromagnetic systems depend solely on electrical power, enabling virtually limitless engagement during ongoing conflict.
A key benefit is the minimization of collateral damage. EMP-based solutions disable drone electronics without causing shrapnel or blast effects, avoiding risks to civilians and infrastructure in populated environments. Additionally, preserved electronics allow forensic teams to trace origins and command chains, adding intelligence value to each interception. Unlike laser systems that can create aviation hazards requiring airspace closures, Leonidas operates safely around civilian infrastructure.
Western missile production is limited to thousands per year while adversaries produce tens of millions of drones annually. Leonidas changes this calculus by operating continuously without ammunition resupply, executing attacks in rapid succession. Multiple networked beams can extend operational range by 50-60%, providing decisive advantages in prolonged, high-tempo engagements.
The system is designed for maximum effectiveness against group one and two drones, with promising preliminary results on group three drones. Tethered fiber-optic drones immune to jamming remain vulnerable to EMP effects, and even future autonomous drones that forego radio frequency navigation are susceptible to electromagnetic interference disrupting their electronics.
Despite senior military leaders recognizing the urgency of deploying systems like Leonidas, Lowery describes a "frozen middle" of mid-level commanders and acquisition personnel who resist departing from traditional, risk-averse procurement processes. Career officers accustomed to peacetime procedures demand exhaustive testing targeting "99.999%" risk reduction before fielding new technology—an approach that lags behind current conflict realities.
However, Lowery cites post-9/11 operational pivots and the rapid IED-response up-armoring as examples of the military's capacity for transformation under crisis. He observes that when true danger is recognized, personnel "snap into a new, like superhuman" operational mode, enabling accelerated deployment.
As a Category 18 directed energy weapon, Leonidas is subject to ITAR regulations imposing significant export constraints. Legal pathways for deploying to theaters like Ukraine remain incomplete, though the ongoing Middle East conflict has accelerated efforts to enable allied access. Lowery notes ongoing discussions with Israel and other partners reflecting heightened international interest.
California-based manufacturing currently supports producing one Leonidas unit per week, targeting 50 annually. Oklahoma is identified as the next major facility for multi-system-per-week output. Lowery notes that scaling is limited more by facility and workforce capacity than by electronic components.
The realities of persistent conflict demand acceptance of solutions with 80–90% readiness rather than delaying deployment to eliminate every conceivable risk. Lowery stresses that real-world performance against active threats provides greater value than continued laboratory testing, justifying deployment after satisfactory combat trials despite institutional preferences for further validation.
1-Page Summary
Leonidas represents a new class of scalable, high-powered microwave systems designed to defend against drone threats by generating an electromagnetic shield. Its development focused on scalability, with configurations ranging from portable toolbox-sized variants to massive fixed installations capable of multi-kilometer coverage.
Leonidas operates as a protective electromagnetic field—described by its inventor, Andy Lowery, as the first human-made force field—that disables drones and similar electronic threats. The core concept is to emit powerful electromagnetic interference (EMI) that couples voltages into a drone’s circuit boards, causing their computers to crash or servos to freeze, much like a “blue screen of death” on a PC. When a drone enters the electromagnetic bubble, its electronics succumb to the intense field, rendering it inoperable.
Leonidas leverages both wideband and narrowband high-powered microwave capabilities. Unlike older narrowband systems, which were inconsistent across targets, Leonidas employs advanced hardware and AI-driven control loops to rapidly shift frequencies and algorithms to match each drone’s unique susceptibilities. This targeted approach maximizes electronic disruption, regardless of drone make.
The Leonidas antenna features hundreds of miniature elements phased together to create a unified, highly energetic microwave beam. Each antenna element emits a fraction of total energy, and when all are precisely synchronized, their combined output yields a narrow, potent beam. This beam is steered electronically in microseconds, like the sweeping of a spotlight or a laser light show, allowing rapid retargeting across the sky so multiple drones can be engaged in rapid succession, seemingly simultaneously.
The resultant microwave beam resembles a spotlight, covering an area of approximately 5–10 degrees. Electronically, the beam can be directed within a 60-by-60-degree segment of the sky almost instantaneously; combined with mechanical steering, the whole antenna can rotate at 30 degrees per second for comprehensive coverage.
At the system’s heart are [restricted term] nitride-based converters (“L-Rams”) that transform stored DC power into microwave energy with high efficiency. This technology allows Leonidas to deliver long-duration, high-energy pulses needed for comprehensive electronic disruption—a feat traditional vacuum tube-based directed energy systems cannot achieve. The continuous pulses account for multiple clock cycles of a target computer, ensuring deep and reliable interference.
Leonidas’ detection and engagement workflow integrates a multi-tiered sensor network to guarantee swift recognition and takedown of threats.
Leonidas mounts a 360-degree radar, supported by electro-optical and infrared sensors, enabling detection of aerial threats—including small drones—at ranges from 10 to 20 kilometers. The collected data presents the operator with a “god view” of the operational landscape, overlaid with real-time drone positions sourced from integrated radar sensors and network-linked installations.
The modularity of Leonidas allows installations as small as a toolbox—portable but limited to engagement ranges of about 50 meters for use cases like armored vehicles or tanks—or as large as a building for defending embassies, airfields, or bases at standoff distances of 1.5 kilometers or more. Even larger arrays (up to 100×100 feet) could theoretically protect regions spanning several miles, suitable for major infrastructure defense.
Leonidas is effective against a broad spectrum of targets, including stationary objects via fiber optic detection, autonomous drones operating without GPS or radio signals, and even swarms—demonstrated by rapid sequential disabling of 49 drones in under a second. The system can focus its energy on individual drones or rapidly sweep across clusters in just fractions of a second.
Detection units function autonomously or leverage network integration (such as with Anduril’s Lattice command network), facilitating early detection and optimal assignment of effectors (the Leonidas beams) to targets, similar to advanced air defense networks like Iron Dome. All installations can be networked over Starlink and UHF communication, further enhancing shared situational awareness and collective area defense.
Leonidas is designed with comprehensive safety and operational flexibility for both battlefield and homeland defense applications.
The system’s electromagnetic output operates at low-frequency microwave energies that pass harmlessly through biological tissue, similar to FM radio or broadcast TV signals. Andy Lowery attests to its safety for humans, animals, and plants—even standing before the active beam for up to 15 seconds is harmless, as the wavelengths used are non-ionizing and lack the energy required to damage living tissue.
Leonidas only emits microwave energy when a target is confirmed, and each engagement lasts just 10–20 seconds per cycle, minimizing overall environmental exposure.
Because Leonidas relies on directed electromagnetic energy rather than physical projectiles, it causes no kinetic damage to surrounding structures, ...
Leonidas Technology and Capabilities
Drone warfare is rapidly redefining the modern battlefield and homeland security, exposing vulnerabilities in traditional defense postures and accelerating the demand for adaptive, layered defense systems.
Shawn Ryan and Andy Lowery highlight a crucial asymmetry in today’s aerial threat landscape: affordable drones, often costing $10,000 or less, can threaten defense assets that require multi-million dollar missiles to counter. This mismatch is unsustainable and disproportionately favors attackers who can deploy large numbers of low-cost, off-the-shelf drones. The analogy is simple—using massive, expensive defenses to counter tiny, inexpensive threats is like having a lion’s cage with bars so wide that mice can run straight through it.
China’s drone manufacturing capability is staggering, with estimates of up to 30 million drones produced annually. This output dwarfs any Western military production capability, especially in missile manufacturing. As Lowery notes, "there’s nothing we can make 30 million of" in the U.S. military arsenal. Western defenses thus face a severe magazine depth disadvantage, compounding the challenge of countering drone swarms with traditional means.
The evolution of first-person-view (FPV) drones, some equipped with fiber-optic tethers, empowers small teams to conduct precision strikes without the need for advanced or resource-heavy infrastructure. These tethered drones resist radio frequency jamming, adding an element of resilience previously reserved for more advanced military systems.
The threat environment is global and increasingly networked. Russian intelligence sharing with Iran and the potential for Chinese-manufactured drones being used by adversaries heighten risks for the U.S. and its allies. Lowery and Ryan both suggest the possibility of drone threats at virtually any high-value location: military bases, intelligence agency headquarters, government buildings, and public venues.
Recent incidents underscore these risks. At Barksdale Air Force Base, a site central to U.S. nuclear deterrence, swarms of drones in coordinated waves (twelve per wave, multiple waves) overflew critical infrastructure. The drones, impervious to jamming, completed their surveillance and departed undetected, exposing significant vulnerabilities. The origin of these drones remains unknown, underscoring the difficulty in attributing drone attacks.
Operation Spiderweb in Ukraine demonstrates how drone swarms can overwhelm even well-prepared air defenses. This same swarm tactic is now influencing attacks in the Middle East. The pattern points to drones as a vector for cheap, scalable, and devastating attacks that have a psychological and operational impact far beyond their immediate effects.
Some drones employ fiber-optic tethers that make them immune to traditional radio frequency jamming. These platforms only become vulnerable to direct, physical neutralization, raising the bar for effective countermeasures.
The next generation of autonomous drones will not rely on GPS or radio signals, making them immune to current jamming technologies. In the future, electromagnetic pulse (EMP) defenses may be required as one of the few remaining effective means to neutralize these threats.
Modern drone defenses are fundamentally layered, but every system admits "leakers"—threats that penetrate outer defenses. Lowery notes that nine out of ten drones are neutralized, but with swarms, ten percent still get through. When facing a swarm of a hundred, ten make it past. Against a thousand, a hundred leak through, which is alre ...
Modern Drone Warfare Threats and Vulnerabilities
Electromagnetic defense systems like Leonidas deliver an extraordinary cost advantage in high-frequency scenarios. Andy Lowery explains that neutralizing a single drone with Leonidas costs merely five to 20 cents in energy. As usage increases—removing, for example, 50 drones per month—the per-drone cost settles into the hundreds of dollars, factoring in all operational expenses. This is a dramatic reduction compared to traditional missile interceptors, which can cost millions per shot.
The system’s economic superiority manifests when compared across use cases: it becomes especially cost-effective after neutralizing 50-100 drones, far outpacing missile-based systems. Unlike kinetic weapons, which require expensive and time-consuming resupply—often taking months for replenishment—electromagnetic systems depend solely on electrical power, enabling rapid, virtually limitless resupply during ongoing conflict. High operational tempo and system utilization continue to drive the per-shot cost lower, making Leonidas optimal for both high-value and high-volume defense scenarios.
A key benefit of electromagnetic systems is their minimization of collateral damage. EMP-based solutions disable drone electronics without causing shrapnel, fragmentation, or blast effects, thus avoiding risks to civilians and infrastructure. Kinetic systems, by contrast, often pose unacceptable hazards to non-combatants in populated environments, which severely restricts their homeland use. The Leonidas system’s non-destructive effects preserve much of the drone’s electronics; this allows forensic teams to recover onboard computers and trace origins, operations, and command chains—adding intelligence value to each interception.
Moreover, Leonidas avoids the shutdown risks associated with other directed energy weapons. Unlike laser-based systems—which can generate aviation hazards requiring temporary airspace or airport closures—the electromagnetic pulses operate safely around civilian infrastructure. The FAA has expressed interest in these systems due to their safety and reliability for urban or homeland defense.
Western missile production is limited to thousands per year, while adversaries can produce tens of millions of drones annually, creating a significant disadvantage for traditional defenses. Leonidas changes this calculus—operating continuously with no need for ammunition resupply except for standard electrical power.
Electromagnetic systems like Leonidas execute attacks in rapid succession without interruption for maintenance, resupply, or reloads. Additionally, these systems can be networked; steering multiple beams at the same target can extend operational range by 50-60%, and overlapping coverage ensures robust, seamless protection without the logistical limitations faced by finite missile inventories. This adaptability and magazine depth provide a decisive edge in prolonged, high-tempo engagements.
Strategic Advantages Over Traditional Defense Systems
The deployment of advanced systems like Leonidas faces multiple hurdles ranging from bureaucratic inertia to regulatory constraints and production scaling challenges. The changing nature of modern conflict demands a shift from peacetime process adherence to a wartime mentality focused on rapid fielding and operational outcomes.
Senior military and executive leaders increasingly mandate the urgent deployment of systems like Leonidas, recognizing the severity of drone threats, but encounter resistance from mid-level commanders and acquisition personnel. Andy Lowery describes this resistance as the “frozen middle,” where those tasked with implementation hesitate to depart from traditional, risk-averse acquisition and testing processes unless explicitly directed otherwise.
Career officers, accustomed to peacetime procurement, remain wedded to bureaucratic routines that demand exhaustive testing and the elimination of nearly all theoretical risk—targeting “99.999%” risk reduction—before new technology is fielded. This approach lags behind the urgency required by current conflict realities, as Lowery notes, “that’s a peacetime attitude... I’m not at war. We can take our time to run through the different exercises.”
However, Lowery cites examples such as the post-9/11 operational pivot and the rapid up-armoring response during the 2008 IED crisis to highlight the U.S. military’s capacity for transformation under crisis conditions. In such situations, clarity of purpose breaks bureaucratic inertia, enabling accelerated fielding and deployment that would be achievable now if the same mindset prevails. He observes that when true danger is recognized, personnel “snap into a new, like superhuman” operational mode, as seen on the USS Stennis after the 9/11 attacks and during the Army’s MRAP production surge.
Leonidas, as a Category 18 directed energy weapon, is subject to U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), which impose significant constraints on export and allied provision. These controls distinguish Leonidas from less restricted dual-use drone systems, requiring additional layers of legal authorization and documented approval for international transfer.
Legal pathways for deploying these systems to advantageous theaters, such as Ukraine, remain incomplete, leaving a notable gap between the technical readiness of the system and its authorization for use by allies. Nonetheless, the ongoing Middle East conflict has accelerated efforts to remove deployment barriers. The administration is now working aggressively to enable allied access and operational deployment of such systems in response to urgent battlefield requirements. Lowery notes ongoing discussions with Israel and other partners, reflecting heightened international interest amidst active hostilities.
California-based manufacturing currently supports a goal of building one Leonidas unit per week, with a target of producing 50 annually—a rate Lowery considers proven and feasible. Further production expansion is planned, with Oklahoma identified as the next major facility, geared toward multi-system-per-week output once sufficient demand materializes. Achieving rates above 100 units per year will require addressing asse ...
Deployment Challenges and Military Integration
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