The failure of Enron in the early 2000’s is one of the largest bankruptcies in US history (with Lehman Brothers in 2008 as the largest). Its accounting scandal led to Enron’s bankruptcy as well as the dissolution of Arthur Andersen, one of the big five accounting firms. Shareholders were wiped out, and tens of thousands of employees left with worthless retirement accounts.
Today the name “Enron” still evokes a reflexive repulsion, a feeling that these were simply bad people doing illegal things. But, we think, that’s in the past. Surely we’ve evolved as a society, and by thinking hard enough, you or I can avoid these problems.
In reality, when you dig into the details, Enron’s downfall is the predictable mixture of human greed, poorly structured incentives, and lack of sanity checks when everyone has their fingers in the pie.
You might be surprised to learn that most of Enron’s accounting tactics were not technically illegal at the time - they were actually publicly celebrated for being financial innovations. Shareholders, employees, investment bankers, and accountants all benefited from the situation and enabled Enron for years. They only stopped when it became untenable.
The most important takeaway from The Smartest Guys in the Room is to understand the key enabling conditions for Enron’s deception. When multiple conditions mutually reinforce each other and create positive feedback loops, a massively outsized result - a lollapalooza - can happen.
These are also the warning signs you can use to detect unstable situations and desist from bad behavior.
The root of Enron has to be the accounting tactics that enabled deception. They let Enron book more revenue than they actually earned; keep losses and debt off balance sheets. If these were disallowed, the money-losing state of Enron would have been apparent far sooner.
All this structure became so convoluted that no one totaled up the big picture. No one pieced together the dependencies between Enron’s deals, and how the dominoes would fall if Enron’s stock price fell.
Lesson: Resist the temptation of clever accounting tricks that mislead on fundamentals, even if they’re technically legal. You may eventually deceive even yourself on the true fundamental strength of the situation.
A pattern of Enron’s compensation style was to reward short-term behaviors (like stock price or closing deal sizes) without concern for long-term value (like profitability). And according to the book’s author, Skilling happily fed greed, believing it was the best motivator for performance.
Lesson: Make sure your compensation structures align with the fundamental goals of the business, and that there are balancing check points
These party lines began with good intentions, but as Enron slipped into a gray zone, they helped justify bad behavior.
Enron saw itself as revitalizing an industry populated by dinosaurs and bringing efficiency through privatization and free markets. With a missionary
Andy Fastow’s department saw itself as a financial wizard, pushing the boundary of possibility while staying within the lines of...
Unlock the full book summary of The Smartest Guys in the Room by signing up for Shortform .
Shortform summaries help you learn 10x faster by:
Here's a preview of the rest of Shortform's The Smartest Guys in the Room summary:
The Smartest Guys in the Room chronicles the history of Enron, from beginning to end. Putatively, it began with good intentions and a believable vision. Then, as it focused on short-term stock prices, it became corrupted by deceptive accounting, making more egregious bets.
Ken Lay, founder and CEO of Enron, believed in efficient markets. The 1970s energy crisis caused natural gas to become deregulated. Lay saw an opportunity to profit from this deregulation.
Lay had served in various roles in gas companies before heading Houston Natural Gas (HNG) in 1984. His vision was to control a large fraction of pipeline which would allow better negotiating leverage.
Larger Omaha company InterNorth, in danger of being taken over by corporate raiders, wanted to defensively increase its size and debt load. It acquired HNG in 1985, with terms very favorable for HNG. Ultimately, Lay gained control of the board and became CEO of the company, renaming it Enron.
Things didn’t immediately work out quite as well as Lay hoped. A glut of gas on the market depressed prices and put Enron’s long-term gas contracts underwater. Management of the combined entity was...
Trading companies are too volatile to reliably produce increasing earnings. So rather than claiming to be a speculation company, Skilling branded Enron as a logistics company, finding the most cost-effective way to delivery power from any plant to any customer. This provided cover for incomprehensible businesses.
Skilling feared that any appearance of losses would shatter the illusion of Enron being wizard risk managers, so fought hard to hide them.
Skilling’s obsession with Enron’s stock price and with meeting quarterly Wall Street targets got Enron addicted to bad business practices:
The bad practices were begun to hide losses and prop up stock price. As the fundamental core of Enron failed to yield actual revenue, Enron felt forced to expand its deception, putting off its day of reckoning to later.
All the financial machinations around SPEs were meant as temporary measures while Enron bet big on its next two major businesses. Both of them, however, sustained massive losses.
Enron’s historical bread and butter was large wholesale contracts with commercial buyers. But it believed there was a coming wave of deregulation, where federal/state governments would release municipalities from local monopolies to allow the free market to drive prices down. Enron could then sell directly to businesses and homes.
In reality, the federal government wasn’t interested in intervening in state affairs, and only a few states started pilot programs toward deregulation (New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, California).
In the few hotspots it could work in, Enron campaigned aggressively to recruit consumer households to sign up, promising lower utility costs. However, the local suppliers...
Despite Enron’s best efforts to conceal their losses, by late 2000, skepticism started mounting. The dotcom bubble had fallen from its peak, and company fundamentals were being questioned.
On December 2000, Jeff Skilling was announced to succeed Ken Lay as CEO, taking place in February. This was already planned well in advance - his contract had a trigger - if he weren’t named CEO by end of 2000, he could leave and be paid over $20MM.
Enron embarked on new schemes to lock in gains while avoiding booking losses.
In 2000, SPEs called Raptors would buy underperforming Enron assets. If the assets continued to decline in value, the Raptors would pay Enron, thus giving Enron a gain that would offset the loss.
In reality, these transactions were grounded on Enron stock. This led to positive feedback loops:
By late 2000, the assets in SPEs declined in value, and Enron needed its stock to continue...
"I LOVE Shortform as these are the BEST summaries I’ve ever seen...and I’ve looked at lots of similar sites. The 1-page summary and then the longer, complete version are so useful. I read Shortform nearly every day."Sign up for free
The nightmare scenario is more or less what happened at the end of 2001. Over a series of months, Enron collapsed, one step after another.
Internal rumors began circulating about issues at Enron.
The SPE Raptor deals ran into trouble.
As the largest bankruptcy in US history to that point, the public demanded heads. And there were many responsible parties to punish.
The clearly illegal smoking guns led to straightforward convictions - Fastow’s misrepresentations about LJM; asset sales that were booked as revenue but in reality had a guarantee to be rebought, which meant it was a loan.
Arthur Andersen, previously one of the big five accounting firms, was convicted of obstruction of justice in 2002 for shredding documents. It voluntarily surrendered its licenses to practice as CPAs in 2002.
The banks agreed to write big settlement checks, ultimately producing $7.2 billion for shareholders (about 20 cents for each dollar lost).
Beyond these, the legal difficulty was that most of the financial maneuvers were not technically illegal (which is why Fastow so brazenly boasted about the structures, and Wall Street praised them).
There also was no smoking gun that indicated either Lay or Skilling knew the extent of risk taken and predicted Enron’s demise. On...
How was Enron able to get away with its bad behavior for so long, even when its operations involved thousands of people with partial insight into the problems? Here we take a look at the major conditions that promoted Enron’s deception. These are themes that might recur in future disasters.
(Shortform note: while the original book mostly tells a chronological story, we pulled the themes and patterns from the book to form this chapter.)
People who could have stepped in and intervened didn’t, often because they had a large personal stake in Enron’s success. Further, the more Enron became a success (like in terms of stock price or deal flow), the more beholden the stakeholders were to Enron.
Furthermore, everyone looked to each other for validation. “Surely all these other people can’t be wrong!” Yet no one realized no one else had done their due diligence.
In a culture where earnings are prized above all, earners have the leverage to conduct bad behavior, unpunished. Threaten to quit and you get what you want. This culture promotes caring about self rather than the longevity of the company.
Much is written about the management styles of the senior executives at Enron. They each had idiosyncracies that, when combined, led to a proliferation of problems.
With Shortform, you can:
Access 1000+ non-fiction book summaries.
Access 1000+ premium article summaries.
Take notes on your
Read on the go with our iOS and Android App.
Download PDF Summaries.
Here we invert the question - how do you avoid building an Enron? Make sure you avoid the bad practices of Enron with this checklist.