In this episode of The Diary Of A CEO, Steven Bartlett speaks with Robert Pape about the unfolding Iran crisis and the mechanics of military escalation. Pape explains how his predictive modeling—developed over two decades of studying U.S. air power—has proven accurate as events have materialized, from failed leadership strikes to Iran's strategic seizure of the Strait of Hormuz. He outlines the escalation trap: a self-reinforcing cycle where initial interventions create pressures that cannot be exited without accepting defeat.
The conversation covers Iran's control of critical shipping lanes and the resulting global oil crisis, the failed diplomatic memorandum and its strategic violations, and the asymmetric warfare realities that complicate military solutions. Pape discusses the political pressures facing President Trump as midterm elections approach, the risk of ground operations and permanent warfare, and the potential for domestic constitutional crisis. The episode provides a framework for understanding how initial military decisions can lead to escalating commitments with no clear path to resolution.

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In his discussion with Steven Bartlett, Robert Pape analyzes the Iran crisis of 2025–2027 through the lens of the escalation trap—a phenomenon where initial military interventions create self-reinforcing cycles that cannot be exited without accepting defeat. Pape's predictive modeling, developed over two decades of studying U.S. air power and escalation scenarios, has proven remarkably accurate as the crisis unfolds.
Pape's predictions have materialized month by month since early 2025. Despite killing Iran's Supreme Leader and over a hundred senior officials in opening airstrikes, the regime endured, confirming Pape's key forecast that "bombing alone can't topple regimes in modern military history." Subsequent attempts—six weeks of bombing, a two-month blockade, and economic incentives—all failed to resolve the crisis or reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
The escalation unfolds through five distinct stages: limited strikes targeting leadership, Iranian retaliation including seizing the Strait of Hormuz, economic crisis with spiraling oil prices, potential ground operations to capture Iranian coastal areas, and transformation into permanent warfare. As of June 2026, Pape identifies the crisis at stage three, with the U.S. facing a choice between accepting Iranian dominance or escalating to costly ground operations. He estimates a 70% risk of U.S. ground operations by July 2026.
President Trump faces parallel pressures in both policy and politics. Ceding the Strait of Hormuz appears domestically as surrender, yet military options to reverse this are unlikely to succeed. Pape draws a direct comparison to Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam escalation, where LBJ understood the situation was unwinnable but felt unable to accept defeat due to domestic political pressure. Similarly, Trump faces midterm elections in August 2026 with rising gas prices and a looming economic crash. At the June 2026 G7 summit, Trump admitted the world's oil reserves would deplete within four weeks, warning of economic chaos. Political imperatives pressure Trump to seek symbolic victories, even as military advisors recognize the odds of success are slim.
Iran's seizure of the Strait of Hormuz marks a drastic regional power shift. Before the war, Iran did not control the strait and never charged for passage. Now, with U.S. naval forces absent, Iran can threaten virtually any vessel attempting passage. This control is profound—about 20% of the world's oil passes through the strait, providing Iran with massive strategic leverage. Companies face daunting risks, as ships worth $300 million each when loaded could be attacked, leading many to avoid the route entirely.
The U.S. and 32 nations coordinated an emergency release of 400 million barrels of oil, with the U.S. contributing 172 million barrels. Despite these efforts, by July 2026 the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve stands at a 40-year low. Gulf states sought to redirect pipeline flows to the Red Sea, but this only partially offset the blockade. The situation worsened when Iranian-backed Houthis cut off the Saudi Red Sea pipeline, blocking both primary export routes and severely diminishing global oil flows.
As reserves dwindle and refineries strain, the world moves toward acute economic emergency. Trump's June 2026 G7 warning that global energy stockpiles will deplete in four weeks represents a historically precarious position. Crude oil depletion means less feedstock for refineries, further compromising gasoline and diesel production. This scenario—global fuel shortages triggering economic chaos—is precisely the nightmare outcome the administration sought to avert with diplomatic agreements.
Vice President Vance approached the memorandum as a transactional, business-style agreement. However, Pape emphasizes this was a fundamental error, noting that international politics, especially major wars, are about the balance of power—not simple exchanges. Iran's objective was to use the MOU to shift the regional power balance and achieve hegemony. The agreement effectively provided Iran with a roadmap to becoming the most dominant state in the Persian Gulf.
According to Pape, the memorandum allowed Iran to waive passage fees through the strait for only 60 days, with future fees set jointly by Iran and Oman, excluding the United States entirely. The agreement also advanced Iran's "security belt" strategy, extending operational influence from the Gulf through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean, relying on proxies like the Houthis and Hezbollah to threaten shipping lanes and disrupt bypass routes.
Trump signed the MOU believing it essential to avoid economic collapse, but the administration soon undermined it. Secretary of State Rubio introduced a framework in Lebanon that violated Article One guaranteeing Lebanese territorial integrity. Trump encouraged ships to transit without Iranian coordination, violating Article Five, and conditioned Iran's frozen assets on purchasing American products, overriding Iran's rights under Article Eleven. In response, Iran resumed attacks to reassert control, leading to strategic defeat for the Trump administration.
Despite months of intense bombing, Pape explains that Iran retains enough drones and missiles to continue inflicting severe damage. Iran entered the conflict with tens of thousands of drones, ballistic missiles, and anti-shipping missiles, and its remaining capabilities are sufficient to ensure continued attacks. Even with large-scale destruction, Iran's arsenal allows for repeated saturation attacks that can overwhelm U.S. defenses.
Iran's industrial production sustains the threat, with estimates of 55,000 drones produced annually. The challenge is compounded because precision-guided weapons are easier and cheaper to manufacture than the interceptors needed to defend against them, meaning the defense may run out of interceptors before Iran's supply is exhausted.
Iran's vast, mountainous terrain creates a three-dimensional search and destroy challenge. Pape compares the problem to finding a truck in California, except the search area within a 500-mile radius is even larger. Drones small enough to fit in a room could be hidden in countless locations—caverns, warehouses, or underground facilities—making them almost impossible to locate from the air. Complicating all efforts, Iran can produce and deploy new weapons faster than airstrikes can eliminate them.
Military control doesn't guarantee resumed shipping. Pape emphasizes that shipping companies base risk assessments independently, and crews may refuse to sail in high-risk situations. The true test is not military dominance but restoration of commercial confidence that transit is safe enough to justify the financial and human risks.
Recent Iranian targeting patterns suggest enhanced reconnaissance or external support from Russia or China. Despite U.S. ships using disabled transponders and evasion tactics, Iranian strikes remain accurate. The evolution from initial intermediate-range missiles and drones to increased use of ballistic and sea-skimming cruise missiles reveals a robust, well-managed, and diversified arsenal with no signs of ammunition depletion.
Trump faces mounting pressure as the U.S. approaches possible economic collapse immediately before midterm elections. The timing places his leadership under direct voter scrutiny, with likely Republican losses that would reduce his power. Under intense pressure for a breakthrough, Trump's incentives for military action increase significantly, though his advisors view such operations as carrying high risk with low probability of success.
Pape warns that inserting ground forces and exerting political control over foreign territory drastically increases the risk of suicide terrorism. His research shows it's not casualties from air strikes that prompt suicide attacks, but the deep violation felt when foreign troops control a population's way of life. Military occupation is the biggest catalyst for suicide terrorism, far more than remote violence. Iran's Supreme Leader is issuing statements inspiring decentralized terrorist actions that could target American commercial airliners, hotels, or military installations.
Among MAGA Republicans, support for war actually increases following American troop deaths due to unwillingness to view sacrifices as mistakes. If Democrats win Congressional control in midterms, they may attempt to defund the war—a tactic successfully used in 1974 to halt Vietnam War funding. However, Trump could veto restrictions or use emergency authorities to bypass Congress, escalating constitutional conflict.
Pape foresees a parallel between the current moment and the 1960s turbulence, when collision of domestic unrest and unpopular war produced mass demonstrations, terrorism, and assassinations. The worst-case scenario is the simultaneous occurrence of a major international crisis and a domestic electoral crisis, with no simple or stable outcome—only a period of escalating danger for American democracy and global security.
Pape explains that prior to the war, America was predominant, Israel rising, and Iran declining. However, almost immediately after war began, Iran's control of the Strait of Hormuz dramatically increased its regional leverage and transformed it into a regional hegemon. To restore the previous balance would require a permanent and substantial U.S. military presence aimed at suppressing Iran—a costly, long-term commitment.
Pape notes Trump missed an early opportunity to declare victory after killing Iran's Supreme Leader and other top leaders. By April, advice shifted to containing Israeli expansion, but Trump adopted this approach too late, after Iran had consolidated regional power. Now, U.S. offers to Iran lack credibility since Iran already controls key regional chokepoints and dominates the regional order.
China aims to prevent Iranian defeat while leveraging American desperation, viewing America as a declining power and preferring to keep the U.S. fixated away from Asia. Russia exploits U.S. focus on Iran to pressure Ukraine and Europe, with American and European resources redirected toward the Gulf, limiting support and advanced systems for Ukraine.
American forces have been repositioned to the Gulf of Oman, suggesting potential operations targeting Iranian ports as a means of securing symbolic victory before midterms. While such operations could yield short-lived successes, lasting results would demand extended occupation likely to fuel terrorist recruitment. The underlying problem remains: the Strait is threatened, Iran can disrupt shipping, and a global economic crisis looms. Pape suggests a Democratic midterm victory could empower Congress to restrict military funding, recalling the 1974 Vietnam precedent. Absent such actions, Trump's incentives strongly favor escalation as symbolic victories are sought, raising the specter of an entrenched forever war.
1-Page Summary
The Iran crisis of 2025–2027, as analyzed by Robert Pape and discussed with Steven Bartlett, demonstrates the dangers of the escalation trap, a phenomenon in which initial military interventions rapidly create self-reinforcing cycles of escalation that cannot be exited without accepting defeat. Pape's predictive modeling, drawn from patterns in military history and tested over two decades, proves closely accurate as the crisis unfolds through a series of well-defined escalation stages.
Pape has spent over 20 years modeling U.S. air power and escalation scenarios involving Iran, advising presidential administrations since 2001. As of early 2025, his long-standing predictions materialized: initial bombing and infrastructure strikes failed to topple the Iranian regime or force desired behavior, but instead triggered cycles of retaliation and intensification. Pape describes his escalation model as an upside-down pyramid, with each stage becoming more dangerous and choices more constrained.
The model has proven correct month by month. Despite killing the Supreme Leader and over a hundred senior Iranian officials in opening airstrikes, the regime endured, confirming Pape’s key forecast that "bombing alone can’t topple regimes in modern military history" — a lesson reinforced by conflicts since World War I. Subsequent attempts at coerced change — six weeks of bombing, a two-month blockade, memorandums of understanding, and economic incentives — all failed to resolve the crisis or re-open the Strait of Hormuz.
The escalation ladder unfolds through five distinct stages:
As of June 2026, Pape identifies the crisis at stage three, analogizing the situation to the Titanic approaching an unavoidable iceberg, with insufficient "lifeboats" (policy solutions) to save all stakeholders. Ongoing U.S. bombing is met by Iranian attacks on American bases in Jordan and Houthi actions closing Saudi pipelines, worsening the world economic crisis and signaling fast-approaching decisions on whether to escalate further or accept a painful loss. Pape estimates the risk of U.S. ground operations in Iran at 70% by July 2026, driven by both tactical setbacks and strategic economic imperatives.
Pape’s model is built on extensive historical precedent: modern military history shows that air power, even when lethally effective at leadership decapitation, rarely if ever compels regime change. He references Afghanistan: even after toppling the Taliban with air power, enduring suicide terrorism only began when large U.S. ground forces occupied the country. This underlines that deeper escalation produces new security challenges, not solutions.
President Trump’s predicament illustrates how the escalation trap creates parallel pressures in both policy and politics. Ceding the Strait of Hormuz to Iran is domestically toxic — a "big L to wear on your chest" in Pape's words — as it appears equivalent to surrender and humiliation. Yet, military options to reverse this reality are unlikely to succeed and carry mounting risks.
Bartlett and Pape draw a direct line from Johnson’s escalation in Vietnam to Trump’s current dilemma. LBJ knew he was escalating into an unwinnable situation but felt unable to accept the optics of defeat due to domestic political pressure, a cycle that ultimately ruined his presidency. Similarly, Trump faces midterm elections in August 2026 with the specter of rising gas prices, a looming economic crash, and a likely Democratic victory if the crisis isn’t resolved. Johnson’s White House tapes revealed an understanding that escalation was futile, yet the political costs of withdrawal were too great to bear.
Trump’s own statements reflect the depth of the crisis. At the June 2026 G7 summit, he publicly admitted the world’s oil reserves would be depleted within four weeks, warning of economic chaos. The U.S. government tried to delay this bedlam by signing a memorandum of understanding with Iran, yet quickly undermined its terms in pursuit of a more favorable resolution, leading back into escalation.
The Escalation Trap: Predictive Modeling and Historical Patterns
Iran’s recent seizure of the Strait of Hormuz marks a drastic shift in regional power. Before the war that began on February 28, Iran did not control the strait and never charged for passage. The conflict changed this dynamic. With U.S. naval forces absent, Iran moved from a posture of survival to one of ambition, exploiting the opportunity to establish control over the strait. Now, Iran can threaten virtually any vessel that attempts passage; ships encounter drones, mines, and other barriers even if they try to evade detection.
This control is profound—about 20% of the world’s oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Such dominance provides Iran with massive strategic leverage and wealth, potentially funding further military ambitions. Companies now face daunting risks, forced to decide whether to send ships—floating assets worth $300 million each when loaded with up to a million barrels of oil—through a gauntlet of potential attacks and insurance issues, which leads many to avoid the route entirely.
To address the sudden disruption, the U.S. and 32 member nations of the International Energy Agency coordinated an emergency release of 400 million barrels of oil from their reserves, with the U.S. contributing 172 million barrels over 120 days. Despite these efforts, as of July 2026 the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve stands at about 300 million barrels—a 40-year low, not quickly replenishable.
In the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and the UAE sought to reduce dependence on the Strait by redirecting pipeline flows to ports on the Red Sea. While bypasses at first kept roughly 7 million barrels per day moving, this only partially offset the blockade, leaving around 13 million barrels daily still at risk due to Strait dependency. The daily cost to America for the crisis approaches $2 billion, while asymmetric Iranian attacks are far less expensive to maintain.
The situation deteriorated further when the Houthis, backed by Iran, cut off the Saudi Red Sea oil pipeline at Yanbu, halting another seven million barrels per day. As a result, both primary export routes—the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea—are blocked, severely diminishing global oil flows.
This compounded crisis strains global refining infrastructure. With between 25% and 40% of refining capacity located in the Persian Gulf constrained, global production of gasoline and diesel is squeezed. Simultaneously, Russian attacks on refineries in Ukraine and the Persian Gulf further reduce the ability to process crude into fuels. The twin shocks of crude shortages and refining limits ...
Strait of Hormuz Blockade and Oil Crisis
Vice President Vance believed that negotiating with Iran by emphasizing future financial benefits would lead to peace. He approached the memorandum as a transactional, business-style agreement—offering money and benefits in exchange for Iran opening the Strait of Hormuz. However, Robert Pape highlights this as a fundamental error, underscoring that international politics, and especially major wars, are about the balance of power—not simple exchanges of services for payment. Pape points out that Iran's overriding objective was to use the MOU to shift the regional power balance and achieve regional hegemony. Iran considered the clauses directly relating to the control of the Strait and the assertion of dominant security influence to be paramount. The agreement effectively provided Iran with a roadmap to becoming the most dominant state in the Persian Gulf and Middle East, a position they were eager to formalize. Iran thus signed the MOU, as it directly served their objectives of securing control over the Strait, expanding regional dominance, and obtaining international legitimation for these ambitions.
According to Robert Pape, the signed memorandum specifically allowed Iran to waive passage fees through the Strait of Hormuz for only 60 days, with future fee decisions to be set jointly by Iran and Oman. Notably, the agreement excluded the United States from any say in determining these fees, effectively granting Iran ongoing unilateral control over Strait access. The memorandum’s language left no ambiguity about future U.S. influence—there was “no clause to even let the United States wiggle itself in.” The authenticity of the agreement is confirmed by the fact that Iran and the White House both released identical, final version documents.
With control over the Strait of Hormuz, Iran recognized a vulnerability: the growing trend of bypass pipelines—such as Saudi Arabia’s pipeline to the Red Sea and the UAE’s pipeline to Fujairah—that reduced dependency on the strait and threatened the value of Iran’s leverage. In response, Iran and the Revolutionary Guard advanced a “security belt” strategy, aiming to extend operational influence from the Gulf, through the Red Sea, to the Mediterranean. This belt relied on Iranian proxies, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon, to threaten shipping lanes and disrupt potential bypass routes like future Syrian pipelines. Pape emphasizes that Iran’s security arc is operational, not merely conceptual, guaranteeing effective control over Persian Gulf oil, regardless of the export route.
President Trump signed the MOU, believing immediate access to oil through the Strait of Hormuz was essential to avoid global ...
The Failed Mou: Diplomatic Agreement and Strategic Violations
Despite months of intense bombing and assertions that Iran’s air force, navy, and nearly all its missile capabilities are destroyed, Robert Pape explains that these assessments significantly underestimate the persistent threat. Even after sustained strikes, Iran retains enough drones and missiles to continue inflicting severe damage. Only a small fraction of its drone and missile arsenals is needed to breach U.S. defenses through saturation, with swarms overwhelming available interceptors. Iran entered the conflict with tens of thousands of drones, ballistic missiles, and anti-shipping (sea-skimming cruise) missiles, and its remaining capabilities are more than sufficient to ensure continued attacks against U.S. positions.
Though large proportions of Iranian missiles have reportedly been destroyed, the sheer scale of Iran’s arsenal allows for repeated, effective saturation attacks. Even with reductions, enough remain to compromise U.S. bases and ships, making elimination nearly impossible through strikes alone.
Iran’s industrial production sustains the threat. Pape notes estimates of Iran producing 55,000 drones per year, with thousands handed off to Russia and more produced consistently even during conflict. Destroying existing missile and drone stocks does not guarantee safety, as new weapons rapidly replace those lost, maintaining Iran’s ability to strike.
The challenge is compounded because precision-guided weapons continue to become easier and cheaper to manufacture than the interceptors needed to shoot them down. While the U.S. can convert so-called "dumb bombs" into precision bombs using affordable guidance kits, the defense may still run out of interceptors before Iran’s supply of launchable drones and missiles is exhausted.
Iran’s geography fundamentally complicates military operations. Its vast, mountainous terrain creates a search and destroy challenge that is three-dimensional, not just two-dimensional. Pape compares the problem to finding a truck somewhere in California — but in this case, the area within a 500-mile radius, larger than California, is potential search ground.
This immense geographic expanse, combined with networked mountains, offers countless hiding places. Drones and missiles could be in caverns, warehouses, or even ordinary rooms scattered throughout cities and countryside, making them almost impossible to locate from the air.
The search for Iran's hidden weapons is painstaking and difficult. Drones, like the Shaheed series, are small enough to fit inside an average room. Each must be hunted drone-by-drone or in tight clusters, requiring extensive time, resources, and intelligence. Even if one location is discovered and neutralized, countless more remain hidden, shielded by terrain.
Complicating all these efforts, Iran can produce and deploy new drones and missiles faster than airstrikes can eliminate them. U.S. operations are stuck in a cycle: as quickly as they find and eliminate stockpiles, Iran’s industry replenishes its arsenal, keeping the threat level constant.
Military control or destruction of Iranian assets does not guarantee the resumption of commercial shipping. Pape emphasizes that shipping companies cannot be compelled by military orders and base their risk assessments independently. For global commerce to regain confidence, the perceived danger to ships and crews must be addressed, not simply the presence of hostile forces.
The financial value of oil tankers, carrying hundreds of thousands or over a million barrels of oil per voyage, raises the stakes. In high-risk situations, crews may refuse to sail and shipping strikes can occur, further impeding vital econom ...
Asymmetric Warfare and Military Reality
The confluence of international and domestic crises during a high-stakes election season sets the stage for political and constitutional turmoil in the United States. As Robert Pape explains, the spiraling violence stemming from potential military escalation with Iran, combined with domestic political volatility, could create a scenario reminiscent of the 1960s' chaos.
President Trump faces mounting pressure as the U.S. approaches a possible economic collapse, intensified by a looming oil crisis. At the G7, Trump warns that oil reserves could deplete in four weeks if the Strait is not reopened, which would trigger economic chaos. The timing of this crisis—immediately before the midterm elections—places Trump's leadership under direct voter scrutiny, with the likely result being significant losses for his party that would reduce his power. Should the Republicans lose the midterms, Trump risks becoming a lame duck president, unable to advance his agenda and potentially facing Democratic-led impeachment efforts.
Under intense pressure for a breakthrough before the midterms, Trump’s incentives for military action increase significantly. His advisors view the prospect of operations—such as landing ground forces for symbolic control at Chabahar or Jask on Iran's southeastern coast—as carrying both high risk and a low probability of durable success. Trump could frame such an operation as evidence of American willingness to use force, hoping to influence voter perceptions of his leadership. However, these actions would not solve the underlying strategic problem. The strategy echoes President Johnson’s Vietnam escalation, which was likewise driven by domestic political pressures rather than achievable military objectives.
Robert Pape, drawing on extensive research, warns that inserting ground forces and exerting political control over foreign territory drastically increases the risk of suicide terrorism. His studies show that it is not merely the casualties from air strikes that prompt suicide attacks; rather, it is the deep violation felt when foreign troops control a local population’s way of life. Military occupation is the biggest catalyst for suicide terrorism—far more than remote violence.
Pape points out that occupying forces greatly increase recruitment for suicide attacks. Iran's Supreme Leader is issuing statements resembling those of former ISIS leader Baghdadi, directly inspiring decentralized terrorist actions. These attacks could target American commercial airliners, hotels in Middle Eastern cities like Aqaba frequented by American businessmen, or U.S. military installations. Inspired and command-directed attacks, such as those that occurred in Paris in 2015 and San Bernardino, become more likely as ground operations persist.
The onset of U.S. troop casualties will not necessarily deter war efforts—in fact, it may harden partisan resolve. Pape observes that among MAGA Republicans, support for the war actually increases following American troop deaths due to the unwillingness to view these sacrifices as mistakes. Rather than provoking calls to end the conflict, initial ground troop deaths are likely to galvanize Trump’s base and fortify their support for continued operations to avoid any perception of meaningless loss. American public opinion on war is deeply divided, with MAGA Republicans showing far more support for escalation than the general population, giving Trump further incentive to persist even as casualties mount.
If Democrats win control of Congress in the midterms, they may attempt to defund the war, invoking their constitutional power of the purse—a tactic successfully used in 1974 to halt funding for the Vietnam War. However, the president can veto any Congressional funding restriction or war powers resolution, requiring a very difficult two-thirds supermajority in both chambers to override. Trump may also attempt to bypass Congressional restrictions using emergency transfer authorities and creative counting within the Pentagon’s budget, further escalating ...
Political Desperation and Domestic Crisis
The conflict in the region reflects a series of American and allied miscalculations in the pursuit of dominance. Political and military decisions have backfired, resulting in a significant shift in the balance of power.
Robert Pape explains that prior to the war, the regional power structure showed America as the predominant force, Israel as a rising power, and Iran as a state in decline. However, almost immediately after the war began, the balance shifted. Iran took control of the Strait of Hormuz, dramatically increasing its regional leverage. This move not only gave Iran substantial future economic potential but also bolstered its military power and influence across neighboring states.
Control of the Strait of Hormuz has provided Iran with newfound power that extends beyond traditional military capabilities, such as bombing. Iran's control means it can directly impact energy flows and exert influence regionally, transforming itself into the regional hegemon.
To restore the previous balance, Robert Pape argues it would take a permanent and substantial U.S. military presence aimed at suppressing Iran. No short-term or symbolic military measures could reverse Iran's power gain without a broader, costly, and long-term commitment.
Robert Pape notes President Trump missed an early opportunity to declare victory immediately after the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader and other top leaders. Pape advised, at that time in March, to declare that the United States had achieved its objectives and seek negotiations with Iran about its nuclear program. Trump did not act on this and instead stayed engaged in conflict, making a clean off-ramp impossible.
By April, advice shifted to suggest militarily containing Israel, particularly as Israel expanded into Lebanon. Trump adopted this approach months too late, after Iran had already consolidated regional power, making containment efforts ineffective and creating missed diplomatic opportunities.
Now, theoretical U.S. offers to Iran lack credibility and substance. Since Iran already controls key regional chokepoints and dominates the regional order, simply returning to violated agreements or offers is insufficient to bring Iran back to the negotiating table.
Robert Pape explains that China is interested in preventing the destruction of Iran while leveraging American desperation. Chinese leadership views America as a declining power and prefers to keep the U.S. fixated away from Asia, thus minimizing a direct confrontation with China.
Russia, on the other hand, uses the Iran crisis to its advantage in Europe and Ukraine. With American and European military and financial stocks redirected toward the Gulf, Ukraine receives less support, especially advanced missile defense systems, while Russia increases pressure in Crimea and risks escalating its campaign in Ukraine.
The regional crisis depletes Western resources and attention, creating a global economic crisis as energy prices surge and hindering Europe’s ability to fulfill commitments to Ukraine. With the U.S. and allies distracted in the Middle East, both Russia and China find strategic breathing room to pursue their objectives.
American forces, including 4,500-5,000 Marines and approximately 4,000 troops from the 82nd Airborne, have been repositioned to the Gulf of Oman. This placement suggests potential g ...
Political and Strategic Miscalculation in Pursuit of Power
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