In this episode of The Diary Of A CEO with Steven Bartlett, military analyst Steve Keen examines why conventional military strategies fail against Iran and how the regional power balance has fundamentally shifted. Keen explains that decades of modeling reveal a consistent pattern: air campaigns can destroy visible infrastructure but cannot eliminate Iran's buried uranium stockpiles or underground military capabilities, leaving the regime stronger after each attack.
The conversation explores Iran's transformation into a regional power through its control of the Strait of Hormuz and its growing alliance with Russia and China. Keen outlines three stages of potential conflict escalation, from initial airstrikes to ground warfare, and discusses the dilemma facing U.S. leadership: commit to a protracted ground war or accept a nuclear-armed Iran. The episode also covers the breakdown of diplomacy following Trump's 2018 withdrawal from the nuclear deal and examines why current circumstances leave limited options for preventing Iran's nuclear weapons development.

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Despite overwhelming military power, air campaigns targeting Iran repeatedly fail to achieve strategic goals. Steve Keen describes years of modeling that show a consistent finding: U.S. bombers can destroy above-ground enrichment facilities, but they cannot destroy enriched uranium itself. Using an analogy, Keen explains that even if you destroy the pan used for panning gold, you cannot destroy the gold—it's simply buried under rubble and recoverable.
Iran anticipates these attacks and buries its critical assets—enrichment facilities, drones, and missile stores—underground, making them virtually invulnerable to airstrikes. While the U.S. can identify and destroy visible targets, the destruction offers only temporary setbacks. Once bombing ceases, Iran retrieves undamaged uranium and resumes its programs, and such attacks can further incentivize nuclear weapon development as deterrence.
Keen emphasizes the political consequences of airstrikes by drawing from Vietnam War research. Heavy U.S. bombing destroyed 80% of Ho Chi Minh Trail throughput but failed to break resistance. Instead, surviving such intense bombings emboldened fighters, proving they could win by simply surviving. After twenty-one years of modeling campaigns against Iran, Keen found that each scenario consistently made Iran stronger, leaving essential capabilities preserved and populations radicalized. Ultimately, stopping Iran's nuclear enrichment would require ground forces—air power alone cannot destroy what has been cleverly hidden or deeply buried.
Keen points out that U.S. policymakers long assumed Iran was on the verge of collapse, expecting military pressure or sanctions to topple the regime. Instead, Iran has shown remarkable resilience, strengthening its position through diplomatic negotiations and shaping ceasefire proposals that reflect its rising influence.
A central pillar of Iran's newfound power is its control over the Strait of Hormuz, enabling it to influence global energy markets and use oil flows as leverage. Iran's 10-point ceasefire proposal demands international recognition of its dominant role, including control over shipping tolls, complete lifting of sanctions, global acceptance of its right to uranium enrichment, war reparations, and the end of UN resolutions against the regime. Such demands are only possible for a state confident in its status as a major geopolitical actor.
Meanwhile, America's claim to be the protector of Gulf states is now undermined. Keen describes that U.S. bases, once guarantees of security, are now targets for Iranian precision strikes. The Gulf coalition is fracturing as allies increasingly distance themselves, with Saudi Arabia and the UAE seeking security cooperation with Pakistan rather than relying on the U.S. The shift in energy control is compelling Asian allies to reconsider their relationships—for India and Japan, access to oil matters far more than political alignment with Washington.
The emergence of a new bloc—Russia, China, and Iran—amplifies the challenge to U.S. dominance. Together, Iran and Russia control around 31% of the world's oil, and Russia has provided Iran with military targeting data. This cooperation marks the decline of uncontested U.S. hegemony and the rise of a new order where Iran commands outsized influence across the globe.
Keen and Steven Bartlett discuss the pattern of escalation that follows three interconnected stages. The conflict begins with the United States bombing Iranian nuclear sites, but Keen notes the regime survives, often emerging stronger. Iran's reaction is "horizontal escalation"—seizing the Strait of Hormuz to demonstrate its ability to survive and project power.
This advances the scenario to stage three: deployment of U.S. Marine ground forces to retake strategic territory. The area presents some of the most challenging terrain in the world for amphibious operations, and President Trump has repeatedly suggested taking Iran's oil fields through coastal assaults. To regain the Strait and oil fields, U.S. forces would need to control a corridor at least 100 miles by 20 miles while defending against persistent Iranian drone attacks.
A key dynamic is the political response to American casualties. Keen cites Vietnam as precedent: when Marines are killed, instead of prompting withdrawal, these deaths strengthen political resolve to "finish the job." This makes the war "sticky," likely expanding into a ground war lasting at least six months from which it is politically difficult to retreat.
If the U.S. withdraws without securing Iranian uranium stockpiles, Iran is poised to become a nuclear-armed state within a year—a new and permanent force in world power politics. This leaves U.S. leadership with a harsh dilemma: engage in a costly, protracted ground war or face a nuclear-empowered Iran with global ambitions.
Iran possesses significant stockpiles of enriched uranium that is dispersed, buried deeply, and hidden beyond the reach of aerial bombing. Keen emphasizes that securing Iran's enriched uranium—physically possessing and removing it—is the only way to prevent rapid nuclear weapons production, but this would require ground troops in an unrealistically large and complex operation.
If the U.S. reduces military involvement, Iran could develop nuclear weapons within a year. Keen explains that hardline U.S. threats, particularly from Trump, have unified Iranian society around a defensive stance, with even pro-democracy movements now supporting nuclear weapon development as protection against existential threats.
Keen outlines Iran's likely nuclear strategy as emulating North Korea's model—developing an arsenal and conducting warhead tests to deter U.S. action. The most rational strategy is to achieve a threshold arsenal of at least five weapons, conduct a test detonation on Iranian soil, then follow a week later with a second test. This display creates credible deterrence, as the world would assume Iran has sufficient reserves to retaliate, significantly altering regional and global power dynamics.
Keen emphasizes that Trump's 2018 withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal destroyed the only functioning framework for limiting Iran's nuclear ambitions. Under the Obama-era deal, Iran kept uranium enriched to 3.5% under constant inspection. After withdrawal, Iran has dramatically increased its stockpile and enrichment level, making the original constraints now look naïve.
Bartlett and Keen detail how Israeli actions repeatedly undermined U.S. diplomatic efforts. Israeli airstrikes ended negotiations within 36 hours of Trump's June announcement of talks. Most pivotal was the assassination of Ali Larijani, Trump's primary Iranian contact, by an Israeli-led airstrike in March 2026, derailing what Trump described as being on the verge of a historic agreement.
Prime Minister Netanyahu's repeated claims that Iran was a "paper tiger" shaped not only Israeli but also American intelligence assessments. Keen and Bartlett note that many U.S. officials, influenced by Israeli intelligence, underestimated Iran's resilience, leading to flawed strategic planning.
Recent diplomatic proposals now include measures to constrain Israel rather than Iran. Keen proposes legislation mandating a total cutoff of American aid to Israel if it attacks Iran, and another clause involving Israel joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in exchange for Iran limiting enrichment to 3.5%. Trump now faces an Iran undeterred by U.S. air power, controlling the Strait and demanding regional recognition. Keen notes that the limited window for a minimalist nuclear deal has closed, and according to him, the catastrophic failure in Iran has rendered NATO a non-entity, with European leaders refusing American calls for troop deployments. The U.S. now lacks a realistic Plan B, as bombing alone cannot resolve the enriched uranium issue, giving Tehran major leverage in any future diplomatic engagement.
1-Page Summary
Despite their overwhelming military power and tactical success at striking targets, air campaigns such as those aimed at Iran repeatedly fail to achieve their strategic and political goals. The experience of targeting Iran's nuclear ambitions and historical lessons from conflicts like the Vietnam War reveal the severe limitations of air power when faced with a well-prepared, resilient adversary.
Steve Keen describes a consistent finding across years of modeling bombing campaigns against Iran: U.S. bombers can destroy above-ground industrial facilities that enrich uranium, but they cannot destroy the enriched uranium itself. Using an analogy, Keen says that even if you destroy the pan and river used for panning gold, you cannot destroy the gold itself—it's recoverable. Bombing leaves the uranium simply buried under rubble, undamaged and ready to be retrieved.
Iran anticipates aerial attacks and disperses or buries its enrichment facilities and arsenals—including drones and missile stores—underground. While the U.S. can identify and destroy visible targets above ground with satellites and other sensors, Iran's critical assets are intentionally deeply buried and concealed, making them virtually invulnerable to airstrikes.
Destroying industrial targets offers only a temporary setback. Once bombing ceases, Iran can retrieve undamaged enriched uranium and resume its programs. This approach merely delays their progress, not stops it. In fact, such attacks can further incentivize Iran's leaders and population, making them more desperate to pursue nuclear weapons for deterrence and possibly payback, especially if civilian infrastructure—such as electrical power—is also targeted.
Keen points out that although the U.S. can quickly destroy assets visible from above, Iran’s strategy of deeply burying key military infrastructure means that bombing campaigns leave significant portions of Iran’s warfighting and nuclear capacity intact.
Iran uses its concealed drone and missile arsenals to launch attacks from protected positions, notably in the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz. These ongoing capabilities demonstrate that, despite U.S. air superiority, Iran can still impose costs and threaten vital shipping routes, showing how military dominance fails to neutralize adversaries with hidden, resilient abilities.
Keen emphasizes the political consequences of airstrikes. Drawing from his Vietnam War research, he notes that bombing campaigns can backfire by energizing and uniting enemy populations. In Vietnam, heavy U.S. bombing—especially against the Ho Chi Minh Trail—destroyed 80% of logistical throughput but failed to break resistance. The resilience shown by surviving even the most intense bombings emboldened and motivated North Vietnamese and Viet Cong fighters, rather than demoralizing them.
Military Ineffectiveness: Why Air Strikes Fail to Achieve Strategic Goals Against Iran
Policymakers in the U.S. and Western countries have long assumed Iran was on the verge of collapse, expecting that one more push—such as military pressure or economic sanctions—would force the Iranian regime to fall. Steve Keen points out that this was a widespread and ultimately false assumption in the foreign policy community. Contrary to these predictions, Iran has shown remarkable resilience, even after direct attacks and the assassination of key leaders. The decentralized nature of Iran’s leadership has made it difficult for adversaries to target or destabilize the regime effectively. Instead of collapsing, Iran has managed to strengthen its position, using diplomatic negotiations and direct messages to the White House through intermediaries such as Pakistan, and shaping ceasefire proposals that reflect its rising influence.
A central pillar of Iran’s newfound power is its control over approximately 20% of global oil supply and, crucially, the Strait of Hormuz. This strategic chokepoint enables Iran to influence global energy markets and use oil flows as leverage to coerce other nations into accepting its regional objectives. Shipping through the Strait, vital for Asian economies, gives Iran direct financial and geopolitical leverage.
Iran’s 10-point ceasefire proposal to the U.S. and Israel, as explained by Bartlett and Keen, requires international recognition of its dominant role: Iran demands control over tolls for ships passing the Strait of Hormuz (reportedly $2 million per ship), revenue sharing with Oman, complete lifting of U.S. sanctions, return of frozen Iranian funds, global acceptance of its right to uranium enrichment (while promising not to seek nuclear weapons), war reparations, and the end of all UN resolutions against the regime with a new Security Council mandate. Such demands are only possible for a state confident in its status as a major geopolitical actor, making clear that Iran wants not only regional dominance but also the ability to dictate rules in line with historical great powers.
America’s claim to be the protector of Gulf states—anchored by military bases in Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia—is now undermined. Keen describes that these bases, once guarantees of security, are now targets for Iranian precision drone strikes, no longer providing a stable regional coalition against Iran. As a result, the Gulf coalition is fracturing: Iraq, previously installed by U.S. intervention, increasingly distances itself from American military presence; Oman is being drawn closer to Iran through proposed revenue sharing; and Qatar keeps a low profile.
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, feeling most threatened, are seeking security cooperation with Pakistan rather than relying on the U.S. The Trump administration’s reluctance to firmly defend U.S. bases—or the bases of its allies—sends a clear signal of unreliability. Allies are being told to defend themselves, a far cry from the security guarantees that underpinned the previous order.
The shift in energy control is compelling U.S. allies in Asia to reconsider their relationships. For India, which depends on oil through the Strait of Hormuz, access to supply matters far more than political alignment with Washington—so Delhi remains at least neutral, if not leaning toward Tehran. This places India in a far more precarious position compared to the U.S. and Europe, as the supply of oil, not just its price, is on the line.
In Japan, Prime Ministerial visits to Washington have not produced milita ...
Iran's Rise: Regional/World Power and Global Power Shift
The conflict follows a pattern of escalation that can be traced through three interconnected stages: initial airstrikes, Iranian retaliation, and the looming threat of a U.S. ground war, followed by the grave consequences of either entrenchment or facing a nuclear-armed Iran. Steve Keen and Steven Bartlett discuss these stages, the logic behind military and political decisions, and the lack of a clear “off-ramp.”
The escalation begins with the United States bombing Iranian nuclear sites in an attempt to destabilize the regime. Despite targeting leaders and key sites, Keen notes that the regime survives, often emerging stronger and more resilient—a conclusion validated by Professor Pape’s models showing leadership-targeting bombing as ineffective.
Iran’s reaction to the bombardment is “horizontal escalation”: rather than accepting losses, the regime asserts strength by seizing the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint. This move demonstrates Iran’s ability to survive initial attacks and project power in ways that counteract direct American action.
With Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, the scenario advances to stage three: the deployment of U.S. Marine ground forces to retake strategic territory. The area around the Strait presents some of the most challenging terrain in the world for amphibious operations, described as a “moonscape”—harsh, mountainous, and inhospitable for landing troops from sea or air.
President Trump has repeatedly suggested that the U.S. should take Iran’s oil fields, alluding to amphibious assaults to secure both coastline and inland energy infrastructure. Keen explains the limited alternatives for a ground invasion—Pakistan and Afghanistan are not viable staging grounds, and Azerbaijan refuses involvement—making a coastal assault the main option.
To regain and hold the Strait and oil fields, U.S. forces would need to control a corridor at least 100 miles by 20 miles, defend against persistent Iranian drone attacks, and protect ground troops from mobile, air strike-resistant weapons. Amphibious landings, supported by Osprey aircraft, would be required, exposing troops to immediate and ongoing danger.
A key dynamic of ground operations is the political response to American casualties. Keen cites Vietnam as precedent: when U.S. Marines are killed, instead of prompting withdrawal, these deaths strengthen political resolve to “finish the job.” About 36% of the American public, predominately aligned with the Republican base, typically view such losses as honorable sacrifice, making it politically difficult for leadership to pull back without seeming to betray the fallen. While 59% may oppose the war, a determined minority will support escalation, especially when called to honor U.S. troops.
This dynami ...
Conflict Escalation: Three Stages and the Choice Between Ground War or Nuclear-Armed Iran
Iran possesses a significant stockpile of enriched uranium, including 1,000 pounds of 60% enriched uranium and 10,000 pounds of uranium enriched between 5% and 20%. This material is dispersed, buried deeply, and hidden beyond the reach of aerial bombing. Steve Keen emphasizes that if it were possible to destroy Iran's enriched uranium material just by bombing known sites, it would have already been done. However, Iran has ensured that its uranium is well-secured, often hidden as rock or stored in deeply buried tunnels and caves, making it impossible for air campaigns to target the material itself instead of just the physical facilities. According to Keen, securing Iran's enriched uranium—physically possessing and removing it—is the only way to prevent the rapid production of nuclear weapons, even if the above-ground enrichment sites are destroyed. This necessity means that only ground troops might accomplish such a task, but the operation would be unrealistically large and complex, not a quick endeavor by a small force.
If the security of Iran’s uranium is not ensured and the U.S. reduces its military involvement, Iran could develop nuclear weapons within a year. Keen asserts that neither the Trump nor Biden administrations have found a way to stop Iran’s enrichment, and bombing alone cannot resolve the problem. If the United States withdraws, Iran’s internal power will grow, and its nuclear ambitions are likely to progress unchecked.
Keen further explains that hardline U.S. threats, particularly from President Trump—who warned he could end Iranian civilization in one night—have unified Iranian society around a defensive stance. Even the previously robust pro-democracy movement in Iran now tends to support nuclear weapon development as protection against existential threats from outside. Trump’s aggressive rhetoric and threats of overwhelming force have bonded the Iranian regime and population more closely. Many now see nuclear weapons as essential for deterrence, and consensus in favor of weaponization is growing.
Keen outlines Iran’s likely nuclear strategy as an emulation of North Korea’s m ...
Iran's Uranium Enrichment Capabilities and Nuclear Deterrence
Steve Keen emphasizes that the 2018 decision by President Trump to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal destroyed the only functioning framework for limiting Iran's nuclear ambitions. Under the Obama-era deal, Iran was allowed to keep uranium enriched up to 3.5%, under constant international inspection. After Trump’s withdrawal and years of unsuccessful diplomacy under both Trump and Biden, Iran has dramatically increased its stockpile and enrichment level of uranium—now far greater than under the Obama agreement. Keen states frankly that eliminating Iran's enriched uranium stockpile is impossible without deploying ground forces, a step considered entirely unrealistic. Thus, Trump’s withdrawal directly created the current scenario, where the original constraints now look naïve compared to Iran’s expanded nuclear capability.
Steven Bartlett and Steve Keen detail how Israeli actions repeatedly undermined U.S. diplomatic efforts. In June, Trump announced talks with Iran, but Israeli airstrikes ended negotiations within 36 hours. Israeli bombing killed the Iranian Supreme Leader and his advisors, leading to U.S. retaliatory strikes after Israel’s ultimatum, a sequence confirmed by Senator Rubio. A pivotal moment was the assassination of Ali Larijani, Trump’s primary Iranian contact for a significant 10-point peace plan, by an Israeli-led airstrike in March 2026. Trump himself complained that these unilateral Israeli operations derailed what he described as being on the verge of a historic agreement, effectively resetting diplomatic efforts.
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s public statements repeatedly branded Iran as a "paper tiger," claiming Israeli operations left Iran crippled and on the verge of collapse, painting a picture of imminent victory. This narrative—from dominating airstrikes to defeating Iranian defenses—shaped not only Israeli but also American and allied intelligence assessments. Keen and Bartlett note that many U.S. officials, influenced by Israeli-provided intelligence, underestimated Iran’s capabilities and resilience. Despite mounting evidence of Iran’s staying power, few challenged the prevailing assumption of its impending collapse, leading to flawed strategic planning and a lack of preparedness for Iran’s continued resistance.
Recent diplomatic proposals include measures to constrain not Iran, but Israel. Keen proposes a legislative approach: a bill mandating a total cutoff of American aid to Israel for the remainder of Trump’s presidency if Israel attacks Iran or even Lebanon. Such enforceable constraints would give the U.S. leverage over Israeli military adventurism. Another pivotal clause in negotiations involves Israel joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in exchange for Iran limiting its uranium enrichment to 3.5% under international inspection. This would permit IAEA oversight of both Israeli and Iranian nuclear stockpiles, creating a balanced, two-sided verification regime and moving U.S. Middle East policy from a pro-Israel default to a more balanced, regionally adaptive approach.
With his earlier deals and pressure campaigns failing, Trump now faces an Iran undeterred by U.S. air power, controlling the Strait of Hormuz and demanding regional recognition, sanctions relief, and formal nuclear rights. Steve Keen notes that negotiating with Iranian moderates earlier—rather than ...
Diplomatic Failure: Breakdown, Failed Decisions, Lack of Off-ramps
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