In this episode of Stuff You Should Know, Chuck Bryant and Josh Clark examine how the Electoral College system creates swing states that wield disproportionate influence in presidential elections. They explain how the winner-take-all electoral system allows candidates to win the presidency while losing the popular vote, and why campaigns concentrate their resources on a handful of competitive states while largely ignoring safe states where outcomes are predictable.
The conversation covers how electoral maps have shifted dramatically in recent decades, with states moving between parties and new swing states emerging. Bryant and Clark also discuss how the system affects voter participation, particularly in safe states where minority party voters may feel their ballots don't matter. The episode concludes with an explanation of the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, an alternative approach that would align electoral outcomes with the national popular vote without requiring a constitutional amendment.

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Chuck Bryant and Josh Clark discuss how the U.S. presidential election system, based on the Electoral College, creates a dynamic where swing states hold disproportionate influence due to their close political divisions and persuadable voters. Bryant emphasizes that even hundreds of undecided voters can determine a state's outcome, making these states the focus of substantial campaign resources.
Clark explains that citizens don't directly elect the president—they vote for electors who then vote in the Electoral College. This means a candidate can win the presidency while losing the popular vote. Each state's electoral votes equal its congressional representation, and nearly all states use a winner-take-all system. Maine and Nebraska allocate votes differently, though Clark notes analyses suggesting this district-based approach could actually increase disparities between popular and electoral outcomes.
The system also creates "safe states" with predictable outcomes based on historical patterns. Bryant explains that campaigns largely ignore these states, leaving residents feeling sidelined. The blue/red color coding for states, which Bryant notes only became standard in 2000, has evolved into cultural shorthand that reinforces tribal political identities and oversimplifies complex political landscapes.
The electoral map has seen dramatic shifts in recent decades. Between 1966 and 1988, Republicans maintained a lock on 21 states representing 191 electoral votes, including California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Vermont. In 1992, Bill Clinton disrupted this by flipping nine states totaling 118 electoral votes, creating a new Democratic "blue wall" that has held in every election since.
The 2016 election brought another pivotal shift when Donald Trump broke the Democratic blue wall by flipping Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Trump achieved this by mobilizing less-educated, rural blue-collar workers who had largely been absent from recent contests, overturning prevailing demographic assumptions. He nearly flipped Minnesota and Maine as well, suggesting even the bluest states could no longer be taken for granted.
Since then, some states have stabilized: Ohio now leans Republican, while Colorado and Virginia lean Democratic. Georgia and Arizona have emerged as genuine swing states, and Texas, while still Republican, has shifted left by four points, attracting heightened media attention.
According to the Brookings Institution, more than 75% of presidential campaign spending concentrates in swing states, mostly on ads and targeted outreach. Campaigns micro-target specific constituencies within these states, aiming to sway just enough votes to tip the balance.
Voters in safe states often feel ignored and neglected by presidential campaigns. Those supporting the minority party in safe states may feel their votes are wasted, as the winner-take-all system effectively erases their ballots at the national level. This perceived futility can discourage participation, even though local races still offer engagement opportunities.
A state's swing status often stems from demographic and geographic diversity, particularly the urban-rural divide. Florida exemplifies this with its varied regions and shifting demographics—younger generations now represent 54% of registered voters, changing the political calculus. North Carolina's swing state status similarly comes from balancing populous, educated urban areas with extensive rural regions.
Clark explains that the Electoral College discourages participation in safe states by making individual votes seem inconsequential. In states dominated by one party, minority party voters often feel their votes can't influence the winner-take-all system. However, Bryant emphasizes that voters should always participate for ballot measures and local elections, noting that vote totals signal political shifts to parties and strategists.
Clark cites Trump's 2016 victories in Wisconsin and Michigan as examples of how mobilizing typically low-turnout voters can flip "safe" states, leading to realignments that upend national expectations. Consistent voting in the minority can influence party decisions to compete in new places, as seen with increased focus on Georgia.
Bryant stresses that voting is a fundamental right for which many Americans—especially women and people of color—have only recently secured access through significant struggle. He argues that dismissing voting as pointless stems from a privileged perspective that diminishes historical sacrifices. Clark concludes that the seriousness with which campaigns and even foreign governments treat U.S. elections demonstrates that results are not predetermined.
The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) seeks to address how candidates can win the popular vote by substantial margins yet still lose the presidency. Under the compact, member states pledge their electoral votes to the national popular vote winner rather than their own state's winner. Currently, 15 states and DC have passed legislation to join, with several more considering it.
Clark notes that this approach avoids the constitutional amendment process, which would require ratification from 38 states to abolish the Electoral College. Instead, it works around the system by leveraging state law. The Electoral College was deliberately designed by the framers to prevent direct popular vote selection, placing an elite layer between voters and presidential selection.
Clark emphasizes that the Electoral College has resulted in four presidents who lost the popular vote, including Al Gore in 2000 (by 500,000 votes) and Hillary Clinton in 2016 (by 2.9 million votes). Analysis shows a candidate could theoretically win with as little as 23% of the popular vote by focusing on low-population swing states. The NPVIC addresses this by ensuring member states award electoral votes in alignment with national preference, guaranteeing the presidential winner reflects the popular will of the entire country.
1-Page Summary
The U.S. presidential election system, based on the Electoral College, creates a dynamic where swing states hold outsized influence due to their political division and shifting voter allegiances. In contrast, "safe states," those reliably voting Democratic or Republican, receive far less campaign attention and are shaped by historical voting patterns and reinforced color-coded identities.
Chuck Bryant emphasizes that swing states are defined not only by their close political divisions but by their significant populations of persuadable voters who could shift their allegiance from one party to another. Sometimes just thousands, or even hundreds, of undecided or swing voters can ultimately determine a state's outcome. Because these voters can change the result of an entire state, every vote in a swing state is especially vital, making them the focus of substantial campaign attention, money, and effort. For example, Florida—a perennial swing state—receives enormous attention during presidential campaigns. This phenomenon persists even as political polarization intensifies in the U.S., making the existence of undecided voters in these states all the more surprising and consequential.
Many Americans believe their individual vote directly elects the president, but Josh Clark explains that the U.S. system is indirect. Citizens vote for electors pledged to a candidate, and electors, in turn, vote for the president in the Electoral College. This structure means that a candidate can win the presidency despite losing the national popular vote, as has happened in several modern elections. The real contest is for a majority of the Electoral College votes (currently 270 out of 538), not necessarily for the most actual votes nationwide.
Each state's Electoral College vote total equals its number of U.S. Senators (always two) plus its number of Representatives in the House, which is based on population. Except in Maine and Nebraska, nearly all states use a winner-take-all system—if a candidate wins a state's popular vote by even a single vote, they receive all of that state's electoral votes. This setup means that narrow margins in key swing states can have massive implications; even a difference of a thousand votes can dictate which candidate receives a large bloc of electoral votes, making these states disproportionately powerful in the outcome.
Maine and Nebraska depart from the winner-take-all rule. They allocate two electoral votes to the statewide popular vote winner, while the remaining votes are awarded based on individual congressional district results. Though this approach may initially appear fairer, Clark notes analyses (such as from fairvote.org) suggesting that if every state used a district system, it could actually result in greater disparities between the national popular vote and the electoral outcome. For example, under some scenarios a candidate could theoretically win the electoral vote while receiving as little as 23% of the popular vote, further disconnecting the will of the voters from the actual result.
The Electoral College system also creates "safe states," ...
Swing States and the Electoral College System
Josh Clark and Chuck Bryant analyze how the U.S. presidential electoral map has seen dramatic shifts over the last three decades, with watershed years like 1992 and 2016 upending established political alignments and redefining battleground states.
Between 1966 and 1988, Republicans maintained a firm electoral lock with 21 states reliably voting Republican every election. This so-called "red wall" represented 191 electoral votes, a significant advantage for Republican candidates. Notably, this bloc included states such as California, Illinois, New Jersey, Virginia, and Vermont—states that would later become Democratic strongholds. During this period, Democrats faced a steep disadvantage, needing to win more than three-quarters of the remaining electoral votes to secure victory, excluding the predictably Democratic DC.
In 1992, Bill Clinton disrupted this entrenched dynamic, flipping nine states from the Republican red wall, totaling 118 electoral votes. This included California, Illinois, New Jersey, and Vermont—states that have not voted Republican in any presidential election since 1992. Clinton’s victory marked an unprecedented transformation, as these previously Republican strongholds became part of a new Democratic "blue wall."
Clinton’s ultimate triumph, with a 370-168 margin in the Electoral College, demonstrated that deeply rooted electoral patterns could be dramatically upended, redrawing the political map. The once-reliable Republican states he captured have since voted Democrat in every presidential election, solidifying their place in the blue wall of 18 states, along with DC, that steadfastly supported Democrats from 1992 onward.
The 2016 election represented another pivotal moment when Donald Trump managed to break the Democratic "blue wall" by flipping traditionally Democratic states like Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania. Trump achieved this by mobilizing voters who had been largely absent from recent contests—especially less-educated, rural blue-collar workers, some of whom had been lifelong Democrats. This targeted outreach overturned the prevailing demographic assumptions about which groups composed each party’s base and who turnout efforts should target.
Trump's efforts came close to flipping additional strong Democratic states such as Minnesota and Maine, both of which have traditionally voted Democratic for decades—Minnesota, in particular, had not voted Republican in roughly 50 years. These near-victories suggested that even the bluest of states could no longer be taken for granted.
Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, once cornerstones of the blue wall, became competitive battlegrounds in 2016, signaling a new era where states previously considered safe could, with the right strategy and candidate, become critical swing states overnight.
Voting Pattern Shifts (Red to Blue Wall, 2016 Trump Flip)
According to the Brookings Institution, more than 75% of a presidential candidate's campaign spending is concentrated in swing states. Most of this spending goes toward ads—both traditional and social media—along with robocalls and other targeted outreach activities. Candidates focus their money, time, and campaign stops in these competitive states because, in the Electoral College system, securing enough swing state wins can mean reaching the crucial 270 electoral votes needed to win the presidency.
Campaign outreach in swing states is not generic but highly targeted. Campaigns strategize to identify specific constituencies within these states, such as autoworkers or public infrastructure workers, aiming to sway just enough votes in key groups to tip the balance in their favor. This micro-targeting and investment underscore why swing states like Florida consistently receive significant attention and resources from both major parties, leaving candidates to almost exclusively prioritize these battlegrounds over states with more predictable outcomes.
Voters in safe states—those that reliably vote for one party—often feel ignored and neglected by presidential campaigns. Residents of these states express frustration that national candidates rarely visit, address their local concerns, or engage in campaign events outside of swing states. As one example, people in Idaho may feel sidelined as campaigns focus on Florida or Ohio.
This lack of attention makes many safe state residents believe their voices matter less in presidential outcomes, especially in states with long-standing partisan patterns. Voters who back the minority party in safe states may feel their ballots are wasted, as the winner-take-all allocation of electoral votes means that even a sizable minority’s votes are effectively erased at the national level. This perceived futility can discourage participation in presidential elections, even though local ballot measures and contests still offer chances for engagement. Ultimately, candidate engagement in safe states is limited by the overwhelming focus on swing state strategy.
A state’s swing status is often shaped by significant demographic and geographic diversity, particularly the urban-rural divide. Florida exemplifies this dynamic: Its cultural and political landscape varies dramatically by region, ...
Campaign Strategy and Political Focus on Swing States
The discussion between Josh Clark and Chuck Bryant highlights how the U.S. electoral system, particularly the Electoral College, shapes voter participation and perceptions of "wasted votes," especially in states perceived as politically safe for one party.
Josh Clark explains that in states dominated by one party—for example, Georgia, which has trended Republican for years—voters from the minority party often feel their votes will make no difference in presidential contests. Because the Electoral College assigns all a state's electoral votes to the candidate who wins the popular vote there, individual ballots cast for the losing party are effectively neutralized. This discourages participation from voters who feel the outcome is predetermined.
This “wasted vote” mentality undermines the idea of equal participation. Clark notes that Democratic voters in Republican-dominated Georgia, or Republican voters in strongly Democratic states, may be tempted to abstain from voting, further cementing political divides and diminishing the influence those voters could wield if they participated en masse.
Chuck Bryant adds that voters should always participate, not just in presidential races but also because ballots include crucial local elections and referenda. Even in a “safe” state, votes shape statewide and local outcomes, and the cumulative data signals political shifts to parties and strategists. For example, a close gubernatorial race in Georgia, like when Stacey Abrams almost won, drew national attention and altered perceptions of the state's political landscape. Parties adjust national campaign strategies based on these vote totals, so every vote helps signal potential for future competitive races.
Persistent participation from minority party voters in “hopeless” states can contribute to long-term shifts. Clark references Vermont in 1992, where voters might have believed their votes for Bill Clinton were wasted, but their turnout ultimately changed the state’s support. Consistent turnout, even when winning seems unlikely, builds a foundation for future change.
Clark also cites Donald Trump’s 2016 victories in Wisconsin and Michigan as examples of how “safe” states can flip when campaigns manage to mobilize voters who usually abstain. Engaging these low-turnout groups can move a “hopeless” state into competitive territory, leading to potential realignments that upend national expectations.
Both hosts emphasize that aggregate data from consistent voting in the minority can influence party decisions to compete in new places. Bryant points to the increased focus on Georgia as vote tallies have indicated shifting demo ...
Electoral System's Impact on Participation and "Wasted Votes"
The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) is a coalition of states advocating for an alternative approach to selecting the U.S. president. Their overriding question, as Chuck Bryant frames it, is how a candidate can win the popular vote by substantial margins—such as 3 million or 500,000 votes—and still lose the presidency. The NPVIC seeks to address what they view as a broken system by circumventing the Electoral College’s current function while still operating within its structure.
Under current Electoral College rules, states award their electoral votes to the candidate who wins that state’s popular vote. The NPVIC changes this by having member states pledge their electoral votes to the candidate who wins the national popular vote, rather than their own state’s winner. For example, if Idaho joined the compact and the compact was active, Idaho’s electoral votes would go to the national popular vote winner even if another candidate won Idaho’s ballots.
Currently, the states and jurisdictions that have passed legislation to enter the compact include Washington, Oregon, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Vermont, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii. Several more, including Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia, are considering or have pending legislation for joining the compact.
A key feature of the NPVIC is that it does not abolish the Electoral College, thus avoiding the cumbersome constitutional amendment process, which would require ratification from 38 states. Instead, it works around the Electoral College by leveraging state law, allowing states to collectively ensure their electoral votes reflect the national popular vote outcome without any change to the Constitution.
The Electoral College was deliberately included by the framers of the Constitution to place an elite layer between the voters and the presidential selection. Josh Clark notes that this mechanism was designed to prevent the direct popular vote from choosing the president, entrusting the power to a select group of politicos.
Defenders of the Electoral College often cite the founders’ intentions, focusing on their vision for checks and balances. However, this system results in ...
Electoral Reform: National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
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