In this episode of Stuff You Should Know, the hosts explore how A.Q. Khan became a key figure in nuclear weapons proliferation. The episode details Khan's journey from studying metallurgy to infiltrating a Dutch uranium enrichment company, which led to his central role in developing Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1980s.
The summary covers Khan's establishment of an international nuclear trafficking network that supplied technology and materials to countries including Iran, North Korea, and Libya. It also examines how geopolitical factors, particularly U.S. Cold War priorities and Khan's popularity in Pakistan, allowed his activities to continue for decades before his eventual arrest and controversial release.
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A.Q. Khan, born in India in 1936, became the central figure in Pakistan's nuclear weapons development through his expertise in metallurgy and espionage. After earning his doctorate in metallurgy in 1972, Khan infiltrated a Dutch uranium enrichment company, Urenco, where he gained access to crucial nuclear technology. Upon returning to Pakistan, he led Project 706, successfully producing bomb-grade uranium by 1982.
Khan established an extensive international network for trafficking nuclear technology and materials. Through front companies and middlemen, his operation supplied nuclear capabilities to several nations. In Iran, Khan's network helped construct 50,000 uranium enrichment centrifuges by the 1990s. With North Korea, he established a trade relationship exchanging nuclear knowledge for missile technology. His network's activities continued until 2003, when authorities intercepted centrifuge parts bound for Libya.
The United States' response to Khan's activities was heavily constrained by geopolitical considerations. During the Cold War, U.S. presidents from Carter to H.W. Bush overlooked Pakistan's nuclear program to maintain cooperation against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. When Khan's network was finally exposed, Pakistan's President Musharraf placed him under house arrest, though he was later pardoned and released. Seymour Hersh reports that the U.S. accepted this lenient treatment in exchange for information about Pakistan's nuclear aid to Iran. Khan's popularity in Pakistan, where he is revered for advocating Muslim countries' access to nuclear weapons, also influenced the government's reluctance to hold him fully accountable.
1-Page Summary
A.Q. Khan played a crucial role in Pakistan's quest to develop nuclear weapons. His expertise in metallurgy and espionage were integral to the country's uranium enrichment efforts.
A.Q. Khan's journey from a metallurgy student to the leader of Pakistan's nuclear enrichment program illustrates his critical role in the country’s nuclear development.
Born in India in 1936, A.Q. Khan moved to West Pakistan in 1952. He pursued metallurgy, graduating initially in 1960 from the University of Karachi. Khan’s education in metallurgical engineering culminated with a doctorate in 1972.
In the early 1970s, Khan worked at Physical Dynamic Research Laboratory in the Netherlands, which was connected to the uranium enrichment company Urenco, a consortium involving Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands. Khan used his position to gain access to confidential information about ultracentrifuges, indicative of espionage for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program. Dutch intelligence agencies grew suspicious when Khan asked questions unrelated to his work, reflecting his intent to steal nuclear technology.
Despite being removed from enrichment projects due to these suspicions, by October 1975, and leaving the company with vital documents, Khan was alread ...
A.Q. Khan's Role in Pakistan's Nuclear Program
A.Q. Khan's illicit activities involved the widespread exchange of nuclear technology and materials with countries like Iran, North Korea, and Libya, circumventing international restrictions and causing global security concerns.
Peter Griffin, a partner in a Dubai-based company, placed orders in 2001 with a Malaysian company, which created a subsidiary to turn these plans into a real program. This network included a diverse group of actors such as middlemen from across Europe, designers from Switzerland, and companies constructed specifically for building and shipping these parts from various countries like Malaysia and Turkey to Libya. The Khan network had grown sophisticated enough to produce sales brochures for arms sales fairs.
Khan's first dealings with Iran began in 1987. He helped them construct up to 50,000 P1 centrifuges that were essential for producing highly enriched uranium. While Iran received the outdated P1 centrifuges initially, by the mid-1990s, the more advanced P2 centrifuges also began to reach Iran. Iran's government paid $3 million for nuclear information and further attempted to bypass Khan's 10 percent commission by directly contacting suppliers.
Khan reportedly made at least 13 documented trips to North Korea aiding in their enrichment program. In turn, North Korea provided Pakistan with long-distance missile technology, establishing a quid pro quo arrangement. Notably, during Pakistan's nuclear test in 1998, North Korean delegates, l ...
A.Q. Khan's Illicit Nuclear Network and Deals With Iran, North Korea, Libya
The U.S. faced significant challenges in trying to restrain A.Q. Khan’s nuclear proliferation activities because of geopolitical considerations that took precedence over nonproliferation goals.
During the 1980s, the United States supplied military aid to Pakistan to support their fight against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Despite awareness of Pakistan's nuclear program, the U.S. intelligence services did not intervene, prioritizing cooperation with Pakistan over nuclear nonproliferation. Presidents Carter, Reagan, and H.W. Bush even falsely certified that Pakistan did not have a nuclear weapons program to keep supplying aid. This certification continued until the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1990, at which point President Bush ceased aid when he could no longer certify Pakistan’s non-nuclear status.
Once A.Q. Khan's nuclear network was exposed, President Pervez Musharraf, under U.S. pressure, removed Khan from his position at the research laboratories, ostensibly demoting him to an advisory role. Khan was later put on TV to admit his role in the proliferation network and apologize, claiming he acted alone—a statement viewed with widespread skepticism.
Despite this public facade, Pakistan placed Khan under house arrest, with the initial arrest being followed by a pardon. Meanwhile, Pakistan continued to protect Khan from the CIA and International Atomic Energy Agency by refusing direct questioning. Even after his release, Khan was barred from giving interviews to the United States or international nuclear commissions.
Stopping A.Q. Khan's Nuclear Proliferation and Enabling Geopolitical Factors
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