In this episode of Modern Wisdom, CIA whistleblower John Kiriakou discusses the structure and operations of America's intelligence agencies, arguing that career bureaucrats form a "shadow government" with more practical power than elected officials. Kiriakou explains how the CIA's longevity relative to presidential terms allows it to effectively bypass executive directives, and how minimal congressional oversight enables agencies to operate with limited accountability.
Kiriakou covers the post-9/11 torture program and explains why harsh interrogation methods are both illegal and ineffective compared to rapport-based approaches. The conversation also addresses government surveillance expansion through the Patriot Act, the erosion of civil liberties, and China's economic strategy for global influence. Additionally, Kiriakou discusses international intelligence operations, methods foreign services use to recruit American assets, and historical examples of behavioral engineering campaigns—including successful mass persuasion efforts that have shaped public opinion both domestically and abroad.

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John Kiriakou discusses how intelligence officers at the CIA often serve for 25 to 37 years, far outlasting presidential terms. This enduring bureaucracy can effectively bypass presidential directives by appearing compliant while circumventing orders. Chris Williamson compares this to running a nightclub—the real loyalty forms between long-standing managers, not temporary owners. Kiriakou emphasizes these career officials have more practical power than elected leaders and a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.
The CIA capitalizes on new presidents' inexperience through the highly classified President's Daily Brief, creating emotional allegiance and making them "one of the guys." The agency also exercises power by withholding information from Congress. Kiriakou shares an example where a failed operation resulting in loss of life was deliberately not reported to congressional oversight because Congress was preoccupied with other matters.
Congressional oversight is severely limited—about 40 to 50 staffers oversee agencies with 20,000 to 40,000 employees. This enormous disparity means committees largely rely on the CIA's self-reporting. Kiriakou affirms that the CIA functions as a "shadow government," with actual policy-making power residing with career officials operating below political appointees. These unelected bureaucrats exercise true control, insulated from political turnover.
The CIA's post-9/11 torture program employed harsh interrogation methods that violated U.S. law and the Constitution. Waterboarding involves strapping a subject onto an inclined board and pouring water over the face, producing a drowning sensation. Abu Zubaydah actually drowned during this process—his heart stopped and he had to be revived. The cold cell technique involved stripping prisoners, chaining them to a ceiling, chilling the room to 50°F, and throwing ice water on them hourly, causing deaths that were never prosecuted.
Kiriakou explains that torture is proven ineffective for extracting truthful information. Subjects will say whatever they think interrogators want to hear to stop the pain, leaving analysts to spend months separating fact from fiction—by which point any operational value is lost. Historical examples support this: John McCain provided the names of the Green Bay Packers' offensive line when asked to name his military unit while being tortured.
In contrast, the FBI's rapport-based interrogation approach involves treating suspects respectfully and offering small tokens like cigarettes or writing materials. Success develops over weeks or months as interrogators cultivate relationships, leading individuals to eventually open up voluntarily. This non-coercive environment produces reliable intelligence.
Despite the Federal Torture Act of 1946 and UN Convention Against Torture explicitly prohibiting these methods, the U.S. became what Kiriakou calls a "torture state" after 9/11. After World War II, the U.S. executed Japanese soldiers for waterboarding American POWs, and in 1968 court-martialed a U.S. soldier for the same act. The law hasn't changed—the country's standards did. These illegal techniques resulted in coerced confessions that judges subsequently excluded from legal proceedings, meaning families of victims never see proper trials and suspects remain in indefinite detention.
Kiriakou explains the U.S. classification system includes levels beyond "top secret," with dozens of additional compartments requiring separate clearances. Certain research is so compartmentalized that not even presidents are routinely informed—they must specifically request access. A former classification czar under George W. Bush believes about 75% of classified information is designated that way only to shield the government from embarrassment, not for genuine security.
Prior to 9/11, the FBI needed a federal judge to authorize investigations with specific cause and a signed warrant. After the Patriot Act, the FBI only needs to issue a National Security Letter to demand information, bypassing the judiciary completely. Recipients are prohibited from revealing the demand, eliminating any opportunity for subjects to contest surveillance or even know it's happening. Agencies can also simply purchase desired metadata directly from companies.
Technology corporations are now tightly intertwined with government surveillance efforts. Following 9/11, the CIA received authorization to invest in tech startups, becoming the first investor in Palantir, now a global security software giant with credible suggestions that its data is accessible to the NSA and CIA. Companies like Flock and Clearview AI allegedly help the government sidestep legal protections limiting official domestic surveillance.
A Cato Institute survey shows nearly 30% of Americans under 30 support the government installing surveillance cameras in every home, compared with only 14% of the general population. Kiriakou finds this generational shift troubling, noting that the normalization of data sharing with tech platforms has led younger generations to view trading personal information for services as standard, eroding expectations of privacy and threatening civil liberties.
Kiriakou identifies China as the greatest U.S. strategic threat, though it lacks a traditional history of imperialism. Instead of investing heavily in military expansion, China co-opts nations through economic means—buying ports, airports, factories, and infrastructure. This economic strategy isolates the U.S. internationally and frees up resources for technology development. While the U.S. defense budget exceeds one trillion dollars annually maintaining over 200 bases in more than 140 countries, China leverages more targeted spending to buy global influence.
China intensifies its espionage campaigns directly targeting the U.S. A deep-cover cell was uncovered in New York City, Chinese intelligence recruits U.S. officials including Capitol Hill staffers and FBI agents, and Chinese intelligence officers are strategically placed in hard science PhD programs across the U.S. Additionally, U.S. passport chips are manufactured in China, meaning China can potentially control or compromise the security of all American passports.
When ranking global intelligence services, Kiriakou asserts that Israel leads in effectiveness and advancement per person, operating from a constant sense of existential threat. This aggression is directed not only at adversaries but also at allies—recently, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency warned officers that Israel was ramping up intelligence operations targeting the U.S. government. The FBI historically identified over 180 undercover Israeli operatives infiltrating U.S. defense contractors.
Kiriakou describes the "Asset Acquisition Cycle" used by foreign intelligence services to recruit Americans: Spot, Assess, Develop, and Recruit. Operatives seek vulnerabilities such as personal debt or financial pressures to exploit. Most compromised assets within the U.S. government are not foreign nationals but American citizens who have been turned after beginning their careers in good faith.
Successful intelligence operations require patience, skill, and ingenuity. The Israeli operation to kidnap Adolf Eichmann from Argentina required building a fake safe house and operating in a country with which Israel had no diplomatic ties. Similarly, the hunt for Carlos the Jackal required months of persistent surveillance in Khartoum, with a CIA contractor devising clever means to confirm his presence before he was subdued by his dentist and extradited to France.
Kiriakou recounts the CIA's first covert action program in Italy's 1949 election. The CIA gave $150,000 to the Christian Democratic Party to rent journalists, then provided pro-conservative articles for publication in mainstream newspapers. The communists, leading in all pre-election polls, ultimately lost. Kiriakou underscores that the operation's success depended almost entirely on control of media placement—simply having a platform to reliably push a narrative shifted the outcome.
In the 1970s, Nestle struggled in the Japanese beverage market due to longstanding preference for tea. Nestle enlisted psychoanalyst Cloterepi, whose expertise revealed that childhood memories shape adult preferences. Armed with this insight, Nestle launched a years-long campaign targeting children with coffee-flavored desserts, introducing the taste in a form they would enjoy and remember. By the time coffee-flavored Kit Kats hit the market in 2014, Japanese consumers were already comfortable with coffee, and Japan's coffee market achieved record highs.
In contrast, Kiriakou shares an example of a failed U.S. psychological operation: a $150,000 initiative in Yemen where the military ran a pirate radio station playing jazz interspersed with call-in shows. The idea was that by encouraging Yemeni youth to appreciate jazz, they would develop more favorable views of the United States. Kiriakou calls the strategy naïve and concludes that most government psyops fail due to lack of cultural insight and simplistic assumptions about how easily populations can be swayed.
Kiriakou points to a rare and highly successful domestic campaign: the acceptance of the Patriot Act after 9/11. Americans, driven by fear-based messaging about terrorism, quickly acquiesced to severe erosions of constitutional liberties. Most public complaints focused not on fundamental privacy intrusions but on minor inconveniences like removing shoes at airport security. This campaign normalized sweeping government surveillance and established new norms where the loss of privacy is accepted as a trade-off for collective security.
1-Page Summary
Intelligence officers at the CIA often serve for 25 to 37 years, far outlasting the usual four- or eight-year term of a president. John Kiriakou describes how this enduring "deep state" bureaucracy can bypass presidential directives by appearing compliant while in reality circumventing the orders. He recalls knowing officers who have spent nearly four decades in the agency, cementing their expertise and influence. Presidents, on the other hand, come and go, never accumulating the institutional knowledge or forming lasting relationships that the career staff do.
Chris Williamson compares the agency to running a nightclub, where the true loyalty forms between the long-standing managers rather than the temporary owners; as "owners" (presidents) change frequently, career bureaucrats develop stronger ties with their peers, not with those briefly in charge. Kiriakou agrees, emphasizing that these long-term officials have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo to secure their jobs and authority, leading to their having more practical power than the elected leaders.
Kiriakou notes that the CIA actively capitalizes on the inexperience of new presidents, especially those lacking foreign policy backgrounds. As soon as a new president is elected, they begin receiving the highly classified President’s Daily Brief (PDB). Handled by top-ranking intelligence officials, these briefings reveal sensitive operations and secrets, creating an emotional allegiance in the president and making them “one of the guys.” This immersion in insider knowledge can sway presidents toward supporting the agency uncritically. Only presidents with significant foreign policy experience tend to remain more skeptical and less beguiled by the mystique of classified information.
The CIA also exercises power by keeping certain information shielded from presidents or failing to report key incidents to congressional oversight. Kiriakou shares a personal example in which a failed operation that resulted in a loss of life was deliberately not reported to Congress at the urging of his station chief, simply because Congress was considered to be preoccupied.
Following the revelations of the Church and Pike Committees in the 1970s, formal oversight committees were created: the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Kiriakou points out the mismatch—about 40 to 50 congressional staffers are tasked with overseeing massive agencies that can number 20,000 to 40,000 employees. This enormous disparity in scale and access to information makes effective oversight nearly impossible and means the committees largely rely on the CIA’s self-reporting.
Kiriakou offers a concrete example: when a covert operation went bad and resulted in a loss of life, the station chief instructed him not to report the event to Congress, rationalizing that it wasn’t the right time as Congress was consumed with the budget. Kiriakou obeyed, noting that this kind of nondisclosure was not ...
Cia Structure, Oversight, and the "Deep State"
The CIA’s post-9/11 torture program employed harsh interrogation methods, some of which were approved by the Justice Department, despite these techniques violating both U.S. law and the Constitution.
Waterboarding involves strapping a subject onto an inclined board with the head below the feet, placing material such as cloth or burlap in the mouth, and pouring water over the face. This produces a sensation of drowning—enough water can permeate the material to actually induce drowning. In the case of Abu Zubaydah, he drowned; his heart stopped and he had to be revived, only to be subjected to further torture. Waterboarding is not legal under U.S. law.
The cold cell method entailed stripping prisoners naked, chaining them to an eyebolt in the ceiling so they could not sit or rest, chilling the cell to 50°F, and throwing buckets of ice water on them hourly. This technique caused prisoner deaths, constituting murder never prosecuted or authorized by the Justice Department.
CIA-authorized sleep deprivation involved keeping prisoners awake for up to 12 days, with industrial-strength lights and loud music played on a loop. The American Psychological Association reports people begin to lose their minds by day seven and start dying by day nine as organs shut down. Survival beyond this point is unsustainable.
Torture is proven ineffective for extracting truthful information. Subjects under torture will say whatever they think interrogators want to hear to make the pain stop. Analysts are then left to sift through false and misleading information, a process that can take months—by which point any operational utility is likely lost. For example, John Kiriakou notes it might take six months to separate fact from fiction—time in which a terror plot might already occur.
History shows torture produces unreliable confessions. John McCain, for example, provided the names of the Green Bay Packers’ offensive line when asked to name his military unit while being tortured, illustrating how captives fabricate answers to stop abuse.
Effective interrogation centers on respect, patience, and dialogue. The FBI’s long-practiced approach involves engaging suspects in friendly conversation, treating them respectfully, and offering small tokens like cigarettes, apples, or writing materials. This non-coercive environment can lead to genuine disclosures.
Success develops over weeks or months as interrogators cultivate rapport, leading individuals to eventually open up. Unlike the CIA’s focus on inflicting pain, the FBI’s rapport-based approach offers a proven path to reliable intelligence.
The Feder ...
Interrogation Methods, Torture, and Interrogation Ethics
John Kiriakou explains that the US government’s classification system includes several levels: unclassified, sensitive but unclassified, confidential, secret, and top secret. “Confidential” typically covers information that may be embarrassing to the government if exposed, whereas “secret” and “top secret” classify information whose revelation would cause serious or grave damage to national security, respectively, as defined in the Espionage Act.
Beyond “top secret,” there are dozens of additional compartments, such as Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information/Special Intel Keyhole (TS-SCI-SITK) and gamma, each with its own clearance requirements. “Gamma” represents some of the highest compartments for CIA analysts on a day-to-day basis, often covering highly sensitive information like intercepted foreign leader communications. There are also operationally generated compartments, like the now-defunct “ZARF,” with randomly assigned code names, further restricting access even among those with top secret clearance.
Kiriakou notes that certain research, especially that conducted by DARPA or involving special operations, is so compartmentalized that not even presidents are routinely informed. If a president requests information on such matters, they must be read into the compartment specifically—a process not done by default, though the president holds ultimate declassification power.
Kiriakou cites a former classification czar under George W. Bush, now an anti-classification activist, who believes that about 75% of classified information is designated that way only to shield the government from embarrassment or inconvenience, not for genuine security.
He describes a pattern where the White House and Pentagon authorize leaks regularly, using classified information as a political tool, to embarrass foreign leaders, or to gauge public reaction to potential policy moves. Although such leaks technically violate the Espionage Act, they are common practice in Washington.
Kiriakou recounts how, prior to 9/11, agencies like the FBI needed a federal judge to authorize investigations, requiring specific cause and a signed warrant. After the passage of the Patriot Act, this changed dramatically. The FBI now only needs to issue a National Security Letter to demand information from service providers, bypassing the judiciary completely. Recipients are prohibited from revealing the demand, eradicating the opportunity for the subject to contest the surveillance or even know it’s happening.
Furthermore, if agencies want data from an ISP, they can simply ask for it or “just buy” the desired metadata directly from companies, circumventing the need for court approval or warrants altogether.
Kiriakou warns that technology corporations are now tightly intertwined with government surveillance efforts. He believes the economy is deeply infiltrated, with companies and devices—TVs, phones, internet services—providing avenues for data collection.
In the wake of 9/11, the CIA received congressional authorization to invest in tech startups, which led to the agency becoming the first investor in Palantir. Now a global secur ...
Government Surveillance and Civil Liberties
John Kiriakou states that China does not have a traditional history of imperialism, rarely invading or attacking other countries except for isolated conflicts such as Tibet, a brief conflict with North Vietnam, and two border skirmishes with India. Instead, China co-opts other nations through economic means. Rather than investing heavily in military expansion or supporting a global network of military bases like the U.S., China focuses its resources on global investments—buying ports, airports, factories, and infrastructure such as desalination plants. This economic strategy isolates the U.S. internationally, frees up cash for technology development, and strengthens China’s influence without direct confrontation.
While the U.S. defense budget exceeds one trillion dollars annually, funding inefficient projects and maintaining over 200 bases in more than 140 countries, China leverages its more targeted spending to buy global influence. Kiriakou notes that this enables China to invest in technological advancement and strategic infrastructure rather than in purely military assets. He argues that China’s endpoint resembles U.S. Cold War containment: fostering conditions where the U.S. is isolated, economically strained, and potentially self-collapsing under mounting debt and defense obligations.
At the same time, China intensifies its espionage campaigns. Recent Chinese intelligence operations have directly targeted the U.S. and its allies: a deep-cover cell was uncovered in New York City, where agents threatened dissidents in the Chinese American community and their families back in China. China recruits U.S. officials, including Capitol Hill staffers, FBI agents, and attempts to infiltrate the CIA. Moreover, Chinese intelligence officers are strategically placed in hard science PhD programs across the U.S., highlighting the breadth and seriousness of the threat.
Kiriakou reveals another layer of vulnerability: U.S. passport chips, key to American identification and border security, are manufactured in China even though assembly occurs in Thailand. The chips contain source security codes, meaning China can potentially control or compromise the security of all American passports. This highlights a core U.S. security weakness—not just from military or espionage threats, but through deep supply chain dependence on China for essential components like semiconductors. The U.S.’s reliance on China-made chips exposes it to risks of sabotage, surveillance, or unauthorized access to sensitive information embedded in vital national infrastructure.
When ranking global intelligence services, Kiriakou asserts that Israel leads in effectiveness and advancement per person. Israel operates from a constant sense of existential threat, fueling unsurpassed intensity and excellence in intelligence work. This aggression is not only directed at adversaries but also at allies—recently, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) warned all officers that Israel was ramping up intelligence operations targeting the U.S. government, particularly the DIA.
The increasing co-location of Israeli officers in the Pentagon and the CIA further blurs lines between cooperation and infiltration. Historically, the FBI identified over 180 undercover Israeli operatives infiltrating U.S. defense contractors across the country, underscoring the sophistication and persistence of Israeli intelligence efforts in the United States.
Kiriakou describes the "Asset Acquisition Cycle," a four-stage process used by foreign intelligence services to recruit Americans: Spot, Assess, Develop, and Recruit. First, the target is identified and their access to valuable information is assessed. Next, operatives seek vulnerabilities—such as personal debt, love for family, or financial pressures—to exploit. Once a vulnerability is identified and tested, the individual is formally recruited, often in exchange for financial or personal favors. Most compromised assets within the U.S. government are not foreign nationals, but American citizens who have been turned after beginning their careers in good faith. Unlike the Soviet Cambridge spy ring in Britain—where agents like Kim Philby were recruited and ideologically groomed as students—foreign assets inside the U.S. government are overwhelmingly turned in place through personal vulnerabilities.
The evolution of espionage has produced incredibly ...
International Intelligence Operations and Threats
Behavioral engineering, propaganda, and subtle consumer manipulation have shaped political outcomes, economic preferences, and citizen attitudes in both dramatic and everyday ways. Examining high-profile intelligence operations and corporate marketing campaigns reveals both the effectiveness and frequent limitations of mass persuasion strategies.
John Kiriakou recounts the CIA’s first covert action program, which aimed to remove the communist party from contention in Italy’s pivotal 1949 election. The operation was straightforward: the CIA gave $150,000 to the Christian Democratic Party and instructed them to use the money to rent journalists. The CIA then provided these journalists with pro-conservative articles, which were published in mainstream newspapers, swaying public perception. As a result, the communists, leading in all pre-election polls, ultimately lost the election.
Kiriakou underscores that the operation’s success depended almost entirely on control of media placement. Simply having a platform to reliably push a narrative, even with minimal sophistication, shifted the outcome of a nation’s election.
In the 1970s, Nestle struggled to make inroads into the Japanese beverage market, which had a longstanding preference for tea over coffee. To address this, Nestle enlisted psychoanalyst Cloterepi, whose expertise revealed that childhood memories play a key role in shaping adult preferences. Japanese consumers, having few or no childhood associations with coffee, naturally gravitated to tea.
Armed with this insight, Nestle launched a years-long campaign targeting children with coffee-flavored desserts and treats, introducing the taste of coffee in a form they would enjoy and remember. One early example was a children’s dessert with coffee flavor. Over time, these imprints of coffee taste influenced the future buying habits of an entire generation. By the time coffee-flavored Kit Kats hit the market in 2014, Japanese consumers were already familiar and comfortable with coffee. As a result, Japan’s coffee market achieved record highs and the flavor was embedded in the nation’s consumer culture.
John Kiriakou shares an example of a failed US government psychological operation: a $150,000 initiative in Yemen where the US military ran a pirate radio station playing jazz interspersed with call-in shows. The idea was that by encouraging Yemeni youth to develop an appreciation for jazz—a genre perceived as distinctly American—they would develop more favorable views of the United States. During these shows, hosts would slip in pro-American messages to callers. Kiriakou calls the strategy naïve and dismisses it as ineffective.
Behavioral Engineering and Mass Persuasion
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