In this episode of Modern Wisdom, Robert Pape examines the rise of violent populism in America, arguing that the primary threat to democracy now comes not from foreign adversaries or fringe groups, but from tens of millions of citizens who express support for political violence. Pape presents survey data showing extraordinary increases in support for violence across the political spectrum, driven by rapid demographic shifts and rising wealth inequality that create existential anxieties about political power and cultural identity.
Pape challenges conventional stereotypes about who engages in political violence, revealing that perpetrators increasingly come from educated, middle-class backgrounds rather than marginalized communities. The conversation covers the mechanisms through which social media normalizes violence, the dangerous dynamics surrounding upcoming elections, and the absence of leadership willing to unify Americans against violence. Pape emphasizes that political figures are symptoms rather than causes of these deeper social transformations affecting mature Western democracies worldwide.

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According to Robert Pape, the main threat to American democracy is now tens of millions of citizens expressing support for political violence—far beyond the threat of foreign governments or fringe extremist groups. Pape distinguishes violent populism from ordinary populism by its direct support for violence as a political tool. Unlike past eras where political violence came from small, isolated groups, today's violent populism emerges across the political spectrum, normalized through a "cascade effect" where each violent episode raises acceptance of future violence.
Recent surveys reveal extraordinary increases in support for political violence. By September 2025, 14% of Americans supported anti-Trump violence, and after Charlie Kirk's assassination, 65% of American adults—about 65 million—supported using force to prevent Trump from becoming president. Pro-Trump violent populism is also pronounced, with 16% of Americans supporting using the military against Democratic protesters. Combined, roughly 100 million Americans currently back some form of political violence.
Three recent instances illustrate this shift: the Summer 2020 George Floyd protests where 5-7% of demonstrations turned violent, the January 6th Capitol attack where 1,600 of 120,000 rally attendees engaged in direct violence, and college campus protests after October 7, 2023. Pape emphasizes that mass support for violence crucially increases its likelihood, as social approval nudges volatile individuals toward action. Social media has accelerated this process, offering instant validation and magnifying the normalization effect.
The United States is experiencing rapid social changes driven by significant demographic shifts and rising wealth inequality. In 1990, 76% of Americans were non-Hispanic white; today that figure has dropped to 57%, with projections reaching 49% within 15 to 20 years. For over two centuries, the U.S. population was consistently 80-85% white, making this transformation historically unprecedented. Pape emphasizes this rapid demographic transition is creating acute existential anxiety over political power and cultural dominance, directly driving Donald Trump's rise and focus on immigration.
Surveys reveal Americans who fear whites are being intentionally replaced are four times more likely to support violence for Trump, while those viewing the country as historically racist are 2.5 times as likely to support violence against him. Parallel to demographic change, the top 1% of Americans now hold 26% of the country's wealth, up from 17% in the late 1980s. This creates what Pape calls a "negative sum society," where each year feels like a step backward for the bottom 99%.
Pape stresses the most powerful force behind political violence is not individual leaders but deep, broad social changes. Politicians like Trump or Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez are symptoms rather than causes, reflecting and amplifying anxiety generated by underlying shifts. This dynamic is not peculiar to the United States—other mature Western democracies including Germany, Canada, Britain, and France are witnessing similar patterns.
Pape explains that the prevailing stereotype of political violence perpetrators—young, rural, unemployed militia members—no longer reflects reality. The new typical profile is well-educated, middle-class Americans with nice homes, stable careers, and financial investments. Pape's analysis of all 1,575 individuals prosecuted for January 6th reveals that 45% were established professionals—business owners, doctors, gynecologists, nurse practitioners, and psychologists. Mapping Texas participants' home locations, he finds they overwhelmingly come from affluent suburbs around Dallas and Austin, not poorer or rural regions.
Pape explains these perpetrators believe they are on the brink of losing everything due to political changes and fear for their lifestyle, status, and future if the opposing party comes to power. He references Luigi Mangione, who came from generational wealth and attended the Ivy League University of Pennsylvania, yet engaged in political violence for social justice causes. Another example is Cole Allen, a 31-year-old engineer and Trump's third would-be assassin, who described feeling morally obligated to address social injustices, styling himself as a Robin Hood figure.
Evidence linking support for political violence to actual violence is found in perpetrators' manifestos. After attacking Paul Pelosi, the perpetrator apologized for failing to kill Nancy Pelosi, acknowledging he acted because "they wanted her dead." According to Pape, manifestos commonly include family apologies but also rationalize violence by invoking pain, duty, and the support of a larger community, establishing a link between personal motivations and broader social endorsement.
Pape warns the coming midterm elections represent unprecedented risk, detailing a three-stage process where electoral disputes could escalate into widespread violent conflict. Stage one occurs when razor-thin margins create a "legitimacy shock," leading losers to doubt election validity. Stage two is the congressional certification on January 6, 2027, echoing the events of 2021, where the losing side must decide to accept or contest results. Stage three involves prolonged opposition and potential violence lasting months or years if the losing coalition refuses to concede.
Pape categorizes the upcoming midterms as possibly the most dangerous in living memory, noting Trump has already referenced using the Insurrection Act to suppress potential Democratic protesters. He references his June 2025 New York Times warning about imminent political violence, noting that within months his predictions came true with Charlie Kirk's assassination, Operation Midway Blitz in Chicago, and Metro Blitz in Minneapolis.
Pape connects domestic polarization to foreign policy, noting the Iran war marks the first post-WWII conflict with no "rally around the flag" effect. Public support splits along partisan lines, demonstrating deep existential cleavages in American politics that even foreign propaganda cannot bridge.
Survey data show 65% to 70% of Americans abhor political violence, according to Pape. However, this "silent majority" lacks effective leaders or platforms to amplify their anti-violence consensus. No political leader on any side is willing to make opposition to political violence a top campaign issue, even though this is fundamental to maintaining stability.
Media and political leaders perpetuate a cycle where they attribute opposing violence to ideology while excusing their own side. Left-leaning outlets may dismiss left-affiliated attackers as mentally ill, while right-leaning media use similar approaches for right-wing violence. Pape gives the example of Trump's behavior surrounding January 6th: Trump failed to intervene until hours after violence began, later glorified insurrectionists, and ultimately pardoned all 1,575 prosecuted participants. Efforts such as de-platforming Trump and Tucker Carlson did not reduce violence, as the anger is sustained by deeper social changes, not merely by figureheads.
Pape argues a united, consistent message from all leaders—clearly rejecting violence by their own side—remains essential to combating violent populism. Trump's political strategy demonstrates keen understanding of the stakes many Americans feel about cultural and demographic shifts, often focusing on symbolic social issues that major media dismiss as trivial but resonate deeply with voters anxious about the pace and direction of social transformation.
1-Page Summary
Political violence in America has entered an unprecedented era. According to Robert Pape, the main threat to democracy is now the tens of millions of Americans who express support for political violence—far eclipsing the threat posed by foreign governments or fringe extremist groups. This support, now lodged in the mainstream, is fundamentally changing the political landscape of the country.
Pape distinguishes between ordinary populism and violent populism. Ordinary populism involves large segments of society upset with the establishment, leading to political polarization and sometimes peaceful protest. It can fuel massive electoral shifts and increased political participation without necessarily crossing into illegality or violence. Violent populism, however, transforms establishment anger into direct support for political violence as a tool to achieve political goals. This distinguishes it from the past, when such violence was the activity of small, isolated groups or lone individuals.
Pape insists that the era since the beginning of President Trump’s first term is historically unique—neither echoing the 1960s, with nearly all violence on the left, nor the 1920s where it was mostly on the right. Today, violent populism emerges on both sides of the political divide, fueled by mass support for violence and social media's amplification of inflammatory rhetoric. Political violence is thus normalized across the spectrum in a “cascade effect,” where each new violent episode raises acceptance of future violence. Mass support for violence does not require every supporter to act but raises the probability and scale of such acts by giving volatile individuals social approval and a sense of legitimacy.
Recent surveys and focus group data reveal extraordinary increases in public willingness to justify political violence. Several years ago, support for anti-Trump violence stood at just 6-9% of Americans; by September 2025, support had already reached 14%, representing over 30 million people, and after Charlie Kirk’s assassination, an astonishing 65% of American adults—about 65 million—declared support for using force to prevent Trump from becoming president. Forty-four percent of all Democrats polled endorsed this position.
The specifics of this support are troubling. In focus groups, 55% of those backing “force” against Trump meant assassination attempts with rifles, not non-lethal confrontation or rioting. The remaining 45% included those who envisioned January 6-style riots—violent mass actions to prevent political opponents from rising to power.
Pro-Trump violent populism is also pronounced. Sixteen percent of Americans, nearly all Republicans, support using the U.S. military to suppress Democratic protesters—around 40 million people. Combining pro- and anti-Trump support, Pape calculates that roughly 100 million Americans currently back some form of political violence as the nation approaches the midterms.
The new era of violent populism is marked by major, collective, and confrontational episodes rather than isolated acts:
Violent Populism in America: Definition, Statistics, and Manifestations
The United States is experiencing rapid social changes driven by significant demographic shifts and rising wealth inequality. According to Robert Pape, these root causes are fueling existential politics and a period of violent populism which threaten the fabric of American democracy and are increasingly being mirrored in other mature democracies.
The demographic composition of the U.S. has changed rapidly in a single generation. In 1990, 76% of the American population was non-Hispanic white; today that figure has dropped to 57%. If current trends continue, the country is projected to reach 49% non-Hispanic white within the next 15 to 20 years—an imminent tipping point depending in part on immigration and deportation policies. Pape emphasizes that for over two centuries, the U.S. population was consistently between 80% and 85% white, making the current transformation historically unprecedented and politically significant.
This rapid demographic transition is creating acute existential anxiety over which political parties will control the future. The Republican Party, being much more heavily white in composition than the Democratic Party, finds its electoral prospects tied to these demographic trends. The shift not only affects which party wins elections but also the core coalition and policy focus of both major parties.
The demographic transformation is a direct driver of the meteoric rise of Donald Trump, whose presidential campaign and signature immigration issue resonated powerfully with voters anxious about losing cultural and political dominance. Trump’s focus on immigration and, later, deportations, has kept him at the top of the Republican Party, as many supporters see him as a bulwark against these changes. For a significant fraction of the Trump base, he represents a stand against what they perceive as deliberate efforts to reduce white political power.
Surveys reveal the depth of this anxiety: Americans who fear that whites are being intentionally replaced in the U.S. are four times more likely to support violence for Trump. Conversely, those who view the country as historically racist are 2.5 times as likely to support political violence against Trump. Thus, the demographic shift is not loosely, but directly, fueling violent populism, explaining why such unrest is happening now and not in previous generations.
Parallel to the demographic revolution, wealth has been concentrating at the top at an accelerating rate. In the late 1980s, the top 1% of Americans held about 17% of the country’s wealth; today that share has ballooned to 26%. This rise means the bottom 99% is increasingly squeezed, facing higher costs, declining opportunities, and reduced upward mobility compared to previous generations. The benefits of economic growth accrue to the very top, while the rest operate within what Pape calls a “negative sum society,” where each year feels like a step backward.
This cocktail of concentrated wealth and economic anxiety extends across the political spectrum. Both Republican and Democratic elites share deep fears: when the opposing party holds power, they might lose material comfort, political rights, or the long-term well-being of their children. Specific events, like the government and media response to disasters in strongly Republican areas, or persistent concerns among Democrats about the erosion of legal rights, reinforce these worries.
The fusion of wealth concentration and demographic anxiety means that each election is transformed into a zero-sum, existential contest. Both sides are convinced that a loss for their party threatens their identity, privileges, or future prospects. Political leaders in both parties focus on restraining the other side’s billionaires, but neither demonstrates serious commitment to reversing the wealth shift among their o ...
Root Causes: Demographic Shifts, Wealth Inequality Fueling Existential Politics
Robert Pape explains that the prevailing stereotype of political violence perpetrators—someone young, rural, unemployed, and involved with militias—no longer reflects reality. Over the past five or six years, the new typical profile is that of well-educated, middle-class Americans; people with nice homes, stable careers, and financial investments. These individuals are often seen in suits and ties and live in affluent suburbs rather than in rural or economically-disadvantaged areas.
Pape describes this new stereotype as both insurrectionists and social justice warriors emerging from privileged backgrounds, reinforcing that perpetrators are no longer the marginalized or disenfranchised. He emphasizes that those involved are from places like Elmhurst, Illinois, and the prosperous suburbs of Dallas and Austin, Texas—not from remote or rural areas like the Texas Panhandle. This marks a shift of violent populism into the mainstream, middle-class American society.
Pape’s analysis of all 1,575 individuals prosecuted for the events of January 6th reveals that 45% were established professionals—business owners, doctors, gynecologists, nurse practitioners, and psychologists. This significant proportion demonstrates how the mainstream, educated, and economically secure segments of the population are now implicated in political violence.
Mapping the home locations of the Texas participants in the January 6th attack, Pape finds they overwhelmingly come from affluent suburbs around Dallas and Austin, not poorer or rural regions. This pattern further supports the conclusion that violent political actors today are mainstream, middle-class individuals.
Chris Williamson questions why individuals who seemingly have much to lose—stable families, careers, property, and education—would risk everything for political action or violence. Pape explains the answer lies in the perceived threat these individuals feel: they believe they are on the brink of losing everything due to political changes and fear for their lifestyle, status, and the future if the opposing party comes to power.
Pape underscores that these perpetrators believe they are acting in defense of their existing privileges and way of life, which are felt to be under immediate threat. The willingness to risk so much comes from an urgent sense that the stakes are existential.
Pape references Luigi Mangione as a representative case. Mangione comes from generational wealth, attended prestigious preparatory schools and the Ivy League University of Pennsylvania, and enjoyed a privileged lifestyle in Hawaii. Despite these advantages, he engaged in political violence for what he viewed as social justice causes—showing that privilege does not inoculate against radicalization.
Another notable example is Cole Allen, a 31-year-old engineer and the third would-be assassin of President Trump. In his manifesto, Allen describes feeling morally obligated to address social injustices happening under the Trump administration. He styles himself as a Robin Hood figure: ready to sacrifice and take action where he believes others, despite sharing his beliefs, would not.
Who Commits Violence: Educated Middle-Class Profile Contradicts Stereotypes
Robert Pape warns that the coming midterm elections represent an unprecedented risk in American democracy, driven by the potential for election-related violence that extends well past Election Day. Drawing on both recent history and new societal divides, Pape lays out a multi-stage process by which electoral disputes could escalate into widespread, sustained violent conflict.
Pape details a process in three stages where the American electoral system, under current polarized conditions, transforms mass grievance into political violence.
Stage one occurs at the moment of the vote count, especially when margins are razor thin. The losing side, regardless of party, is primed to see the outcome as illegitimate. They tend to believe the other side must have cheated, feeling a profound “legitimacy shock.” Pape emphasizes that both parties now show signs of refusing to believe they lost fair and square.
Stage two is the focal point of certification, slated for January 6, 2027, echoing the events of January 6, 2021. The process of formally seating the winner in Congress becomes a flashpoint, as whichever side loses must decide: accept the results or contest them. Pape questions whether either party will restrain their supporters from pressuring Congress, raising the possibility of massive protests or unrest during certification.
If disputes are not resolved on certification day, stage three unfolds with prolonged opposition and potential violence lasting months or years. Pape notes that if the losing coalition refuses to concede, violence can escalate well past certification, potentially destabilizing governance.
Pape categorizes the upcoming midterms as possibly the most dangerous in living memory, not because of Election Day but due to what follows during the certification and aftermath.
Pape recounts how President Trump has already referenced using the Insurrection Act and deploying the military to suppress potential Democratic protestors. This raises the specter that a Republican victory might be met with armed federal responses to left-wing dissent, while a Democratic win could provoke unrest from the right.
Societal changes have eroded mechanisms for peaceful concession. Pape argues that the composition and attitude of both major parties mean that neither side is likely to quietly accept defeat, amplifying the risk of post-election escalation.
Pape references his June 2025 New York Times warning about imminent po ...
Elections: The American Domestic Escalation Trap
Survey data consistently show that 65% to 70% of Americans abhor political violence, according to Robert Pape. This large majority opposes violence in politics and constitutes a “silent majority.” However, they lack effective vehicles, leaders, or platforms to express and amplify their anti-violence consensus. Despite the country becoming more radicalized, surveys repeatedly reveal this core consensus against violence.
Pape emphasizes that there is no political leader—on any side—willing to make opposition to political violence a top campaign issue or priority, even though this is fundamental to maintaining American stability. The public’s anti-violence stance is not reflected in mainstream leadership or political discourse. Almost no political leaders are vocally concerned about the risk of violence occurring, especially not from their own supporters.
Podcasts, rather than traditional political or media avenues, are currently rare but important mediums where this anti-violence stance is vocalized. Pape acknowledges specific podcast hosts and media figures who focus their platforms on combatting political violence and reflecting the views of this unrepresented majority, attempting to give them a voice. Yet, on social media and in wider civic spaces, there is still low visibility and pushback against violent populism.
The media and political leaders often perpetuate a cycle where they attribute political violence by the opposing side to ideology while excusing or minimizing violence by their own side. Left-leaning outlets may dismiss left-affiliated attackers as suffering from mental illness, while right-leaning media use a similar approach for right-wing violence, deflecting responsibility away from their own camp. Stories about political violence are formulaic in their bias and rarely acknowledge the underlying, bipartisan problem.
While some organizations and a few political leaders have attempted more balanced discussions of violence, these efforts are uncommon and rarely rewarded in the current political climate. Instead, most leaders fail to actively restrain or discourage violent tendencies in their supporters, furthering the risk of escalation. Both the language used and the lack of accountability help normalize a dangerous cycle—one not easily broken without explicit restraint and condemnation from political figures themselves.
The glorification and excusal of violence by partisan leaders deepen the problem. Pape gives the example of Donald Trump’s behavior surrounding the January 6th insurrection: Trump failed to intervene until hours after the violence began and later publicly expressed admiration for the participants. Even after the event, Trump glorified the insurrectionists, used Truth Social to validate January 6th, and ultimately pardoned all 1,575 prosecuted participants, regardless of the severity of their crimes. Pape’s research team reviewed every one of these cases, illustrating the scale and conscious nature of Trump’s response.
Efforts such as de-platforming Trump and other inflammatory figures like Tucker Carlson did not reduce the underlying sentiment or incidence of political violence. Pape points out that the media and some policymakers believed removing these figures from mainstream platforms would diminish violent impulses, but the data ...
Leadership's Lack of Restraint and Anti-Violence Message
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