In this episode of the Lex Fridman Podcast, Andrew Scull examines the troubled history of psychiatric treatment and the current state of mental healthcare. The conversation traces biological interventions from the 19th century through the mid-20th century—including insulin coma therapy, electroconvulsive treatment, and lobotomy—that often caused more harm than healing. Scull explains how financial incentives, institutional authority, and selective reporting allowed these practices to persist despite poor outcomes and significant patient harm.
The episode also explores the development of psychoanalysis and cognitive behavioral therapy, the accidental discovery of psychiatric medications, and the limitations of current treatment options. Scull addresses fundamental challenges facing modern psychiatry, including the disconnect between diagnosis and biology, the failure of deinstitutionalization policies, and the crisis of homelessness and incarceration among those with serious mental illness. The discussion emphasizes the need for psychiatry to broaden its focus beyond pharmacology to address the psychosocial dimensions of mental health.

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The history of biological interventions in psychiatry reveals desperate measures that often caused more harm than benefit, driven by scientific enthusiasm, financial incentives, and institutional authority. These interventions were justified with problematic theories and distorted success rates, resulting in profound ethical consequences.
As 19th-century asylums failed to deliver promised cure rates, psychiatrists blamed genetic defects and "degeneration," branding patients as evolutionary throwbacks who couldn't be cured. This justified prolonged institutionalization as segregation rather than therapy. Henry Cotton at Trenton State Hospital embraced the theory that chronic infections caused mental illness, orchestrating mass extractions of teeth, tonsils, and organs. He claimed an 80% cure rate, though 45% of patients subjected to major surgeries died within a year. Despite patient deaths, these extractions continued at Trenton until 1960.
[restricted term] coma therapy, introduced by Manfred Sakel in the 1930s, involved repeatedly inducing hypoglycemic comas with mortality rates between 1–5% and significant brain damage risk. Sakel claimed an 80% cure rate, but 1950s trials revealed its ineffectiveness. Metrosol and Cardiazol therapy induced violent seizures causing fractures and overwhelming terror. Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) began as unmodified treatment often causing fractures and memory loss, initially used as a disciplinary tool in asylums during the 1940s–1960s. CIA-funded experiments in Canada showed extreme consequences before legal restrictions limited involuntary use.
Lobotomy became the most extreme intervention. Walter Freeman's transorbital "ice pick" method involved inserting a sharp tool through the eye socket to sever brain connections. Over 40,000 Americans, mostly women, underwent lobotomy, with many left severely disabled or in a vegetative state. Eugenic beliefs also led to over 60,000 forced sterilizations in the U.S. by 1960, disproportionately in California. These justifications influenced Nazi Germany's T4 euthanasia program, which killed hundreds of thousands and pioneered gas chamber technology later used in the Holocaust.
These interventions persisted partly due to powerful placebo effects—dramatic procedures conducted with institutional authority instilled hope while psychiatrists selectively reported positive outcomes. Practitioners seeking wealthy patients exaggerated cure rates, with Cotton's clinic and Sakel's [restricted term] therapy attracting rich clients nationwide. The absence of randomized controlled trials or rigorous evaluation allowed harmful treatments to persist for decades based on anecdotal observations and selective reporting.
Freud introduced psychoanalysis to America in 1909, emphasizing repressed memories and childhood sexual experiences in generating psychological symptoms. His theory structured the mind as id, ego, and superego, with conflicts underlying mental life. Classical psychoanalysis required five 50-minute sessions weekly, favoring the wealthy elite. Despite lacking empirical evidence, psychoanalytic ideas became influential among artists, intellectuals, and elite culture. Jung split from Freud in 1913, receiving extraordinary patronage from America's richest families. By 1930, only about 300 psychoanalysts practiced in North America, serving a few thousand wealthy clients.
After World War II, psychologists played a greater role as mental health services shifted to outpatient care. Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) emerged through pioneers like Albert Bandura, Albert Ellis, and Aaron Beck as a scientific, pragmatic, and time-limited approach to disrupt maladaptive thought patterns. Beck, originally trained as a psychoanalyst, became disillusioned with its diagnostic inconsistency. CBT addressed everyday problems like mild anxiety and depression through exercises and homework, proving particularly effective for less severe conditions. Organizations like the UK's NICE found CBT outperformed antidepressants with fewer side effects. The measurable, reproducible nature of CBT gave it strong appeal, ensuring widespread adoption while psychoanalysis persisted as a boutique offering.
Psychopharmacology emerged largely through serendipity and commercial interest rather than clear scientific understanding, with initial optimism often obscuring complex issues around efficacy and side effects.
[restricted term], first synthesized as an antihistamine in the 1880s, languished until the 1950s when French physician Henri Labory tried it as an anesthetic potentiator and noticed patients became unusually calm. Colleagues at Paris's Saint Anne's Hospital tested it on psychiatric patients, observing dramatic reductions in agitation. Marketed as Largactil in Europe and [restricted term] in the U.S., it rapidly transformed hospital care. Drug companies capitalized on the market potential through aggressive sales tactics, and within two years millions were taking it.
First-generation antipsychotics effectively suppressed hallucinations and delusions in many patients, helping hospitals manage behavior. However, negative symptoms like apathy remained unaffected, and serious side effects—including akathisia, Parkinsonian symptoms, and tardive dyskinesia—were ignored until psychiatrist George Crane's 1973 publication exposed the harm. Second-generation antipsychotics like [restricted term], [restricted term], and [restricted term] aimed to reduce movement disorders but introduced severe metabolic disturbances, and significant numbers of patients still didn't respond.
Antidepressants were discovered in the 1950s when tuberculosis patients treated with MAOI drugs showed mood improvement. Initially perceived as a limited market, depression became the most common psychiatric diagnosis through diagnostic expansion and direct-to-consumer marketing. SSRIs, introduced in the 1980s with [restricted term], were marketed as correcting a serotonin "deficiency" never robustly supported by evidence. SSRIs slightly outperform placebo, improving depression ratings modestly by one to two points on 60-point scales, with much benefit likely from the placebo effect.
Despite broader use, SSRIs bring substantial complications: emotional numbing, sexual dysfunction often permanent, and severe withdrawal symptoms. The shift of prescribing from psychiatrists to primary care physicians means less monitoring and fewer referrals for alternatives. Overall, the accidental discoveries and aggressive marketing behind psychopharmacology revolutionized treatment while leaving significant questions about efficacy and side effects unaddressed.
Modern psychiatry faces interlinked crises, from unreliable diagnosis to limited treatment effectiveness and catastrophic public policy failures.
The DSM-3 in 1980 marked a shift to an atheoretical, symptom-based checklist system designed to improve reliability but never grounded in biological validity. DSM revisions steadily increased diagnoses from 106 in 1952 to nearly 300 in 2013. Critics, including former DSM leaders and NIMH heads, have denounced DSM-5 as "unscientific and useless." After over $20 billion invested in mental health research, there's been no progress recasting diagnosis in biological terms. Genetic studies failed to identify simple genes responsible for disorders, with large-scale studies explaining only about 10% of schizophrenia risk. Worse, genetic overlaps between schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and autism suggest these aren't discrete entities but points along a continuum.
Despite decades of research, treatment options remain limited. Both antipsychotics and antidepressants offer partial relief to some, but over 40% of users experience treatment-resistant depression or no benefit. The CATIE study found 67–82% of patients discontinued antipsychotics due to poor efficacy or intolerable side effects, including weight gain, metabolic syndrome, diabetes, sexual dysfunction, and withdrawal syndromes. Without biomarkers or genetic tests, psychiatrists and patients face demoralizing trial-and-error. Pharmaceutical innovation has stagnated since the 1990s, with existing drugs often no better than those discovered accidentally in the 1950s.
The U.S. promised deinstitutionalization would be coupled with robust community mental health services, but this promise was never kept. Individuals with serious mental illness now cycle between brief hospital stays, homelessness, and incarceration. Prisons have become the country's largest psychiatric institutions, with Los Angeles County Jail, Cook County Jail, and Rikers Island acting as principal inpatient facilities. People with serious mental illness die 15–25 years earlier than the general population, a mortality gap that's widening. This crisis demands coordinated social, political, and medical solutions—dedicated housing, ongoing support, and political will to prioritize vulnerable populations.
Lex Fridman notes that mental illness is intensely lonely for sufferers but highly social for families and caregivers. Andrew Scull points out that families often become advocates, seeking broader diagnostic criteria and more aggressive treatment. Organizations like NAMI are typically composed of family members rather than patients themselves. This advocacy has contributed to "diagnostic creep," where psychiatric boundaries expand. While access to support improves, there's risk of unnecessary medicalization and overdiagnosis.
The history of psychiatry reveals deep ethical dangers when scientific language replaces ethics. Eugenics justified forced sterilizations by depicting mentally ill individuals as degenerates, a narrative that inspired Nazi policies. In Nazi Germany, these theories escalated into the T4 program's systematic murder of 250,000 mentally ill people, developing gas chamber technologies later used in the Holocaust. American researchers, some supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, participated in eugenic programs and collaborations with Nazi researchers.
Scull stresses that psychiatry has prioritized pharmacology and neuroscience, largely due to federal grant money, while neglecting critical psychosocial components like loneliness, social isolation, and family conflict. Addressing these needs through social supports, employment, housing, and coordinated care would have more immediate positive effects than pharmaceutical advances alone. Yet there are few grant opportunities for studying psychosocial interventions, and academics depend on securing funding for their careers. This systemic bias perpetuates an imbalance: measurable science dominates while compassionate, holistic care lags behind. Scull emphasizes the urgent need to broaden focus beyond medication to embrace ethics, empathy, and the social realities of mental illness.
1-Page Summary
The history of biological interventions in psychiatry is marked by desperate measures that often caused more harm than benefit, shaped by scientific enthusiasm, financial incentives, and institutional authority. These interventions were frequently justified with problematic theories and reinforced by distorted success rates, resulting in profound ethical and human consequences.
As asylums, founded with intense optimism in the 19th century, quickly became overcrowded and failed to deliver promised cure rates—discharging only 35–40% of patients while the remainder endured chronic confinement—psychiatrists resorted to the notion that mental illness was rooted in biological inferiority or genetic defect. This led to the concept of degeneration, branding patients as evolutionary throwbacks with defective brains who could not be cured or released. Such beliefs justified prolonged institutionalization not as therapy but as segregation.
Henry Cotton, trained by leading psychiatrists, became superintendent at Trenton State Hospital and embraced the idea of “focal sepsis,” theorizing that chronic infections in the teeth and organs released toxins causing mental illness. Cotton orchestrated mass extractions of teeth and, when improvement failed, tonsils, stomachs, spleens, and colons. He claimed an 80% cure rate, although 45% of those subjected to major abdominal surgeries died within a year. Cotton's theories gained widespread acclaim, with his lectures published by prestigious presses and lauded in The New York Times. Despite patient deaths and declining professional support after Cotton’s death, tooth and tonsil extractions continued at Trenton until 1960, with hospital dentists estimating hundreds of thousands of teeth were removed.
[restricted term] coma therapy, introduced by Manfred Sakel in the 1930s, involved repeatedly inducing hypoglycemic comas in people with schizophrenia. Patients endured dozens of sessions involving thrashing, convulsing, and loss of consciousness, with mortality rates between 1–5% and significant risk of brain damage and obesity. Although Sakel claimed an 80% cure rate, the therapy remained in vogue until 1950s trials revealed its ineffectiveness, after which it was abandoned.
Seeking to “drive out” schizophrenia by artificially inducing epileptic seizures, psychiatrists began injecting patients with camphor, and later Metrosol or Cardiazol. These treatments caused violent grand mal seizures resulting in fractures and overwhelming terror before onset. Both patients and psychiatrists found the treatment harrowing and unpredictable; its complications were severe.
Electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), first experimented with by Saletti and Binney in Italy, began as unmodified treatment often causing fractures and significant memory loss. Initially, it was used extensively as a disciplinary tool in asylums during the 1940s–1960s—to control rather than cure patients—before later modifications with muscle relaxants reduced physical injuries but not the stigma, memory problems, or ethical controversy. CIA-funded experiments in Canada showed extreme consequences, and legal restrictions eventually sharply limited its involuntary use.
Lobotomy became the most extreme and infamous psychiatric intervention. Early procedures involved alcohol injections; Walter Freeman later created the transorbital, or “ice pick,” lobotomy, inserting a sharp tool through the eye socket and swinging it to sever brain connections. Freeman, seeking to mechanize the procedure, traveled the country performing and teaching the operation, often completing dozens in a day. Over 40,000 Americans, most of them women, underwent lobotomy, with many left severely disabled or in a persistent vegetative state; bureaucratic momentum and Freeman’s evangelism perpetuated the practice into the early 1970s.
Ideas of degeneration and genetic inferiority also led to eugenic policies. Over 60,000 forced sterilizations occurred in the U.S. by 1960, disproportionately in states like California. Justifications used for sterilization in the U.S. were later seized upon by Nazi Germany, fueling the T4 euthanasia program, which killed hundreds of thousands of mentally ill people and pioneered gas chamber technology eventually used in the Holocaust. American and British psychiatric rhetoric, supported by prominent scientists and philanthropies such as the Rockefeller Foundation, were influential in shaping Nazi policy and providing its scientific rationale.
History of Biological Psychiatric Interventions and Ethical Consequences
Freud introduced psychoanalysis to America in 1909 at Clark University, accompanied by his disciples, including Carl Jung. He emphasized the centrality of repressed memories and childhood sexual experiences in generating psychological symptoms. Freud believed the unconscious mind contains "half-murdered memories" that, though hidden, reemerge as symptoms or behavioral disruptions. His theory held that childhood experiences, particularly those involving sexuality and trauma, profoundly shape adult psychology—ideas that mainstream American psychiatry of the period criticized as unscientific and irrelevant for treating psychotic patients.
Psychoanalytic theory structured the mind as three interacting parts: the id (primitive, pleasure-seeking drives), the ego (the rational, reality-oriented mediator), and the superego (internalized moral standards). Conflict and negotiation among these structures underlie both normal and pathological mental life.
Classical psychoanalysis developed into an intensive treatment for those who could afford it—often the wealthy elite. Standard treatment required patients to lie on a couch and practice free association for five 50-minute sessions a week, favoring this method over the earlier use of hypnosis. The therapy intentionally uncovered what patients hid from themselves. While compelling, psychoanalysis lacked rigorous empirical evidence for its efficacy. When foundation officers after World War II pressed analysts for proof that their methods worked, practitioners typically resisted, insisting personality transformation could not be measured easily.
Despite continuous hostility from hospital psychiatry—which remained focused on psychosis and biological explanations—psychoanalytic ideas became a touchstone of early-20th-century elite culture. Freud's influence grew among artists, playwrights, novelists, and intellectuals, especially post-World War I. The popularity of his theories was partly fueled by the broader cultural fascination with trauma, as seen in cases of war-induced "shell shock," and by the compelling, often literary, narratives in his case histories.
Jung split from Freud in 1913 over doctrinal rigidity, the wealthy and rarefied patient base their profession attracted, and Jung's deviation from Freud's focus on sexuality. Jung found extraordinary patronage among America's richest families, such as the McCormicks and Mellons; his works received support from the Mellon Foundation. By 1930, only about 300 psychoanalysts practiced in North America, able to serve a few thousand wealthy clients—an elite, niche medical practice.
After World War II, psychiatry faced both unprecedented need and limited resources. Psychologists, previously less central than psychiatrists, began playing a greater role as mental health services shifted to outpatient care and the federal government funded training through agencies like the VA and the National Institute of Mental Health. Psychologists devised an innovative two-part training system—two years on scientific research methods, followed by two to three years of clinical experience—giving them an advantage in applying for research grants. In contrast, psychoanalysts were disconnected from academic psychology and struggled to secure funding.
Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) e ...
Development and Influence of Psychoanalysis and CBT
Psychopharmacology, the use of drugs to treat mental disorders, emerges largely through serendipity and commercial interest rather than clear scientific understanding. The initial optimism about drug treatment’s effectiveness for mental disorders often obscures complex issues around efficacy, side effects, and mechanisms.
In the late 19th century, Germany leads the world in pharmaceutical chemistry, producing drugs like aspirin and developing a burgeoning drug industry. [restricted term], first synthesized as an antihistamine in the 1880s, languished without a clear purpose until the 1950s. At that time, the French company Rhône-Poulenc provides samples to medical practitioners to see if the drug has potential uses, ranging from antiemetic to eczema treatment. Henri Labory, a lieutenant in the French Navy, tries it as an anesthetic potentiator and notices surgical patients become unusually calm and indifferent—what he calls a "chemical lobotomy." Alerting his relatives at Paris’s Saint Anne’s Hospital, they test it on psychiatric patients in larger doses, soon observing a dramatic reduction in agitation and destructive behavior. [restricted term], soon marketed as Largactil in Europe and [restricted term] in the United States, rapidly transforms into a major tranquilizer, enabling hospital staff to control patient behavior more easily.
Initially, hospital psychiatrists remain skeptical, but drug companies see the opportunity. With aggressive sales tactics and demonstrations to lawmakers, they market the calming effect of these drugs, showing footage of formerly agitated patients becoming placid. Early skepticism by American physicians gives way once SmithKline & French licenses the drug, and within two years, millions are taking it. This commercial success inspires a flood of copycat drugs and spurs the growth of "Big Pharma," shifting the industry’s focus from dubious tonics to powerful prescription products.
[restricted term] and chemically similar first-generation antipsychotics become widely used by the 1960s. These drugs are rebranded from "major tranquilizers" to "antipsychotics," implying activity against the core pathology of psychosis. They effectively suppress the “positive symptoms” of schizophrenia—hallucinations and delusions—in many, but not all, patients, helping hospitals manage disruptive behavior. However, negative symptoms such as apathy, lack of initiative, and poverty of speech remain largely unaffected, leaving many patients withdrawn and inactive.
The initial enthusiasm for antipsychotics results in widespread neglect of their serious side effects. These include incurable restlessness (akathisia), Parkinsonian symptoms, and most notably tardive dyskinesia—late-developing involuntary movements, especially in the face and limbs. These symptoms can be so extreme that affected patients draw stigma and misidentification as “mentally ill” due to the drug’s visible effects. For nearly two decades, many professionals ignore or downplay these issues, sometimes seeing side effects as a sign the drug is working. Only with psychiatrist George Crane’s 1973 Science article does the profession acknowledge the scale of the problem, prompting reforms.
By the late 1980s, concerns about side effects spur revivals and innovations. [restricted term], developed in 1957, avoids tardive dyskinesia but risks catastrophic drops in white blood cells and requires constant monitoring. Still, it proves useful for treatment-resistant cases. The advent of second-generation antipsychotics such as [restricted term], [restricted term], and [restricted term] brings chemically diverse compounds grouped together due to some overlap in efficacy and branding, even though they differ in side-effect profiles and effectiveness. While these drugs are less likely to cause movement disorders, they often introduce severe metabolic disturbances, and significant numbers of patients still do not respond.
The story of antidepressants is similarly accidental. In the 1950s, doctors treating advanced tuberculosis notice that patients given MAOI drugs, intended for the infection, suddenly exhibit dramatically improved moods. Drug companies initially consider depression a small market, then defined primarily by severe, hospitalization-worthy melancholia. This perception dramatically shifts over the following decades as diagnostic boundaries expand and direct-to-consumer advertising flourishes. Depression morphs into the most common diagnosis in psychiatr ...
The Accidental Discovery and Rise of Psychopharmacology
Modern psychiatry faces a set of deep-rooted and interlinked crises, ranging from the unreliable nature of current psychiatric diagnosis and limited effectiveness of pharmacological treatments to a catastrophic failure in mental health public policy. Despite advances in neuroscience and genetics, the field has not translated scientific insights into meaningful improvements for patients, leaving millions underserved and vulnerable.
The foundation of psychiatric diagnosis today was set in 1980 with the introduction of the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-3). This manual, according to Andrew Scull, marked a shift from cause-focused and psychoanalytical approaches to an atheoretical, symptom-based checklist system designed to improve reliability and research utility. The intention was simple: if a patient exhibited more than a certain number of symptoms from a list, they could be classified under a specific diagnosis such as major depression, schizophrenia, or bipolar disorder. This system appealed to drug companies, insurers, and families seeking certainty, but it was never grounded in biological validity—much like an 18th-century doctor classifying all "fevers" together without understanding their distinct causes.
The DSM's revisions have steadily increased the number and granularity of diagnoses: from 106 in the 32-page DSM-1 (1952) to nearly 300 diagnoses in DSM-5 (2013). Critics, including leaders of previous DSM committees and the heads of the National Institute of Mental Health, have denounced the DSM-5 as "unscientific and useless," arguing it is done in secret without scientific rigor.
Research hoped that neuroscience and genetic advances would enable diagnoses based on underlying biological pathology. However, after the investment of over $20 billion in mental health research by the NIMH, there has been no significant progress in recasting the diagnostic system in biological terms. Genetic studies failed to identify simple Mendelian genes responsible for disorders like schizophrenia. Instead, large-scale genome-wide association studies have only explained about 10% of schizophrenia risk, falling far short of understanding a clear, genetic basis.
Worse, genetic research has undermined the distinctiveness of categorical diagnoses. Significant genetic overlaps exist between schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and autism, suggesting these conditions are not discrete entities as currently classified, but points along a continuum of brain dysfunction. Should science ultimately discard these longstanding categories, it could erode public trust in psychiatry.
Despite decades of research, treatment options for serious mental illness remain limited in effectiveness and encumbered by side effects. Both antipsychotics and antidepressants, the cornerstones of current pharmacotherapy, offer partial relief to some, but over 40% of users experience treatment-resistant depression or derive no benefit at all. A large segment of patients obtains some improvement but also faces considerable side effects. The landmark CATIE study found that 67–82% of patients prescribed antipsychotics discontinued them due to poor efficacy or intolerable side effects. These include substantial weight gain, metabolic syndrome, diabetes, cardiac risks, sexual dysfunction, cognitive impairment, and withdrawal syndromes.
The root problem is unpredictable individual response—there are currently no biomarkers or genetic tests to indicate in advance whether a patient will benefit from a specific drug or experience harmful side effects. This forces psychiatrists and patients into a demoralizing and sometimes dangerous trial-and-error process.
Pharmaceutical innovation in psychiatry has stagnated since the 1990s and 2000s, as large drug companies shifted funding to more profitable therapeutic areas. Existing drugs today are often no better than those discovered by accident in ...
The Current Crisis in Modern Psychiatry
Mental illness is described as an intensely lonely and private affliction for those who suffer from it. Lex Fridman notes that the pain and suffering of mental health maladies are deeply personal, but for families and caregivers, the impact becomes highly social. The behaviors of those with mental illness can burden families and the broader community, complicating treatment and daily life.
Families of people with mental illness often become advocates, seeking broader diagnostic criteria, earlier intervention, and more aggressive treatment options. Andrew Scull points out that the diagnosis itself serves as a key to social and educational support. Parents and family members, especially those dealing with difficult cases like autism, often push for expanded criteria to ensure continued access to resources for their relatives. Organizations like NAMI (National Alliance on Mental Illness) are typically composed of family members advocating for the mentally ill, rather than the patients themselves.
This advocacy by families has contributed to what Scull calls “diagnostic creep,” where the boundaries of psychiatric diagnoses expand. While psychiatric “imperialism” or the desire for more clinical territory plays a part, families and advocacy groups resisting narrower definitions also drive this expansion. As a result, access to support improves, but there is also a risk of unnecessary medicalization and overdiagnosis.
The history of psychiatry reveals deep ethical dangers when scientific language replaces ethical frameworks. Eugenics, under the guise of science, once justified forced sterilizations by depicting mentally ill individuals as degenerates—a narrative that reflected and inspired Nazi racial policies. This pseudoscientific rhetoric was used to legitimize violations of dignity and autonomy throughout the early 20th century.
In Nazi Germany, these eugenic theories escalated into the systematic murder of 250,000 mentally ill people through the T4 program, which also led to the development of gas chamber technologies later deployed in the Holocaust. American researchers, some supported by the Rockefeller Foundation, participated in both eugenic sterilization programs and collaborations with Nazi researchers, further cementing the link between dehumanizing scientific language and the erosion of ethical standards in the treatment of the mentally ill.
Andrew Scull stresses that psychiatry has prioritized pharmacology, neuroscience, and genetics, largely due to the availability of federal grant money tied to measurable, biomedical phenomena. This focus, however, neglects the critical psychosocial components of mental illness—issues like loneliness, social isolation, lack of agency, and family conflict over medication. Scull and Fridman agree that imp ...
Social, Ethical, and Policy Dimensions of Mental Health
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