Greely Arctic Expedition | The Longest Winter | 3

Expedition Left Fort Conger August 1883; Faced Severe Environmental and Mechanical Challenges en Route to Relief Ship at Cape Sabine

In the summer of 1883, after two years isolated at Fort Conger on Ellesmere Island, Lieutenant Adolphus Greeley and his men were ordered to abandon their outpost and journey south. Relief ships had already failed to arrive for two seasons, and Greeley faced the pressing threat of the approaching polar night. The party boarded the five-ton steamboat Lady Greeley, accompanied by three smaller boats, in the hope of making it 250 miles to Cape Sabine and the relief ship he expected would be waiting—unbeknownst to them, the Proteus had already sunk weeks before.

Lady Greeley Ran Aground On Ice Post-Departure, Causing Delays and Exposing Crew Discipline Issues With Intoxicated Sergeant Cross at the Helm

Three days into their journey, disaster struck when the Lady Greeley ran aground on coastal ice instead of floating safely off-shore. Freeing the vessel consumed several critical hours. During this crisis, Greeley discovered that Sergeant Cross, entrusted with the ship, had broken into the fuel alcohol and was intoxicated. Cross’s mismanagement and drinking highlighted dangerous lapses in discipline at a crucial moment. Greeley refused Cross’s suggestion to wait for the tide, knowing their rations would not support any further delay, and compelled the crew to free the boat immediately.

Ice Formations Blocked the Route South, Forcing the Expedition Through a Dangerous Crevasse in a Towering Floe That Could Have Crushed Their Boats if It Shifted

Resuming the trek, the expedition pressed 80 miles south but soon found the channel ahead was blocked by a towering, mile-wide ice floe. With storms worsening and a blizzard setting in, Greeley sent Sergeant Brainard to scout. Brainard discovered a narrow crack—ten to fifteen feet wide and possibly stretching through the floe. Greeley made the perilous decision to risk a passage. The smaller boats were roped together, the Lady Greeley towed them in as a unit, and they hurried through the dangerous crevasse; any shift in the ice would have crushed them. Miraculously, they emerged on the other side.

Weather Worsens: Storms and Cold Slow Expedition Progress

After the hazardous crossing, Arctic storms and plunging temperatures set in, halting their advance. Progress slowed to a crawl—only four miles over two days as the men endured driving snow, crashing waves, and subzero temperatures. Further delays plagued the group as freezing conditions locked the waterway and progress over the next two weeks totaled just twenty-two miles.

Leadership Rejects Untested Strategy Due to High Risk

Facing relentless ice, dwindling rations, mechanical issues, and diminishing fuel for the steamboat, Greeley considered a desperate plan: abandon the Lady Greeley and allow their boats to ride a drifting ice floe south. Sergeant Brainard wrote in his diary that it sounded like madness, and Greeley ultimately decided the risk was too great for the untested strategy.

Team, After Abandoning Stea ...

Dr. Pavie and Lt. Kislingberry Aimed to Remove Greeley From Command, Citing His Erratic Behavior and Questionable Decisions to Declare Him Mentally Unfit

Amid deteriorating conditions on the expedition, Commander Adolphus Greeley proposed a controversial plan: loading their boats onto an ice floe and hoping to float south to Cape Sabine. Sergeant David Brainard recorded in his diary that this idea seemed like madness. Greeley’s persistent belief in the ice floe strategy alarmed the officers, prompting many to question his judgment and fitness to lead. Fears ran deep that following through could mean certain death for the group.

During one tense night, Dr. Octave Pavie and Lieutenant Frederick Kislingberry pulled Sergeant Brainard aside. They argued that Greeley was behaving erratically—citing his recent threat to shoot Sergeant Cross as evidence of instability—and that someone needed to act before disaster struck. Their plan was for Pavie to declare Greeley insane, enabling Kislingberry to assume command and return the expedition to Fort Conger. They appealed to Brainard, stressing the stress Greeley and his close aide, Brainard himself, were under, and insisted Brainard's support as the key to rallying the enlisted men. Despite their arguments, Brainard, torn between worry for the party and loyalty to the chain of command, refused to participate in a mutiny and warned them against pursuing such actions any further.

Without Brainard’s support, Pavie and Kislingberry’s mutiny attempt fell apart. Ultimately, Greeley decided against the ice floe strategy, judging it too dangerous, which averted the immediate crisis and defused plans for insurrection.

Greeley's Leadership Improved By Acknowledging Mistakes and Consulting Officers

Greeley Acknowledges His Faults After Kislingberry's Criticism of His Expedition Leadership

After these turbulent events, Greeley’s handling of leadership improved. Realizing the fragile morale and unity of his group, he called a meeting with all officers except Kislingberry, who had been previously stripped of command. In this meeting, Greeley admitted his mistakes and welcomed input from his officers, signaling a shift toward collaborative decision-making. For the first time in a while, the officers felt listened to and valued. This openness boosted morale as the team prepared to push forward.

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Polar Night Conditions at Camp Clay, 1883

By October 1, 1883, Lieutenant Adolphus Greeley and his twenty-four men were stranded in the Arctic, facing the threatening onset of a third polar night with only thirty-five days’ worth of rations. After traveling more than fifty days, they had no permanent shelter and saw little hope for rescue before summer. Greeley, refusing to yield to despair, halved the rations to stretch their meager food for fifty days. The men built shelter using rocks, moss, and lichen for insulation, covering it with their boat as a roof in imitation of Inuit designs to survive temperatures that would sink to -75°F. Drinking water was another ordeal: with most sources frozen solid, they had only enough fuel to melt water twice daily. They lived on reduced and rapidly decaying rations, including moldy dog biscuits, while hunger dominated every conversation.

Small hunting parties searched for game but the harsh, lightless Arctic winter had driven most animals south. The hunters occasionally managed to kill a walrus or seal, offering a rare boost in morale and precious calories. Meanwhile, search teams dispatched for caches or other expeditions’ leftovers endured horrific conditions, sometimes returning with frostbite so severe that men lost fingers and feet.

Starvation, Scurvy, Cold, and Stress Rapidly Deteriorated Men's Health

By Jan 1884, Men's Daily 12-ounce Food Intake Led To Wasting, Delirium, Hallucinations, and Paranoia Among Survivors

By January 1884, food intake plummeted to just 12 ounces a day, quickly eroding the health and sanity of the survivors. At night, starvation haunted their conversations; by day, men succumbed to wasting, delirium, hallucinations, and paranoia. Lieutenant James Lockwood, Greeley’s trusted deputy, began speaking gibberish. Another man challenged others to fights, while some refused to rise from their sleeping bags.

First Death in Expedition: Sergeant Cross (1884) From Starvation, Scurvy, Heart Failure

The first death came on January 18, when Sergeant William Cross succumbed to starvation and scurvy after more than two years in the Arctic. His demise was quietly attributed to a heart condition to prevent further despair, but the survivors understood that starvation was the true cause. The men buried Cross near camp, his death a grim milestone.

Men Ate Non-food Items Like Wax, Boots, Insects, Droppings, and Lichen for Calories

Desperation drove the men to consume virtually anything in search of calories: insects, shrimp, moss, lichen, bird droppings, candle wax, and even leather from boots. These substitutes offered meager nutrition and did little to stave off advancing scurvy and physical collapse.

Forays to Food Caches Were Blocked, Trapping Men With Insufficient Supplies

Hopes for resupply depended on distant food caches left by relief parties. In February, Rice and Jens Edward attempted a desperate trip north to Littleton Island, where vital stores awaited. Open water laced with drifting icebergs blocked their path; the ice was not solid enough for travel, and their boats were now too crucial for shelter to risk further. Despite knowing that stores lay within reach—only 23 miles away—the men were trapped, unable to cross to safety. L ...

Robert Todd Lincoln's Reluctance to Authorize a Rescue After the Proteus Failure

After the Proteus relief ship was lost in 1883, Robert Todd Lincoln, the Secretary of War, became increasingly hesitant to authorize another rescue mission for the stranded Arctic expedition. His reluctance was rooted in widespread government skepticism toward the value and safety of Arctic exploration; the loss of the Proteus only bolstered Lincoln’s belief that further investment in such expeditions would likely end in tragedy and wasted resources. The disaster allowed Lincoln to argue to President Chester Arthur and others that mounting another mission was neither prudent nor necessary.

Henrietta Greeley in San Diego Mobilized Networks and Media to Pressure the Government Into Action

Henrietta Sought Help From Family Friend and Newspaper Owner Douglas Gunn to Publish Articles Demanding Government Rescue of Expedition

She Wrote To Washington Acquaintances, Engaging Military and Political Wives to Influence Decision-Makers

Henrietta Countered Lincoln's Fatalism By Coordinating Efforts With Families to Maintain Hope and Belief That the Men Could Be Rescued

While officials in Washington hesitated, Henrietta Greeley launched her own campaign from San Diego. She met with Douglas Gunn, a longtime family friend and owner of the San Diego Tribune. Deeply worried for her husband and convinced of the government’s duty to act, she told Gunn of her outrage that the authorities would consider abandoning the expedition. Gunn, politically connected and aware of the power of public opinion, pledged his support. He immediately had his newspaper publish articles demanding the government mount a new rescue operation and promised to use his network of editors across the country—including in Washington—to expand the campaign. As he said to Henrietta, “If Lincoln’s worried about bad press, then we’ll give him some.”

With Gunn’s encouragement, Henrietta also reached out to her contacts in Washington, especially the wives of military and political leaders, who were known to wield significant informal influence. Henrietta agreed that she could depend on several well-situated women. She spent her days composing letters and telegrams to every person of influence she could reach, urging them to raise the issue and pressure decision-makers. In conversations with Gunn, she discussed how a coordinated effort could prevent Secretary Lincoln and President Arthur from leaving her husband’s party to die, vowing to keep hope alive that the men could be rescued.

Not content to act alone, Henrietta contacted the families of other expedition members and encouraged them to do the same, insisting that there was good reason to believe the stranded men still lived and could be saved. Throughout the fall of 1883, she was relentless in mobilizing support ...

Navy Rescue Team Finds Surviving Expedition Members Emaciated

On June 22, 1884, at approximately 8 p.m., Lieutenant John Cowell of the United States Navy sailed a steam launch along the shores of Cape Sabine, having piloted it from the Bear, one of the two Navy ships sent to rescue the Greeley expedition. Cowell spotted a tattered distress flag being waved from shore. Upon landing, he and his crew found Private Francis Long, emaciated but alive. After ensuring Long received help, Cowell rushed onward to locate the rest of the party. He found a tent, which he cut open, and called for Adolphus Greeley. Greeley, weakened and barely able to speak, confirmed through labored words that there were seven survivors. He managed only to say that they had accomplished their mission before collapsing from exhaustion. Inside the tent, Cowell was confronted with a grim scene: corpses lay inside, and among the survivors was a man without hands or feet, silently staring back at him.

Survivors Taken To Portsmouth, NH on August 1, 1884; Corporal Joseph Ellison, Who Lost Both Feet to Frostbite, Died During the Passage, Reducing the Count To six Survivors

When Greeley and the remaining survivors regained enough strength, they were taken aboard the rescue ships. During the return journey, Corporal Joseph Ellison, who had lost both feet and several fingers to frostbite, died. By August 1, 1884, only six survivors remained upon their arrival in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Those who endured the ordeal were celebrated as national heroes with a parade in Portsmouth, and their achievement of reaching the farthest northern point ever recorded was recognized worldwide. Despite the ordeal, the scientific data, records, and climate observations painstakingly collected by the expedition were preserved and later retrieved to support ongoing arctic research.

Cannibalism Rumors Prompt Kislingberry Family to Authorize Exhumation For Evidence of Mutilation

Not long after the survivors' triumphant return, rumors about cannibalism among the Greeley party began to swirl. Salacious newspaper stories stoked public outcry. The family of Lieutenant Frederick Kislingberry granted a journalist permission to exhume his body on August 14, 1884, to search for evidence of mutilation. Physicians who examined Kislingberry’s remains provided sworn statements indicating that his flesh had been cut away with a sharp object. The subsequent exhumation of other expedition members’ bodies revealed similar wounds on six corpses, further fueling allegations of cannibalism. Although Greeley steadfastly denied any knowledge ...