In this episode of All-In with Chamath, Jason, Sacks & Friedberg, the hosts examine Ryan Cohen's $56 billion bid to acquire eBay and his strategy for transforming both GameStop and the online marketplace. Cohen shares his business philosophy developed through building Chewy, emphasizing operational efficiency, customer experience, and hiring for determination over credentials. The episode explores how he applied these principles to turn around GameStop by focusing on the company's strengths in pre-owned games and collectibles rather than competing directly with Amazon.
The discussion covers Cohen's vision for combining GameStop's physical retail footprint with eBay's online marketplace, his plans to cut billions in expenses, and his strategy for entering live commerce and digital collectibles. Cohen also delivers direct criticism of eBay's current management and board, pointing to declining metrics, lost users, and a compensation structure he views as disconnected from performance. The episode examines his arguments for why eBay needs new leadership despite the board's rejection of his offer.

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Ryan Cohen's entrepreneurial journey showcases his ability to identify overlooked opportunities and build efficient, driven teams. After abandoning an online jewelry venture, Cohen pivoted to pet e-commerce when he recognized that the pet product market offered recurring revenue potential in a space where Amazon hadn't yet dominated and neighborhood pet stores still thrived. His vision for Chewy combined Amazon's supply chain efficiency with the personalized service of local pet stores, creating a hybrid model that emphasized fast shipping, wide selection, and expert knowledge.
Cohen ran Chewy as "a game of pennies," where success depended on exceptional efficiency. He personally managed early Google Adwords campaigns and supplier negotiations, emphasizing that supplier relationships should be transactional rather than friendly—complaints about contract fatigue signaled he was paying the right price. In hiring, Cohen prioritized "will over skill," seeking determined self-starters over experienced candidates. He recounts promoting a persistent woman from elder care despite repeated rejections because her drive proved more valuable than credentials.
Chewy's growth strategy centered on creating exceptional customer experiences through handwritten cards, pet portraits, and 24/7 service. Cohen believed delighted pet owners would naturally spread the word, providing more effective marketing than paid acquisition. When Cohen sold Chewy for $3.35 billion in 2017, the company later reached a $20 billion IPO valuation, but he expresses no regret. He notes that no one can predict future valuations, and the sale enabled him to pursue new opportunities with GameStop and eBay.
Cohen's GameStop investment began by identifying value in a business widely dismissed by the market. He saw opportunity in a company continually shorted and considered obsolete, recognizing that the upcoming PlayStation 5 and Xbox Series X launches could revive the retailer during this new console cycle. After becoming a passive investor and then board member, Cohen eventually stepped in as CEO when he observed a leadership vacuum and lack of capability from existing management.
Initially, Cohen tried applying Chewy's playbook by hiring e-commerce talent and focusing on online expansion, but this approach failed due to fundamental differences between pet supplies and physical video game retail. After reviewing financials, he pivoted to "maniacal cost cutting," eliminating waste and focusing on GameStop's competitive advantages: pre-owned games and collectibles rather than competing with Amazon on new merchandise.
Cohen expanded into trading card games and sports memorabilia, implementing a cash-for-PSA cards program where customers could bring graded collectibles to any location for immediate payment. Unlike many turnaround scenarios, Cohen valued internal talent over external hires, working closely with veteran employees who possessed deep institutional knowledge while occasionally bringing in outside experts to execute new strategies.
The results are tangible: Q1 revenue reached $835 million with 14% year-over-year growth, expenses dropped from $228 million to $202 million, and GameStop now boasts $9.7 billion in cash with $333 million in free cash flow and an authorized share repurchase plan.
Cohen targets eBay for its complementary fit with GameStop, noting both companies excel in secondary markets and collectibles—GameStop in physical retail, eBay online. His e-commerce expertise from Chewy makes him comfortable navigating eBay's global marketplace. The $56 billion bid leverages eBay's own balance sheet, offering shareholders 50% cash and 50% GameStop stock at a premium, allowing them to retain ownership while gaining new management.
Cohen proposes cutting $2 billion from eBay's $5.5 billion expense base, particularly the $2.4 billion spent on sales and marketing that yields negligible user growth. He sees live commerce as a major opportunity, pointing to its $400 billion market and rapid growth, though eBay's execution remains poor with cumbersome creator onboarding and problematic backend infrastructure. Cohen plans to transform GameStop's 1,600 stores into production studios for eBay sellers and creators while serving as logistics hubs for inventory, fulfillment, and authentication services.
Additionally, Cohen proposes creating a digital collectibles marketplace on eBay for in-game items and skins, noting there's currently no platform offering transparent pricing or efficient trading for these assets despite clear demand.
Cohen delivers pointed criticism of eBay's leadership, noting that every key metric has declined since COVID despite e-commerce market growth. Gross merchandise value and operating earnings have fallen, the company has lost 30 million active users, and operating expenses now exceed 50% of revenues—an unsustainable position for a capital-light marketplace model.
He argues management alienates sellers by cutting relationship programs like the concierge service for top sellers while forcing them to use costly third-party tools for basic functions that Amazon's Seller Central provides natively. Cohen criticizes the board for being highly paid with minimal stock ownership, attending few meetings, and maintaining compensation unconnected to business success. He notes management is "grossly overpaid" while taking "zero risk," and points to a failed shareholder vote to reduce thresholds for calling special meetings as evidence of an entrenched structure blocking accountability.
Cohen also criticizes leadership's reliance on consultants rather than engaging directly with sellers and engineering teams to solve known problems, seeing this as unwillingness to "roll up their sleeves." The board rejected his offer over financing concerns despite the proposal using eBay's own balance sheet, and has avoided scheduling meetings to discuss alternatives. Cohen expresses frustration that media dismisses him as speculative despite his $500 million personal investment in eBay, which directly aligns him with shareholder interests—unlike the current board and management who profit regardless of performance outcomes.
1-Page Summary
Ryan Cohen’s entrepreneurial story is rooted in recognizing overlooked opportunities, exacting operational discipline, and building obsessive, driven teams. His journey from a failed online jewelry venture to leading Chewy to a multibillion-dollar sale highlights his clear-eyed approach to value creation in competitive, low-margin consumer markets.
Cohen initially set out to launch an online jewelry business, investing heavily in trade shows, inventory, and distribution without much knowledge of the field. The breakthrough came during a visit to a neighborhood pet store, where he realized he understood the pet product market deeply as a pet owner himself. This insight, alongside the observable recurring revenue from regular pet purchases and a fragmented market that Amazon and large chains like Petco and Petsmart hadn’t yet dominated, persuaded him to pivot to pet e-commerce.
Cohen observed that neighborhood pet stores still flourished and Amazon, though selling pet supplies since the 1990s, had not reached scale in the category, signaling room for disruption with a direct-to-consumer model.
The vision for Chewy became clear: replicate the personal, knowledgeable service of neighborhood pet stores with the supply chain domination and best practices of Amazon. Fast shipping, wide selection, competitive pricing, and expert knowledge were combined into an online hybrid model, managed by pet owners passionate about the products and customers.
Cohen describes running Chewy as "a game of pennies," where success hinged on exceptional efficiency. He personally handled early Google Adwords campaigns, often late into the night, and negotiated directly with major suppliers. He stresses that maintaining transactional supplier relationships—rather than seeking to be liked—was vital, believing overpayment showed in gift-giving from suppliers, while aggressive negotiation led to complaints about contract fatigue.
He emphasizes the transactional nature of supplier relationships and celebrates tough negotiation as evidence of paying the right price. He also managed key operational tasks from digital marketing to labor and warehouse optimizations, knowing Chewy was always up against world-class competitors like Amazon. For Cohen, success and failure separated at the margin—“pennies in the red is failure and pennies in the black is success.”
Cohen underscores that in online pet retail, winning requires relentless cost control, tight warehouse management, and efficient, competitive shipping.
Cohen looked for what he calls "will over skill" when hiring, prioritizing drive and determination above experience. He cites the example of a customer service leader who persistently applied despite lacking a traditional resume—her motivation and resilience made her an outstanding team member. Cohen sought out "psychopaths" in his own words, drawing together a core team of hard-charging, risk-taking self-starters as devoted to the mission as he was.
He recounts promoting a woman from elder care with no direct experience because of her relentless determination, which he found more valuable than any credential.
Cohen’s ideal team members were diehards, fully committed and willing to take responsibility, in a culture where only “A’s put up with A’s.”
Chewy’s loyalty and growth came from creating remarkable customer experiences. Cohen’s team ...
Ryan Cohen's Business Philosophy and Track Record
Ryan Cohen’s involvement with GameStop began by identifying value in a business widely dismissed by the market and led to a remarkable repositioning focused on operational efficiency, collectibles, and leveraging in-house talent. The results have been robust, with tangible gains in revenue and financial health.
Cohen describes his investment philosophy as seeking out established but out-of-favor businesses with strong historical earnings that the market has written off. GameStop, continually shorted and considered essentially dead for over a decade, fit this mold. Rather than shying away from the widespread pessimism, Cohen saw opportunity in the fear, likening it to running into a burning house—often where distressed investors can find mispriced value.
Cohen’s original thesis was rooted in the cyclical nature of the video game retail business. He recognized that GameStop typically flourished at the start of a new console cycle, as with the upcoming launches of the PlayStation 5 and Xbox Series X. With expectations that consumers would flock to purchase new hardware and software, Cohen believed GameStop could survive on the strength of this cycle even as others wrote the business off.
He was drawn to GameStop specifically because the mainstream consensus and media expected its failure. Cohen notes that such deep-seated negativity is often appealing for investors who seek situations where widespread fear presents a chance to unlock hidden value.
Cohen initially became a passive investor, owning less than 5%. The then-CEO, struggling with an activist, offered him a board seat, mistakenly assuming Cohen would be a passive ally. However, as Cohen’s stake grew and he went public with his concerns, he was compelled to take a more active role. Observing a leadership vacuum and lack of capability or commitment from existing management, Cohen felt he had to step in—transitioning from passive investor to board member and ultimately CEO.
Initially, Cohen tried to transfer strategies from his time at Chewy, hiring e-commerce talent, and focusing on online expansion. However, this approach failed due to fundamental differences between pet supplies e-commerce and physical video game retail, including inventory dynamics and customer purchasing patterns.
After reviewing financials, Cohen quickly saw the Chewy playbook was unsuitable. He realized physical retail and gaming had unique constraints—unlike Chewy, overstock at GameStop led to costly markdowns and stagnant inventory. This learning prompted a sharp pivot in strategy.
Cohen shifted from an e-commerce focus to “maniacal cost cutting.” He ruthlessly cut inefficiencies, pared down excess, and doubled down on GameStop’s established strengths in pre-owned games and collectibles instead of trying to directly compete with giants like Amazon in selling new products.
This operational discipline focused GameStop on what it does best: retailing pre-owned gaming merchandise and building out its collectibles segment. Cohen’s approach highlighted practical execution over grand tech-driven disruption.
Cohen shepherded GameStop's expansion into trading card games (TCG) and sports memorabilia, emphasizing curation and authentication to appeal to collectors. Categories like TCG and sports cards have become major growth drivers.
Cohen implemented a model where customers could bring in graded PSA (Professional Sports Authenticator) cards—rated 8 and above—to any GameStop location and receive immediate cash. The company would then resell these cards either in-store or via online channels, mirroring the established trade-in model for games but applied to collectibles.
This cash-for-PSA cards initiative broadened GameStop's pre-owned business. The transparent market value of graded cards mirrored the predictability that made their pre-owned game segment pro ...
Gamestop's Turnaround Strategy
Ryan Cohen emphasizes the complementary nature of eBay and GameStop, especially as GameStop moves further into the collectibles space. He notes both companies excel in secondary markets and collectibles, with GameStop operating in physical retail and eBay dominating the online arena. Cohen highlights shared interests such as consumer liquidity and authentication of secondhand items, pointing out eBay’s significant global scale and first-mover status as the online de facto marketplace. These overlaps, combined with categories where both companies perform strongly, solidify the strategic logic of the acquisition.
Cohen underscores that his expertise lies in e-commerce, developed during his time at Chewy, making him much more comfortable and effective with online models than traditional retail. This background equips him to understand and navigate eBay’s global online marketplace, turning the proposed combination into an ideal fit within his business capabilities and ambitions.
The bid for eBay, valued at $56 billion, is structured to avoid the need for external capital. Instead, Cohen leverages eBay’s own balance sheet, providing existing shareholders with half the value in cash and half in GameStop stock, offered at a premium to their current holdings. This approach is designed not only for financial practicality—eschewing the practically impossible task of sourcing $60 billion in cash—but also for strategic alignment.
By retaining eBay ownership via GameStop stock, current shareholders continue to benefit from eBay’s earnings in the near and medium term, but with the added advantage of new, e-commerce-focused management under Cohen. The strategy aims for both an immediate uptick in earnings potential and the promise of long-term value creation, particularly in high-growth areas not previously accessible under legacy management.
Cohen identifies operational inefficiency as a critical problem at eBay, particularly within its large expense base of $5.5 billion, including $2.4 billion spent annually on sales and marketing that, so far, yield negligible user growth. He proposes cutting $2 billion in costs, emphasizing that substantial savings can be achieved—especially in marketing—without harming the company’s core performance.
Cohen’s philosophy is to treat every dollar of operating expense as an investment that must generate measurable returns. By enforcing operational discipline and cost efficiency, he expects to deliver an immediate increase in earnings and set a foundation for sustainable profitability.
Cohen sees live commerce as one of the two principal growth vectors for eBay, pointing to its $400 billion total addressable market, rapid U.S. expansion, and popularity in Asia. However, he finds eBay’s current execution in live commerce notably lacking: even with ample users and brand presence, the platform itself is underperforming, with few hundred viewers per sale and complex barriers for creators to go live.
He notes eBay’s application process for content creators is cumbersome, the approval process slow, and the backend infrastructure problematic, discouraging creators and sellers. Cohen’s solution is to remove these barriers by simplifying creator onboarding and fixing backend technology, positioning eBay to better compete with rivals who are currently “crushing” the space.
The Ebay Acquisition Bid and Strategic Vision
Ryan Cohen delivers a pointed critique of Ebay’s management and board, contrasting their performance and approach against broader e-commerce growth and effective business practices. He argues that Ebay’s executive leadership prioritizes self-preservation and consultant advice over necessary operational improvements and direct seller engagement, all while experiencing clear business decline and ignoring accountability.
Cohen notes that every key Ebay metric has fallen since COVID. Gross merchandise value and operating earnings have declined, and Ebay has lost 30 million active users. Even as the overall e-commerce market grows, Cohen says Ebay’s business has stagnated in recent quarters with a revenue line that is “essentially break even.” Revenue is up only slightly, while operating expenses have risen significantly.
Despite being a capital-light business with no inventory, Cohen highlights that Ebay’s operating expenses now exceed half of its revenues. He characterizes this as a structurally unsustainable position that produces inferior capital returns compared to what should be possible for a marketplace model, especially against the backdrop of industry growth.
Cohen criticizes Ebay’s approach to its seller community, stating that "they take their sellers for granted," having cut the concierge program for top sellers. This, he says, has led to sellers moving to other ecommerce platforms.
He points out that sellers must rely on a patchwork of costly third-party tools to run their Ebay businesses, in contrast to Amazon’s “soup-to-nuts” Seller Central solution. This lack of built-in functionality creates friction, reduces seller satisfaction, and diminishes Ebay’s competitiveness. Cohen asserts that in a marketplace model like Ebay’s, sellers are the core customers, and making them successful should be a clear business priority; however, Ebay does not provide the basic tools needed nor actively engages in solving their pain points.
Cohen calls out a fundamental misalignment between Ebay’s board and shareholders, arguing that board members are “making hundreds of thousands of dollars a year,” have minimal to no stock ownership, attend only a handful of meetings, and are highly compensated without their pay being tied to business success or outcomes.
He also contends that management is “grossly overpaid” while taking “zero risk.” Cohen points to a recent failed shareholder vote to reduce the threshold for calling a special meeting as evidence of a shareholder-unfriendly entrenched structure, blocking efforts at accountability and necessary change. He says, "Why is everyone so intent on protecting this entrenched management team and board to continue running the business?" referencing the culture of self-preservation and resistance to external input.
Cohen criticizes Ebay management for consistently turning to outside consulting firms rather than directly working with their own sellers and engineering teams to solve well-known and longstanding issues. He describes this as a lack of willingness to “roll up their sleeves,” preferring to outsource analysis and strategy instead of addressing true operational weaknesses.
He sees this reliance on consultants as a sign of management’s inability or unwillingness to make “basic improvements” critical for company revitalization, asserting that “they're not making their sellers happy” and have lost the hands-on mentality common in founder-operated companies.
Cohe ...
Critique of Current Ebay Management and Board
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