PDF Summary:The Wages of Destruction, by Adam Tooze

Success can often hinge upon the power of economics. In The Wages of Destruction, historian Adam Tooze examines how the Nazi regime structured its economic policies to enable its territorial expansion and military conquests in the years leading up to and during World War II.

Tooze reveals that from the start, the Nazis prioritized rearmament over consumer spending, strategically reallocating resources towards the military. The author provides an in-depth look at how economic factors shaped Hitler's escalating steps toward war, his unwavering belief in acquiring more "living space," and the eventual policies that ravaged the lives of civilians under Nazi control.

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It's time to reevaluate the ideological forces that shaped Hitler's decision-making process. The belief held by Hitler that a clash with the Western powers was inevitable, as well as his rationale for starting the conflict sooner rather than delaying it, cannot be exclusively linked to the previously mentioned strategic and economic considerations. Adam Tooze's analysis determined that the principal driving force was anti-Semitism. Hitler's belief in a worldwide Jewish conspiracy targeting Germany, as highlighted by Tooze, shaped his perception that from 1938 onwards, Western countries started to become adversaries. What other factors could explain the growing alliance between the United States and Britain during this crucial time, despite Hitler's conviction that their objectives were inherently at odds? The belief held by Hitler and his associates was that their enemies appeared tightly allied, largely because of the American media's sway, which they claimed was dominated by Jewish interests, as well as the financiers on Wall Street, to whom they attributed Jewish lineage. The series of events hastened Hitler's move to initiate conflict in September 1939, despite substantial economic and military risks, as argued by Tooze.

The quest for economic self-sufficiency made it imperative to expand territorial holdings.

Tooze underscores the fact that Hitler's drive for self-sufficiency transcended the goal of securing the nation's prosperity and comfort; it was essentially about the survival of the nation. Hitler believed that securing the necessary resources would enable Germany to achieve genuine independence and economic prosperity. This meant creating for Germany a territory and resource base comparable to that enjoyed by either the British Empire of North America.

Germany's ambition to become self-reliant and enhance its agricultural production within its borders presented a formidable goal, underscoring the conviction that expansion of its resource base and territory was necessary.

Adam Tooze highlights the simultaneous emphasis placed by the Nazi government on both agricultural concerns and the increase in food production during a time characterized by rapid industrial development and military expansion, a combination that subsequent analysts have considered contradictory. The focus on agricultural policy by the Nazi regime should not be seen as merely a nostalgic yearning for bygone days. In this work, Adam Tooze contends that despite its reputation as a manufacturing juggernaut, Nazi Germany was still a country where a considerable number of its citizens depended on small-scale farming for their sustenance. The laws introduced regarding Erbhof in the year 1933 had implications that went beyond simple economic strategies. The government in Germany instituted comprehensive changes that transformed the legal status, property rights, and inheritance practices linked to the country's agricultural properties. The Erbhof law was implemented to protect the agricultural community, deemed essential for the continuation and strength of the heritage of Germany, a sentiment grandiosely echoed by the Nazi advocate Walther Darré. Efforts to improve the living standards of rural German farmers clashed with the strict constraints dictated by the nation's agricultural production capabilities.

Germany's economic constraints necessitated a reduction in its usual consumer expenditures and a limitation on its international trade to support its ambitions in military and industrial growth.

The government set up a comprehensive system of entities dedicated to improving the nation's agricultural production and managing the distribution and use of food among its citizens, thus securing the economic steadiness of Germany's agriculturalists. Despite their greatest efforts, they were unable to achieve the autarky that Hitler had promised. In the late 1930s, the Reich had to compensate for deficiencies in meat and butter by significantly increasing the importation of animal feed, which in turn intensified the push to bring the economies of South-Eastern Europe under the Reich's control to meet its demands. Beginning in 1935, the typical approach included the implementation of rationing coupled with an increase in prices. In 1938, there was a particularly stark distinction between consumer goods and military equipment. Tooze highlights a core inconsistency in the Nazi government's claim of being able to allocate Germany's resources in a way that would improve the quality of life for all its citizens. To finance its substantial rearmament efforts, the country had to impose considerable limitations on the public's expenditure.

Hitler's strategy was inherently flawed, hinging on the swift defeat of adversaries who held a material advantage to realize Germany's aspirations for territorial growth.

The government under Hitler escalated its expansion into the territories of Eastern Europe, motivated by the critical necessity to acquire additional food resources. Agricultural specialists associated with the SS concluded in the late 1930s that Germany needed to increase its farmland by a minimum of 7 to 8 million hectares to sufficiently sustain its population. In this sense, Tooze argues, the concept of Lebensraum (“living space”), which has so often caused offence, was more than a euphemism for sheer land area. In the 1930s, Germany viewed land as a critical and limited resource. Tooze suggests that to truly understand Hitler's drive for expansion, one must carefully consider the problem of insufficient land. Hitler was aware that initiating conflict in the east without delay was crucial for a successful campaign, as he understood that postponing action would give the Western powers the opportunity to outpace him in terms of economic and military capabilities.

Other Perspectives

• Economic necessity is not the sole reason for the initiation of war; political ambition, territorial expansion, and ideological goals also played significant roles.
• The ideology of racial superiority was a tool used to justify expansionist and militaristic policies, not necessarily the root cause of all decisions.
• The reduction in rearmament activities could also be seen as a strategic move to conserve resources for the impending conflict, rather than a cause of diplomatic deadlock.
• The alliance with the Soviet Union was as much a strategic move for the USSR as it was for Germany, serving Stalin's interests in Eastern Europe.
• Military preparedness and economic factors may have accelerated the conflict, but personal decisions by Hitler and his advisors also significantly influenced the timing.
• The economic disparities with Western nations were recognized by other political figures in Germany who did not necessarily advocate for war as the solution.
• Hitler's monitoring of global economic and military progress could be interpreted as standard statecraft rather than a unique precursor to war.
• The threat posed by the United States to European financial autonomy could be viewed as a misinterpretation or exaggeration by Hitler to justify his policies.
• The concept of a German empire was not universally accepted within Germany and faced opposition from various political and social groups.
• Balance of payments issues were a common problem for many nations at the time and did not inevitably lead to war.
• The need to act swiftly to prevent the economic might of the US and Britain could be seen as a pretext for aggression rather than a strategic necessity.
• Diplomatic efforts to oppose Britain were complex and involved many factors beyond Germany's control, including the actions of other nations.
• The alliance with Stalin was opportunistic and not necessarily indicative of a failure of German diplomacy.
• Anti-Semitic ideology as a driving force can be challenged by the argument that it was used to mobilize support and deflect from other political failures.
• The quest for economic self-sufficiency could also be critiqued as a cover for imperialistic ambitions.
• The focus on agricultural policy may have been driven by ideological beliefs about land and race rather than purely economic considerations.
• The reduction in consumer expenditures and limitation on international trade could be criticized as detrimental to the German economy and standard of living.
• The strategy of swift defeat of adversaries is debatable, as some argue that a more defensive or diplomatic approach could have been more successful.
• The expansion into Eastern Europe for food resources can be seen as a pretext for territorial conquest and subjugation of other peoples.
• Viewing land as a critical and limited resource could be challenged by the potential for technological and agricultural innovation to overcome such limitations.

Nazi economic policy significantly influenced Germany's social hierarchy, industrial development, and the manner in which World War II was waged.

Adam Tooze strives to provide a comprehensive examination of the internal workings of the Nazi regime. In the final sections of his book, he broadens his analysis to explore the impact of Hitler's Germany's choices on the nation's social framework and their role in shaping the course of the Second World War.

In Germany, a fervent military enthusiasm existed alongside restrained consumer expenditure.

Tooze's analysis often portrays the Nazi regime as more than just a disordered expression of collective madness. A comprehensive grasp of the Third Reich necessitates an examination of the regime's domestic influence and its repercussions on German society.

The National Socialist movement's objectives clashed with the aim for widespread consumer goods availability, leading to the military emerging as the primary symbol of the regime's successes.

Adam Tooze's analysis highlights that the Nazi government was focused not only on expanding its territories and strengthening its armed forces but also on promoting the economic prosperity of its people. Hitler's ambitions were not limited to defeating his enemies; he also sought to elevate Germany's prosperity and aesthetic appeal. He did not intend to impose financial suffering on the citizens of the Soviet Union. The goal of the economic ideology espoused by the Nazis was to achieve a standard of living and a consumer society on par with that of the United States. Under Hitler's leadership, there was a significant push to stimulate a market for mass-produced, economical consumer products (Volksproducts) aimed at the broader German public, with the goal of bridging the gap between their aspirations and the country's reality. The Volksempfaenger, known as the people's radio, quickly reached a sales milestone of one million units in its first year, markedly bolstering the government's ability to manage the dissemination of information to the public. The attempt to manufacture a popular vehicle ultimately concluded in a catastrophic collapse. Tooze considers Hitler's decision to have been a significant miscalculation. Hitler stressed the importance of establishing a manufacturing system focused on mass production, which necessitated that consumers have the necessary purchasing power to acquire the manufactured goods. In the 1930s, the economic situation in Germany was such that even the most affordable automobile was beyond the financial reach of most of the population. Germany's ambition to expand its purchasing power to the level Hitler described in his "Second Book" would require a substantial expansion of its national territory, which could only be achieved with the indispensable use of its military forces. The allure of the Wehrmacht was clear, providing an opportunity for all German men to engage with cutting-edge technological developments. The relentless appetite of the Wehrmacht for modern weaponry, such as vehicles, trucks, tanks, and radios—luxuries that were scarce and expensive for the average citizen—transformed its soldiers and production activities into a twisted but clear symbol of the country's industrial prowess.

During the final years of Nazi rule, the surge in military endeavors resulted in a marked rise in industrial positions focused on weaponry production, yet the quality of life for the general populace maintained its level.

Adam Tooze's examination shows that during the 1930s, employees in Germany's consumer goods sector experienced a stable phase with minimal dependence on foreign-sourced materials. As living expenses remained stable, salaries rose, alleviating worries about joblessness and granting consumers a degree of choice in their purchases. The financial story of Germany under Nazi rule unveiled a considerably more complex reality for the majority of its residents. The expansion of civilian employment opportunities coupled with the investment in bolstering military capabilities certainly contributed to the reduction of unemployment, but this achievement came with its own set of expenses. In 1934, a strategic redirection of resources was coordinated by the Reichsbank in collaboration with the Ministry for Economic Affairs, transitioning their application from civilian to military objectives. With the onset of summer in 1938, Germany's industries catering to consumer needs were experiencing mounting pressures, which aligned with the first high point of the country's wartime economy in a time of peace. Germany's primary goal, according to Schacht, should be to restore balance in its international trade dealings. In order to ensure a consistent flow of crucial materials necessary for military operations and to avert an economic disaster. To maintain the value of the Reichsmark, it was essential to substantially decrease the demand for civilian imports. Austria's incorporation into the larger state had a profound effect on industries catering to consumer necessities, such as those producing food, clothing, and footwear, as they continued to face a shortage of raw materials and finished products.

Agricultural policy execution played a crucial role. The Reich enacted measures to stabilize the economy for German farmers, leading to rationing, rising costs, and consumer needs that went unsatisfied.

Tooze's analysis of life under Nazi governance underscores the rising expenses, diminishing standards of living, and continuous complaints about shortages. The citizens living under the Third Reich, who held aspirations for an American standard of living, were certainly disheartened. The establishment of the Reichsnaehrstand (RNS) by the Nazi government was regarded as a significant and comprehensive organizational achievement in the realm of agricultural administration. In 1933, at the outset, the RNS had been seen primarily as a way of consolidating Darré’s Blut und Boden racial agenda. From 1934 onwards, the pressure on Germany's balance of international payments and its internal agricultural supplies demanded the rapid creation of a comprehensive control system that included all of the country's 6 million small-scale farms. Despite a notable decline in the importation of livestock feed, agricultural production experienced a considerable increase. Even with progress in efficiency, the Reich Nutrition Office was unable to meet Hitler's promise of enhancing the quality of life for all Germans. During the latter half of the 1930s, there was a need to introduce rationing judiciously and to promote the use of substitute goods to preserve equilibrium between the expenses associated with food and income levels.

The industrial sector of Germany: As the hostilities continued, the distinction between state and corporate bodies grew more and more blurred.

The war effort was significantly strengthened by Hitler's economic strategies, which placed German industry in a leading position and reaped advantages from these initiatives. The resilience of German industry's interconnectedness not only intensified during the conflict but also resulted in lasting transformations that survived beyond the collapse of Hitler's rule.

The creation of the Reichswerke Hermann Goering enterprise, concentrating on the expansion of steel, coal, and other major industries under state control, posed a challenge to the Ruhr area's industrial supremacy but failed to substantially improve the country's total industrial strengths.

During the period of the Third Reich, the surge in military spending not only bolstered established German firms but also initiated the establishment of a state-controlled industrial sector, which was largely built upon the expropriated assets of German Jews and the industrial capabilities of territories that had been overrun. The creation of the Reichswerke Hermann Goering in 1937 was a prime example of the period's government-led economic initiatives, stemming from the implementation of Hermann Goering's Four Year Plan. Adam Tooze identifies the critical scarcity of steel as the primary impetus for the expansion, further exacerbated by the Ruhr heavy industrialists' opposition to utilizing Germany's own iron ore resources. Despite the significant increase in output since 1933, the steel industry struggled to simultaneously satisfy the demands of military expansion and the vigorous internal market, which raised concerns that reliance on the nation's substandard ores might diminish the value of their exports. As the summer of 1937 approached, it was clear that the steel production in Germany was not meeting the needs of its military nor achieving the objectives set by the Four Year Plan. The situation was unsustainable both politically and industrially. At a critical moment, Goering took decisive action to announce the creation of the Reichswerke. He reproached the leading steel producers in Germany for their failure to acknowledge the nation's significant challenges and announced his intention to break their stronghold with a major expansion directed by the state.

The development of the A4 (V2) rocket and the manufacture of fighter planes were greatly propelled by the initiatives of German industrial magnates, especially the Jaegerstab project, which indicated a shift toward greater autonomy within the totalitarian state.

In 1940, as portrayed by Tooze, the leaders of Germany's key industrial companies were tasked with managing and distributing the production of essential weapons, a process which Speer subsequently enhanced with his 'self-responsibility' method during the war. Adam Tooze's analysis highlights the disturbing expansion of Germany's concentration camp system, which experienced an increase in the reliance on coerced labor and a simultaneous decline in the availability of vital resources like raw materials, labor, food, and transport. The V2 rocket, a symbol of the military power of the Third Reich, is notoriously associated with the horrors committed at the Dora-Nordhausen concentration camp. The combination of large-scale production techniques, often referred to as the 'American model,' with the harsh strategies of the SS and the strict implementation by the Speer Ministry, was not exclusive to the year 1944. The industrial conglomerate known as the Reichswerke Hermann Goering, which initiated its activities in 1937, was set up after numerous Jewish families were compelled to leave their residences in Salzgitter and the surrounding countryside. In February 1944, Speer and Milch formed the Jaegerstab (Fighter Staff), a coalition that aimed to avert the total collapse of the German air force at its most pivotal moment. Germany intended to fully harness its industrial potential, disregarding any economic norms or legal limitations. The intensifying struggle between Speer's bureaucratic division and the shipbuilding firm owned by the Blohm family in Hamburg highlights the increasing autocratic inclinations that led to the compromise of both political and corporate reputations due to accusations of undermining activities.

The necessity to sustain trade with neutral and allied nations necessitated the diversion of resources that could have been used for potential armaments production.

The common perception that Hitler's government elevated the production of armaments above all other economic activities in Germany, relegating them to a lesser status, appears indisputable due to its deep-rooted presence in the collective awareness and academic research. According to Tooze, this, however, should be challenged, and in this regard as well, the statistics on trade are extremely revealing. Though Germany’s export revenues did indeed fall sharply during the Depression and their volume was further reduced by the imposition of Schacht’s New Plan with its system of price-discriminating quotas, exports in fact recovered substantially after 1935 and throughout the war they remained remarkably robust and persistent. The struggle for limited natural resources and proficient workers was clear within the economy, with export-oriented industries contending against the drive for military armament. Every export transaction signified a distribution of resources that could have been utilized to bolster the strength of Germany's armed forces. The protest highlighted the stark reality of the situation, as it was fueled by the drastic cutback in steel allocations, which had been increasingly focused on exports since 1937 under Speer's direction, and was intensified by the German military's demand for a significant increase in munitions production at the start of the conflict. Germany lacked the capacity to generate enough revenue from international sales to address its substantial balance of payments problems or to secure the foreign currency necessary for a minimal degree of independence, and strategically, exports were a mandatory cost that the Third Reich needed to factor into its economic strategy.

Hitler integrated economic measures with military operations in his approach to World War II.

Adam Tooze underscores the point that the Wehrmacht's collapse was not inevitable. Tooze underscores the substantial economic assets at Hitler's government's disposal in 1940, yet he questions the possibility of a definitive German victory in that year. Germany's control over territories in Western Europe did not bring about a substantial change in the strategic situation that diverged from what German strategists had anticipated since the 1920s. Ignoring the progress made in industrial production capacity does not take into account the considerable challenges faced by Britain and America.

Throughout the conflict, Germany expanded its economic territory by appropriating vital resources from France and territories under its control, thereby alleviating shortages of essential materials.

By the time 1940 arrived, Hitler's domain had accumulated an immense economic power. By 1939, the combined economic production of the European areas influenced by Germany, not counting their colonies, represented a significant 70% of the GDP of the United States. Germany's stockpile of raw materials and armaments was significantly augmented by the procurement of military assets from the Netherlands and Belgium. The German rail network experienced a decrease in operational pressure after the Reichsbank's monetary reserves grew due to the procurement of more rolling stock from Western nations. Germany seemed poised to create a self-sufficient economic sphere encompassing the Netherlands, along with Belgium, France and its overseas possessions, Denmark, Norway, and areas in Central and Eastern Europe, all within the sphere of German sway, a realm with the potential to match the combined resources of the British Empire and the industrial power of America.

The government's harsh use of numerous foreign workers revealed a clear conflict, caught between its ideological convictions and the realities of the situation.

Occupied Europe's labor force constituted its most substantial economic input. Throughout the course of the war, Germany increasingly depended on the labor force sourced from a multitude of other nations. In 1944, Germany's armaments production sector employed a significant proportion of foreign workers, who made up one-third of the entire workforce. A considerable population, encompassing many Poles and Russians, were forced into labor conditions that essentially amounted to bondage as part of the German military's operations. Tooze suggests that the activities of Germany during the war underscored the ongoing clash between the Third Reich's economic logic and its racial ideology since its foundation. During the summer of 1941, Germany's insatiable need for workers was in stark conflict with its decision to initiate hostilities against the Soviet Union and its citizens. The general populace. In the summer of 1942, Hitler and Speer's decision to systematically exploit the Jewish population arose from the critical consequences of the dwindling numbers of Soviet prisoners of war and workers from the East.

The government's resolve to persist led to a catastrophic peak as it implemented an offensive plan that endangered the lives of civilians in the Soviet Union.

The paradox is starkly exemplified by the initiative known as the "Hunger Plan." Adam Tooze argues that Germany's struggle extended beyond a mere economic clash with Britain and the United States. Beginning in 1940, the conflict intensified into a battle for survival that predominantly impacted the inhabitants of the territories under control, particularly those from the Soviet Union. By autumn 1939, military economic experts had devised plans to maintain food supplies during the war in Germany by cutting off the heavily populated cities of Eastern Europe from their food resources. The final version of the Hunger Plan, which endorsed the deliberate limitation of food supply resulting in the demise of numerous Soviet citizens, was officially sanctioned on May 2, 1941, by representatives from all the key governmental agencies. Despite facing initial skepticism, the Wehrmacht's military-economic office, under General Thomas's direction, unexpectedly endorsed the strategy. Adam Tooze argues that the German government's most heinous act of genocide prior to May 1942 was primarily driven by economic considerations. In the struggle for survival, where the fate of the nation hung in the balance, sacrificing numerous civilian lives deemed hostile was deemed acceptable to avert the risk of the German populace facing starvation and a subsequent downfall.

Other Perspectives

• The Nazi economic policy, while influential, was unsustainable and ultimately led to the destruction of Germany's infrastructure and economy by the end of the war.
• Military enthusiasm may have been fervent, but it was often the result of intense propaganda and indoctrination, rather than a genuine, widespread desire for militarization among the populace.
• The regime's focus on military might at the expense of consumer goods did not reflect a successful economic strategy but rather a prioritization of ideology over the well-being of citizens.
• The claim that the quality of life for the general populace maintained its level during the final years of Nazi rule can be contested, as many suffered from increased bombing, food shortages, and the general collapse of civil society.
• The agricultural policies of the Nazi regime, while stabilizing the economy for German farmers, also led to widespread hunger and deprivation in occupied territories.
• The blurring of lines between state and corporate bodies in Germany's industrial sector could be seen as a form of state capitalism that ultimately served the war effort at the expense of the free market and individual enterprise.
• The Reichswerke Hermann Goering enterprise's failure to substantially improve Germany's total industrial strengths could be attributed to the inefficiencies of centralized state planning and the misallocation of resources.
• The shift toward greater autonomy within the totalitarian state, as seen in the Jaegerstab project, may have been less about industrial magnates' initiatives and more about the chaotic and desperate circumstances of wartime production.
• The diversion of resources to sustain trade with neutral and allied nations, while necessary, also highlights the inherent weaknesses in the Nazi economic model, which was overly reliant on conquest and exploitation.
• The expansion of Germany's economic territory through appropriation of resources from occupied territories was not only unsustainable but also came at a tremendous human cost, raising ethical questions about the means used to achieve economic ends.
• The use of foreign workers was not just a conflict between ideology and reality but also a form of slavery that contradicted any claims of economic efficiency or moral legitimacy by the Nazi regime.
• The offensive plan that endangered the lives of civilians in the Soviet Union, while part of a broader military strategy, can be criticized as a gross violation of human rights and a war crime, rather than a legitimate economic or military tactic.

As the Allied forces applied mounting pressure and the military suffered several setbacks, the German war economy began to progressively decline.

The manufacturing of military weaponry in Germany saw a consistent increase during the war, but it failed to accelerate sufficiently to equal the superior production capabilities of its opponents. Tooze argues that the downfall of Germany's efforts during the war cannot be attributed solely to a basic 'failure'. By the time war was imminent, Germany had already maximized its peacetime mobilization potential.

Other Perspectives

• While the German war economy did face decline, it's important to consider that other factors such as strategic errors, the effectiveness of Allied bombing campaigns, and the eventual resource depletion also played significant roles in undermining Germany's military production capabilities.
• The increase in Germany's military manufacturing could be seen as an impressive feat given the resource constraints and the ongoing Allied strategic bombing campaign, suggesting that the issue was not solely about production capacity but also about resource access and logistical challenges.
• The argument that Germany's downfall cannot be solely attributed to failure might overlook the role of ideological rigidity, poor strategic decisions, and Hitler's leadership style, which also contributed to the eventual defeat.
• The assertion that Germany had maximized its peacetime mobilization potential before the war could be contested by pointing out that there were still inefficiencies and potential for further industrial expansion and resource exploitation that were not fully realized until later in the war.