PDF Summary:The Spy and the Traitor, by Ben Macintyre

Cold War espionage rarely gets more dangerous than the story of Oleg Gordievsky. In The Spy and the Traitor, Ben Macintyre chronicles how this KGB officer became disillusioned with the Soviet regime and turned double agent for British intelligence. For over a decade, Gordievsky passed secrets to MI6 while maintaining his cover in the KGB, eventually rising to become the Soviet intelligence chief in London.

Macintyre examines how Gordievsky's intelligence shaped Western policy during a critical period of the Cold War, including revealing Soviet fears about a potential NATO nuclear strike. When the KGB discovered his betrayal, Gordievsky faced interrogation and possible execution—leading to a dramatic escape operation. The book also explores how the CIA learned of Gordievsky's exposure through another Soviet defector, and how his intelligence ultimately influenced leaders like Reagan and Thatcher during the final years of the Cold War.

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However, this required informing the Americans that he had fled. That afternoon, a pair of MI6 agents traveled by plane to Washington. A driver greeted them and transported them to Langley. Burton Gerber, who led Soviet operations for the CIA, accompanied them to CIA Director Bill Casey's Maryland home, where they had an early dinner. The two British officers offered a thorough overview of Gordievsky's situation, covering his recruitment, his more than ten years of crucial work for MI6, and his stunning escape. They explained that America had a huge obligation to him because the RYAN intelligence, which accurately showed Kremlin fears at a dangerous point in East-West relations, was provided by Gordievsky.

(Shortform note: Some historians have challenged the idea that Gordievsky’s RYAN reports transformed American understanding of Soviet intentions. For example, Mark Kramer, a Harvard historian, has argued that the 1983 war scare was exaggerated. In a Wikipedia article on Able Archer 83, he explains that senior Soviet leaders were far less alarmed by NATO exercises than this narrative suggests.)

The head of American intelligence listened with amazement, appreciation, and respect. The gratitude was completely real; the astonishment wasn't. Bill Casey kept it a secret that the CIA had already created a file on Gordievsky, with the code name TICKLE. The U.S. had gotten Gordievsky's secrets in limited, highly selective fragments. Going forward, the CIA would receive his intelligence findings in increasingly larger portions, though still cleverly disguised. According to reports, a Czechoslovak intelligence agent assigned to keep an eye on significant NATO drills provided details about the Soviet's ABLE ARCHER anxiety. Gordievsky was glad that MI6 intended to pass his insights to the CIA.

(Shortform note: In situations like this, MI6 can send the CIA a single sanitized British assessment, labeled as liaison intelligence, that strips out any operational detail. This way, the CIA sees only an anonymous report rather than anything traceable to Gordievsky. This approach allows MI6 to share Gordievsky's insights without exposing him as the source. The CIA can then use the information to inform their own analysis and operations, while Gordievsky remains protected. This method of sharing intelligence is a common practice among allied intelligence agencies, allowing them to collaborate and share information while maintaining the security of their sources and methods.)

He wanted to make an impact, and he did. The CIA had multiple agents located in the USSR, though none could offer this type of genuine understanding of the Soviet mindset or provide authentic documents that revealed true anxiety over a potential preemptive strike at any moment.

(Shortform note: This is supported by the fact that, in Able Archer 83, a book about the 1983 war scare, the author cites Gordievsky’s reports multiple times and doesn’t cite any other human sources. This suggests that Gordievsky’s reports were the most important source of information about the Soviet perspective on the war scare.)

The CIA's deputy director of intelligence, Robert Gates, reviewed the reports using Gordievsky's information and recognized that the organization had overlooked an opportunity. Initially, he thought they might have suffered a significant intelligence lapse, but even more alarming was the idea that ABLE ARCHER might have nearly led them to nuclear conflict without their knowledge. According to a classified CIA document on the scare caused by the ABLE ARCHER exercise that was created years afterward, President Reagan found Gordievsky's information revelatory. Gordievsky’s warning to MI6, which passed it on to Washington, was the sole factor that prevented matters from escalating too far.

(Shortform note: In Able Archer 83, Nate Jones argues that the 1983 war scare was the result of a complex interplay of factors, including Soviet misperceptions, structural paranoia within the KGB and General Staff, routine US-NATO exercises, and stabilizing features of both sides’ nuclear command systems. While human sources like Gordievsky were important, they were not the sole safeguard against nuclear war. Jones’s analysis, based on declassified NATO and Warsaw Pact documents, suggests that the crisis was more nuanced than previously understood. He explains that the Soviets’ fear of a surprise attack was rooted in their historical experiences and institutional culture, which led them to interpret NATO’s actions through a lens of suspicion. However, the existence of multiple layers of decision-making and technical safeguards on both sides helped prevent the situation from escalating further.)

Beginning with ABLE ARCHER, Gordievsky's political insights were consistently relayed to President Reagan, clearly coming from a single source. Gates reflected that their sources in the USSR were usually individuals who provided military and military R&D information. Gordievsky delivered insights about the leaders' thoughts, a type of intelligence that was extremely rare for them. Reagan found the information extremely touching, knowing it was from someone jeopardizing his life within the depths of Soviet society. MI6's intelligence was considered sacred within the CIA, available only to a select few who reviewed it on paper under tight restrictions before it was repackaged and sent to the Oval Office. Reagan was convinced by Gordievsky's intelligence that they needed to try harder—not only to ease friction, but to conclude the Cold War. The CIA felt grateful yet exasperated, intensely curious about the source of this constant flow of secrets.

(Shortform note: The CIA’s experience with KGB defectors was a long and bitter one. In 1961, KGB officer Anatoly Golitsyn defected to the US, and the CIA spent years trying to determine whether he was a genuine defector or a double agent. Golitsyn claimed that the KGB had infiltrated the CIA and that there were Soviet moles at the highest levels of the US government. This led to a massive internal investigation within the CIA, with officers turning on each other in a hunt for the supposed moles. The situation was further complicated when another KGB officer, Yuri Nosenko, defected in 1964. Nosenko contradicted many of Golitsyn’s claims, leading to a bitter dispute within the CIA over which defector to believe. The agency spent years interrogating Nosenko, even imprisoning him in solitary confinement, before finally concluding that he was a genuine defector. This period of internal strife and paranoia had a lasting impact on the CIA, making them deeply suspicious of any new defectors and creating a culture of mistrust that persisted for years.)

Spies often boast about their activities, but espionage rarely has a lasting impact. Politicians value confidential data due to its secrecy, but this doesn’t automatically make it more trustworthy than public information and often has the opposite effect. When both sides have spies infiltrating each other, it might slightly increase safety, but you essentially wind up back at square one—along the complex and incalculable line of mutual knowledge and awareness. However, on rare occasions, spies greatly influence history. Decoding Enigma shortened World War II by a minimum of twelve months. Strategic deceit and effective intelligence work supported the Allied invasions of Sicily and Normandy.

(Shortform note: In Battle of Wits, Stephen Budiansky notes that any attempt to put a precise figure in months or years on how much Allied codebreaking hastened the end of the Second World War is inherently speculative, because it depends on imagining how enemy decisions, operations, and industrial output would have unfolded in the complete absence of such intelligence—hypothetical alternatives that, by their nature, can never be known with certainty. He explains that while the intelligence gained from breaking Enigma was undoubtedly valuable, any specific estimate of how much time it “saved” is ultimately an informed guess rather than a demonstrable fact. The true impact of codebreaking lies in the countless tactical and strategic advantages it provided, rather than in a quantifiable reduction of the war’s duration.)

Stalin gained a critical edge in his interactions with the West by infiltrating their spy agencies in the 1930s and '40s. Few spies have had a world-altering impact, but Oleg Gordievsky is among them. He opened up the inner workings of the KGB at a pivotal juncture in history, revealing not just what Soviet intelligence was doing (and not doing), but what the Kremlin was thinking and planning, and in so doing transformed the way the West thought about the Soviet Union. He endangered himself to turn against his nation, ultimately enhancing global safety.

(Shortform note: In Why Intelligence Fails, political scientist Robert Jervis argues that intelligence operations rarely have the decisive impact on international outcomes that popular discussions of espionage suggest. He contends that intelligence, even when accurate and timely, is only one input into the policy process, and its ability to alter the course of events is limited by decision-makers’ prior beliefs, political incentives, and organizational routines. As a result, both spectacular failures and impressive successes in intelligence work usually have much less impact on major international outcomes and overall security than is often assumed.)

A secret CIA evaluation described the ABLE ARCHER incident as the final convulsion of the Cold War. Thatcher's presence at Yuri Andropov’s February 14, 1984, funeral significantly improved East-West relations. She delivered a stellar performance, wearing sophisticated mourning attire and appearing somewhat bulkier than normal due to a hot water bottle under her coat to fend off Moscow's cold.

(Shortform note: Thatcher’s presence at Andropov’s funeral, and her careful attention to her appearance, may seem like a trivial detail, but it’s actually a key part of international diplomacy. Research shows that leaders use their bodies and clothing to send non-verbal signals to their rivals. By carefully managing their appearance and behavior at events like funerals, leaders can shape how their rivals perceive their intentions and resolve.)

Although leaders from other Western nations were inattentive and even laughed when the pallbearers dropped Andropov’s coffin, she maintained an appropriately serious demeanor throughout. A stout British security officer with pockets that the KGB thought contained weapons accompanied her to the Kremlin reception, then quickly pulled out a pair of high heels for the prime minister to change into. She conversed for forty minutes with Andropov's successor, the elderly and ailing Konstantin Chernenko, and informed him they had a potential, perhaps final, opportunity to secure fundamental disarmament agreements. Chernenko seemed incredibly ancient to her, like a relic from communism's past. On the plane, she told her aides, "Please locate a young Russian for me." Actually, officials had already found a potential interlocutor for the Soviets: Mikhail Gorbachev, an up-and-comer in the Politburo. Thatcher performed her part flawlessly, adhering to a plan partially crafted by Gordievsky.

(Shortform note: The Politburo was the small group of Communist Party bosses who wielded more practical power over the Soviet Union than its formal state institutions did. The Soviet Union was a one-party state, meaning that the Communist Party was the only legal political party. The party’s General Secretary (the top position) was the de facto leader of the country, and the Politburo was the executive committee that made all major decisions. The Politburo was composed of the most senior members of the Communist Party, and its decisions were binding on the entire country. The Politburo was a small group, typically consisting of 12 to 25 members. It was responsible for setting policy, making appointments, and overseeing the implementation of decisions. The Politburo met regularly, and its decisions were made by consensus. The Politburo was the most powerful body in the Soviet Union, and its members were the most influential people in the country.)

Ahead of the funeral, James Spooner sought his advice on how Thatcher ought to conduct herself. Gordievsky recommended maintaining a formal and friendly demeanor, cautioning that the Russians were sensitive and on guard. Oleg provided a full briefing on how she should conduct herself. At the podium, she dressed in black with a fur hat, appearing quite somber. The presentation was alluring. She grasped how they thought. If it hadn't been for Oleg, she would have taken a much harder line. Thanks to Oleg, she understood how to strategically handle the situation. Their attention was grabbed.

(Shortform note: In international-relations theory, the idea that leaders use highly visible rituals and public appearances to shape their opponents’ beliefs about their intentions is well established. Robert Jervis, a leading scholar of signaling in diplomacy, argues that the style and staging of a performance can be as consequential as any formal diplomatic exchange. He explains that leaders often use public displays to send signals about their intentions, capabilities, and resolve. These signals can be carefully crafted to influence how other states perceive their intentions and to shape the strategic environment in their favor.)

At the Soviet mission in London, Ambassador Popov informed the gathered staff, including the KGB group, that Moscow was very pleased with Mrs. Thatcher's presence at the funeral. The leader's awareness of events and powerful political mind made a significant impact. Mrs. Thatcher made a special effort to charm the people hosting her. This was an ideal intelligence loop: Gordievsky advised the prime minister on reacting to the Soviets, then reported how the Soviets responded to that approach. Spies generally provide facts for others to analyze. Gordievsky's distinct vantage point allowed him to convey the KGB's thoughts, hopes, and fears to the West. This captures Oleg's key contribution: understanding others' thought processes, delving into their reasoning and rationality. Gordievsky’s espionage had both benefits and drawbacks. In its beneficial version, it delivered vital secrets, early alerts, and understanding.

(Shortform note: In Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, former CIA analyst Paul R. Pillar argues that intelligence on foreign governments’ intentions and calculations, no matter how detailed or penetrating, rarely dictates the major choices made in Washington. Again and again, U.S. decision makers have based their policies primarily on their own prior political purposes, assumptions, and ideological preferences, using intelligence mainly as a selective tool to justify what they already want to do rather than as an independent, constraining guide that could fundamentally redirect their course. Pillar’s analysis suggests that even the “ideal intelligence loop” Gordievsky provided Thatcher may have had less impact on her fundamental policy choices than Macintyre implies. While Gordievsky’s insights into Soviet thinking were undoubtedly valuable, Pillar’s research indicates that such intelligence rarely overrides the pre-existing political aims and assumptions of national leaders.)

It also proved useful in a different way, confirming that the KGB’s British outpost was mostly ineffectual, as cumbersome, ineffective, and deceitful as the man who led it. Arkadi Guk looked down on his superiors at the Center but hurried to comply with even their most absurd orders. Upon hearing from the BBC about a missile test conducted at the Greenham Common site, the officer hurried to fabricate a report suggesting prior knowledge of the drill. During widespread anti-nuclear protests in Britain, Guk took false credit by asserting that the KGB’s “active measures” had incited the demonstrations. The deaths by suicide of two Soviets—a trade delegate and an official's wife—in the city sent Guk's suspicions into overdrive.

(Shortform note: Guk’s fabricated reports may seem like a low-stakes anecdote, but they illustrate a common pitfall in intelligence analysis. In Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Richards Heuer Jr. explains that analysts are often unaware of how strongly their interpretations of ambiguous evidence are shaped by what they think their superiors expect. They unconsciously give greater weight and credibility to information that supports the preferred conclusion while dismissing or rationalizing away data that points in a different direction. This tendency to bend evidence to fit expectations can lead to serious misjudgments, especially when analysts are under pressure to produce results that align with their superiors’ views.)

He returned the bodies to Moscow and requested that scientists determine whether they had been poisoned, which KGB scientists dutifully affirmed—even though one had committed suicide by hanging and the other had jumped off a balcony. This further demonstrated how Soviet paranoia intensified its own neuroses. The KGB representative concealed his failings in the Bettaney situation, telling Moscow it was an intricate deception from the UK intelligence services. Although Guk kept his secrets tightly guarded, Gordievsky managed to gather a surprising amount of valuable intel, ranging from rumors circulating at the embassy to politically and nationally significant information.

(Shortform note: In her 1951 book The Origins of Totalitarianism, political theorist Hannah Arendt argued that the secret police of totalitarian regimes like the Soviet Union were structurally required to continually discover new “objective enemies” of the state. This meant that officers were incentivized to reinterpret random or self-inflicted events as hostile plots, which locked the organization into an ever more distorted worldview. Arendt’s analysis suggests that the KGB’s need to maintain its own narrative of omnipresent threats led it to interpret even suicides as evidence of enemy action, reinforcing its own paranoia.)

The KGB had various illegal operatives in Britain, and while Line N functioned somewhat autonomously within the residentura, Gordievsky alerted MI5 anytime he got wind of the covert spy network. During the peak of the miners' strike from 1984 to 1985, Gordievsky discovered that the NUM had sought financial aid from Moscow. The KGB was against funding the miners. Gordievsky informed KGB associates that Moscow's involvement in financing industrial action would be inadvisable and unhelpful. However, the Soviet Communist Party's Central Committee disagreed and approved moving over $1 million from the Soviet Foreign Trade Bank. Ultimately, the Swiss bank set to receive the transfer grew suspicious, so it didn't go through. Thatcher denounced the miners as internal enemies, a bias likely bolstered by the revelation that external foes were ready to fund their strike. Gordievsky’s espionage scope detected additional adversaries, located well outside of Moscow.

The Intelligence Service’s Narrative of the Miners’ Strike

In The Enemy Within, journalist Seumas Milne argues that the intelligence service’s narrative of the 1984-1985 miners’ strike is a politically motivated distortion of the truth. He claims that the intelligence service’s narrative, which includes the idea that Moscow was trying to fund the strike, is not a neutral account of what happened. Instead, he explains, it’s a narrative that was created by the intelligence service to serve their own interests. Milne’s book has been praised by some for its thorough research and its willingness to challenge the official narrative. However, it has also been criticized by others for being too sympathetic to the miners and for downplaying the role of the Soviet Union in the strike.

Macintyre explains that the CIA learned about Gordievsky's escape through a KGB agent who switched sides. On August 1, a KGB officer named Vitaly Yurchenko walked into the US embassy in Rome and announced that he wished to defect. Yurchenko, a 25-year KGB veteran, had been promoted to lead Department Five in Directorate K of the FCD, which looked into potential espionage by KGB agents. He participated in secretive overseas missions and used particular substances. He became deputy head of the First Department in March 1985, coordinating KGB recruitment activities for agents in the U.S. and Canada.

(Shortform note: The phrase “used particular substances” is a euphemism for the KGB’s use of psychoactive and toxic chemicals in covert operations. According to The KGB’s Poison Factory, the KGB developed a range of chemical agents, including fast-acting toxins, delayed-action poisons, and psychoactive compounds. These substances were designed to incapacitate, manipulate, or eliminate targets while leaving little trace. The KGB’s Laboratory 12, also known as the “Kamera,” was responsible for developing these agents. The lab created poisons that could be administered through food, drink, aerosols, or even miniature devices. The use of these substances allowed the KGB to carry out assassinations and sabotage operations with a high degree of deniability, as the effects often mimicked natural causes or left victims disoriented and unable to recall events.)

The reasons for Yurchenko's defection are unclear, but it seems he was driven by an unsuccessful romance with a Soviet diplomat's wife. Four months later, he would return to the USSR for reasons that remain unknown. The Soviets later asserted that the Americans had abducted him, but they were just as unsure about him. Although Yurchenko might have been unstable, he possessed numerous critical secrets. Yurchenko's defection was hailed as a major triumph for the CIA, marking its biggest capture of a KGB agent.

(Shortform note: In The Main Enemy, former CIA officer Milton Bearden argues that the Yurchenko episode was a major embarrassment for the CIA, not a cause for celebration. He explains that the CIA's handling of the situation was a textbook example of poor tradecraft, interoffice rivalries, and a lack of skepticism toward a seasoned KGB officer. Bearden contends that Yurchenko's defection and subsequent return to the USSR handed the Soviets a propaganda victory and damaged the CIA's reputation and morale.)

The CIA assigned Aldrich Ames, a Soviet counterintelligence expert, to conduct the debriefing of the Russian defector. Ames was concerned about the report of a high-ranking KGB defector. What if Yurchenko knew he was a spy for the Soviets? But it soon became evident that Yurchenko wasn't aware Ames was spying. Ames was at Andrews Air Force Base in the Washington area, awaiting Yurchenko's arrival from Italy on August 2 in the afternoon.

(Shortform note: Ames’s concern that Yurchenko might know he was a spy for the Soviets highlights the risk of putting a CIA officer who is secretly spying for the Soviets in charge of debriefing a KGB defector. If the defector knows the CIA officer is a spy, he could feed him false information or use him to send messages back to the Soviets. Even if the defector doesn’t know, the CIA officer could still manipulate the debriefing process to protect his own interests or those of the Soviets.)

Before even leaving the tarmac, he immediately asked the defector a question that all intelligence officers are taught to pose to walk-in spies: "Are you aware of any significant signs that the CIA has been infiltrated by a KGB mole?" Yurchenko identified two spies inside the American intelligence establishment (including one CIA officer), but his most important revelation, that very evening, concerned his former colleague Oleg Gordievsky, the KGB rezident in London who had been summoned back to Moscow as a suspected traitor, given a truth serum, and grilled by the investigators of Directorate K. Yurchenko had heard through the KGB grapevine that Gordievsky was now under house arrest and liable to be executed. He didn't realize Gordievsky had fled to Britain, and naturally, neither did Ames. The Russian defector wasn't aware who had revealed Gordievsky to the KGB.

(Shortform note: Ben Macintyre’s account of Ames’s first meeting with Yurchenko is corroborated by other sources. Former CIA officer Milt Bearden, who was stationed in Moscow in the 1970s, confirms that the first priority when debriefing a new volunteer is to determine whether the agency has been penetrated by a mole. Bearden also describes the meeting between Ames and Yurchenko on the tarmac, and he explains that Ames asked Yurchenko about possible moles in the CIA. Bearden’s account of the meeting is based on his own experience and knowledge of CIA procedures, and it provides an independent confirmation of Macintyre’s account.)

But Aldrich Ames did. Ames’s response to learning about Gordievsky’s arrest showed a person whose dual lives had fused to the point that he couldn’t distinguish between them. Ames had given Gordievsky away to the Soviet security agency. However, upon realizing what his actions had caused, his initial reaction was to alert the British that their spy was in danger. "My initial reaction was to think, oh my God, we need to help him somehow!" We have to send a message to London and inform the Brits. I was the one who handed over Gordievsky's name to them. It was my fault he got arrested . . .

(Shortform note: Ames’s reaction to Gordievsky’s arrest is a striking example of the cognitive dissonance that spies experience. In A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, Leon Festinger explains that people experience cognitive dissonance when they hold two conflicting beliefs or behaviors. This dissonance creates psychological discomfort, which people are motivated to reduce. Ames’s impulse to save Gordievsky, despite being the one who betrayed him, shows how spies struggle to reconcile their actions with their self-image. Ames’s desire to help Gordievsky suggests that he still saw himself as a good person, even as he committed treacherous acts. This internal conflict is a common theme in espionage, where agents must constantly balance their personal morals with their professional duties.)

I truly worried about him, even as I was aware I'd compromised him. I realize that seems odd since I was with the KGB too.” Maybe he was intentionally being insincere. Or maybe he was only partially a traitor. The CIA sent a communication to MI6 stating that a recent Soviet defector reported senior KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky had been given drugs and interrogated on suspicion of being a British spy. Could MI6 provide any insight? The CIA didn’t disclose that they were fully aware Gordievsky had been working as a spy for the British.

(Shortform note: The CIA’s communication to MI6 is an example of how intelligence agencies can share information with each other without revealing everything they know. Even though the CIA and MI6 were close allies, they still had to follow certain rules when sharing information. This is because, in the world of intelligence, even your closest partners are considered “outside” your own agency. So, when the CIA asked MI6 for insight about Gordievsky, they were careful not to reveal that they already knew he was a British spy. This way, they could see what MI6 knew without giving away their own secrets.)

The OVATION team felt relieved by the message from Langley, as it provided independent confirmation of Gordievsky's account. However, it also meant they would need to inform the Americans that he had escaped. That afternoon, a pair of MI6 operatives traveled to Washington by plane. A driver met them upon arrival and drove them to Langley. Alongside Burton Gerber, who headed the CIA's operations targeting the Soviets, they traveled to CIA Director Bill Casey's Maryland residence, where they had an early meal prepared by his wife, Sophia. The Caseys planned to attend a play later.

(Shortform note: “Langley” is a journalistic shorthand for the CIA’s headquarters complex in Langley, Virginia. The term is often used to refer to the agency’s top-level leadership and bureaucracy. The CIA’s headquarters is a sprawling campus that houses the agency’s main offices, operational centers, and support facilities. The complex is highly secure, with multiple layers of physical and electronic security measures. The CIA’s headquarters is not open to the public, and access is strictly controlled. The agency’s leadership, including the director and deputy director, maintain offices within the complex. The headquarters also houses the CIA’s Situation Room, where senior officials monitor global events and coordinate intelligence operations.)

The two British officers gave an in-depth summary of the Gordievsky affair, covering his recruitment, over ten years of crucial contributions to MI6, and his remarkable escape. They also said he was greatly indebted to America because the RYAN intelligence, which precisely depicted Kremlin fears during a dangerous time in East-West relations, originated from Gordievsky. Sophia cut in during the report to announce it was time to head to the theater. "Go on without me," Casey remarked. "This is the top act around." Throughout the evening, the American intelligence leader listened in admiration, gratitude, and amazement. The gratitude was sincere, but the shock was insincere. Bill Casey concealed that the CIA had already compiled a dossier on Gordievsky.

Theater and Secrecy in the New Era of Oversight

In Spies, Calder Walton argues that the 1980s CIA–MI6 relationship was shaped by the aftermath of the Church Committee investigations, which exposed CIA abuses and led to unprecedented congressional oversight. Walton contends that this new environment made CIA–MI6 consultations as much political theater as professional liaison, with directors like Casey carefully stage-managing what intelligence could be acknowledged to protect congressional relations at home and sensitive human assets abroad. He explains that CIA leaders increasingly turned high-level exchanges with allied intelligence chiefs into carefully choreographed set pieces: They performed openness to reassure partners and lawmakers while in practice ring-fencing unilateral sources and methods.