PDF Summary:The Gathering Storm, by Winston S. Churchill

The Treaty of Versailles aimed to bring lasting peace after World War I, but Winston S. Churchill argues that it instead laid the groundwork for another devastating conflict. In The Gathering Storm, Churchill examines how the Allies' failure to enforce Germany's disarmament, the rise of Fascism and Nazism, and the League of Nations' inability to maintain collective security created conditions that made World War II inevitable.

Churchill traces the key decisions and missteps that enabled German expansionism—from the reoccupation of the Rhineland to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement—and explains how Allied complacency and reluctance to confront aggression emboldened Hitler. This summary explores Churchill's analysis of the diplomatic failures, economic pressures, and political miscalculations that transformed an unstable peace into the gathering storm of global war.

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The Slow Erosion of Military Strength

In democracies like Britain and France, the process of disarmament was often gradual and subtle. Legislators, responding to voters’ desire for lower taxes and more social programmes, would keep trimming defence budgets. Ships and weapons would quietly disappear as they wore out or retired, never to be replaced. This slow erosion of military strength was often invisible to the public, who assumed their country remained well-defended. The result was a steady decline in military readiness, leaving nations vulnerable when new threats emerged.

Allied Complacency and Planning Errors

Churchill argues that the Allies underestimated the threat posed by Germany rebuilding its military. He believed they could have stopped Germany from rearming in 1933 with a simple order issued at Geneva. By 1936, they could have defeated Germany without any opposition and could have won a war with Germany in 1938. But by the year 1939, the risks of fighting Germany had grown too great. Hitler thought that France and Britain were too weak to fight. He believed the French political system was corrupt and that this corruption had spread to France's army.

(Shortform note: British historian A. J. P. Taylor disagrees with Churchill’s view that the Allies could have easily stopped Germany from rearming. In The Origins of the Second World War, Taylor argues that the Allies were cautious because they were still recovering from the Great Depression and didn’t want to risk another war. He also argues that Germany’s rearmament was not as well-planned as Churchill suggests. Taylor explains that Hitler’s military buildup was often improvised and disorganized, with different branches of the military competing for resources. Taylor’s view challenges Churchill’s idea that there were clear opportunities for the Allies to stop Germany’s rearmament and win a war before 1939.)

He also thought Britain was too pacifist to fight and would accept Germany’s conquest of Poland, just as they had accepted its takeover of the year before in Czechoslovakia. These beliefs were based on the fact that Germany's rearmament was not halted by France or Britain. In 1932, Germany demanded permission to rearm. Britain's media and government supported this demand, arguing that Germany should have the same rights as other countries. This emboldened the country, which pulled out of the League of Nations in 1933. The UK administration took no action at that point.

(Shortform note: The British media and government’s support for Germany’s 1932 demand to rearm and their lack of response to Germany’s withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933 can be understood in the context of the prevailing international relations theories of the time. In his 1939 book The Twenty Years' Crisis, British historian E. H. Carr critiqued the dominant liberal internationalist perspective that had shaped British foreign policy between the wars. Carr argued that this approach was based on the assumption that all nations had equal rights and that economic interdependence would prevent conflict. He explains that this belief led to a reluctance to confront Germany’s rearmament, as many in Britain saw it as a legitimate demand for equal treatment.)

France faced relentless pressure from Britain to accept Germany's demands. That year, the French government proposed a plan to limit the size of all European armies, which would have given Germany the same rights as other countries. France was forced to accept this plan, even though its government knew it was meaningless. The Allies believed that Germany couldn't build a powerful air force and thought they would only have civilian planes and gliders. They did not realize Germany was secretly developing a combat air force and training its pilots in the Soviet Union. In 1934, the British government proposed to strengthen its aerial forces by adding forty-one squadrons. The Labour and Liberal parties opposed this, arguing that it was not necessary and would make war more likely. The UK administration feared losing political support if it opposed Germany.

Germany’s Secret Air Force Training in the Soviet Union

In The Luftwaffe, James S. Corum explains that Germany was able to train its pilots in the Soviet Union by sending them in small groups to a secret training center in Lipetsk, Russia. This center was established as part of a secret agreement between Germany and the Soviet Union, which allowed Germany to develop its air force in secret. The Lipetsk center was run by German officers and provided training in flying, tactics, and staff work. The center also allowed Germany to test new aircraft and develop new tactics. The Lipetsk center was closed in 1933, but it had already trained a significant number of German pilots and officers.

The Road to Appeasement and War

We will explore key decisions that enabled German expansionism and the erosion of Allied deterrence and collective security.

Key Decisions Enabling Germany's Aggression

Churchill highlights the Anglo-German Naval Agreement as a key decision that allowed Germany to expand its sea power. This agreement permitted Germany to build up to one-third of the British Navy’s strength, including submarines, which the Treaty of Versailles had explicitly denied Germany. The agreement was made without consulting France or the League, even as Britain was asking the League to protest Hitler’s violation of the Treaty’s military clauses. It allowed Germany to build quickly for a minimum of 10 years, with no real restriction on its naval expansion.

(Shortform note: Later historians have reinterpreted the Anglo-German Naval Agreement, drawing on British and German archival records. They argue that the agreement was primarily an attempt to salvage the Washington–London naval limitation system, which was collapsing due to Japan’s withdrawal and the US’s refusal to renew the London Treaty. The British saw the agreement as a way to bring German rearmament under measurable control and to maintain the prestige of arms control. However, they misjudged the symbolic advantage it gave Hitler and the extent to which it signaled a British willingness to conduct security policy through unilateral bargains rather than collective arrangements.)

Britain believed the agreement would remove a cause of World War I: the naval arms race with Germany. The German government assured Britain that its U-boats would not attack merchant vessels. The agreement also meant France would maintain a 43% advantage over the German navy. However, this accord was a significant advantage for Hitler during a pivotal time in his strategic planning. He later denounced it as advantageous to Britain, stating that Germany would retract the benefits as a sign of its disapproval. He had already asserted the right to match Britain's figures, though that hadn't curbed Germany's U-boat production. Churchill argues that the agreement equated to Great Britain excusing Germany for violating the military clauses of the Treaty of Versailles.

Arms Control as a Means of Reducing the Risk of War

In Strategy and Arms Control, Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin argue that arms-control agreements are a form of military cooperation between potential enemies. They define arms control as “all the forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope and violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it.” Schelling and Halperin argue that arms-control agreements can be used to reduce the risk of war by making it more difficult for one side to gain a sudden advantage over the other. They also argue that arms-control agreements can be used to reduce the costs of war by making it more difficult for one side to escalate the conflict. This framework helps explain why British leaders believed the naval agreement would reduce the risk of war, while Churchill feared it would legitimize Germany’s earlier violations of the Treaty of Versailles.

Churchill also points to the reestablishment of conscription and military expansion in Germany as violations of the Versailles Treaty. On March 16th, 1935, the Germans formally reinstated compulsory military service. The law from May 21, 1935, enlarged the army and placed it under Hitler's control. The military was structured into three commands and split into military zones, all of which included an Army Corps of three divisions. Three Armored Divisions were also planned. The German Staff College resumed operations on the fifteenth of October, 1935. By that date, 596,000 young men were conscripted, increasing Germany's army to nearly 700,000 active personnel.

(Shortform note: In practice, the new conscription system created a rolling pool of trained men who could be recalled to service at a moment’s notice. The conscripts served for a short period, then returned to civilian life, but they remained part of the military reserve. This meant that the actual fighting strength of the German army was much greater than its official peacetime numbers suggested. The new army structure, with its three commands and military zones, allowed for rapid mobilization and deployment of forces across the country.)

In August 1936, Germany extended the term of active military duty to two years. The 1915 group included 464,000, and with the 1914 cohort staying another year, the count of Germans receiving standard military training in 1936 reached 1,511,000, not including the party's paramilitary units and the Work Battalions. In that year, the active forces of France's military, excluding reserves, totaled 623,000 troops, with just 407,000 stationed in France.

(Shortform note: Churchill’s comparison of German and French military personnel in 1936 predates the opening of German archives, which has led to a revision of the numbers. In The Wages of Destruction, Adam Tooze argues that the German military’s rapid expansion in 1936 was a burden on the German economy, as the government struggled to provide weapons, motor transport, barracks, and trained officers for the new conscripts.)

The Erosion of Deterrence and United Security Among Allied Powers

Churchill argues that the League failed to enforce collective security, the idea that nations would work together to prevent aggression and maintain peace. This failure was evident when the League did not stop the Italian invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1935. Although the League condemned Italy's actions and imposed economic sanctions, these measures lacked the strength to halt the invasion. Italy continued its conquest, and the organization's inability to enforce its own rules showed its ineffectiveness at maintaining peace.

The League’s Role in the Abyssinia Crisis

In The Guardians, historian Susan Pedersen offers a different perspective on the League’s role in the Abyssinia crisis. She argues that the crisis was not just a failure of the League but a clash between imperial power politics and emerging international oversight. Pedersen shows how the League’s efforts to hold Italy accountable for its aggression represented a new form of international scrutiny that challenged traditional notions of sovereignty. This view suggests that the League’s actions, while ultimately unsuccessful, marked a significant shift in how international relations were conducted.

Next, we will explore the diplomatic failures across the Mediterranean region and the breakdown of Eastern European alliances.

Diplomatic Failures in the Mediterranean

Churchill argues that the League of Nations was ineffective in sanctioning Italy for its invasion of Abyssinia. Under Britain's leadership, the League imposed sanctions on Italy, but these were ineffective because they avoided any measures that might provoke war. The measures did not include oil, which was essential for Italy’s military campaign, and other banned materials were not critical to Italy’s war effort. The UK leadership didn't want to use its sea power to stop Italy, fearing a direct military confrontation. The public in Britain supported the sanctions, believing they would stop Italy’s aggression, but they were unaware of how ineffective the sanctions actually were.

(Shortform note: According to Wikipedia contributors, the League of Nations imposed sanctions on Italy in response to its invasion of Abyssinia, but these sanctions were limited and ineffective. The sanctions did not include oil, which was essential for Italy’s military campaign, and other banned materials were not critical to Italy’s war effort. The United States, which was not a member of the League, did not participate in the sanctions and continued to supply oil to Italy. Other major oil exporters, such as Venezuela and Romania, also did not participate in the sanctions. British officials believed that a full oil embargo would be unenforceable and would merely divert Italian purchases to non-League suppliers.)

The British authorities’ reluctance to confront Italy militarily was due to a desire to avoid war at any cost and preserve peace in Europe. They also feared that opposing Italy too strongly would push Mussolini to align with Hitler, which would strengthen Germany and upset Europe's power equilibrium. France was also unwilling to oppose Italy because it had made military agreements with Italy that allowed it to transfer troops from the Italian lines to the German lines, strengthening its position against Germany. France did not want to jeopardize its relationship with Italy by opposing its actions in Abyssinia.

(Shortform note: The British authorities’ reluctance to confront Italy militarily was due to a desire to avoid war at any cost and preserve peace in Europe. They also feared that opposing Italy too strongly would push Mussolini to align with Hitler, which would strengthen Germany and upset Europe's power equilibrium. France was also unwilling to oppose Italy because it had made military agreements with Italy that allowed it to transfer troops from the Italian lines to the German lines, strengthening its position against Germany. France did not want to jeopardize its relationship with Italy by opposing its actions in Abyssinia.)

Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia was motivated by a desire to avenge Italy’s humiliating defeat at Adowa forty years earlier and to solidify his power by expanding the Italian Empire. The League of Nations’ failure to stop Italy’s aggression undermined its credibility as a tool of world government and its ability to control the threat of a resurgent Germany.

(Shortform note: Churchill’s phrase “tool of world government” is interesting because it suggests that the idea of world government was already in the air before the League of Nations was put to the test. In Governing the World, Mark Mazower traces the history of internationalist thought from the Enlightenment to the present day.)

The Breakdown of Eastern European Alliances

Churchill notes that Eastern European countries were hesitant to accept Soviet help to oppose Germany. Poland, Romania, and countries in the Baltic and Finland feared that the Soviet Union would use the opportunity to incorporate them into the Soviet-Communist system, which they opposed.

(Shortform note: This is a classic example of the “balance of threat” theory in international relations, which holds that weaker states are often wary of accepting military support from a nearby great power, fearing that the alliance will become a tool of domination rather than protection.)