PDF Summary:The Cold War, by Odd Arne Westad

The Cold War shaped global politics for nearly half a century, but its roots and effects extended far beyond the confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. In The Cold War, Odd Arne Westad examines how ideological conflict between capitalism and socialism transformed nations across Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. He explores the structural foundations that sustained the rivalry, including nuclear weapons, economic systems, and political control.

Westad traces how the conflict evolved from its origins in postwar Europe through regional manifestations in Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and Afghanistan, ultimately ending with the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991. He examines how Cold War dynamics influenced decolonization, the Non-Aligned movement, and nationalist struggles, while analyzing why the United States struggled to define its global role after the conflict ended. This summary provides an understanding of how Cold War tensions shaped the modern world.

(continued)...

Regional & Global Manifestations of the Cold War

Westad notes that Cold War dynamics influenced the formation of the Non-Aligned bloc, and this group of countries refused to take sides. Led by India, Indonesia, Ghana, Egypt, and Yugoslavia, the movement was formalized in 1961 at a meeting in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Its founders feared that the conclusion of colonial rule would result in fresh conflicts and believed that countries worldwide could organize themselves without resorting to war.

The US Criticized Non-Alignment

Not everyone agreed that countries should be able to remain non-aligned. In Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World, Robert B. Rakove notes that US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles condemned the very notion of neutralism, describing it as “immoral and shortsighted.” Dulles argued that in a world locked in ideological confrontation, states had a moral obligation to align with the United States and the broader “free world.” Efforts by postcolonial leaders to remain nonaligned appeared to him not as a legitimate stance but as a form of dangerous equivocation between freedom and communism.

Next, we'll explore regional arenas of Cold War rivalry and shifts in the Cold War order.

Regional Arenas of Rivalries During the Cold War

According to Westad, the Cold War had a devastating impact on battleground regions like the Korean Peninsula, Indochina, Afghanistan, many African countries, and nations in Central America. Some of these regions recovered, but others had a legacy of cynicism. The US and USSR plundered their client states, and dictators amassed fortunes while their people remained poor.

(Shortform note: In The Cold War, historian John Lewis Gaddis argues that alliances with the superpowers did not invariably operate as mechanisms of exploitation; in many cases they furnished front-line states with security guarantees, economic aid, and access to advanced technology and markets, so that countries such as West Germany, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan experienced rapid growth, political consolidation, and rising standards of living precisely because they were integrated into these Cold War alliance systems.)

Next, we'll examine the Cold War's influence on regional conflicts and internal dynamics.

Cold War as Driver of Regional Conflict

Westad contends that regional conflicts in the Middle East and Asia were fueled by the Cold War. It soon spread to the region, as Israelis and Arabs both sought support for their mutual conflict. The U.S. and the Soviets also worried about Iran. In 1941, Iran was occupied by the Soviets and the British to prevent potential collaboration between Iranian nationalists and Germany, as well as to control Iranian oil production. This occupation alienated most people in Iran and allowed the Soviets to back independence efforts in the northern zone they controlled.

(Shortform note: While the occupation of Iran had long-term consequences that contributed to the Cold War, historians generally don’t consider it a part of the Cold War. The occupation occurred in 1941, several years before the Cold War began. The occupation was a World War II episode, as the Soviets and British sought to prevent Iran from collaborating with Germany and to secure Iranian oil resources. However, the occupation did set the stage for later Cold War tensions, particularly regarding Soviet influence in northern Iran and the broader struggle for control over Middle Eastern resources.)

The British pulled out their forces in 1946, yet Stalin sought to negotiate a more favorable agreement with Iran. At the same time, Azeris and Kurds proclaimed independent republics in northern Iran, backed by the Soviets. In early 1946, America and Britain tried to compel the Soviet Union to leave Iran, creating one of the initial crises of the Cold War. In May 1946, the Soviets retreated because of American influence, but Iran's prime minister quickly reneged on all the commitments he'd made to them. In December 1946, Iranian forces seized control of the north, and Azeri and Kurdish leaders who hadn't fled to the USSR were executed in public. The Iranian Communist Party experienced a setback that was difficult to overcome.

(Shortform note: The US and Britain used the newly created United Nations to pressure the Soviets to withdraw from Iran. They argued that the Soviets were violating Iran’s sovereignty and that their presence was a threat to international peace and security. The US also threatened to cut off economic aid to the Soviet Union if they didn’t comply. The Soviets eventually agreed to withdraw their troops in exchange for a promise from Iran that they would grant oil concessions to the Soviets. However, Iran later reneged on this promise, and the Soviets were left empty-handed.)

Westad adds that the Soviets wanted to assist the Communist parties, but they didn’t believe they were ready to conduct revolutions independently. They also aimed to leverage Soviet influence to secure resources from Asian nations. The Soviets appeared more concerned with undermining American or British interests than crafting their own enduring strategy. Their perspectives on the Cold War were crucial in establishing the state of Israel, which the Soviets would quickly come to lament.

(Shortform note: The Soviets’ Cold War perspectives were crucial in establishing the state of Israel because they saw the creation of a Jewish state as a way to stabilize their sphere of influence. According to A Century of Ambivalence, after World War II, the Soviets viewed many Jews in Eastern Europe as politically suspect, associating them with prewar elites, wartime collaboration, and postwar cosmopolitanism. They saw organized Jewish emigration to Palestine and later Israel as a safety valve to relieve domestic tensions and solidify Communist control in newly annexed and occupied territories.)

In Asia, the model for development provided by the Soviets held more importance than Stalin’s foreign policy actions. Governing parties were impacted by perceived Soviet successes in regard to social and economic development. Across Asia, government programs significantly relied on collective farming, domestic industry, and centralized planning. The US was as reluctant as the Soviets in how it approached Asia, but it was even more constrained by ties to Europe's colonial history. In the postwar era, US administrations largely did not put anticolonialism above Cold War priorities.

(Shortform note: The Soviet model of development was not the only one available to Asian countries. In Governing the Market, Robert H. Wade argues that the Japanese model of development was more influential in East Asia. He explains that the Japanese model was based on a combination of state intervention and market mechanisms, with a focus on export-oriented industrialization. This model was adopted by countries such as Taiwan and South Korea, which achieved rapid economic growth and development. Unlike the Soviet model, the Japanese model did not prioritize collective farming, domestic industry, and centralized planning.)

The US aimed to increase availability of raw materials and potential markets for itself and its allies. In the early Cold War, the US prioritized the growth of capitalism over the sole preservation of national economic interests or those of individual US companies. By the end of the conflict between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang, Cold War priorities overshadowed any other concerns in Asia for the United States and its internal opponents. The US feared the consequences if the Viet Minh won in Vietnam.

(Shortform note: John Lewis Gaddis, a prominent Cold War historian, strongly disagrees with Odd Arne Westad’s view of early US policy in Asia. In his book We Now Know, Gaddis argues that the US was primarily motivated by security concerns and the need to contain communism, rather than by a desire to expand capitalism and markets. Gaddis maintains that US leaders viewed the spread of communism in Asia as a direct threat to American security and global stability, and that economic interests were secondary to the overarching goal of containing Soviet influence.)

America's involvement in Korea allowed them to retaliate against what they viewed as widespread Soviet aggression. The Korean War combined superpower confrontation with Asian nationalism. It was a civil war in Asia, as well as the largest Cold War campaign. The conflict in Korea and its consequences were arguably the worst calamities of the geopolitical struggle. The war devastated the nation and subjugated its citizens. The Korean War was a conflict that could have been averted, resulting from deep ideological divides among Koreans and a framework of Cold War dynamics that facilitated involvement by the superpowers. It was a terrifying emblem of Cold War tensions. It was excessive, brutal, and appeared never-ending, turning Korea into a wasteland and causing people globally to fear that their own nation could be the next to experience such a catastrophe. Consequently, it ramped up and armed the conflict worldwide.

The Korean War Was Not Inevitable

In The Korean War: An International History, William Stueck argues that the Korean War was a conflict that could have been averted. He bases this on archival evidence from Moscow, Beijing, Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang, which shows that the outbreak of fighting in June 1950 was the result of a series of contingent choices, misperceptions, and policy reversals. Stueck identifies several key moments in 1949 and early 1950 when alternative decisions by one or more of the principal actors could realistically have prevented the escalation to full-scale war on the peninsula. For example, he points to the Soviet Union's initial reluctance to support Kim Il Sung's invasion plans, the United States' ambiguous signals regarding its commitment to South Korea's defense, and the Chinese leadership's internal debates about the risks of American intervention.

Cold War & Internal Regional Dynamics

Westad states that internal dynamics in Latin America were influenced by the Cold War, exacerbating existing inequalities and conflicts. Latin America was already grappling with severe social injustice and inequality. The Cold War introduced the US's single-minded preoccupation with Communism. The US government saw radicalism in Latin America and Soviet-style Communism as inherently aligned, leading it to form alliances with military regimes throughout the continent.

These governments crippled the region, cutting their populations off from political participation and a sense of national identity. They obstructed social development that could have created a middle class with greater inclusivity. The Cold War impaired the decision-making of both the United States government and Latin American elites, resulting in a shared oppressive system that wasn't ultimately advantageous to either side.

The Cold War in Latin America

In Latin America’s Cold War, Hal Brands challenges the view that the US’s “alliances with military regimes throughout the continent” simply “crippled the region.” Brands argues that the Cold War in Latin America was first and foremost a struggle among Latin Americans themselves, in which military officers, conservative elites, and revolutionary movements pursued their own ideological and political projects and frequently exploited superpower assistance to wage their own battles. He explains that US involvement was an important enabling factor, but Washington neither created these conflicts nor exercised anything like complete control over the goals, methods, or brutality of the local actors who fought them.

Shifts in the Cold War Order

Westad explains that the end of the Soviet Union marked the conclusion of the Cold War as a global framework. The Cold War was a clash between socialism and capitalism that reached its height between 1945 and 1989. It was a global system since the leading world powers formed their foreign policies in relation to it. The conflict concluded because global conditions were changing. Global economic shifts initially favored the United States, but later increasingly benefited China and additional Asian nations.

(Shortform note: Since Westad wrote, researchers have noted that the United States has leveraged its central position in global finance and digital networks to build an “underground empire” of chokepoints—such as dollar clearing, the SWIFT messaging system, major cloud providers, critical semiconductor and telecommunications supply chains, and core internet infrastructure—that channels other states’ economic growth and technological development through U.S.-dominated systems, allowing American policymakers to monitor flows of money and data and, when they choose, to restrict or weaponize access to these infrastructural hubs. This means that Asian growth is increasingly running through U.S.-dominated networks.)

The Cold War's conclusion in Europe resulted from a period of growing Eastern and Western relations, which reduced their mutual fear. The demonstrated success of incorporating outlying nations into a European bloc also contributed to concluding the Cold War. The Cold War concluded in 1989 as Eastern Europeans revolted and Gorbachev failed to protect the Communist governments. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the final end of the Cold War's global framework. The Soviet collapse definitively concluded the Cold War. No nation remained to confront the United States worldwide by promoting a fundamentally distinct ideology.

(Shortform note: Odd Arne Westad’s claim that no nation remained to confront the United States worldwide by promoting a fundamentally distinct ideology is historically dubious. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has promoted a “China model” of one-party rule grounded in political meritocracy as an alternative to Western-style liberal democratic capitalism. In The China Model, Daniel A. Bell argues that the PRC’s system of one-party rule grounded in political meritocracy, combined with constrained forms of democracy at lower levels and extensive policy experimentation, constitutes a coherent and normatively defensible alternative to Western-style liberal democratic capitalism. Bell contends that the China model is increasingly viewed by political elites in other countries as a possible model for achieving modernity, good governance, and rapid economic development without adopting the full institutional package of liberal democracy.)

The Cold War dominated global affairs for two generations, drawing on an ideological battle that began earlier and persisted longer. The conclusion was abrupt, but the precursors were lengthy. The Cold War was weakening for a while, since at least the significant economic and political shifts worldwide in the mid-1970s. The ideological Cold War, which predated the state system by almost two generations, disappeared only in part. The Marxist-Leninist model of communism was no longer a feasible societal blueprint.

(Shortform note: Westad is referring to the ideological struggle that began in the 19th century and continued into the 20th century, which was later described by Karl Polanyi in his 1944 book The Great Transformation. Polanyi argued that “for a century the dynamics of modern society was governed by a double movement. The one was the principle of economic liberalism, aiming at the establishment of a self-regulating market; the other was the principle of social protection, aiming at the conservation of man and nature as well as productive organization, and using protective legislation, restrictive associations, and other instruments of intervention as its methods.”)

However, little changed for America. American foreign policy rolled on, unperturbed by any significant adjustments in strategic vision or political aims. The United States emerged victorious after the Cold War, yet the majority of Americans continued to feel secure only if the world resembled their nation more closely and if other countries followed the U.S.'s wishes. The notions and presumptions formed over time remained completely unchanged, even though a significant outside threat was gone. Most decision-makers from both political parties thought this period represented U.S. unipolarity, allowing it to act on its impulses with minimal expense. Two kinds of U.S. triumphalism emerged following the Cold War.

(Shortform note: Unipolarity is a term used in international relations to describe a global power structure in which one state holds a preponderance of power and influence, with no other state or coalition of states able to challenge its dominance. In the context of the post-Cold War era, unipolarity refers to the United States' position as the world's sole superpower, with unmatched military, economic, and technological capabilities. This unipolar moment was characterized by the absence of a peer competitor to the U.S., allowing it to shape international affairs with relative freedom and minimal constraints.)

Clinton's approach stressed capitalist prosperity in the American style and market values globally. Bush's approach emphasized predominance. The Bush version might never have existed if Islamist fanatics hadn't attacked New York and Washington. The way the U.S. responded to these attacks was shaped by Cold War experiences. Bush's administration decided to seize the opportunity of this unipolar period to strike its foes and take control of Afghanistan and Iraq. Strategically, these actions were meaningless, effectively establishing two 21st-century colonies governed by a dominant country uninterested in or disinclined to pursue colonialism.

(Shortform note: The author’s characterization of the Afghanistan and Iraq campaigns as “strategically meaningless” and “21st-century colonies” is misleading. In Occupational Hazards, David M. Edelstein argues that contemporary military occupations are best understood as security-driven, temporary arrangements in which foreign forces exercise authority in order to address perceived threats and reshape local institutions with an eye toward eventual withdrawal, often operating under evolving international mandates and domestic political constraints, rather than as open-ended projects of imperial expansion or traditional colonial rule.)

Bush's advisors for foreign relations determined the course of action. They emphasized projecting power, controlling territory, and changing regimes, while using regional coalitions, robust economic sanctions, global law enforcement, and retaliatory airstrikes could have been more effective. During the last decade of the 20th century and the early 21st century, it was as though the United States no longer had the global purpose it had during the Cold War and hadn't yet discovered a replacement. The previous norms and mindsets stayed largely unchanged. The triumphalism from the Cold War didn't allow for self-reflection and focused discussion, making post-Cold War policy changes more challenging to implement. America didn't leverage its best Cold War lessons to grasp its post-Cold War role. The U.S. is finding it increasingly challenging to sustain global dominance. It must increasingly collaborate with others in a multipolar state system.

How Terrorism Ends

In How Terrorism Ends, Audrey Kurth Cronin argues that projecting power, controlling territory, and changing regimes are rarely effective in eliminating terrorist organizations. She notes that most terrorist campaigns end through a combination of police work, intelligence sharing, and political processes. Large-scale military interventions, she argues, are costly, often radicalize new recruits, and rarely bring about the definitive demise of a terrorist movement. Cronin’s research suggests that a more nuanced approach—combining targeted law enforcement, international cooperation, and addressing underlying political grievances—offers a more sustainable path to counterterrorism success.

We’ll now examine geopolitical realignments and evolving conflict dynamics.

Geopolitical Realignments

Westad notes that the USSR's influence on Eastern Europe was significant after World War II. The Red Army had seized control over a large part of the region, and the USSR was now a formidable force in politics and military. In countries like Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia, the Soviets were greeted as liberators. They were viewed as conquerors in nations like Poland, Hungary, and the Baltic region. Stalin wanted the Red Army and Soviet civilian advisers to bolster the Left and give Communists a chance to wield substantial power. The Soviet model could lead these countries to socialism.

(Shortform note: In this context, “the Left” refers to the political parties and movements in Eastern Europe that advocated for radical socialist reconstruction of their societies under Soviet auspices. This included not only the Communist parties but also other left-wing groups like social democrats and agrarian socialists who saw the Soviet Union as a model for economic modernization and social justice. The Left in these countries was often divided between those who wanted to work within existing democratic frameworks and those who favored a more revolutionary approach. Stalin’s strategy was to unite these forces under Communist leadership, using the Red Army’s presence to suppress right-wing opposition and create a political environment conducive to socialist transformation.)

At the same time, the Eastern European region was a crucial buffer against potential imperialist aggression from America and Britain against the USSR. Stalin believed they had to retain Soviet influence, but he wanted to maintain it without disrupting relations with Britain and the U.S. The USSR needed reconstruction, and until it was completed, Stalin aimed to prevent his World War II allies from acting aggressively.

(Shortform note: Some historians have challenged the idea that Stalin’s main goal was to preserve Eastern Europe as a protective zone without provoking a rupture with Britain and the U.S. In We Now Know, John Lewis Gaddis argues that Stalin treated the region as a springboard for ideological and strategic dominance over the rest of Europe, even at the cost of acute tensions with his former allies. He explains that Stalin’s actions in Eastern Europe were part of a broader strategy to expand Soviet influence and control, rather than merely defensive measures.)

The Soviet Union’s influence in Eastern Europe led to numerous clashes with America and Britain. The United States and Britain clashed verbally with the Soviets over reparations from Germany and Italy, over the treaties with Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and over Trieste in Italy, which the Yugoslav Communists had taken over after the war ended. By the spring of 1947, most U.S. policymakers and a large number of Europeans were preoccupied with what seemed like a continuous Soviet drive to expand influence in Eastern Europe.

(Shortform note: In The Problem of Trieste and the Italo-Yugoslav Border, Glenda Sluga explores the complex history of Trieste, a city on the Adriatic Sea that became a focal point of international diplomacy and conflict after World War II. Trieste was claimed by both Italian irredentists and South Slav nationalists, making it a symbol of the broader struggles over national identity and territorial boundaries in postwar Europe. Sluga argues that the “Trieste question” became a laboratory for new ideas about self-determination, minority rights, and international governance, as diplomats, experts, and local actors experimented with different solutions to the city’s contested status.)

President Truman thought the Soviets had an expansionist mindset, but he also felt they wouldn't risk a total rift with the US and Britain. In the following two years, however, Truman began to question his initial assessment. He was enraged by the Soviet actions in Eastern Europe, feeling that Stalin had broken promises to FDR regarding the establishment of democracies there. He also thought the Soviets were becoming more confrontational, both in European and Asian regions.

(Shortform note: Truman’s diaries and early National Security Council papers show a clear shift in his thinking about the USSR after the crises in Poland, Iran, and the Turkish Straits. Initially, he described the Soviets as potential partners, but after these events, he began to see them as long-term adversaries. This change in language and tone suggests that Truman’s view of the Soviets became more pessimistic as he perceived their actions as increasingly aggressive and uncooperative.)

Stalin's tactical decisions shaped the geopolitical landscape in Europe. He believed that Communist revolutions would occur in areas where support could be provided by the Red Army, particularly in Eastern Europe. He viewed these regions as a buffer against potential Western aggression and sought to maintain Soviet influence without provoking a rift with the US and Britain. Stalin's approach to postwar Eastern Europe was marked by a lack of planning, as Kremlin leaders had been focused on the war. He wanted Soviet military forces and advisors there to bolster the Left and steer these countries toward socialism. Stalin's approach of asserting strong Soviet authority in Poland conflicted with what his allies and most Poles wanted, helping spark the Cold War.

Stalin’s Postwar Policy in Europe

Some historians disagree with Odd Arne Westad’s view that Stalin’s lack of planning in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland, helped spark the Cold War. In Stalin’s Wars, Geoffrey Roberts argues that the decisive escalation to Cold War arose primarily from American choices about Germany’s future and the use of the atomic monopoly as an instrument of political pressure, not from Soviet policy in its neighboring states. Roberts, drawing on Soviet archival sources, contends that Stalin sought to maintain great-power cooperation, was ready to live with a non-communist but non-hostile Europe beyond the Soviet sphere, and understood the postwar settlement in Europe as a set of limited security arrangements rather than as a prelude to an inevitable confrontation with the West.

Evolving Conflict Dynamics

Westad explains that the Cold War influenced conflicts in the region and other areas. The Middle Eastern region was characterized by instability and volatility, making it difficult to gain long-term benefits. Limited economic development, aside from in Israel and certain Gulf nations, was more crucial to the region's future than changing Cold War loyalties of Middle Eastern nations. Middle Eastern secular nationalist governments didn't bring the kind of enhancements to everyday living that most people sought. Instead, they ended up with more authoritarian and less democratic governments that allied with foreign powers who appeared to have little regard for their peoples' lives.

(Shortform note: In addition to limited economic development, another structural fault line of the region is water scarcity. In Water, Steven Solomon argues that the chronic freshwater scarcity across the arid belt from North Africa to the Persian Gulf has been a primary driver of instability and conflict in the Middle East. He explains that control over shared rivers, aquifers, and large dams on the Nile, Jordan, and Tigris–Euphrates systems has been a central source of political power, a driver of cross-border and internal conflict, and a key determinant of whether governments can secure food supplies, sustain agriculture, and meet the everyday needs of rapidly expanding urban populations.)

Certain younger individuals started seeking alternative sources of leadership and meaning to commit to. Feeling hopeless and humiliated drove thousands to attend mosques and Islamic schools, where preachers attributed Arab regimes' failures to their separation from God. The U.S. didn't consider Islamists a primary danger. Instead, the Islamists could be advantageous, as they were against Leftist regimes focused on nationalism, which the U.S. also detested and wished to eliminate. Their socially conservative and anti-Communist views were also aligned with American interests. The Islamists saw Communists as their chief adversaries, particularly in Iraq and Iran. The Soviets saw the Islamists as reactionary remnants of the past. They had no place in societies evolving—under Soviet leadership—toward socialism.

(Shortform note: Scholars have debated the role of religion in international relations, with some arguing that it’s a key driver of conflict and others suggesting that it can be a force for peace. In the context of the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR both viewed Islamism through the lens of their own ideological frameworks, with the U.S. seeing it as a potential ally against communism and the USSR viewing it as a threat to their vision of a secular, socialist society. Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s work on religion and international relations suggests that this dynamic is part of a broader pattern in which states seek to “manage” religion by defining certain forms of Islamism as acceptable and others as dangerous.)

By the close of the 1970s, the Cold War had turned the Middle East into an area with tough, nearly insoluble issues. The region was split between U.S. and Soviet allies, similar to European and eastern Asian countries. Each power backed governments that failed to properly serve their citizens. Neither side truly aimed to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict; they only pursued negotiations to the extent that it would improve their stance against the other Superpower.

(Shortform note: Some historians disagree with Odd Arne Westad’s claim that neither Superpower truly aimed to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For example, political scientist William B. Quandt argues in Peace Process that in the mid-1970s, many American officials genuinely pursued peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors as a substantive objective in its own right. He explains that these officials believed that achieving stable Arab-Israeli accommodations was a vital American interest and a moral responsibility, not merely a by-product of other strategic concerns.)

The United States would not engage with the Palestinian leaders, whom they deemed terrorists. The Soviets professed backing the Palestinians' objectives, though they aimed to control Palestinian groups. America's fixation on ensuring a steady flow of oil from the region meant that regimes like Iran and Saudi Arabia became natural allies of the US. It was a combustible combination that ensured the region remained extremely unstable until the Cold War concluded and afterward.

(Shortform note: Security theorists have described the Middle East as a “regional security complex,” a region where the security of each state is so closely intertwined with that of its neighbors that no state can achieve security in isolation. In Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver argue that the Middle East’s security dynamics are shaped by a combination of local rivalries and external interventions.)