PDF Summary:Ordinary Men, by Christopher R. Browning

How did ordinary German men become perpetrators of mass murder during the Holocaust? In Ordinary Men, historian Christopher R. Browning examines Reserve Police Battalion 101, a unit of middle-aged family men from Hamburg who participated in the systematic killing of Jewish people in Poland during World War II. These men were not hardened soldiers or fervent ideologues—they were reserve policemen with no combat experience.

Browning explores the mechanisms that transformed these "ordinary men" into killers: the dehumanizing effects of war and propaganda, the psychological distance created by bureaucracy, and the powerful pressure to conform to group expectations. He traces how the battalion's involvement escalated from deportations to mass shootings, and examines why most men participated despite having opportunities to refuse. The book raises questions about human nature, moral responsibility, and the conditions under which average people commit atrocities.

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The Trawniki Men as Perpetrators and Victims

The Trawniki recruits of Operation Reinhard have become a paradigmatic case for historians studying the phenomenon of coerced collaboration in the Holocaust. In Bloodlands, Timothy Snyder argues that in the region he calls the “bloodlands,” the men who entered German service as local auxiliaries had almost always already been exposed to massive state violence from one or both dictatorships, and their later involvement in German killing policies is best understood as coerced collaboration: their choices were structured by previous Soviet and Nazi terror, by hunger and captivity, and by the fear of what another change of regime would bring, so that the line between perpetrator and victim often ran through the same life rather than between clearly separate groups. The Trawniki men, in this view, were both victims and perpetrators, and their actions can only be understood in the context of the overlapping Nazi and Soviet occupations.

Browning also points out that the Order Police played a significant role in the Nazi's Final Solution, their plan to exterminate European Jews. The Order Police played a role in the Final Solution in three ways: First, they took part in the widespread killing of Russian Jews during the summer and fall of 1941. Second, they guarded the trains deporting Jews to extermination camps. Third, they helped clear Jewish ghettos, gathering victims and compelling them onto trains.

(Shortform note: Since the publication of Ordinary Men, international law and scholarship have evolved to recognize the three roles of the Order Police as direct acts of genocide, rather than peripheral assistance. This shift reflects a broader understanding of the Holocaust, emphasizing the active participation of various groups in the systematic extermination of Jews. This reclassification has significant implications for how we understand the Holocaust and the responsibilities of those involved.)

Methods of Persecution and Killing

Browning notes that the group systematically hunted and killed Jewish people in forests and bunkers. They developed a system of informants and scouts who hunted for and disclosed where Jews were hiding. Numerous Polish people shared information on Jewish individuals concealed in the woods who had taken food from local farms, fields, and villages. The unit then dispatched minor search parties to find the hidden Jews. The patrols followed their Polish guides to the bunker hideouts and threw grenades inside.

(Shortform note: In Secret City, historian Gunnar S. Paulsson challenges the idea that Poles willingly informed on hidden Jews. He argues that while some Poles did betray Jews, most didn’t systematically hunt them. He explains that a significant minority of Poles provided substantial help to Jews, while the majority remained indifferent.)

Surviving Jews who came out of the bunkers after the first grenades exploded were made to lie prone so they could be shot through the neck. The corpses were typically left for the closest Polish villagers to bury. These patrols were so frequent that the majority of officers couldn't recall their number. The battalion conducted a pair of operations in the Parczew forest: one in autumn 1942 and another in spring 1943. The first sweep targeted Jews, partisans, and escaped Russian prisoners of war. The second sweep found a forest hideout of escaped Russians and Jews who resisted with weapons. Around 100 to 120 Jewish people and Russians lost their lives. The battalion lost at least one member when Trapp's adjutant, Lieutenant Hagen, was accidentally shot by his own men.

(Shortform note: An adjutant is a staff officer who assists a commanding officer with administrative work and passes on orders. In the context of a police battalion, the adjutant would be responsible for handling the paperwork and formalities of the unit, as well as relaying the orders of the commanding officer to the rest of the unit. In this case, Trapp's adjutant would have been responsible for handling the administrative work of the battalion and passing on Trapp's orders to the rest of the unit.)

In addition, Jews found beyond the ghetto were shot on sight. On October 15, 1941, Hans Frank, who led the General Government, mandated that any Jew found outside the ghetto would be sentenced to death. The decree was in response to German public health officials in Poland who feared that Jews would exit the ghettos to smuggle food, thus spreading the typhus epidemic that was devastating them. The decree was not fully implemented until October 1942, when signs declared that Jews who failed to relocate into the ghettos would be executed.

(Shortform note: Some Holocaust historians disagree with Browning’s assertion that Hans Frank’s October 1941 order was a response to typhus fears. In Holocaust, Peter Longerich argues that the order was part of a broader radicalization of Nazi policy in the General Government, which increasingly used medical and epidemic language as a bureaucratic camouflage for the systematic extermination of Jews. He explains that the Nazis’ use of epidemic language was a way to legitimize their policies and make them seem like public health measures rather than acts of genocide.)

The battalion made “forest patrols” for “suspects,” building up a network of informers and “forest runners,” or trackers, who searched for and revealed Jewish hiding places. Many Poles volunteered information regarding Jews in the forest who, in their desperate attempts to survive, had taken food from fields, farms, and villages in the vicinity. In autumn 1942 and spring 1943, the battalion conducted a pair of forest-clearing operations in Parczew. The initial search killed 500 Jews. The second sweep killed 100 to 120 Jews and Russians. The battalion incurred at least one death. The battalion also killed Jewish people who were forced to work on several expansive farms that the German occupiers had seized and were running. Additionally, they killed Jews who had stayed concealed in urban areas instead of the forest.

The Context of the Forest Patrols

The “forest patrols” and informers operated in a countryside that was already under severe strain from the German occupation. In Defiance, Nechama Tec describes how the German occupation of the rural borderlands of eastern Poland and western Belorussia created a climate of fear and scarcity that shaped villagers’ responses to Jews hiding in the forests. The Germans expropriated food and livestock from local farmers, leaving them with barely enough to survive. Villagers who were seen as tolerating Jews or forest groups risked collective punishment from the Germans. This created a situation where villagers’ decisions about whether to help or betray Jews were often driven by fear of German reprisals and the need to protect their own meager resources, rather than by preexisting hostility toward Jews. The Germans’ policy of collective punishment for any perceived resistance or aid to Jews meant that entire villages could be destroyed for the actions of a few individuals. This created a climate of fear and suspicion that made it difficult for Jews to find help, even from those who might have been sympathetic to their plight.

Battalion 101: Perpetration and Explanation

Next, let’s discuss the escalation of involvement of the police battalions in mass killings, as well as the mechanisms of perpetration that influenced the individuals in Police Battalion 101.

The Escalation of Involvement

Browning explains that the involvement of police battalions in mass killings escalated over time. For example, for sixteen months, Police Battalion 310 was stationed in Poland, being taught to act as a dominant occupier before being transferred to Soviet territory. Its personnel were chosen from an age group that had been more nazified; over 40% were party members, and 10% were members of the SS. The battalion casually participated in indiscriminate killings of Jews, Slavs, Romani people, and different groups of "asocials."

(Shortform note: In KL, Nikolaus Wachsmann explains that the Nazis used the term “asocials” to refer to people who were unwilling or unable to live up to the regime’s ideals of disciplined work and orderly conduct. This label was deliberately vague and elastic, allowing the Nazis to stigmatize and incarcerate a wide range of people, including beggars, vagrants, habitual petty offenders, street prostitutes, alcoholics, and many others. The Nazis used this label to justify locking up or killing people without any specific crime, marking them with a black triangle as a sign of their alleged worthlessness and expendability.)

Additionally, Police Battalion 307 participated in the July 1941 massacre of adult Jewish men in Brest-Litovsk, followed by later massacres in Belarus. In the spring and summer of 1942, ghettos in the Lublin district were cleared, followed by anti-partisan operations in the area now known as Belarus from fall 1942 to summer 1944. Police Battalion 105 came together in the autumn of 1939. Its members were born between 1902 and 1909, and had previously been reserve policemen between 1937 and 1939.

(Shortform note: The two units described above were formed in the context of a decade-long transformation of German policing. In the 1930s, the German police force underwent a significant transformation, becoming increasingly militarized and politicized. This shift was driven by the Nazi regime's desire to create a force that could be used for both internal repression and external aggression. The police were reorganized along military lines, with a focus on discipline, hierarchy, and combat training. This militarization was accompanied by a process of politicization, as the police were purged of individuals deemed politically unreliable and replaced with Nazi loyalists.)

In late 1939 and early 1940, they underwent comprehensive military training along with extra ideological education before taking on duties in Norway as occupying forces and being redesignated as a reserve police battalion at the start of 1941. The battalion was then deployed to the Baltic in the summer and fall of 1941, where it conducted many anti-partisan missions, and to the Netherlands from 1942 to 1944, where it helped send Dutch Jews to Auschwitz. Police Battalion 303 consisted of people born from 1909 to 1912 who volunteered and were given to the SS and law enforcement as a swap for the many trained policemen who had been moved to the army. They received substantial preparation and were deployed to Poland for nine months before entering Ukraine in June 1941, where they took part in numerous massacres of Jews, including Babi Yar.

The War and the Holocaust

The redeployment of these battalions to the Baltic, the Netherlands, and Ukraine reflects the changing nature of the war and the Nazis’ shifting priorities. As the Nazis conquered more territory, they needed more men to maintain control over these areas. The Nazis also needed more men to carry out their plans for the mass murder of Jews and other groups. The redeployment of these battalions to the east, where the Nazis established their killing zones, shows how the war and the Holocaust were closely linked. The war created the conditions that allowed the Nazis to carry out their plans for mass murder, and the Holocaust was an integral part of the Nazis’ war effort.

Let’s first examine the earliest activities and responses of the 101st Reserve Police Battalion. Then, we'll discuss the evolution of methods and increasing violence, which grew more brutal.

Initial Actions and Responses

Browning notes that initially, Reserve Police Battalion 101 took part in consolidating Jews into larger ghettos and camps. The battalion came to Lublin County in June 1942, initially told their duties would involve guarding. They gathered Jews from less populated areas and relocated them to larger ghettos and camps. Sometimes only Jews who could perform labor were taken and transported to sites in the Lublin area. In other instances, the whole Jewish population was gathered and transported by foot or vehicle. Jews unable to be relocated because of age, frailty, or illness were executed. The men were not told the names of the towns from which they had deported Jews or the places to which the Jews had been relocated.

Ethical Fading

In Blind Spots, Max H. Bazerman and Ann E. Tenbrunsel explain that people can participate in harmful systems without seeing themselves as unethical. This is because of “ethical blind spots” and what they call “ethical fading.” Ethical fading occurs when people focus on the technical aspects of a task and overlook the ethical implications. For example, the Reserve Police Battalion 101 was told their duty was to “guard” while they gathered and relocated Jews. To avoid ethical fading, Bazerman and Tenbrunsel recommend pausing before carrying out instructions, examining how the task is framed, and identifying who will be affected by your actions. They also emphasize the importance of questioning authority when the language used masks the real human consequences of what you are being asked to do.

Evolution of Methods and Escalation of Violence

Browning explains that the battalion's methods of violence evolved to include mass shootings and deportations. The battalion initially conducted a mass shooting in Shepetovka, Ukraine, where they killed several hundred Jews, including women and children. They persisted in conducting smaller executions in other towns throughout the year. The battalion’s first deportation took place in the Polish town of Łomazy, where they rounded up the Jewish population and sent them to the Treblinka extermination camp. The battalion kept deporting people from other towns throughout the year.

(Shortform note: According to Hitler’s Police Battalions, the battalion that conducted the shooting in the Ukrainian town and the battalion that conducted the deportation in the Polish town were two different battalions. The book explains that the battalion that conducted the shooting in the Ukrainian town was part of a group of battalions that operated in the Soviet Union, while the battalion that conducted the deportation in the Polish town was part of a different group of battalions that operated in Poland.)

Browning also notes that the psychological impact on the perpetrators led to changes in how violence was carried out. The psychological strain on the men needed consideration and relief. Members of the 101st Reserve Police Battalion gradually grew more proficient and desensitized as executioners.

(Shortform note: Browning wasn’t the first to suggest that psychological strain made perpetrators more proficient and desensitized executioners. In 1989, psychologist Ervin Staub argued that once people begin to participate in group killings, the need to see themselves as good, effective members of their community pulls them along a “continuum of destruction” in which they increasingly refine their killing skills while becoming emotionally numb to what they are doing.)

How Perpetration Was Achieved

Let’s now look at the mechanisms of perpetration that influenced Reserve Police Battalion 101's members. Browning asserts that indoctrination and propaganda played a role. As with German society as a whole, the men were engulfed by a flood of racist and anti-Semitic propaganda. The uniformed police provided indoctrination during initial training and consistently within every unit. Such continuous propaganda likely played a significant role in strengthening overall ideas of German racial supremacy and a "degree of dislike" of Jews.

(Shortform note: In 1962, French philosopher Jacques Ellul published a book on the nature of modern propaganda. He argued that propaganda is most effective when it’s continuous and coherent, meaning that it’s a constant stream of information that all fits together. When people are surrounded by such propaganda, it slowly changes their entire worldview. This helps explain how the policemen could come to see racist ideas as common sense rather than as a controversial ideology.)

Nevertheless, much of the indoctrination content evidently wasn't aimed at older reservists and was, at times, extremely unsuitable or unrelated to them. There's a noticeable lack of surviving documentation specifically meant to condition the officers for personally murdering Jews. To believe that this material could have taken away the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101's ability to think independently, you'd need to have strong faith in the influence of indoctrination.

(Shortform note: In Age of Propaganda, Anthony R. Pratkanis and Elliot Aronson explain that modern propaganda works by providing people with prepackaged interpretations and scripts for how to respond to situations. Instead of thinking independently about each situation, people learn to apply these scripts automatically. This is why indoctrination can be so effective: It replaces slow, effortful thinking with quick, automatic responses.)

Browning also notes that conformity to the group played a significant role in the battalion members' conduct. The battalion received directives to kill Jews, though individual soldiers were not given the same orders. Nevertheless, the vast majority of the group committed murder, even though nearly all of them—initially, at least—were appalled and repulsed by their actions. Most couldn't disrupt formation and stand apart by behaving in an obviously nonconformist way. Firing their weapons was the simpler option. Nonshooters were making others do the "dirty work" by stepping out of line.

(Shortform note: Browning’s claim that group conformity was the main reason why most of the men went along with the killings has been challenged by other historians. In his 1996 book Hitler’s Willing Executioners, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen argued that the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 were motivated by a radical anti-Jewish worldview that they had internalized long before the Nazis came to power. Goldhagen contends that these men killed Jews not because they were pressured to do so by their peers, but because they believed it was the right thing to do.)

Because the battalion was required to shoot regardless of whether individuals participated, declining to do so meant not taking part in an unwelcome group duty. Browning adds that, in relation to one's comrades, it was essentially antisocial. Those who did not shoot risked isolation, rejection, and ostracism—a very uncomfortable prospect within the framework of a tight-knit unit stationed abroad among a hostile population, so that the individual had virtually nowhere else to turn for support and social contact. The threat of isolation became even greater because opting out could be viewed as a moral rebuke of one's peers: the nonshooter was potentially suggesting he was "too good" for such actions.

(Shortform note: Research on ostracism has shown that social rejection is a powerful motivator for human behavior. The need to belong is a fundamental human need, and when that need is threatened, it can cause significant psychological distress. In the context of a military unit, where camaraderie and group cohesion are essential for survival and effectiveness, the threat of isolation would have been particularly acute. The fear of being ostracized by one's peers could have been a powerful force, compelling individuals to conform to group norms even when those norms involved participating in morally reprehensible actions.)

Many, but not all, of those who refrained from shooting instinctively attempted to alleviate their comrades' inherent judgments of their behavior. They claimed they were "too weak" to kill, rather than "too good." Taking that position didn't question fellow soldiers' esteem; instead, it supported and endorsed "being tough" as a more valuable trait. For those who were anxious, another benefit was that it didn't morally question the regime's lethal policies, although it did present another issue: the line separating being "weak" from being a "coward" wasn't significant. Thus, the majority of those who refrained from shooting subtly reinforced the dominant "macho" norms that deemed "toughness" as the ability to kill defenseless men, women, and children, and they tried not to disrupt the camaraderie that formed the basis of their social circle.

(Shortform note: In The Code of the Warrior, Shannon E. French argues that moral courage in war includes the willingness to resist or disobey orders that violate the warrior’s code, especially commands to harm noncombatants. She contends that a fighter who refuses to take part in the deliberate killing of the innocent is demonstrating strength of character, integrity, and loyalty to the true profession of arms rather than weakness or failure as a warrior. French’s perspective suggests that there are military communities that view the refusal to kill civilians as a mark of strength rather than a failing.)

The struggle to reconcile the conflicting pressures of moral obligation with the unit's standards resulted in various anguished efforts to find middle ground: taking infants to the assembly point instead of killing them on the spot; not shooting while on patrol unless a zealous comrade was present who could report this reluctance; bringing Jews to the site for execution and shooting but deliberately aiming to miss.

(Shortform note: In Hitler’s Willing Executioners, Daniel Jonah Goldhagen argues that these limited gestures of noncompliance reveal far less inner moral struggle than Browning claims. Goldhagen contends that the men of Reserve Police Battalion 101 were not acting in spite of their consciences but in accordance with them. He argues that the occasional, limited efforts they made to lessen their own discomfort while carrying out the killings reveal not a troubled moral opposition to murdering Jews but rather the depth of their commitment to an eliminationist antisemitic project that they believed to be just and necessary.)

Only a truly remarkable few stayed unfazed by being called "weakling" by their peers and could handle being viewed as "no man." Browning notes that the core Nazi belief that Germans were racially superior to Jews could seamlessly integrate with the idea of Germany being embattled and encircled by foes. If it's uncertain that most of the policemen comprehended or adopted the theoretical aspects of Nazi ideology from SS indoctrination pamphlets, it's also uncertain that they were resistant to "the influence of the times"—the constant proclamation of German superiority and incitement of contempt and hatred for the Jewish enemy. The Nazis waged an ethnic conflict more effectively due to the war. During the war, it became common to view the enemy as undeserving of humane treatment, which made it simple to classify the Jews as the "enemy," or Feindbild.

The Effects of Dehumanizing Rhetoric

Social psychologists have found that when people are exposed to dehumanizing rhetoric about a group, their empathy for that group decreases and their willingness to endorse violence against them increases. This is true even when the group is a fictional one. David Livingstone Smith, a philosopher who studies dehumanization, argues that this process is a key factor in enabling ordinary people to commit atrocities. He points to historical examples like the Rwandan genocide, where Tutsis were repeatedly described as "cockroaches" in the media, and the Holocaust, where Jews were depicted as vermin in Nazi propaganda. Smith's research suggests that when people are repeatedly told that a group is less than human, they begin to see them as outside the bounds of moral concern.