PDF Summary:King of Kings, by Scott Anderson

The Iranian Revolution of 1979 would radically reshape the politics of the Middle East for the next half-century. Led by Ruhollah Khomeini, Shia Muslim theocrats overthrew the US-backed monarchy of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi—a shift that weakened Western influence in the region, fueled the rise of Islamic militancy, and sparked a hostage crisis remembered as a major US foreign policy failure.

In his 2025 history of the revolution, King of Kings, journalist Scott Anderson argues that it was all preventable. Our guide explores the socioeconomic forces and intelligence failures in both Iran and the US that brought about this rupture. We’ll also expand on the historical context surrounding these events and draw from perspectives from political and social theory to shed light on Anderson’s history.

(continued)...

Part 3: How Instability Led to Revolution

Now that we’ve covered how and why US officials and Pahlavi’s government overlooked Iran’s unstable political situation, let’s turn to Anderson’s account of how that instability led to the 1979 revolution. In this section, we’ll discuss the growing Islamic rebellion to Pahlavi’s regime, the failed response by Pahlavi and the US, the revolutionary war, and how it set the stage for the Iran hostage crisis.

The Islamic Rebellion Against Pahlavi’s Regime

Anderson writes that Pahlavi was overthrown by a movement of radical Islamic theocrats led by the cleric Ruhollah Khomeini. Let’s explore this movement’s origins and rise to power.

(Shortform note: Ruhollah Khomeini was born in 1902 to a religious family in the town of Khomeyn. His father and grandfather had both been Shia Clerics, and he studied in Qom, a center of Shia scholarship in Iran. He wrote extensively on Islamic law, philosophy, and ethics, eventually establishing himself as a prominent scholar and adopting the name of his hometown, Khomeyn. In the 1950s, Khomeini obtained the rank of Ayatollah, which means “sign of God” and confers the right to independently interpret Shia law and doctrine. Throughout his career, Khomeini wrote extensively against Western influence and the loss of traditional Shia practices and beliefs, views which shaped his revolution.)

An Escalating Muslim Protest Movement

Anderson traces the origins of the revolution back to 1963, when opposition first crystallized around Khomeini. In a public sermon, the cleric denounced the secular reforms of Pahlavi’s White Revolution, accusing Pahlavi of undermining Islam and submitting Iran to foreign influence. Pahlavi jailed him for this sermon, and his imprisonment sparked demonstrations and protests throughout Iran. Unsure how to respond, Pahlavi delegated the decision to a trusted advisor, who turned the military against the protestors with lethal force. Pahlavi then sent Khomeini into exile, trying to curb his influence without inflaming protests with further incarceration.

The protests were quelled, but the regime’s punitive response triggered an escalating cycle of confrontation. Anderson explains that Shiite religious practices created an ideal framework for organizing and sustaining a movement. Shiite mourning traditions require a public gathering 40 days after a person’s death. So whenever protestors died in a clash against the military, large groups of supporters would take to the streets after 40 days; some protestors would be killed, triggering another wave of protests 40 days later. This rhythm of repression, martyrdom, and mourning galvanized opposition against Pahlavi and enabled the protest movement to grow.

The Role of Martyrdom and Mourning in Shia Islam

Mourning rituals played a crucial role in galvanizing anti-Pahlavi protests because of the central place of martyrdom in Shia tradition. Recall that Shia Muslims split from Sunni Islam over the question of succession after the prophet Muhammed, believing that divine authority comes through his bloodline. This made figures like Imam Husayn—Muhammed’s grandson—central to religious and spiritual life.

Husayn is remembered for standing up to a corrupt ruler, Yazid ibn Muawiya, who claimed the Caliphate. Refusing to pledge allegiance, Husayn confronted Yazid despite having far fewer followers, ultimately dying at the Battle of Karbala. Shia Muslims venerate Husayn’s sacrifice as a moral and spiritual example of a faithful stand against tyranny and corruption. This martyrdom is commemorated annually on the holy day of Ashura.

During the 1979 revolution, Islamic dissidents drew heavily on this tradition to frame fallen protestors as martyrs, giving religious meaning to their resistance. Khomeini portrayed Pahlavi as a modern Yazid and clerics or protestors as modern Husayns. By linking the revolutionary struggle to this well-known narrative of good versus evil, Khomeini created a powerful call to action that motivated devout Shia to join in the uprising.

Khomeini's Leadership in Exile

Anderson explains that even in exile, Khomeini continued leading the opposition. After a brief stay in Iraq, the cleric took up residence in Neauphle-le-Château, a small town just outside of Paris, France. One of his most important collaborators, Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, came up with the idea of recording Khomeini’s sermons on cassette tapes and smuggling them back to Iran, where they were widely circulated by religious dissidents.

(Shortform note: Khomeini’s use of media to organize a revolution from afar drew on a well-established revolutionary playbook. While exiled in Europe, Russian revolutionary Vladimir Lenin wrote his most famous pamphlet, What is to be Done?, and led the Bolshevik party to split from the more moderate Mensheviks. Similarly, French nationalist Charles DeGaulle, exiled in Britain from Nazi-occupied France, led the remaining Free French Forces and gave speeches that reached France from British airwaves, encouraging the resistance to fight on.)

Anderson writes that Khomeini’s neighborhood in Neauphle-le-Château became a gathering place for people sympathetic to his cause. The town drew Shiite theology students, Iranian expats, political intellectuals, and journalists reporting on his movement. This burgeoning community connected the exiled cleric to new advisors and lieutenants, allowing him to build a political organization outside of Pahlavi’s reach.

(Shortform note: To this day, much of the world remembers Neauphle-le-Château for its unlikely role in the Iranian revolution. There’s even an annual pilgrimage to the town by Iranians living in diaspora. Many locals feel ambivalent or resentful about this legacy. They view Khomeini’s presence as a brief event imposed by the French government and dislike their town’s association with the authoritarian regime he established. They also feel that his legacy inappropriately overshadows other cultural ties to the neighborhood, such as the playwright Marguerite Duras or the cognac brand Grand Marnier.)

Yazdi’s Management of Khomeini’s Image

In addition to expanding Khomeini’s influence through cassette tapes, Yazdi also played an instrumental role in managing Khomeini’s image to the larger international community. Anderson writes that, having lived in the US, Yazdi understood Western culture and served as Khomeini’s interpreter. His translations filtered out Khomeini’s most extreme and violent rhetoric, cultivating an image of Khomeini as a moderate who’d respect human rights and democracy in Iran. Yazdi trusted that most media outlets wouldn’t have their own Farsi interpreter on hand, and he was typically right.

Furthermore, Yazdi successfully played on America’s fear of communism to make Khomeini’s movement more palatable. Under Yazdi’s advice, Khomeini began including denunciations of communism in his sermons and interviews, alleviating US concerns that a theocratic Iran would play into Soviet hands and making the US less resistant to Khomeini’s political movement.

The Theory Behind Yazdi’s Media Strategy

By tailoring Khomeini’s image to appeal to Western policy makers and media, Yazdi employed an advertising strategy called audience segmentation. This allows a communicator to divide their audience into separate segments based on their expectations, values, or demographics, and then tailor separate messages for each audience. In this case, Yazdi divided Khomeini’s audience into two segments: revolutionary extremists and Westerners who’d respond better to centrism.

Audience segmentation can create problems if a message intended for one audience reaches the other audience instead. To prevent this, Yazdi filtered information in his translations—a strategy similar to what media theorists call gatekeeping. This is when someone with access to information and an audience makes decisions about which information to pass on and which to reject, as if operating a “gate” for information to pass through. As a translator, Yazdi operated such a gate, preventing the flow of information that would harm Khomeini’s image.

Finally, by encouraging Khomeini to present himself as an anti-communist to the West, Yazdi engaged in what communication theorists call framing: strategically emphasizing certain characteristics while de-emphasizing others to encourage a favorable audience reception. Khomeini was an anti-communist, but Yazdi didn’t mention that he rejected Marxism because he was opposed to atheism, not because he supported capitalism. In fact, Khomeini was dismissive of economic thought as a whole; he once famously quipped that “economics is for donkeys.” But by framing Khomeini as a staunch anti-communist, Yazdi could ensure he was seen as a useful ally to the US who’d keep Iran from siding with the Soviet Union.

Pahlavi and US Fail to Contain the Crisis

As Khomeini’s movement grew, it became clear to Pahlavi and the US that Iran was vulnerable to revolution, and both tried to manage and contain the crisis in their own ways. However, Anderson states that both of their responses were failures.

Pahlavi’s Response

Anderson writes that as Palahvi’s support started to crumble, he began facing significant pressure from his advisors and US officials to step down. He responded by forming a new government and appointing Shapour Bakhtiar as prime minister. Pahlavi’s plan was to leave the country and hand over power to this new government. However, once more he proved hesitant and indecisive, delaying his departure. This led to confusion among the Iranian people as to who was really in charge, which weakened the new prime minister’s political standing, as he couldn’t firmly establish his power and authority with Pahlavi hanging around.

Pahlavi finally left the country, but Bakhtiar further weakened his political standing when he found out that Khomeini was planning to return. Understanding the threat that Khomeini posed to his fledgling government, Bakhtiar sent him a letter asking him to wait a few weeks before returning from exile. Anderson says the Iranian public saw this as a grovelling display of deference, one that suggested that the country’s real power and authority already lay with Khomeini. As a result, Bakhtiar’s government started on just as unstable a foot as Pahlavi’s had ended.

Who Was Shapour Bakhtiar?

Why did Pahlavi pick Bakhtiar to be prime minister, and why was his government unable to succeed? According to historians, Bakhtiar was a social democrat and secular nationalist in the same tradition as Mossadegh (who, you’ll recall, had been ousted by a CIA-backed coup in 1953). Bakhtiar sought to transition Iran toward democracy, lift media censorship, reform the secret police, and change the monarchy into a symbolic figurehead rather than a political power. Because he’d spent most of his career opposing Pahlavi, this gave Bakhtiar credibility as an opposition leader, so Pahlavi hoped that his appointment would appease and co-opt the revolutionary movement.

However, both sides of the conflict rejected Bakhtiar, dooming his administration. Because he’d spent his career opposing Pahlavi, the monarchy’s loyalists saw him as a disloyal outsider to the regime they’d supported. At the same, Bakhtiar’s secularism prevented the Islamic revolutionaries from accepting him as an alternative, particularly because of his liberal views on gender equality and LGBTQ rights. Furthermore, because he was hastily appointed by Pahlavi, many revolutionaries saw him as an extension of the old regime rather than an alternative to it. His sudden appointment also meant he lacked the organic base of support and politically aligned media channels that could have solidified his governing power.

The US Response

According to Anderson, the US response (led by then-President Jimmy Carter’s administration) was just as ineffective as Pahlavi’s. It pursued two contradictory plans at once, both of which turned out to be non-starters, and so failed to stabilize the country.

One plan was to stabilize Iran’s government by encouraging Iranian generals to seize power and form a military government. The US believed this could prevent Khomeini from toppling the regime. However, this plan was undermined by a lack of political will on the part of the generals. Pahlavi had promoted officers based on loyalty rather than competence, and he isolated them from each other to prevent them from plotting against him. When US officials met with the generals to encourage political action, they found that all of them were meeting each other for the first time, and were used to carrying out directives from on high rather than making executive decisions themselves.

The US’s other plan was to send diplomats to secretly communicate with Khomeini’s camp through unofficial channels. The hope was that by establishing a relationship with the rebels, the US could continue its political and economic relationship with Iran under a new regime. However, this too proved misguided: After the revolution, Khomeini and his supporters would reveal the grudge they held against the US for its role in supporting their enemy, Pahlavi.

These two strategies undermined each other because each side (the military and Khomeini’s camp) became aware that US officials were collaborating with the other. This lowered trust in the US for both groups, corroding American relations with whichever side came out on top.

The US’s Mixed Track Record of “Dual-Track” Foreign Policy

The practice of pursuing two seemingly conflicting goals at once is called “dual-track” foreign policy, and its legacy is complex. At its best, this strategy allows administrations to hedge their bets and carry out careful balancing acts between competing goals. However, its essentially two-faced nature also carries the risk of destroying trust, credibility, and relationships. Dual-track foreign policy was especially common for the US during the Cold War, as its goal of stopping communism sometimes conflicted with its goal of promoting democracy and human rights. Here, we’ll explore two other examples (in Chile and South Korea) and compare their successes and failures to those in Iran.

When Chileans democratically elected Marxist Salvador Allende in 1970 to lead the country, US foreign policy wanted to topple his socialist government, but didn’t want to undermine America’s pro-democracy reputation in the international community. Therefore, it pursued a dual track strategy of officially acknowledging Allende’s government while covertly backing a revolution by the right-wing dictator Augusto Pinochet. This helped the US achieve its goal of ousting Allende; however, its covert actions came to light and undermined the US’s credibility in the region, the world, and among US citizens.

A more successful example of dual-track policy comes from the US relationship with South Korea. In the interests of preventing the spread of communism, the US backed the authoritarian dictator Park Chung Hee in 1961. However, at the same time, it quietly pressured his government to enact democratic reforms and support the growth of democratic institutions such as universities and independent media. This caused some friction, as some in South Korea’s pro-democracy movement saw the US as backing authoritarianism, but it led to a gradual democratic transition where the US achieved both major goals: South Korea became democratic and remained a close ally of the US.

Each of these provides a useful contrast with Iran. In Chile, the US suffered a loss of credibility after the revolution, but it succeeded in its primary aim of ousting Allende. This may be because it was able to keep its support of Pinochet secret until after the coup. In South Korea, the US maintained credibility with both sides through gradualism and intelligence: US officials were aware of democratic tendencies and quietly sought to encourage them, rather than letting them fester into a full-blown revolution where the US would have to pick a side.

The Iranian Revolution

Because Bakhtiar and the US failed to stabilize Iran, the nation was left open to Khomeini’s influence. Next, we’ll explore how he returned, toppled the government, and consolidated his theocratic rule.

Khomeini Returns from Exile

Khomeini and his staff returned to Iran on February 1, 1979, in spite of Bakhtiar’s pleas for delay. Anderson says that when he landed on a chartered flight from France, Khomeini was met by hundreds of thousands of supporters. Many of them saw him as a sacred figure—the 12th Imam. Recall that in Shia Islam, divine authority passes through a sacred family lineage of 12 leaders, known as the Imams. The 12th Imam, Mahdi, is believed to have gone into hiding as a child to escape persecution, beginning a period of “occultation” during which he remains hidden by God. Shia belief holds that he will return at the end of time, similar to the second coming of Christ, and some of Khomeini’s followers interpreted his return to Iran in this light.

In his first public address, Khomeini denounced Bakhtiar’s government as illegitimate, condemned the US for supporting Pahlavi, and warned Iran’s military to abandon their posts. On February 5, he unilaterally formed his own government to replace that of Bakhtiar, appointing Mehdi Bazargan as prime minister. Khomeini claimed the authority to form his own government through a medieval Shiite doctrine called velayat-e faqih, or “guardianship of the jurist.” Under this doctrine, clerics rule on behalf of the hidden Imam, and religious authority overrides secular law and government officials.

Why Khomeini’s New Theocratic Government Held Legitimacy

Khomeini’s religious appeals had a wide audience: Demographers explain that 90% of Iranians identify as Shia, which meant that Khomeini’s religious message could resonate across classes, regions, and ethnicities. But why did they trust his vision over that of other clerics? Scholars of rhetoric argue that Khomeini expertly leveraged wide-spread Shia beliefs to turn the devout to his cause.

First, Khomeini connected his revolution to the messianic myth of the Imam’s return. Though Khomeini didn’t declare himself divinely guided, he didn’t stop his followers from giving him the title of Imam. Furthermore, in Islamic teachings, the return of the 12th Imam marks the beginning of a “golden age” of peace, prosperity, and universal Islam. Khomeini framed the creation of an Islamic state as a step in the direction of this golden age.

Second, Khomeini invoked traditional Shia ideas about religious war and personal obligation to mobilize supporters. Shia has a deep tradition of duties that are “fard,” or mandatory, such as praying and fasting. Khomeini used his religious authority to declare that all Shia Muslims had a “mandatory duty” to create an Islamic state. He also leveraged the concept of jihad—a war for the spread or defense Islam. Though this was historically invoked in wars against outsiders, Khomeini framed Pahlavi’s secular regime as an “outsider to Islam,” declaring him an infidel and an enemy of the religion. He combined these ideas of jihad and fard to present the overthrow of Pahlavi as a collective duty.

Finally, though many Shia considered Khomeini an expert on velayat-e faqih, or “guardianship of the jurist,” some scholars argue that he also repurposed this doctrine toward his own ends. In medieval times, the doctrine largely gave clerics guardianship over populations who couldn’t care for themselves, such as orphans, widows, and people with disabilities. It wasn’t applied to entire populations, and it didn’t overrule other forms of political authority.

The Revolutionary War

Even though Khomeini declared his own government, Bakhtiar’s government was still managing the country and maintained control of the military. This set the stage for an armed showdown between the theocratic revolutionaries and the national military.

Anderson explains that the war started when Iranian state television aired a controversial profile of Khomeini. As this program played for military personnel at an airforce base in Tehran, a fight broke out between mechanics who supported Khomeini and officers who remained loyal to Pahlavi. Hearing gunshots, protestors broke into the airforce base to help the mechanics. There, they seized weapons and ammunition from the base to distribute among other rebels. Throughout the night, rebels looted more weapons, and the fighting spread throughout Tehran and other major cities.

The Spread of Revolutionary Violence

The spread of revolutionary violence throughout Tehran supports what health researchers call the “contagion model” of violence. This holds that people who’ve been exposed to violence are more likely to engage in violence themselves—both immediately and over the long term—allowing violence to spread through populations like a disease.

This happens because exposure to violence triggers a natural aggression response, which can motivate the exposed person to act violently as well. Group dynamics also play a major role. When people see members of their group fighting, they often join the fight to conform to their group and participate in its actions. Finally, health researchers note that population density can exacerbate the spread, as can the suspension of social norms. This may explain why it spread so quickly through the crowded city of Tehran and during a moment of heightened political uncertainty.

After the Iranian military failed to contain the fighting, its generals called an emergency meeting on February 11. In hopes that they could save themselves from reprisal, they decided to declare neutrality. This meant that the military would maintain its internal structure, but would return to their barracks and allow Khomeini to take control. Once the military declared neutrality, Bakhtiar realized his government could no longer defend itself, and he fled from his office by helicopter, relinquishing his authority and conceding his governing power.

(Shortform note: According to military historians, the Iranian military’s declaration of neutrality and its consequences follow a historical pattern: During revolutions, militaries often play the role of “tie-breaker,” deciding the conflict’s outcome. Studies have shown that democratic revolutions succeed when the military either sides with the protestors or declares neutrality, and they fail when the military sides with the old regime. Furthermore, authoritarian regimes that rely on their militaries to suppress dissent put themselves in a precarious position: If the military defects, then the government loses its main source of power. Therefore, by declaring neutrality, the military effectively sided with Khomeini, allowing his revolution to take power.)

Khomeini Consolidates Power

Anderson writes that Khomeini consolidated his power after the revolution with a mix of political outmaneuvering and brutal repression. The Islamic theocrats carried out a series of mass executions, purging those who’d taken part in Pahlavi’s government—including the generals who believed they could save themselves by declaring neutrality. These political targets were sentenced to death in show trials without evidence, representation, or appeals. Thousands would end up facing the firing squads. With the generals out of the way, Khomeini’s faction seized control of the military. The new regime suppressed dissent by closing down opposing media outlets and pressuring moderate Shia clerics.

As the extremist character of Khomeini’s rule revealed itself, the broad coalition that overthrew Pahlavi started to fracture, but this worked out to Khomeini’s advantage as well. When moderate co-conspirators resigned in protest, Khomeini tightened his grip on the government. Furthermore, when the new regime held elections for an “Assembly of Experts” to draft and approve a new constitution, leftists and centrists boycotted the elections in an attempt to delegitimize them. This move backfired, creating a theocratic supermajority in the assembly, which successfully drafted and approved a constitution based exclusively on Khomeini’s ideals.

Do Revolutions Always End This Way?

Khomeini’s revolution resulted in violent reprisals against the overthrown regime and a monopolization of power. Historians suggest that revolutions often end in similar ways, but not always. Let’s look at some historical examples:

Things played out similarly in 20th-century Russia: After the Russian Revolution overthrew the tsar in 1917, the Bolshevik party launched a second coup, overthrowing the provisional government and the other socialist factions that had fought at its side. This new regime consolidated power with the “Red Terror,” in which remnants of the former regime were arrested and often executed as “counterrevolutionaries.” Similarly, during the French revolution (1793-1794), the radical Jacobins overthrew the moderate Girondins, resulting in an estimated 17,000 executions during the “Reign of Terror.”

Revolutions in South Africa and Czechoslovakia ended very differently. The overthrow of South African Apartheid resulted in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (1995), in which past human rights abuses were brought to light, but their perpetrators were granted amnesty. This revolution ended with a multi-party democracy committed to fair elections between the different parties. During the “Velvet Revolution” in Czechoslovakia (1989), when mass demonstrations forced the country’s communist leader to step down, his regime negotiated a peaceful transfer of power with the protesting factions. This also resulted in a multi-party democracy.

So, why do some resolutions lead to violence and authoritarianism, while others don’t? Both the South African and Czechoslavakian revolutions were carried out through largely non-violent means, and by coalitions united by democratic ideals. These factors likely allowed them to take a different path than those in Iran, France, and Russia.

Fallout: The Iran Hostage Crisis

Khomeini’s rise to power resulted in one of America’s greatest foreign policy disasters, the Iran hostage crisis. In this final section, we’ll discuss how the relationship between US and Iran led to Iranian militants storming the American embassy and taking US officials hostage. Then, we’ll explore the US’s failed military response and the crisis’s eventual resolution.

The Iran-US Relationship Under Khomeini

According to Anderson, the Iran-US relationship was fragile in the first year of Khomeini’s reign, but not quite destroyed. The Carter administration held onto the optimistic hope that moderates would eventually take the reins, allowing the US to recreate its strategic partnership. As a result, the US didn’t withdraw its staff and embassies from the hostile nation.

In spite of Carter’s intentions to maintain the peace, one major sticking point remained: What would become of the aging “King of Kings,” the shah Pahlavi in exile? Anderson writes that Pahlavi lived in a variety of countries after his exile began, including Egypt, Mexico, and the Bahamas. Khomeini and his supporters called for Pahlavi to be returned to Iran so that he could bring back his wealth and face justice. They also distrusted the US with the exiled leader, fearing that it would attempt another coup to restore Pahlavi to his throne, as it had done in 1953.

While Carter had no intention of betraying a US ally by delivering him into the hands of his enemies, he was reluctant to allow the former monarch into the US, as this could destroy America’s fragile relationship with Khomeini’s Iran. However, Pahlavi’s health was failing, and he needed medical attention that was only available in the US. Several US foreign policy officials pressured Carter to allow him into the country for medical treatment. Though reluctant, Carter assented.

US Precedent for Denying Ousted Dictators Asylum

Carter’s decision to allow Pahlavi entry went against the grain of several earlier US decisions. For example, that same year, Carter denied asylum to former US ally Anastasio Somoza Debayle, a Nicaraguan dictator who had also just been overthrown. However, there were a few key differences between Debayle’s situation and Pahlavi’s: Carter had already withdrawn support of Debayle because of his poor track record on human rights. Conversely, he’d supported Pahlavi to the end of his rule and tried to sweep his authoritarian tendencies under the rug.

Accepting Pahlavi into the US also contradicted another precedent: When Cuban revolutionary Fidel Castro overthrew military dictator Fulgencio Batista, the Eisenhower administration decided against granting Batista asylum; Eisenhower believed that accepting him would harm US relations with the new regime and weaken America’s reputation as a supporter of democracy.

Like Eisenhower, Carter recognized that granting a deposed leader asylum might disrupt a delicate political situation—but unlike Eisenhower, Carter folded under political pressure and granted the leader asylum. Many argue that he did this without adequate preparation—he knew that this would upset the new Iranian regime but failed to protect Americans in the region, which led to the hostage crisis we’ll discuss next.

Hostages Taken

Anderson writes that, as predicted, Pahlavi’s arrival in the US infuriated Khomeini’s new regime, and Khomeini publicly denounced the US. In response to these denunciations, an armed student group decided to storm the US embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1980. Their plan was to find evidence of the US’s intentions to restore Pahlavi to power, revealing them once and for all. They stormed the fences of the embassy in large numbers, taking over 50 Americans hostage.

In response to the seizing of hostages, the Carter administration froze Iranian financial assets abroad, applying economic pressure to secure their release. This set off a long and bitter stalemate between the two countries as neither side gave in. Carter tried to resolve the problem with military action in a rescue mission known as Operation Eagle Claw. However, this mission was unsuccessful because of equipment failures; one of the helicopters crashed, killing eight service members.

Why US Attempts to Bring Back the Hostages Failed

The US made two significant attempts to bring back the hostages. In its first attempt, the US filed a claim against Iran in the International Court of Justice. Its case was that Iran had violated international law under the Vienna convention, which grants diplomats immunity to the laws of the countries that host them. The court ruled in favor of the US on May 24, 1980, arguing that even though Iran didn’t plan the embassy attack, the country assumed responsibility by supporting the taking of hostages afterward. The court demanded immediate release of all hostages, but Iran refused to participate in the proceedings or adhere to the ruling, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction and should have dismissed the case.

One month before the court ruled in its favor, the US made its second attempt to rescue the hostages with Operation Eagle Claw. According to historians, this operation failed for two primary reasons. First, the US lacked a unified “Special Operations” force, and so separate branches of the military were required to coordinate on a hastily made plan, leading to miscommunications and oversights. Second, US intelligence failed to understand the local environment and climate. The helicopters flew directly into a dust storm, clogging mechanical parts and reducing visibility, which led to the equipment failures and crash.

A Sour Resolution

Anderson explains that Carter eventually moved Pahlavi to Egypt in an attempt to placate Khomeini, where he finally succumbed to his illness and died on July 27, 1980. However, this did nothing to resolve the crisis, as the Iranians were still calling for Pahlavi’s wealth to be returned. Carter’s team began negotiating a deal with the Iranians, but it fell through, harming his re-election campaign and allowing Ronald Reagan to replace him. Diplomats finally reached a deal shortly after Reagan’s inauguration on January 20, 1981; all hostages were released after 444 days in captivity. The standoff was over, but it left behind a state of mutual distrust and hostility between the two nations, which would remain for generations.

(Shortform note: Historians explain that US and Iranian diplomats resolved the hostage crisis through an agreement called the Algiers Accords, held in Algeria. This agreement stipulated that Iran would release all hostages and that the US would drop criminal proceedings in international courts. In return, the US agreed to unfreeze Iranian assets and return much of Pahlavi’s wealth (though not all of it for legal and technical reasons). It also promised not to interfere with Iran’s politics or military. The US and Iran also agreed to the creation of an international tribunal that would settle claims made by individual Americans and Iranians, such as the return of assets lost by US businesses during the revolution.)