PDF Summary:Call Sign Chaos, by Jim Mattis and Bing West

Strong leadership and teamwork are essential to military success—but what does effective leadership actually look like in practice? In Call Sign Chaos, retired Marine Corps General Jim Mattis and co-author Bing West draw on Mattis's decades of military experience to outline the principles of leading and organizing successful military operations.

Mattis and West explain how leaders can build trust and unity within their teams, communicate intent clearly, and empower subordinates to make independent decisions. They discuss tactical and strategic considerations in modern warfare, from the importance of realistic training to the challenges of counterinsurgency operations. They also examine larger strategic questions, such as NATO's role in an evolving security landscape and the need for alignment between policy, strategy, and resources.

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Organizational Structures & Operational Practices

Mattis and West emphasize that distributing decision-making power is crucial for mission success. This enables faster information sharing and making decisions, which is essential for outpacing adversaries. However, it requires clearly communicating the leader's objectives and well-trained subordinates who can make intelligent decisions independently. Subordinate commanders need to be highly disciplined to ensure their independent decisions align with the overall mission. Subordinates need training to handle surprises and make sense of ambiguity, and they should be rewarded for taking initiative.

Distributed Cognition

The idea of distributing decision-making power throughout an organization aligns with the concept of “distributed cognition” in cognitive science. This theory, explored in Edwin Hutchins’s Cognition in the Wild, suggests that cognitive processes are not confined to individual minds but are spread across people, tools, and environments. Hutchins argues that complex thinking often emerges from the interactions between individuals and their environment, rather than from isolated mental processes. He explains that cognitive tasks are often too complex for a single person to handle alone, so groups of people, along with their tools and technologies, work together to solve problems.

Operational and Tactical Uses in Modern Warfare

Mattis and West point out that effective training and simulation are crucial for developing tactical skills. Mattis emphasizes the importance of training that creates physical memory and automatic reactions. He also stresses that troops must know each other well and build mutual trust. They should rehearse their skills whenever possible, even during breaks in fighting. They should also imagine what will happen during battle, visualizing the tumult and noise. This mental preparation helps them make rapid choices with insufficient information. Mattis also believes that service members should practice giving clear, concise orders in high-pressure situations. He had his unit sergeants and commanders handle surprise situations through radio communications, adding stress to their training.

(Shortform note: A meta-analysis of 62 studies on “mental practice” found that repeatedly imagining complex tasks led to significant performance improvements. This effect was consistent across demanding fields like sports and surgery, suggesting that vivid rehearsal alone changes how people encode and apply task information. The researchers found that mental practice was especially effective for tasks requiring precise timing and coordination. This supports Mattis’s view that imagining the chaos of battle and rehearsing under stress can help troops make better decisions with limited information. The study also found that mental practice was more effective when combined with physical training, aligning with Mattis’s emphasis on building physical memory and automatic reactions.)

He also believes that troops should anticipate problems before they occur, asking them what they would do if he went down or if radio communications were lost during a chemical attack. Troops should be able to recognize cues and anticipate what will happen next. Mattis used tactical simulations to help his troops hone this skill. The simulators were designed for maximum realism, immersing soldiers in the chaos of combat. They helped the soldiers develop ingrained reactions, automatic responses, and a shared comprehension.

(Shortform note: A meta-analysis of flight-simulator training programs found that pilots who trained extensively in realistic, scenario-based simulations made faster, more accurate decisions in real-world operations. This suggests that such training can sharpen judgment under pressure. However, the study also found that the effectiveness of simulation training depends on how closely the scenarios match real-world conditions. This supports Mattis’s emphasis on maximum realism in his tactical simulations.)

Mattis and West note that clear communication and shared understanding are vital for strategic success. When everyone understands the objectives and the reasons behind them, they can work together effectively and make bold decisions.

(Shortform note: The importance of clear communication and shared understanding for strategic success is a key theme in organizational theory. In Managing the Unexpected, Karl E. Weick and Kathleen M. Sutcliffe argue that organizational reliability depends on a process of “sensemaking,” where people continually reinterpret their objectives and the reasons behind them. This process allows organizations to detect weak signals and prevent failures before they occur.)

Next, we’ll explore operational principles and strategic considerations.

Operational Doctrine

Mattis and West argue that strategic guidance should be rooted in past examples and insights gained. Doctrine is a collection of guidelines on the most effective combat strategies for leaders and soldiers. It establishes previously successful strategies and provides fighting guidelines for an organization, informed by experimental and costly battlefield lessons.

(Shortform note: Mattis and West’s view of doctrine as a tool for learning from the past reflects a modern tradition in military thought. In Military Adaptation in War, Williamson Murray argues that doctrine in the modern era is less about codifying eternal truths and more about forcing conservative militaries to learn from recent wars.)

The authors also assert that the effects-based operations strategy is flawed and ineffective. EBO is an Air Force strategy that uses a "system of systems" method to strike specific target groups and predict the weakening of enemy abilities. It’s effective when focusing on physical systems with clear boundaries, like electrical infrastructure and highways.

However, the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) generalized the EBO concept to adaptable, unpredictable open systems such as combat. That was a mistake. The EBO approach is mechanistic and deterministic, ignoring that fighting is fundamentally a struggle of resolve and other mostly nonquantifiable elements. It needs centralized leadership to gather accurate intelligence and evaluate strike impacts as they happen. This demands an ongoing stream of precise combat information, necessitating unbroken communication. Field leaders must act as reporters instead of concentrating on weakening the opponent's resolve. This sacrifices initiative and leads to a crucial weakness.

Effects-Based Operations and Airpower

In Airpower Reborn, editor John Andreas Olsen argues that airpower theory grounded in an effects-based, systems-oriented understanding of an opponent remains indispensable for contemporary campaign design. He contends that modern air forces can use precision, reach, and situational awareness to generate carefully sequenced physical, functional, and psychological effects across an adversary’s political, military, and economic structures, thereby shaping behavior and decision-making rather than merely destroying fielded forces. Olsen’s contributors argue that this approach allows airpower to achieve strategic objectives with greater efficiency and fewer resources than traditional attrition-based methods. They emphasize that understanding the interdependencies within an adversary’s system enables air forces to identify and exploit critical vulnerabilities, creating cascading effects that can paralyze enemy operations and will to fight.

Next, we'll look at tactical moves and combined arms, as well as campaigns, COIN, and stability operations.

Tactical Maneuvers & Combined Arms

Mattis and West explain that to effectively perform tactical maneuvers, coordination of diverse military units and weapons is necessary. This refers to using different types of military units and weapons, such as infantry, tanks, aerial support, and artillery working together in a coordinated manner.

(Shortform note: The belief that effective tactical maneuvers require integrating multiple types of units and weapons emerged from the need to overcome the stalemates of World War I trench warfare. Military theorists in the interwar period, such as J.F.C. Fuller and Heinz Guderian, argued that combining infantry, tanks, artillery, and air support could break through enemy lines more effectively than any single arm alone.)

Campaigns, COIN & Stability Operations

Mattis and West explain that Mattis focused on counterinsurgency and stability efforts in Iraq. His aim was to provide safety until Iraqi troops were prepared to assume control. He aimed to lessen the circumstances that led Iraqis to back anti-coalition activities, reward those who turned against the former regime, and defeat noncompliant elements. He also wanted to establish rapport with Iraqi people to acquire intelligence.

Mattis understood that the shift to a Shiite-controlled democracy would involve conflict, so he needed to communicate to his Marines that they needed to decrease the overall level of violence while controlling it during enemy engagement. They needed to be deadly yet show restraint.

The British in Iraq

The British faced similar challenges in Iraq after World War I. In Inventing Iraq, Toby Dodge explains that the British wanted to control Iraq without spending much money. They tried to do this by using the Royal Air Force to keep order from the air and by creating a local army made up of Sunni Arabs. This approach led to a big revolt in 1920. Dodge argues that this way of ruling made Iraq rely on violence and fear instead of getting people to agree with the government. The British thought they could control Iraq by playing different groups against each other, but this only made things worse.

Strategic Considerations

Mattis and West argue that NATO must adjust to evolving threats and ways of fighting. NATO was established following the Second World War to avert a Soviet attack on the democracies of Western Europe. The Soviet threat waned with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, Western Europe wanted to preserve the security guarantee that NATO offered, centered on American strength. NATO grew from its initial membership of 12 countries to 26. Mattis and West explain that the root issue with transforming NATO was insufficient drive and proactivity due to a culture driven by processes. Disorder dominated, and focus shifted from results to procedures.

(Shortform note: Some analysts have challenged Mattis and West’s assertion that NATO’s core problem was a culture driven by processes. In The Great Delusion, political scientist John J. Mearsheimer argues that the United States’ post–Cold War grand strategy of liberal hegemony drove Washington to expand NATO ever farther eastward, extending security guarantees up to Russia’s borders in the belief that spreading the Western liberal order would produce peace. However, he explains that this policy was destined to be seen in Moscow as a grave strategic threat and to fuel a dangerous security competition between Russia and the West.)

They produced numerous documents about NATO's necessary actions, but they didn't follow through with what appeared to be good ideas. Partly, this was because NATO concentrated on the war in Afghanistan. Why focus on potential future threats while you’re dealing with a current one? But like in the Marine Corps, Mattis didn't want America's allies to have a narrow focus. Eventually, they'd leave Afghanistan and encounter new threats. Mattis requested that every NATO country dispatch its top strategic minds to Norfolk to articulate the particular military issue confronting the alliance.

(Shortform note: A 2017 article on NATO's strategic debates shows that the alliance's focus has shifted away from Afghanistan. The article discusses how NATO can deter Russian coercion, particularly in the Baltic states, and how it can do so in both conventional and hybrid domains. The article also discusses the need for NATO to adapt to new security challenges, such as cyber threats and disinformation campaigns. This suggests that Mattis's efforts to broaden NATO's strategic focus may have had some success, as the alliance is now grappling with a wider range of security issues beyond Afghanistan.)

Following several months of collaboration, the NATO Secretary-General and Mattis organized a European meeting with the top political and military officials from NATO countries. The group reached a consensus on various security trends and potential threats. The result, "Multiple Futures," contained the problem statement that allowed each European nation to evaluate the sufficiency of its NATO force contributions. NATO couldn't rely on traditional forces meant for a kind of industrialized conflict like World War II against the now-defunct Warsaw Pact, nor could it embrace just one restrictive style of combat.

(Shortform note: In [Shaping the Next One Hundred Years](https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographreports/MR1626.html)_, Robert J. Lempert, Steven W. Popper, and Steven C. Bankes argue that planning under conditions of deep uncertainty is best served by constructing multiple, systematically contrasting long-term futures. They recommend using quantitative models to explore how alternative strategies perform in each scenario, and then distilling from this ensemble of cases a set of robust capability benchmarks. These benchmarks, they argue, can then be used by decisionmakers in individual jurisdictions as external yardsticks when reviewing the adequacy of their own force structures, investments, and commitments.)

Opponents would pick a different method. NATO couldn't concentrate only on border defense, counterinsurgency, or nuclear deterrence. While it couldn't perfectly predict the future, it had to avoid getting it completely wrong. The Afghanistan conflict made NATO realize it was essential to become proficient in irregular warfare. However, Russia's invasion of Georgia underscored a new threat. In 2006, the tactics of Hezbollah primarily relied on unconventional methods, enhanced with traditional military capacities. In contrast, in Georgia in 2008, Russia employed conventional military power supported by unconventional tactics. These indicators collectively suggested a developing form of combat, a blend of various styles. History demonstrates that warfare's nature evolves to fit new conditions.

The Concept of Hybrid Warfare

Strategists now refer to this “blend of various styles” as hybrid warfare. This concept helps us understand how enemies combine regular armies with guerrilla tactics, cyberattacks, and information warfare in a single campaign. It’s a way to make sense of how modern conflicts mix old and new methods. The idea of hybrid warfare has sparked debate among military thinkers. Some argue it’s just a new label for age-old tactics, while others see it as a necessary update to our understanding of war. The concept has become central to how NATO and other Western militaries think about future threats, especially as they face adversaries who don’t play by traditional rules.

Mattis and West also argue that Europe should take more responsibility for defending itself. Mattis believes NATO is essential for the solidarity of Western democracies, but he also believes that Europe must contribute more to its own defense. He believes that if the distribution of burdens remains as uneven as it currently is, NATO will be incapable of maintaining unity. He believes Americans can't be more concerned about European children's freedom than the Europeans are.

The Risks of Europe Taking More Responsibility for Its Own Defense

Some experts argue that if Europe takes more responsibility for its own defense, it could inadvertently weaken NATO. In Security and Defence Policy in the European Union, Jolyon Howorth argues that if European governments build parallel military planning, command, and capability structures that are not fully integrated with the Atlantic Alliance, they risk institutional duplication, political rivalry, and, in the longer term, a dangerous fragmentation of the overall Western security architecture. This could erode NATO’s military cohesion even if the alliance’s treaty framework remains intact.

We’ll now examine strategic pitfalls and incoherence, along with elements of effective strategy.

Strategic Pitfalls and Incoherence

Mattis and West argue that strategic incoherence and policy disarray can undermine military operations. For example, Mattis's division received directives regarding what actions not to take—don't attack—but they were not provided any instructions about what to do. The consequences of this confusion at both the theater and national command levels are immeasurable. The enforced tactical pause in Fallujah and the outrageous actions of renegade personnel at Abu Ghraib cost the US its moral authority.

(Shortform note: In Fiasco, Thomas E. Ricks argues that the US occupation of Iraq was doomed by two key decisions: the de-Baathification policy and the disbanding of the Iraqi army. These actions created a security vacuum, fueled the insurgency, and left US forces unprepared to deal with the rapidly deteriorating situation. Ricks also highlights how the US military's lack of preparation for post-invasion Iraq led to the use of former regime prisons like Abu Ghraib for detainees, contributing to the abuses and scandals that further undermined the US mission.)

Elements of Effective Strategic Leadership

Mattis and his co-author explain that strategic leaders must align policy, strategy, and resources. Strategy connects the final policy goal to armed forces and diplomatic methods and resources. Government officials, diplomats, and military leaders have to collaborate and share insights with each other until they are convinced they have a workable policy. A shift in policy requires strategy and related resources to adjust to match the revised objectives.

(Shortform note: Mattis and his co-author argue that strategic leaders must align policy, strategy, and resources. However, in situations of radical uncertainty, it may be impossible to align these elements because you don’t know what the policy should be or what strategy will work. In Antifragile, Nassim Nicholas Taleb argues that in such situations, it’s better to keep resources flexible and experiment with small, low-risk actions to see what works before committing to a full-scale policy and strategy.)

Mattis and West also argue that effective leaders have to be open to making tough decisions to ensure efficiency and effectiveness. For example, Mattis recommended disbanding JFCOM after determining that its functions were redundant and that its duties could be performed more effectively elsewhere. This decision saved a significant amount of money and cut numerous personnel positions. Mattis emphasizes that each organization needs a valuable purpose or should be eliminated.

The Risks of Eliminating Redundancy

While Mattis and West argue that every organization needs a valuable purpose or should be eliminated, this approach can sometimes backfire. In Lead and Disrupt, Charles A. O’Reilly III and Michael L. Tushman argue that in highly dynamic environments, organizations need to balance efficiency with adaptability. Sometimes, seemingly redundant or inefficient subunits are actually crucial for long-term success. Eliminating them can improve short-term performance but undermine the organization’s ability to adapt to future challenges.