PDF Summary:Black Hearts, by Jim Frederick

In March 2006, American soldiers raped and murdered a 14-year-old Iraqi girl and killed her family in Mahmudiyah, Iraq. In Black Hearts, journalist Jim Frederick examines the circumstances that led to this war crime, tracing the failures in leadership, planning, and oversight that created conditions for such an atrocity to occur.

Frederick explores the strategic missteps of the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the escalating violence in southern Baghdad, and the dysfunction within the unit involved. He details how poor planning for post-invasion Iraq, the dissolution of Iraqi military and police forces, and inadequate resources created an environment of chaos. The book also covers the subsequent investigation, prosecution, and the lasting impact of the incident on the soldiers, the local population, and the broader American military presence in Iraq.

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(Shortform note: In Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, Ahmed S. Hashim explains that the rapid organization of the Sunni insurgency was made possible by the pre-existing networks of pious, combat-experienced officers and activists. Years of war, conscription, and sanctions had already created the human and logistical infrastructure for armed mobilization. The Islamic Army in Iraq and the Mujahideen Army could quickly mobilize because they didn’t have to build their organizations from scratch. Instead, they could tap into existing networks of military, tribal, and religious connections.)

Sunni groups responded to Shi'ites and also began launching assaults on the U.S. military, civilian employees, and what they considered a puppet Shi'ite government. A Jordanian extremist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was one of the first foreign figures to reach the region. After the American invasion of Iraq, Zarqawi formed a group called Tawhid wal-Jihad, mainly staying in Anbar and southern Baghdad. He developed a fondness for suicide car bombings, plotting deadly attacks targeting the Jordanian embassy, the United Nations offices in Baghdad, and Najaf's Imam Ali mosque. Zarqawi's reputation as a terrorist expanded, elevating him to infamy worldwide. With each success, additional funding and personnel from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria entered via the Syrian border. In late 2004, Zarqawi affiliated with Al Qaeda, renaming Monotheism and Jihad as Al Qaeda's Iraqi branch.

(Shortform note: In Black Flags, Joby Warrick explains that over the next decade, Zarqawi’s organization would be reorganized several times, eventually becoming the Islamic State, which briefly governed population centers and institutions in both Iraq and Syria. Warrick’s book is a biography of Zarqawi, who was killed in 2006. He explains that Zarqawi’s death didn’t end the organization he created. Instead, it was reorganized several times, first as al-Qaeda in Iraq, then as the Islamic State of Iraq. The group suffered setbacks from US and Iraqi operations, but it eventually regenerated under new leadership. By 2014, the group had rebranded itself as the Islamic State and controlled large swaths of territory in Syria and Iraq, including major cities like Mosul and Raqqa. The Islamic State established a self-declared caliphate and governed population centers and institutions in both countries.)

In southern Baghdad, Al Qaeda's goals frequently aligned with those of tribal factions and local insurgencies. There were countless nationalist groups involved in insurrection, continually experiencing a state of merging, allying, disputing, splintering, and dividing.

(Shortform note: This worked because the groups were able to form short-term coalitions with Al Qaeda to fight a common enemy, while still maintaining their own long-term goals and identities. This allowed them to benefit from Al Qaeda's resources and expertise without fully committing to its ideology or agenda.)

They quickly formed an alliance with the group. The Quarguli and Janabi tribes, among others, had interconnected roles in smuggling during Saddam's era, and the organization co-opted and exploited those connections to build a formidable recruiting and financing pipeline. For instance, the Sunni Janabi clan faction in the Yusufiyah area had been engaged in a prolonged dispute with the Shi'ite Anbari tribe. With Janabi support, Al Qaeda drove numerous Anbari families out of their homes, transforming them into shelters, training centers, weapons storage, and torture facilities. Violence between sects expanded, becoming organized, vicious, and ceaseless. Sunni gangs made Shi'ites abandon their homes.

(Shortform note: Insurgent organizations often exploit illicit trading networks to fund their operations. They offer protection and political influence to brokers, who in turn provide recruits and a share of their profits. This symbiotic relationship allows insurgents to tap into established smuggling routes and networks, while brokers gain protection and political leverage. The result is a mutually beneficial arrangement that sustains both the insurgency and the illicit trade.)

Pamphlets were distributed, threatening Sunni landlords to evict Shi'ite tenants or else all of them would be killed. Abductions, brutalization, and killings occurred daily. Groups of masked criminals hunted people through the streets, savagely beating them, binding their hands, and executing them. No events were forbidden, no strategies off the table. A suicide bomber in an ambulance detonated a bomb at a wedding in Yusufiyah, resulting in four deaths and sixteen injuries. Sunni organizations expanded their expulsions beyond locals. Armed with AK-47s, they established roadblocks along Highway 8, the main route between Baghdad and southern Iraq, capturing fuel tankers and freight trucks and killing those they believed were headed for the Shi'ite pilgrimage sites in Najaf and Karbala. Shi'ite clerics discarded their unique dark robes and headwear as they moved through. Rebels put out $1,000 rewards for killing Shi'ites.

The Logic of Violence in Civil War

In The Logic of Violence in Civil War, political scientist Stathis N. Kalyvas argues that much of what appears to be senseless brutality in civil wars is actually the result of calculated strategies of selective violence. He contends that armed groups use targeted intimidation and punishment to establish control over territory, deter defection, and shape civilian collaboration. Kalyvas emphasizes the importance of local information networks in determining who becomes a target, suggesting that violence is often used to monopolize the flow of information in favor of the perpetrating group. He explains that pamphlet threats, targeted abductions, and roadblock executions are not random acts of terror but rather components of a broader effort to control populations and resources.

Consequences for Unit Behaviour & Tactics

Frederick argues that the squadron's tactics were often ineffective and poorly planned. For example, they established checkpoints to secure roads and prevent insurgents from installing IEDs. However, these TCPs didn't move, were poorly defended, and were located in enemy territory. The unit also had to secure a bridge, but confusion arose about how to do this. The battalion commander believed the bridge could be secured from a distance, but others disagreed. The company commander received no written guidance about manning the position and gave no guidance to his platoons, leaving them to figure out how they should secure the bridge on their own. They often relied on two soldiers and a vehicle to guard it.

Counterinsurgency Strategy

Frederick’s criticism of the squadron’s tactics reflects a broader debate within military theory about the effectiveness of counterinsurgency strategies. In The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, General David Petraeus and his co-authors argue that the key to successful counterinsurgency is winning the support of the local population. This means that every decision, from where to place checkpoints to how to secure bridges, must be made with the goal of gaining the trust and cooperation of the local people. Petraeus argues that static checkpoints and poorly defended positions can undermine this goal by making the military appear weak and ineffective. Instead, he advocates for a more flexible and adaptive approach that takes into account the specific needs and concerns of the local population.

Unit Dysfunction & the Road to Atrocity

Frederick contends that dysfunction and poor leadership within the unit contributed to the atrocity. The battalion commander and his top leaders were disconnected from the on-the-ground reality. They failed to recognize the dire state of Green’s mental health and the impairment of First Platoon. Instead, the battalion commander belittled the platoon's inability, said they were drowning in self-pity, and held the platoon and their leaders responsible for their issues. This made them feel isolated and persecuted, fueling their decline.

The battalion commander also denied the Bravo Company commander's requests for more troops, arguing that the company had an adequate number of soldiers but wasn't deploying them effectively or that no soldiers were available. His strategy was to switch out leaders, not units, believing that a group gains the locals' trust by establishing a longer presence.

The Breakdown of Military Discipline and Leadership

In Crimes of Obedience, Herbert C. Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton argue that the My Lai massacre was the result of a breakdown in military discipline and leadership. They contend that the soldiers involved in the massacre were under intense pressure to produce results and were given conflicting orders from their superiors. This created a situation in which the soldiers felt they had to take matters into their own hands, leading to the massacre. Kelman and Hamilton argue that the soldiers involved in the massacre were not inherently evil or sadistic. Instead, they were ordinary people who were placed in an extraordinary situation. The breakdown in military discipline and leadership created a situation in which the soldiers felt they had no choice but to commit the massacre. Kelman and Hamilton's analysis of the My Lai massacre suggests that the battalion commander's actions in the case of the Black Hearts may have contributed to the atrocity. By blaming the platoon for their problems, denying them additional soldiers, and failing to address Green's mental health issues, the battalion commander created a situation in which the soldiers felt they had to take matters into their own hands.

The Abeer Qassim al-Janabi Atrocity and its Aftermath

Frederick describes how American troops committed a heinous war crime against Abeer Qassim al-Janabi and her family. On March 12, 2006, they sexually assaulted and killed the 14-year-old girl and murdered her family. The servicemen planned and executed their actions systematically.

(Shortform note: A war crime is a serious violation of the laws of armed conflict, such as intentionally targeting civilians, torturing prisoners, or using prohibited weapons. These acts are outlawed under international law, including the Geneva Conventions, and those responsible can be prosecuted by international courts. The attack on Abeer Qassim al-Janabi and her family is considered a war crime because it involved the deliberate targeting and killing of civilians.)

Next, we will examine the investigations and the fallout from the massacre.

Investigation, Prosecution, and Fallout

Frederick explains that investigations into the Mahmudiyah incident were conducted, but some considered them hasty and incomplete. The first investigation, begun on June 18, centered on the decisions made and guidance given about staffing at the AVLB. That investigation concluded after eleven days. The second investigation, which started in early July, examined the rape-murders, specifically investigating how four soldiers were able to leave their TCP2 post without being detected and how often the command structure actually checked on and supervised B/1-502 IN's tactical sites. This report was finished in only five days.

(Shortform note: The Army’s internal investigation system is designed to be quick and efficient, which is why the two investigations into the Mahmudiyah incident were able to be completed in only 11 and five days, respectively. These investigations are typically conducted by officers within the same command structure, allowing for rapid information gathering and decision-making. The process is often more of a review than an open-ended investigation, with a specific scope and timeline. This approach allows the Army to address issues quickly, but it can also lead to concerns about the thoroughness and impartiality of the investigations.)

The first investigation clearly assigned fault to the platoon and company, stating that multiple instances of complacency and an absence of standards at the platoon level caused the event. It advised giving Kunk a letter of concern, the mildest and most insignificant type of censure, with no substantial penalties or lasting adverse effects on an officer's professional path. It advised issuing written reprimands to Goodwin and Norton. To many, this seemed like another example of shifting responsibility for bad news as far down the command hierarchy as they could. The investigation concentrated on how disorganized Bravo Company was, but there was also some unacknowledged fault on the higher levels. The subsequent investigation was also considered hasty and incomplete. The investigating officer never interviewed Sergeant First Class Fenlason, who was away at the time, and only spoke with eight people from 1st Platoon.

Commanders Control the Investigative Process

In Military Justice: A Very Short Introduction, Eugene R. Fidell explains that military justice remains fundamentally command-centric: the same commanders who are responsible for operations also control the investigative machinery, decide how broad or narrow an inquiry will be, and determine how quickly it must be wrapped up. This structure creates powerful incentives for fact-gathering to be tightly framed around the conduct of the most junior personnel, for inquiries to be concluded rapidly, and for responsibility to be individualized as a matter of small-unit discipline rather than traced up the chain of command to examine higher-level policies, resourcing decisions, or failures of oversight. The two investigations described here—quickly concluded and focused almost entirely on 1st Platoon and Bravo Company—fit a broader, documented structural pattern rather than being arbitrary judgments.

The Mahmudiyah Massacre became an international scandal, and both Iraq's government and its citizens were outraged. Al Qaeda leveraged the outrage to the fullest for their propaganda. The incident negatively impacted the troops stationed in Yusufiyah. 1st Platoon was regarded as the problem child of First Strike.

(Shortform note: In Social Identity, Richard Jenkins explains that social-identity theory is a psychological framework that explores how individuals define themselves based on their group memberships. When a subgroup within a larger organization is labeled as problematic, it can create an identity threat that undermines the subgroup’s confidence and decision-making abilities.)

Next, we'll examine the initial responses and cover-up attempts, along with the formal investigations and legal consequences.

Initial Responses and Cover-Up Attempts

Frederick describes how Justin Watt faced challenges and didn't receive immediate support when he tried to report the crime. Watt wasn't a participant and lacked proof, but he'd heard a credible account of some members of the 1st Platoon committing a major crime, and he wanted Davis's help to report it. Watt struggled with the stress of reporting the crime. He feared the people he was implicating would try to harm or even murder him. He hoped to convey the information to someone who had the authority to take action but wasn't part of the regular battalion hierarchy.

The History of Whistleblowing in the US Military

Watt's fear of retaliation and his struggle to find someone outside the regular battalion hierarchy to report the crime to can be understood in the context of the long history of whistleblowing in the US military. During the Vietnam War, soldiers who tried to report atrocities often faced denial or retaliation rather than support. Nick Turse, in his book Kill Anything That Moves, documents how the military often tried to cover up or downplay reports of war crimes, creating a culture of silence and fear among soldiers. This history likely contributed to Watt's anxiety about coming forward and his desire to find someone outside the regular chain of command to report to.

Formal Investigations and Legal Consequences

Frederick notes that the legal proceedings for those implicated in the incident were complex and unprecedented. The Army couldn't assert jurisdiction over Green because he had already been discharged, so the Justice Department used the 2000 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) to prosecute him. The Justice Department was in unknown waters, as there were few previous cases for dealing with accusations against a soldier for a crime committed on active duty overseas but who had returned to the U.S., been discharged, and was living as a civilian before the crime was discovered. Green was the initial veteran to risk receiving a death sentence in a nonmilitary trial for his wartime actions.

(Shortform note: Since Green’s case, lawmakers have used MEJA to prosecute other crimes committed by military personnel and contractors overseas. In these cases, legislators have cited Green’s case as a precedent for when U.S. criminal law can be applied to conduct abroad. This has led to a more nuanced understanding of the law’s scope and limitations. For example, legal scholars have argued that MEJA should be interpreted to cover a broader range of offenses, including those committed by military contractors and other civilians accompanying the armed forces.)

The jury convicted Green on every charge of conspiracy, rape, and murder, yet deadlocked on the decision of sentencing him to death. When the jury couldn't agree on the death penalty, Green was automatically sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.

(Shortform note: In federal capital cases, the jury must unanimously agree to sentence a defendant to death. If the jury can't agree, the judge must sentence the defendant to the most severe punishment available that isn't the death penalty.)