PDF Summary:Age of Revolutions, by Fareed Zakaria

The world is experiencing multiple revolutions at once—technological, economic, cultural, and geopolitical—that are reshaping how nations and individuals navigate modern life. In Age of Revolutions, Fareed Zakaria examines how societies have historically responded to periods of radical transformation, tracing patterns from the French Revolution through today's political realignments and the rise of populism.

Zakaria explores how economic progress without political adaptation leads to upheaval, how identity politics has replaced class-based divisions, and how the liberal international order faces challenges from authoritarian movements and great power competition. He discusses strategies for maintaining open societies while building resilience, managing the complex relationship between the United States and China, and implementing policies that strengthen communities. The book offers a framework for understanding our current moment of disruption and navigating the tensions between global cooperation and national interests.

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A different type of identity revolution emerged in the 1990s. Zakaria argues that the 1960s didn't manage to create an enduring agreement on a unified social reform agenda. Rather, it revealed new cultural divisions that became political fault lines. In the US, the identity shifts of the 1960s led to an immediate, significant backlash that fueled ongoing political division. Men, white people, and Christians, who had historically been dominant, suddenly felt their control waning. As women or groups from racial minorities sought equality, white men increasingly felt under threat. Identity politics focused on white male identity started gaining traction nationwide. Across Europe, shifts in society happened much more rapidly and left a lasting impact.

(Shortform note: Zakaria’s claim that identity politics centered on white male identity gained traction in the US is supported by research showing that many white Americans now view “white” as a salient political group identity. This sense of white group belonging strongly predicts partisanship and attitudes on issues like immigration, even after controlling for economic characteristics. This suggests that white identity politics has become a significant force in American political life. The research draws on large, nationally representative surveys, providing robust evidence for these trends.)

Europe’s multiparty frameworks were more successful at including diverse perspectives, easing some of the political conflicts that troubled America. In Germany, by the 1980s, people with left-leaning views could select from social democrats, centrists, and the Green party. These choices alleviated some of the divisiveness and discord that trouble the U.S. two-party system.

(Shortform note: In Parties and Party Systems, political scientist Giovanni Sartori argues that multiparty systems can sometimes increase tension and instability. He describes “polarized pluralist” systems, where many parties with extreme ideological differences compete. In these systems, parties often focus on attacking each other rather than finding common ground. This can lead to frequent government collapses and make it hard to pass laws. Sartori points to Weimar Germany as an example, where too many parties with extreme views contributed to political chaos.)

Now, let’s look at the core tenets of illiberalism and how the illiberal backlash has manifested in America and Europe.

Core Tenets of Illiberalism

Zakaria argues that illiberalism is a global movement that challenges liberal democracy. It rejects Enlightenment values like pluralism, tolerance, and a secular society. Illiberalism is often associated with populist leaders who claim to represent the authentic will of the populace against the elites.

(Shortform note: In political science, “illiberalism” usually refers to governments that maintain elections but gradually erode independent institutions that protect individual rights. These governments often use populist rhetoric to justify their actions, claiming to represent the “true will of the people” while undermining checks and balances.)

Examples of Authoritarian Backlash

According to Zakaria, populism emerged as a reaction against globalization and immigration in Europe. The neoliberal policies endorsed by the Washington Consensus protected global capitalism from democratic pressures, fostering the perception of an unresponsive elite focused on globalism. The shift of government authority to the EU's bureaucracy made Europeans feel like they'd lost agency. Large-scale migration caused white Europeans to feel like foreigners in their native countries. These developments supported each other, promoting instability and preparing people for the fires of the cultural conflicts ignited by right-wing populists. Throughout Europe, populist parties capitalized on this uneasiness.

(Shortform note: Zakaria’s explanation of the rise of populism in Europe is far from the only one. In Cultural Backlash, political scientists Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart argue that the rise of right-wing populism in Europe is a reaction to the spread of progressive values. They argue that older, socially conservative voters feel threatened by the growing acceptance of multiculturalism, gender equality, and LGBTQ+ rights. This cultural backlash, they contend, is a more significant driver of populist support than economic factors like globalization or immigration. Norris and Inglehart base their argument on decades of cross-national survey data, showing a strong correlation between traditional values and support for populist parties.)

Zakaria notes that centrist right and left factions were aligned in backing more immigration and closer European unity, though they disagreed on economic policies. But as integration and immigration sped up, this consensus came apart. The historical division between the political left and right shifted to a new split: politics that are open versus those that are closed, regarding topics like trade or immigration. Populist nationalism leveraged the identity revolution to exploit emerging anxieties. With populism seeping into the core of politics, conventional social classes unraveled. By 1999, the far-right Freedom Party in Austria had gained the support of a majority of the nation's manual workers. In Western Europe, mainstream political parties saw their average vote share decline from nearly 80% in the 1970s to under 60% by the 2010s.

The Evolution of Party Systems in Western Europe

The rise of the far-right Freedom Party in Austria and the decline of mainstream parties in Western Europe can be traced back to the evolution of party systems in the region. In the early 20th century, Western European party systems were characterized by a clear divide between left-wing and right-wing parties, with the left representing the working class and the right representing the middle and upper classes. However, as the 20th century progressed, this divide began to blur as parties became more focused on managing the state rather than representing specific social groups. In Ruling the Void, political scientist Peter Mair argues that this shift led to a disconnect between parties and their traditional bases of support, creating an opening for radical parties to emerge.

Zakaria adds that American populism arose in reaction to income disparity and perceived threats to traditional values. The Populist Party, a notably successful third party in U.S. history, emerged in areas centered on agriculture and the working-class industrial sector. Populists criticized the gold standard system, which fixed the value of the American dollar to gold, arguing that it benefited the wealthy while leaving laborers poor and indebted. They accused politicians of corruption and claimed that financial and industrial leaders were unjustly profiting from the workers who produced America’s goods. The Populist Party governed states, received presidential electoral votes, and sent dozens of legislators to Congress.

(Shortform note: Historian Richard Hofstadter, in his influential 1955 book The Age of Reform, offered a sharply critical view of the Populist Party and its legacy. Hofstadter argued that the Populist movement was less a principled protest against income disparity and more an expression of status anxiety among rural Americans who felt their social position eroding in an increasingly urban and industrial society. He contended that Populist leaders often resorted to conspiratorial thinking, scapegoating distant financial elites and urban interests while idealizing a nostalgic vision of rural America. Hofstadter’s interpretation sparked intense debate among historians, with some arguing that he unfairly dismissed the Populists’ genuine economic grievances and their contributions to American political reform.)

In 1896, the Democratic presidential nominee was Nebraska politician William Jennings Bryan. He opposed urban industrialists' corrupt practices and the unfairness confronting farmers in rural areas. He also opposed pegging the dollar's value to gold, arguing that it benefited bankers and disadvantaged workers. Bryan’s campaign drew support from farmers and laborers who felt marginalized by industrialization. The Populist Party also put Bryan forward as its candidate. Although he lost the 1896 election, Bryan's populist supporters highlighted the weaknesses of the dominant economic system. Zakaria says the Populist Party eventually vanished, though populism's backlash endured.

(Shortform note: Pegging the dollar’s value to gold helped creditors and hurt debtors because it made the money supply inflexible. When the money supply is tied to a fixed amount of gold, it can’t expand to meet the needs of a growing economy. This often led to deflation, where the value of money increased over time. While this benefited creditors, who were repaid in more valuable dollars, it hurt debtors like farmers and wage earners. Farmers, who often had fixed debts, found it harder to repay loans as the value of their crops fell. Wage earners also suffered as their incomes stagnated or declined.)

Bryan’s later career showed that, in contrast to European socialism, American populism relied heavily on people who perceived modernity as a threat to their cultural traditions. In 1925, Bryan participated in the prosecution during the Scopes "Monkey Trial," which opposed the idea that Darwin's theory of evolution should be taught because it contradicted the Bible. In America, the response to the Industrial Revolution was grounded in religious fundamentalism and longstanding values, rather than secular, Marxist-inspired working-class politics.

The Industrial Revolution and the Rise of the American Labor Movement

Another American response to the Industrial Revolution that Zakaria doesn’t mention is the rise of labor unions. In Death in the Haymarket, James R. Green describes how, in the decades after the Civil War, industrial wage workers in America’s new factory cities created a broad, insurgent labor movement that was secular in outlook, organized through trade unions, assemblies of the Knights of Labor, and socialist and anarchist political clubs. These workers responded to the harsh discipline, long hours, and economic insecurity imposed by industrial capitalism by building their own newspapers, educational societies, and mass demonstrations for the eight-hour day.

Sustaining an Open, Progressive Path Toward Liberal Goals

Zakaria asserts that the ideology of liberalism has driven political modernization globally. This ideology developed during the Enlightenment, challenging religious and monarchal power. It's commonly defined as domestic personal rights and freedoms, religious liberty, market economies and free trade, and working with other nations under a framework of rules. Economic principles of liberalism, like acknowledging ownership rights and utilizing open markets and commerce, have become widely embraced worldwide. However, they're often adjusted to guarantee a more equitable and fair economy.

(Shortform note: Zakaria’s argument that the ideology of liberalism has driven political modernization globally overlooks the fact that many countries have modernized without embracing liberalism as he defines it. For example, the postwar economic miracles of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan were driven by “developmental states” that used powerful bureaucracies to direct market economies and manage trade. These states saw market economies and free trade as tools for national development, not as ends in themselves.)

The political give-and-take was most effective in places such as the U.S., Britain, and the Netherlands, where liberals advocated for increased openness, freedom, and individual rights. They faced opposition, often from traditionalist groups who aimed to maintain the existing system. However, eventually, as party politics had its effects, liberals and conservatives softened, and the nations advanced—perhaps not as rapidly as liberals wished but at a speed beyond conservatives' expectations. Society changed in a manner that aligned with its inherent characteristics rather than opposing them.

The Importance of Gradual Change

It’s important to recognize this pattern because when political parties abandon this gradual give-and-take, countries become more vulnerable to constitutional crises and even regime collapse. For example, research comparing 28 countries that experienced democratic breakdowns with 34 that didn’t found that the key difference was whether political parties were willing to compromise and accept gradual change. In countries where parties refused to work together, polarization increased, and the political system became more fragile. This made it easier for anti-democratic forces to exploit divisions and undermine democratic institutions.

Let’s look at the global strategy for an open system and the need to build domestic resilience.

Global Strategy for an Open Order

Zakaria contends that the United States played a key role in establishing a new global structure after World War II. The term "American Century" now describes this order. The US contributed to the United Nations and other international regulatory bodies, promoted global commerce, and discouraged future conflicts among major powers. American influence supported the new global structure. An economic system was created, backed by global regulations and policies sustained by new organizations: the UN, the IMF, and GATT (which preceded the WTO).

Zakaria explains that both Franklin D. Roosevelt and later Harry Truman were notably committed to transparency and collaboration. Free trade flourished once again, largely due to the relentless work of Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, who advocated for trade as a means for countries to develop and thrive in peace.

The Institutionalization of the American-Led Order

In After Victory, G. John Ikenberry argues that the collapse of the interwar order—the failure of the Versailles system, the weakness of the League of Nations, and the instability of the old gold-standard world economy—convinced American planners that postwar stability could not rest on ad hoc great-power diplomacy or informal bargains alone. The lesson they drew was that unconstrained freedom of action for the leading state (the US) and its partners could lead to the unraveling of the entire order, as had happened in the 1920s and 1930s. This experience led them to design a deeply institutionalized, “constitutional” order in which power would be regulated by binding rules, dense multilateral organizations, and agreed procedures that constrained the leading state as well as its partners. This approach aimed to lock in commitments, reduce fears of abandonment or domination, and prevent a return to the competitive, unraveled politics of the interwar period.

Zakaria argues that the global order must address challenges like Russian aggression and China's ascent. Russia is the most pressing danger because it has violated the rule that borders cannot be changed by force. Russia isn't cut off from the global community after invading Ukraine, but it has been distanced from the most affluent and high-producing nations. Its future involves technological regression, a stagnant economy, and weakening diplomatic power.

(Shortform note: The rule that borders cannot be changed by force has its roots in the interwar period, when the international community sought to prevent the recurrence of large-scale conflicts like World War I. The 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed by major powers including the US, France, and Germany, was a significant step in this direction, as it renounced war as a means of resolving disputes and prohibited the use of force to alter territorial boundaries.)

China is expected to continue as the second-biggest economic power in the world, possessing advanced technology, a strong military, a vast populace, and a tradition of accomplishment and creativity. The US and China are the two most powerful countries in the world, but China is significantly weaker in several respects. It has few allies, minimal ability to shape the agenda, and is regarded with suspicion by the majority of the surrounding countries. Its economic framework is faltering, and its population projections are bleak. Yet, it possesses considerable resources, surpassing every nation except the U.S. Zakaria warns that if China and the United States move toward a confrontational relationship, it will lead to globalization unraveling, the world splitting into zones based on economy and security, and the open global order falling apart.

The Future of Globalization

In Underground Empire, Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman argue that the world’s economic interconnection is unlikely to disappear, even if the US and China become more confrontational. Instead, they suggest that the nature of this interconnection will change. They argue that the US and China will continue to be interconnected through global networks of finance, production, and data, but these networks will become tools of power and control. States will try to “weaponize” their positions in these networks, using their control over key nodes and chokepoints to gain leverage over their rivals. This could involve rerouting and redesigning networks, as well as using access to critical infrastructures as tools of coercion and surveillance.

Now, let’s look at the US strategy toward China and how FDR’s coalition reshaped the Democrats.

Engagement & Deterrence

Zakaria notes that the US strategy toward China has mixed engaging with deterring. The US has tried to integrate China into the worldwide political and economic framework while also supporting other Asian powers to balance China’s influence. This approach worked for a while, but China's current leader, Xi Jinping, has adopted a more aggressive foreign policy. He believes China should be recognized as a global powerhouse and has taken actions that threaten the US and its allies. The US needs a strategy that reflects the complexity of its relationship with China, which is both a competitor and collaborator.

Engagement Plus Balancing

In The China Challenge, Thomas J. Christensen describes the US strategy toward China as “engagement plus balancing.” This is similar to Zakaria’s idea of a strategy that has mixed engaging with deterring. Christensen explains that the US has tried to engage China by integrating it into the global economy and international institutions, while also balancing China’s growing power by strengthening alliances with other Asian countries. This dual approach aims to encourage China to be a responsible global player while preventing it from becoming too dominant.

Zakaria adds that the US needs a nuanced strategy to manage its complex relationship with China, which serves as a competitor, customer, adversary, and collaborator. The US has attempted to restrict China's ability to obtain the latest technologies that might have military applications, while allowing it to buy most other items. Additionally, the U.S. has restricted China's capability to sell some technologies and acquire certain companies. The Biden administration characterizes this approach as putting a "tall barrier" around a "compact area" of crucial technologies. However, Zakaria says it's difficult to maintain this approach in reality.

(Shortform note: The US has a long history of trying to restrict the export of sensitive technologies to China, and it has always been difficult to maintain a clear distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive technologies. For example, in the 1980s, the US allowed China to buy advanced computers for civilian use, but it was difficult to ensure that these computers were not used for military purposes. Similarly, in the 1990s, the US allowed China to buy advanced telecommunications equipment, but it was difficult to prevent this equipment from being used for military purposes. These examples show that it is difficult to maintain a clear distinction between sensitive and non-sensitive technologies, and that the US has struggled to maintain this distinction in the past.)

Politicians will compete to ban more goods from China, while American businesses will push to exclude competitors. China's goals are ambiguous. It seeks a political system that’s more isolated, greater economic independence, and a society that's less shaped by Western culture and values. This is escalating tensions, which could cause more hostility and even a great-power war.

(Shortform note: China’s desire for a more isolated political system and greater economic independence is rooted in its historical experiences with foreign powers. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, China endured what it calls the “century of humiliation,” during which Western countries and Japan imposed unequal treaties, forced open its markets, and intervened militarily.)

The US will also have to contend with the fact that Europe needs to maintain positive economic connections with China to fuel its economy. Almost every country in Asia counts China as its biggest trade partner. China is also South America's and Africa's biggest trading partner abroad. These nations wish to preserve strong commercial relationships with China, utilize affordable technology from China, and obtain all the assistance, financial support, and expertise that China provides. Concurrently, they’re cautious regarding China and seek robust geopolitical connections with the US.

China’s Role in Global Trade

While China is a major trading partner for many countries, it’s not accurate to say that almost every country in Asia and all of South America and Africa have China as their biggest trading partner. According to the World Bank’s World Development Report 2020, many low- and middle-income economies are more tightly integrated into production networks centered on firms from the European Union and the United States than into those centered on China. This suggests that while China is a significant player in global trade, the US and EU still hold considerable influence in many regions.

Coalition & Norms

Zakaria explains that Franklin Roosevelt's coalition reshaped the Democrats, aligning them with social democratic ideals. Roosevelt’s coalition had shifted away from farming regions. With industrialization, cities expanded and the wealth disparity increased, attracting numerous urban workers to the Democrats’ view of a more engaged government. The Democratic Party started to look like social democracies in Europe, which promoted regulated markets alongside redistribution and welfare, but it kept a more moderate and gradual approach.

(Shortform note: Some historians have pushed back on the idea that Roosevelt’s coalition made the Democrats resemble European social democracies. In Fear Itself, historian Ira Katznelson argues that the New Deal was shaped by the need to accommodate Southern Democrats who were committed to maintaining racial segregation and white supremacy. This alliance, he explains, prevented the creation of universal social rights and instead led to a fragmented welfare state that often excluded Black Americans.)

Roosevelt's reforms challenged the longstanding, unquestioned faith in market infallibility and endorsed an interventionist government capable of delivering stability and protection from economic crises. In 1935, he enacted legislation that laid the groundwork for today's welfare state. This welfare model was distinctly American—more limited and more market-oriented than what European social democrats endorsed—but it still became a core part of the Democratic Party's identity. Zakaria adds that Roosevelt's reforms were first intended as a temporary response to the unique emergency of the Great Depression, rather than as a lasting shift in ideology. Yet FDR's fresh Democratic alliance was there to last. The Democrats had evolved to not only criticize free-market economics but also to champion the welfare state.

The Origins of the American Welfare State

While Roosevelt's 1935 legislation is often credited with laying the groundwork for the modern American welfare state, some historians argue that the roots of US social policy extend much further back. In Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, Theda Skocpol contends that the US had a distinctive welfare state in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, centered on Civil War veterans' pensions, state-level mothers' pensions, and national maternal and child health programs. These programs, she argues, demonstrate that long before the rise of modern social insurance for workers, American governments were spending heavily to protect soldiers and mothers and had made social provision a routine function of the state.

Zakaria says the Republican coalition shifted from Reaganism to populism. Reaganism was a collection of beliefs that included reducing government intervention, minimizing taxation, reducing government expenditures, a robust military, and advancing democracy globally. Populism is a political approach that seeks to represent the interests of ordinary people, often by opposing the established elite.

(Shortform note: Some historians argue that Zakaria leaves out a key component of Reaganism: the Republican coalition’s partnership with the Christian Right. This partnership made religious and cultural traditionalism a defining feature of the Republican coalition. This partnership was so important that some historians argue that Reaganism wouldn’t have been possible without it.)

Trump's ascent to power resulted from the Republican Party's many years of introspection. Reagan's approach, which focused on liberalizing economies and advocating for democratic principles, was no longer viable. The route charted by populists, ranging from Pat Buchanan to Newt Gingrich, directed the party to Donald Trump. The Republican establishment's immigration and trade policies hadn't aligned with its electorate for some time. In 2013, the Republican Party's supporters rejected a proposal to reform immigration, presented by the "Gang of Eight," a group of bipartisan senators, which counted Marco Rubio and Lindsey Graham among its members—both of whom would later become followers of Trump. In 2016, people who vote Republican were prepared for a change.

The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism

Zakaria is not the first to trace the Republican Party's trajectory from Reaganism to Trumpism. In 2011, Theda Skocpol and Vanessa Williamson published The Tea Party and the Remaking of Republican Conservatism, which argued that the Tea Party movement had successfully pulled the Republican Party to the right from within. They showed how a dense network of local groups, national organizations, donors, and conservative media had reshaped who participates in Republican politics and how candidates calculate their incentives. This organizational infrastructure made it easier for an unconventional candidate like Trump to capture the nomination.

Building Domestic Resilience

Zakaria argues that nations are prioritizing resilience at home over economic growth. They're limiting foreign commerce and investment while becoming more economically involved. Beneath the surface, nationalism is growing. Previously, Western agreement focused on a global open model that applauded mutual prosperity. The current consensus perceives China's ascent as detrimental to Americans and seeks to address the harms of globalization. The US made its economy globally accessible, but American laborers and national security were harmed as a consequence.

(Shortform note: Zakaria’s ideas don’t apply to all countries. In Straight Talk on Trade, economist Dani Rodrik argues that small, open economies have little choice but to rely heavily on international trade and financial flows. He explains that when these flows are structured to diversify export markets and sources of imports rather than concentrate exposure, deeper integration into the world economy can actually increase their economic security by reducing vulnerability to shocks in any single partner, product, or region.)

Let’s explore some practical policies for strengthening society.

Practical Policies for Strengthening Society

Zakaria suggests implementing policies that bolster communities and reduce insecurity. These include initiatives such as no-cost early childhood education, financial assistance for child care, and compensation for parental leave to support family life. Developing community infrastructure, supporting educational resources, and encouraging civic engagement can strengthen individuals' ties to their communities.

Institutions of higher education should focus on forming communities devoted to education and open dialogue, instead of pursuing significance by affiliating with political agendas that aren't central to their main purpose. Additionally, rational market oversight paired with redistributing wealth can ease the insecurity experienced by laborers.

The Unintended Consequences of Centralized Policies

Policies that “bolster communities and reduce insecurity” can have unintended consequences. For example, highly centralized programs can erode the local initiative and pluralism that make communities resilient. When the state takes over functions that communities once managed themselves, it can weaken the very social bonds and sense of agency that make those communities strong. This can lead to a cycle where communities become increasingly dependent on external support, losing the capacity to solve their own problems. The challenge is to find ways to support communities without undermining their autonomy and ability to adapt to changing circumstances.