PDF Summary:The Sleepwalkers, by Christopher Clark

Europe's path to the First World War was complex and driven by an intricate web of diplomatic alliances, nationalistic sentiments, and implicit power struggles. In The Sleepwalkers, Christopher Clark provides a thorough examination of these interwoven factors, tracing the aspirations and motivations of key figures and nations that inexorably led to the outbreak of war.

The deep-rooted antagonism between Serbia and Austria-Hungary set the stage for escalating tensions, but one incident alone did not spark the war. Instead, Clark illuminates how the fragile balances of power among Europe's major players eventually shattered as nationalistic desires intensified, military capabilities expanded, and diplomatic negotiations faltered, ultimately transforming a regional dispute into a continent-wide conflict.

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The objectives of the Russians in forming this alliance were diverse and lacked clear definition. The Russian leadership prioritized maintaining a workable relationship with Germany rather than establishing a strong alliance with the French republic, whose political culture was at odds with Russian autocracy, despite Berlin's decision to let the 1887 treaty lapse amidst the era's diplomatic tensions. The Russian leadership believed that fostering friendly relations with Berlin depended on their capacity to ensure that France did not gain sufficient strength to threaten German security, a situation they could manage by either presenting a possible risk or, if necessary, by forming a defensive alliance with Germany. The prospect of Britain joining the Triple Alliance was a key factor in persuading Tsar Alexander III and his counselors to form a partnership with France. Russia's worldwide competition with Britain, which encompassed disputes concerning Persia, Afghanistan, the Turkish Straits, and China, could have escalated to a catastrophic climax had it merged with its regional conflicts concerning the Balkans with Austria.

Britain's shift from neutrality to aligning with France and Russia in foreign affairs was significantly influenced by the perceived menace of Russian expansion in Asia, underscoring the critical influence of the geopolitical 'Great Game' on their international relations.

Britain's decision to shift from its customary policy of neutrality and engage in alliances with France and Russia was influenced more by the rivalry for dominance in areas like Central Asia, the Middle East, and the strategic maritime routes linking the Mediterranean to the Black Sea, than by concerns over Germany's growing influence. Britain's discomfort arose from the Franco-Russian alliance, which seemed capable of undermining Britain's global standing, given that these countries were rivals on the world stage.

The 1902 alliance between Britain and Japan was established as a strategic measure to counteract Russia's growing presence in China and to protect British interests in India, demonstrating how local disputes were intertwined with the changing balance of power on the European continent.

British officials, in response to what they saw as Russian territorial ambitions, sought to strengthen ties with countries that likewise regarded Russia's increasing power with apprehension. Japan's ascent to a powerful stance in the contest for control over Manchuria was cemented after its decisive victory over Qing China in their conflict. On January 30, the United Kingdom and Japan formalized their increasingly collaborative relationship by entering into an alliance treaty. Britain aimed to use its newly formed alliance as a means to strategically limit the expansion of Russia's power through military actions, thereby avoiding the necessity for a substantial increase in its military presence in India to counter a possible advance by Russia to the south.

Britain's establishment of the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 aimed to strengthen its dominion over Egypt and simultaneously accommodate French interests in Morocco, showcasing how colonial concessions were employed to manage the intricacies of rivalry among leading powers.

The Entente with France in 1904, which was chiefly established to maintain the balance of power among empires, resulted from a series of diplomatic negotiations. Britain regarded the move not as an antagonistic action towards Germany, which was primarily seen as a potential partner in limiting Russian influence. Working alongside France helped to ease rather than intensify colonial strains, which subsequently bolstered endeavors to fortify diplomatic ties with Russia. The French foreign affairs minister altered his initial tactic of creating a European alliance to oppose Britain, opting for a more straightforward and attainable method after 1900 to secure France's dominance in Morocco via a colonial trade. In the pact with London, Delcassé agreed to recognize British dominion over Egypt, thereby tacitly ensuring that the United Kingdom would back France's intentions to set up a protectorate in Morocco.

In 1907, an understanding was reached that, though not solidified, sought to reduce strains at the fringes of the British Empire, underscoring Britain's preference for strengthening relations with Russia over Germany.

In 1907, the respective capitals were the bases from which Foreign Minister Izvolsky and Sir Arthur Nicolson delineated their nations' spheres of influence in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. These accords aimed to reduce the strain on Britain's overextended defense and naval capabilities, ensuring the protection of economic assets crucial for maintaining British supremacy.

The rise of Germany as a significant colonial force in later history escalated tensions and destabilized the European landscape, underscoring the dangerous consequences of its quest for sovereignty in global affairs.

Clark analyzes the growing frustration and anxieties in Germany that resulted from its belated quest for an overseas empire. Germany, distinct from other European countries, had already experienced industrialization before it became unified in 1871. In the decades that followed, the new empire had to struggle with the consequences of its status as a parvenu power trying to secure a place for itself in an international system already dominated by the far-reaching and relatively settled overseas empires of Britain, France, and Russia.

The expiration of the Reinsurance Treaty in 1890 intensified German fears of isolation and vulnerability, a situation further aggravated by the formation of an alliance between France and Russia, underscoring the difficulties faced by empires that emerged later compared to those established earlier.

Between 1890 and 1907, Germany, a latecomer to the colonial empire game, faced a clear demonstration of its precarious position as its efforts to break out of isolation and form new partnerships proved fruitless. As time progressed, Germany's strategic alternatives narrowed, leading to the critical decision to build a powerful navy to challenge Britain's dominance over the oceans.

Germany's attempts to create partnerships within Europe to break free from the restrictive encirclement by the Entente powers highlighted the fragility of the newly formed imperial alliances.

Germany's diplomatic strategies fluctuated, at times pursuing a partnership with Russia in the east and at other moments striving for an agreement with Britain in the west, yet by 1914, neither initiative had succeeded in producing results.

Germany's naval augmentation markedly escalated its rivalry with Britain, illustrating the way in which competitive military buildups can cultivate an atmosphere of distrust among predominant global nations.

Germany's move to expand its naval capabilities substantially reflected the changing dynamics on the global stage. Germany acutely recognized the pivotal role that control over sea lanes played in upholding Britain's global and imperial preeminence throughout the past hundred years. The incident where a congratulatory message was sent to President Kruger intensified their competition with Great Britain, underscoring the fact that attempts to enlarge their colonial territories were likely to be met with formidable opposition from the leading global forces, particularly amidst the acute dispute concerning southern Africa. The construction of a naval fleet capable of challenging Britain's supremacy on the oceans heightened the sense of a German threat, especially in Britain, leading to an increasingly acrimonious naval arms race among alliances.

Germany's initiation of a strategy aimed at international influence mirrored a condition of ambivalence, which was indicative of the tension between its aspirations for empire and the actual implementation of these objectives.

Numerous other factors contributed to the worsening of worldwide circumstances. Germany's approach to global policy was characterized by a lack of clarity, combining aspirations for supremacy in global trade with a vague and unrealized plan for forging new alliances.

The increasing importance of alliances started to alter the perspectives of the involved countries, demonstrating the way personal perceptions started to influence their conduct in international relations.

The reconfiguration of partnerships within Europe carried significant consequences. Clark suggests that the solidarity within these groups was bolstered by the establishment of bonds between France and Russia, along with the understanding between Britain and France, which intensified and channeled their concerns, uncertainties, and fears towards rival blocs.

In 1907, Eyre Crowe penned a document that outlined Germany's ambitions for dominance, underscoring the influence of nationalist and imperialist ideologies on the foreign policy strategies of the United Kingdom.

The memorandum that Eyre Crowe wrote on January 1, 1907, is recognized as one of the earliest and clearest expressions of this viewpoint on international relations, providing the British public with a thorough psychological analysis of Germany, portraying it as a country motivated by belligerent and expansionist tendencies, determined to pursue its goals by means of coercion and the ruthless exploitation of weaknesses in interactions with other countries. Key individuals in the UK's Foreign Office perceived Germany as a nation with an assertive stance in international relations. Sir Arthur Nicolson, whose policy was guided by the maxim that Russia and France, despite the dangers they posed at many points along Britain’s imperial periphery, must be appeased at almost any cost.

France overestimated Britain's level of commitment to supporting French policies, under the impression that the Triple Entente represented a solid alliance.

Britain's agreements with France and Russia, mainly focused on colonial issues, were also interpreted by the French as signifying a continuous commitment to back the Franco-Russian alliance.

Germany's growing unease was exacerbated by the expanding sway of the Entente, especially because of their erroneous assumption that Britain played a major role in the hostile alliance, highlighting their incorrect understanding of the strategic objectives and ambitions of the United Kingdom.

The Germans felt encircled by potential threats. They interpreted the initiative from the United Kingdom to enhance ties with Russia as a tactical move designed to sideline Germany. The belief that Britain was a key player in the alliance bolstered the view that the Entente's main purpose was to counteract German ambitions. A more conciliatory approach by the United Kingdom toward Germany would certainly undermine the solidarity of the entire framework. Holstein was a firm advocate of prioritizing a pact with Britain as Germany's utmost objective in the years leading up to the conflict.

Other Perspectives

• The formation of the Franco-Russian alliance, while aimed at counterbalancing Germany, could also be seen as an aggressive move that contributed to the encirclement of Germany, potentially provoking German insecurity and militarism.
• The notion that Britain's shift from neutrality was primarily due to Russian expansion in Asia could be nuanced by considering Britain's broader strategic interests, including maintaining its naval supremacy and colonial interests, which were threatened by other powers as well.
• The alliance between Britain and Japan, while certainly a counter to Russian influence, might also be critiqued as a move that emboldened Japanese imperialism, contributing to future conflicts in the region.
• The Entente Cordiale and the subsequent agreements with Russia could be criticized for being more about British self-interest and the protection of its empire than about stabilizing Europe or containing German power.
• The view that Germany's rise as a colonial force was inherently destabilizing could be challenged by arguing that it was the existing colonial powers' unwillingness to accommodate a rising Germany that contributed to tensions.
• The idea that Germany's fears of isolation were intensified by the expiration of the Reinsurance Treaty might be countered by the argument that Germany had other diplomatic options it could have pursued more vigorously.
• The fragility of imperial alliances could be seen not just as a product of their newness, but also as a result of the complex and often conflicting interests of the powers involved, which made any alliance inherently unstable.
• The criticism of Germany's naval buildup could be met with the argument that it was a natural and legitimate aspiration for a rising power seeking to protect its global interests and commerce.
• The suggestion that Germany's strategy aimed at international influence was ambivalent might be countered by the view that it was a rational response to a rapidly changing and uncertain international environment.
• The assertion that alliances altered perspectives and conduct could be critiqued by arguing that alliances were often a reflection of pre-existing perceptions and interests rather than a cause of change in behavior.
• Eyre Crowe's document and the British perception of Germany could be criticized for possibly contributing to a self-fulfilling prophecy, where treating Germany as a potential adversary encouraged it to become one.
• The claim that France overestimated Britain's commitment could be countered by suggesting that Britain's actions, particularly in the lead-up to World War I, demonstrated a stronger alignment with France than the French may have realized.
• The idea that Germany's unease was exacerbated by an erroneous assumption about Britain's role in the Entente could be challenged by arguing that Germany's concerns were not unfounded given the eventual military cooperation between Britain and the Entente powers during World War I.

A sequence of pivotal circumstances and decisions progressively laid the groundwork for the outbreak of the First World War.

Clark's analysis explores the intricate factors that contributed to the initiation of hostilities in 1914, scrutinizing how the combination of institutional structures, various forms of communication, both formal and informal, and the unique characteristics and relationships of key individuals influenced the creation of diplomatic and military strategies.

The Habsburg monarchy's vacillating approach to policy-making intensified the growing strains in its relationship with Serbia after 1903, underscoring the difficulties inherent in governing empires with diverse ethnic compositions.

Clark scrutinizes the decision-making processes and methodologies employed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Here he highlights multiple factors that made Austria-Hungary especially vulnerable to the chaos sparked by the expansionist ambitions of Serbia and the increasing sway of Russia, despite the country's progress in industrial and economic growth.

The complexities in managing foreign conflicts were exacerbated by the tensions within Vienna's political landscape following the reorganization of power after the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise.

Clark argues that the 1867 Compromise, which shaped the Austro-Hungarian Empire's political structure, considerably restricted the Habsburg monarchs' ability to formulate and execute a unified, strategic policy when interacting with the Balkan nations. After being ousted from Italy in 1859 and subsequently detached from the German nation-state in 1866, the Habsburg monarchy was compelled to divide its rule between Austria and Hungary, while striving to preserve an appearance of unified imperial control. The pact provided a precarious foundation for managing international affairs. Post-1867, the evolution of international relations occurred in the absence of a singular, supreme power directing the political order. The unfolding of events was shaped by the dynamics between multiple autonomous power hubs, including the military elite and the department responsible for overseeing military affairs, as well as various government agencies and individual diplomats, all competing for influence and striving to gain the endorsement of the nation's governing figures.

The involvement of the Austro-Hungarian emperor in settling disagreements among top officials highlights the possibility of misusing royal powers in a time characterized by a slow transition to democratic rule.

Franz Joseph, the Emperor, typically responded to policy suggestions instead of proposing them, but he still held a significant role in the political arena. Clark suggests that amidst considerable volatility and unpredictability, the emperor was the sole steadfast element. The system continued to function despite this situation. The aristocracy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire consistently showed adeptness in adjusting their strategies and achieving workable, though not flawless, compromises, even amidst sporadic upheavals. In the event of an unforeseen emergency, it was ambiguous who would take charge and act decisively, as well as the process through which choices would be determined. Political actors outside the core circle of the Habsburg hierarchy achieved a degree of autonomy and influence that their counterparts in the more centralized governmental frameworks of Germany and Britain did not possess.

Austria-Hungary's position on Balkan matters, particularly regarding Serbia, was markedly shaped by the tug-of-war between those pushing for peace and those urging for confrontation.

In his analysis, Clark delves into the historical dynamics, scrutinizing how the push for peace clashed with the adamant conviction of some that conflict was the only answer to the issues posed by the nations of the Balkans. Before Serbia had the opportunity to make a move, Conrad von Hötzendorf, who assumed the role of chief of the General Staff in 1906 and was a staunch advocate for engaging in military operations, supported the launch of an offensive against them. The heir to the Habsburg throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, harbored views that contrasted with those of his advisory councils. The archduke was staunchly opposed to Conrad's proposal for starting conflict in the Balkans and showed equal commitment to advancing significant reforms in the internal political structure of Austria-Hungary. Leopold von Berchtold, who assumed the role of joint foreign minister in 1912, had a reputation for being good-natured and generally steered clear of confrontations.

The monarchy frequently misunderstood the foundational principles and organizational framework of Serbian political factions, leading to an overestimation and wary misinterpretation of the opposition's intentions and strategies.

Clark argues that the officials from Austria incorrectly assessed the political forces within Serbia. The empire viewed Serbia as the principal challenge to its peace, meticulously mapping out the network of agents, unruly military factions, and nationalistic writings that supported the nation's expansionist aspirations after the June 1903 assassination and King Peter Karadjordjević's subsequent ascension to the throne. The perception that the Serbian authorities exerted greater control over these groups and their actions was more widespread than the reality, with baseless speculations of secret cooperation in circumstances that were generally marked by tacit agreement, and sinister motives ascribed to actions that were usually the result of a chaotic blend of impulsive responses fueled by fear, an instinctual drive to conceal one's deeds, and the common Serbian aversion to confronting unpleasant realities.

The Austrian government struggled to distinguish between official state matters and the unofficial conduits that were encouraging Serbian expansion, underscoring the difficulties faced by the empire's decision-makers in deciphering intelligence and grasping the situation within Serbia.

The complex web of relationships linking the Serbian government with nationalist factions made it difficult to distinguish between officially approved and unauthorized actions, puzzling observers abroad as well as authorities within Serbia. The stability of the Habsburg Empire was seen as being under considerable threat because of Serbia's territorial expansion goals. Clark argues that their perception of the issues was distorted by an inherently negative outlook, which caused them to place undue emphasis on the use of diplomatic and military tactics to resolve crises.

The impact of the Italian attack on Libya in 1911 and the two Balkan Wars in transforming the European system and accelerating the Balkanization of the alliances, demonstrating how events on Europe's periphery could reshape power relations at the centre

For Clark, the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 are one of the crucibles of the July Crisis; they played a critical role in strengthening the bond between France and Russia along with the southeastern Balkans, setting the stage for a localized dispute between Austria-Hungary and Serbia to expand into a widespread European conflict. French and Russian diplomats frequently envisioned a scenario in which a conflict in the Balkans, instigated by Serbian ambitions, would compel Austria-Hungary to attack Serbia, which would then necessitate Russian intervention to protect its ally, ultimately triggering the activation of the alliance between France and Russia. Yet Clark also highlights the extent to which these wars were a consequence of decisions made in Europe, showing how the Italian assault on Libya in 1911, though it was triggered by French unilateralism in Morocco, met with encouragement from Paris and London, but provoked the anxieties of Austria-Hungary, which rightly predicted that it would have a destabilizing effect on the Balkan peninsula.

Italy's foray into Libya, resulting in the undermining of the Triple Alliance, serves as a key illustration of the confusion prevalent within the alliance networks during the late 19th century.

Clark argues that Italy played a considerable, though not direct, role in sparking the Balkan conflicts of 1912 and 1913 due to its strategic attack on Ottoman-held Libya in autumn 1911. Italy, in its quest to expand its influence in North Africa and preserve its role as a crucial element of European equilibrium, entered into secret negotiations with France, Britain, and Russia to gradually undermine the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, all the while intentionally excluding its Triple Alliance allies from these discussions. Despite warnings from their allies about the potential for causing unrest with an incursion into Ottoman territories in the Balkans, the Italians went ahead, gambling on a rapid victory.

The swift escalation of conflicts in the Balkans accelerated the military readiness within the alliance between France and Russia, demonstrating an increasing openness among French officials to the possibility of a conflict originating in that area.

In autumn 1912, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, and Montenegro formed a coalition with the shared objective of driving out Ottoman forces from the Balkan region, an alliance that came into being as a result of the Italian War. The onset of the First Balkan War marked a pivotal moment in international relations, undermining the united determination of European countries to preserve the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Russian expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean. The swift victories of the League's allies resulted in internal conflict among their ranks. French political leaders, along with their advisors in military strategy and economics, increasingly recognized that a Balkan dispute, possibly sparked by Austrian hostility toward Serbia, might offer a chance for Russian forces to confront Germany, thereby easing the pressure on French troops, an insight pointed out by the French political analyst Alexandre Ribot in December 1912. The sequence of occurrences in the Balkans had a considerable impact on how France and Russia reacted to the subsequent crisis following the assassinations in Sarajevo.

The United Kingdom's diplomatic strategy in the Balkans shifted its emphasis from limiting Russian dominance to containing the aspirations of Germany, thereby altering the core reasons behind its alliances with France and Russia.

British authorities explored strategies to mitigate the strain in the Balkans following periods of unrest in the area. British diplomats viewed the Ottoman Empire as a key partner, vital in impeding Russia's progression toward the Turkish Straits, since Russian control over this area could jeopardize Britain's supreme status and significant stakes in the Eastern Mediterranean. British policymakers, aware of Austria's waning power and the emergence of a Balkan coalition opposed to it with seeming support from Russia, perceived an opportunity to explore different strategic options, including the possibility of using Germany to temper the actions of Austria-Hungary and employing Britain's diplomatic and strategic clout to help achieve a balanced resolution.

The sense of immediacy among the strategists of Germany's armed forces was intensifying in response to Russia's expanding military prowess, and there was a growing agreement that it would be wise to commence hostilities sooner rather than later.

The evolving circumstances in the Balkan region led to the German military taking steps that hastened the onset of the July Crisis. Germany viewed the main result of the Balkan disputes as a persistent weakening of the Austro-Hungarian Empire's military prowess. The Habsburg Empire had always been a flawed ally, but it at least possessed the numbers to provide some relief for German forces facing the Franco-Russian alliance in the west. Clark suggests that by 1913, there was a growing sense of unease within Germany's military ranks about the risk of the monarchy's inability to preserve its already weakened state. The General Staff's anxiety intensified as they carefully recorded the swift transformation and strategic redeployment of Russia's military might, which was made possible through significant monetary backing from France. The heads of the German military increasingly recognized the need for prompt action, with figures such as Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke either genuinely convinced or claiming to be convinced that if a European conflict was inevitable, the current circumstances were the most favorable for facing it. The prevailing opinion held that initiating hostilities at an earlier stage would be advantageous, thwarting the Entente powers from capitalizing on their expanding population, burgeoning industrial capabilities, and the progression of time to secure a strategic upper hand.

The diplomatic exchanges leading up to the summer of 1914 were fraught with a dangerous unpredictability, as attempts to preserve stability were continually undermined by the growing animosity among various coalitions in the years leading up to the conflict.

Clark characterizes the period between 1912 and 1914 as one in which the principal European countries actively pursued diplomatic initiatives aimed at peacefully resolving the Balkan crisis to prevent a potential continental war. Efforts to diminish tensions during this period, known as the Era of Negotiations in Germany, led to a paradoxical situation: they inspired optimism yet also decreased the willingness to confront, and because they often focused on specific disagreements, they did little to change the underlying network of antagonistic alliances that influenced decisions during the next crisis.

The gatherings in 1912 at the maritime hub on the Baltic Sea underscored the fragility of the détente efforts aimed at improving German-Russian relations, underscoring the precarious nature of trust stemming from their inconclusive outcomes.

Tsar Nicholas and his foreign minister engaged in conversations with the Kaiser and Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in the German cities of Potsdam and Berlin, which fueled hopes for an ongoing easing of the tense relations between Russia and Germany. The assembly seemed for a time to

Other Perspectives

• The assertion that pivotal circumstances and decisions alone laid the groundwork for WWI could be challenged by emphasizing the role of systemic issues such as nationalism, imperialism, and militarism.
• The influence of institutional structures and key individuals might be countered by arguing that impersonal forces like economic interests and social tensions played a more significant role.
• The critique of the Habsburg monarchy's policy-making could be met with the argument that it was not vacillation but the complex nature of multi-ethnic governance that created strains with Serbia.
• The vulnerabilities of the Austro-Hungarian Empire could be seen not just as a result of external pressures but also due to internal decay and inefficiency.
• The 1867 Compromise might be defended as a necessary measure to maintain the empire's unity, rather than a hindrance to strategic policymaking.
• The emperor's involvement in settling disagreements could be viewed as a stabilizing factor rather than a misuse of royal powers.
• The stance on Balkan matters could be argued as a reflection of a realistic assessment of the empire's strategic interests rather than a simple tug-of-war between peace and confrontation.
• The misunderstandings of Serbian political factions might be reinterpreted as a rational response to the opaque and turbulent political climate of the region.
• The struggle to distinguish between official and unofficial Serbian actions could be seen as a common challenge in international relations, not unique to the Austrian government.
• The impact of the Italian attack on Libya and the Balkan Wars could be contextualized as part of broader imperialist trends rather than isolated events that reshaped power relations.
• Italy's undermining of the Triple Alliance could be seen as a rational pursuit of national interests in the face of a changing geopolitical landscape.
• The acceleration of military readiness within the French and Russian alliance might be justified as a prudent response to the perceived threat from the Central Powers.
• The UK's shift in diplomatic strategy could be critiqued as opportunistic and contributing to the destabilization of the region.
• The sense of immediacy among German strategists could be challenged as a misreading of the strategic situation, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy of conflict.
• The diplomatic exchanges leading up to 1914 could be defended as sincere attempts at peace, with the failure being due to unforeseen complexities rather than inherent animosity.
• The gatherings in 1912 between Germany and Russia could be seen as a missed opportunity for peace rather than an indication of the fragility of détente efforts.