PDF Summary:Team of Teams, by Stanley McChrystal
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In 2004, General Stanley McChrystal took over as commander of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Task Force fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq. The sprawling organization—encompassing strategists, analysts, and elite special forces from every branch of the U.S. military—was struggling to make headway against an unconventional enemy and environment.
In Team of Teams, McChrystal describes how he transformed the slow-moving bureaucratic task force into an agile, adaptable network of teams united by a “shared consciousness”, trust, and decentralized decision-making. After years of being outmaneuvered by Al Qaeda, the reinvented task force pulled together to eliminate terrorist leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi and began winning the fight against terrorism in Iraq. These accomplishments hold lessons for all kinds of organizations struggling with unconventional challenges and environments today.
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Resistance and Success
At its headquarters, the task force provided extra seats for partner agencies it hoped would participate in O&I—it was important that the CIA, NSA, FBI, and other outside agencies who provided intelligence hear first hand what the task force needed based on what was happening in the field. However, at first, only the CIA participated, while other agencies were wary of the open-sharing environment.
But the task force leaders tried to lead by example, quickly sharing data as raids were completed. McChrystal believed that the value of information grew as it was shared and more people were able to make use of it. As the intelligence agencies got faster and more useful information from the task force, they stepped up their participation, further developing and using the information—for instance, in questioning detainees. Special forces operating in the field communicated with analysts about what they were finding during raids.
O&I attendance grew to 7,000 as the value of the information and interaction increased. Everyone could see problems being solved and conflicting information being reconciled. Many participants developed their own problem-solving skills as a result. Despite involving thousands of people for two hours daily, the O&I saved untold time by eliminating the need for people to get clarification. While there was a risk of information falling into the wrong hands, the task force never had any leaks, and sharing information saved lives.
Scaling Up Trust
To build trust and familiarity between teams accustomed to operating in silos, the task force established an embedding program, which assigned a team member to a different team for six months. The idea was to:
- Provide embedded team members with a view of the war from within a different team
- Build new personal relationships
- Consequently, create ties between teams
Special operations teams at first resisted the program—however, as a point of pride, each sent their best team member to represent them. The experience built understanding and trust as the embedded team members saw the other teams’ strengths and shared their new-found knowledge with their “home” team.
In a similar effort to build ties with the external agencies (the CIA, NSA, and so on), the task force greatly expanded an existing program of sending liaison officers to these partner agencies. As the special ops teams had sent their best operatives to be embeds, the task force chose only top quality candidates as liaisons.
In addition to building trust through the liaison program, the connections and knowledge sharing enabled the task force to develop a more well-rounded understanding of AQI from partner agencies—for instance, about how the terrorist group’s global finance system worked.
Also, partner agencies began sending people to the task force meetings—and all the extra seats eventually filled up. Agencies and teams found that the more they cooperated, the more they benefited.
A Liaison Success Story
The task force sent a Navy SEAL officer to a U.S. embassy in the Middle East to coordinate efforts against Al Qaeda—however, the embassy staff at first didn’t welcome him or share intelligence with him. Having little work to do, he volunteered to collect the trash from each office, and used the task to meet people and build relationships. For instance, from taking out the trash, he learned that one embassy employee liked a certain fast-food sandwich, so he requested the task force send these sandwiches with its next delivery.
The SEAL officer slowly won respect and eventually the ambassador approached him to request help with protecting the embassy and its forces against Al Qaeda, which was ramping up in that country. The officer provided expert advice and task force intelligence, as well as pulling in task force resources.
Transforming Leadership
Even though the restructured task force in Iraq developed the shared consciousness and team connectivity to determine the right things to do to counter AQI, they often couldn’t act on their own or act quickly—decisions had to travel up and down a lengthy chain of command.
Paradoxically, the instant communication enabled by technology slowed decision-making, as more people had the ability to weigh in; senior leaders wanted to approve things that, in the past, they wouldn’t have been directly involved in due to lack of real-time communication. Approval processes for strikes on terrorist leaders extended to the Pentagon or even the White House. Yet delayed decisions could allow a target to escape or could mean life or death in the complex, ever-changing circumstances on the ground.
To speed up the reaction time, McChrystal began pushing decision-making authority down, in a policy of “empowered execution.” Often, he didn’t explicitly delegate—instead, he created a general rule: If it advances the task force effort, do it (assuming it’s moral and legal).
His more self-assured officers made decisions and reported them at the O&I briefing, where McChrystal’s public approval encouraged more people to act. The task force decentralized until it became uncomfortable, which McChrystal defined as the “sweet spot.” He knew that because sharing decision-making authority is uncomfortable for leaders, discomfort would be a sign they’d achieved their goal.
Naturally, there was a learning curve: Subordinate officers had to become comfortable with not only making decisions, but also pushing authority down further. Partner agencies were initially confused and wanted verification that subordinate officers were acting with McChrystal’s approval.
Soon though, empowered execution began paying off:
- Decisions were made more quickly, increasing the effectiveness of special operations.
- The quality of the decisions actually improved because those making them were more invested in the outcomes, and because the people closer to the action were better equipped to decide what to do. Task force leaders had expected decision quality to decline as a trade-off for speed because they believed their own decisions as leaders were superior—however, that turned out not to be the case.
In addition to the policy of pushing authority down throughout the organization, McChrystal adopted an “eyes on, hands off” policy for himself, meaning that if subordinates fully informed him about what they were doing, he’d simply observe without getting involved. Conversely, if they didn’t provide sufficient “visibility” (part of shared consciousness), he would jump in aggressively.
McChrystal found he was more effective when he supervised processes to ensure the task force avoided silos and bureaucracy that would hinder agility. He used technological capabilities to do his job of coordination better, rather than to monitor and intervene in others’ jobs or operations. He likened this concept of leadership to “leading like a gardener,” that is, creating and cultivating an organizational ecosystem in which others could operate more effectively.
Putting the Pieces Together
The Task Force’s team-of-teams organizational model, incorporating the transformational concepts of trust, purpose, shared consciousness, and empowered execution, finally brought down AQI leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi.
By the spring of 2006, the playing field had changed: In several years, the task force had 1) learned a great deal more about Zarqawi and his organization and 2) dramatically increased its effectiveness in gathering intelligence and disrupting the terrorist network.
A break came when task force units captured a dozen AQI fighters in a raid on a farmhouse—U.S. intelligence analysts soon identified several of them as not merely fighters but mid-level AQI operatives potentially connected to terrorist leadership. Interrogators homed in on one particular operative, Allawi (not his real name), and brought the vast, now-networked, task force resources to bear on determining what he knew. A hive mind consisting of teams across Iraq, intelligence agencies in the U.S. and United Kingdom, partners across the region, and more than 70 task force liaison officers coordinated questions to ask the detainee and offered insights on his answers.
Finally, Allawi revealed the name of Zarqawi’s spiritual adviser, Sheikh Abd al-Rahman, with whom the terrorist leader had regular in-person contact. The task force determined Rahman’s location and monitored it 24/7. Maintaining constant surveillance diverted resources from other task force operations, which in the past would have prompted competitiveness or distrust among units. However, thanks to shared consciousness, trust, and transparency, everyone understood and united around the common purpose of taking down Zarqawi.
The task force was able to track Rahman to a meeting with Zarqawi at a farmhouse outside Baghdad. When Rahman arrived there, a man dressed in black robes emerged to greet him, and the task force’s network of analysts quickly identified the man as Zarqawi. At the task force HQ, McChrystal’s Baghdad operations commander called for an air strike and dispatched a special operations team. Practicing empowered execution, McChrystal didn’t question or intervene in the orders. The strike blew up the house, and the commando team arriving a half-hour later found Iraqi medics outside with a still-alive Zarqawi on a stretcher. However, Zarqawi died a few minutes later.
Next, the task force drew on resources stretching to the FBI in Washington, to confirm Zarqawi’s fingerprints and thus, his identity. Finally, task force units across Iraq struck multiple targets, including 14 in Baghdad, in an effort to hit each one before word of Zarqawi’s death spread to AQI operatives and caused them to flee. These strikes yielded intelligence revealing further connections among the terrorists and leading to new raids.
A Transformed Organization
By the time of the successful strike against Zarqawi, the task force had begun taking for granted the network of relationships, trust, and shared consciousness that enabled the huge success. These elements had become part of their everyday operations.
They were now winning the fight against AQI because they were learning and adapting more quickly than the enemy. They were striking unpredictably, day and night, more quickly than AQI could regroup—enabled by the networking and trust between analysts and field operators.
It was all the result of a management transformation. Now, instead of being a centralized efficiency-oriented organization, the task force was an interconnected network constantly learning and adapting.
The Challenge Is Ongoing
However, the subsequent rise of ISIS in Iraq under a new terrorist leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, less than 10 years after McChrystal’s success in transforming the task force and capturing Zarqawi, underscored two truths about change:
- There’s no permanent fix in a constantly and rapidly changing complex environment.
- Transforming organizations is an ongoing, uphill battle due to a tendency to backslide.
When facing challenges, there’s a temptation in organizations to revert to the planning and efficiency-oriented processes they’re comfortable with and that have worked in the past. But results are what count—and getting results in a new environment requires transforming how organizations do things for the long term.
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PDF Summary Introduction
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Team of Teams is the story of how McChrystal transformed the task force in the middle of a war— a task he likened to a sports team switching from football to basketball in the middle of a game—requiring it to discard familiar equipment as well as every preconception about winning a war. Drawing on both military history and management theory, McChrystal suggests that the task force’s experiences in reinventing itself can apply to many organizations facing unconventional challenges.
This summary is divided into five parts that link the task force’s practical experience with management theory and the experiences of other large organizations:
- Part 1 describes the new and challenging environment the tradition-bound U.S. task force faced in Iraq and discusses theories of organizational management and change.
- Part 2 examines the strengths of adaptable teams and the challenges of scaling them up in a large organization.
- Part 3 describes how the task force transformed itself into an interconnected network of adaptable teams.
- Part 4 examines how the role of leaders must change in an adaptable organization.
- Part 5 puts the pieces together, showing how the...
PDF Summary Part 1: Old Methods, New Environment | Chapter 1: Getting a Handle on AQI
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Yet, AQI managed to prevail. An example of AQI’s effectiveness against the task force was its September 2004 bombing of a celebration to open Baghdad sewer plant. AQI terrorists drove cars loaded with explosives into the crowd, killing 35 children and wounding 10 Americans and 140 Iraqis. Within hours, AQI had posted a video of its success on the internet.
Despite being the “best of the best,” the task force’s elite special forces, strategists, and intelligence analysts hadn’t discovered the plans and prevented the bombing. Moreover, terrorist attacks like the sewer plant bombing kept increasing. In 2004, there had been more terrorist attacks in Iraq than in the entire world in 2003. They continued to escalate and by spring 2006, attacks were killing more than 1,000 Iraqis a month.
AQI Tactics
AQI’s foothold in Iraq dated back to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein. After Hussein’s fall, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who ran a jihadist organization and training camp in Afghanistan, moved into Iraq and joined with dispossessed Sunnis to resist the new Iraqi government.
Zarqawi’s goal was to trigger a sectarian civil war that would destroy Iraq, paving the...
PDF Summary Chapter 2: Managing for Efficiency
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Taylor’s methods, while not popular with factory workers, resulted in enormous time and cost savings for factory owners (small savings at each step added up). Factories produced more faster with less waste and fewer people.
Taylor introduced his assembly-line metal production system at the 1900 Paris Exposition. His small line of a few lathes and workers could cut 50 feet of steel per minute compared to the normal nine feet. He had determined the optimal temperature for cutting steel, the best way for using water to cool the lathe, and the best speed for running the equipment. Taylor’s demonstration created quite a buzz, with one engineer even hailing it as a landmark in human history.
Far-Reaching Impacts
Taylor believed achieving optimum efficiency could be applied to anything—from cutting steel to cooking eggs for breakfast. It wasn’t long before this thinking affected nearly every corner of society, white-collar work included: There was a best way to sit at a desk, assemble papers, and put a sheet into a typewriter. Waste was decried and efficiency became the greatest good.
The new drive for efficiency had two profound effects on organizations:
1. **It...
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Learn more about our summaries →PDF Summary Chapter 3: Responding in a Complicated Versus Complex Environment
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- An AQI propaganda post could trigger riots over a wide area.
- A video posted online of a successful AQI attack could immediately boost recruitment.
How Complexity Works
Scientists have been studying complexity for years. In 1961, Edward Lorenz of MIT had a key insight into complexity that became known as the butterfly effect. While manipulating weather data with numerous variables, he realized that a tiny change he made in rounding the data the second time through had a huge cumulative effect on the results. This led him to two theories about interconnectedness:
1) Complex systems have countless parts that interact in countless ways. Therefore, a small event could trigger a chain of interactions that has a cumulative impact over time. Illustrating this, Lorenz theorized that the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil could start a chain of billions of interactions in air currents and weather systems leading to a tornado in Texas.
2) Predicting the future in a complex system is nearly impossible because any number of interlinked factors could come into play and affect the outcome. A small action could have no effect or a colossal one—but it’s...
PDF Summary Chapter 4: Restructuring for Resilience and Adaptability
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For example, in recent years, Dutch engineers have made resilience instead of flood-proofing their objective in handling water.
- After a massive 1953 storm and tide overwhelmed dikes, authorities at first tried to predict and control where water would go with a huge containment project completed in 1997. But the system’s channels actually caused water to flow higher and faster, making sea flooding worse. Also, the system couldn’t handle heavy rainfall and snowmelt in the Alps that created flooding from the opposite direction (rivers couldn’t absorb the extra water).
- So engineers shifted their goal from control and containment to resilience—withstanding flooding. They lowered dikes to allow rivers to spread out, and they used farmland as floodplains to handle extra water until the rivers could absorb it.
When it comes to environmental issues like flood control, resilience thinking is actually a reversion to the past when humans coexisted with nature more than they tried to control it. Since we instead became optimizers and created specialized systems to increase efficiency for the greatest return, we’ve undermined adaptability and thus resilience.
Resilient...
PDF Summary Part 2: Forging Effective Teams | Chapter 5: Building Trust and Purpose
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The crew had only moments to respond to the crisis, which occurred at only 2,000 feet (emergency training addresses engine failure at 20,000 feet but not below that). Every member of the crew sprang into action without being told what to do. In less than four minutes, they turned the plane around, prepared for a crash landing, and splashed down on the Hudson. Everyone on board survived as a result of the empowered teamwork—Sullenberger wouldn’t have had time to assign and supervise all the crew members and still land the plane safely.
United Flight 173
In contrast, United Flight 173, en route from New York to Portland in 1978, crashed, killing two crew members and seriously injuring 24 people.
The tragedy began when the aircraft developed a minor problem with landing gear while nearing Portland—the gear was down but the crew didn’t know it due to an indicator light not working. When they finally determined the gear was down, they weren’t sure the wheel suspension was working, in which case the wheels could collapse upon landing.
Rather than functioning as an adaptive team, the crew waited to act until they received instructions from the captain, who alone decided...
PDF Summary Chapter 6: Breaking Down Silos
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While this type of carefully planned, intricate operation worked for addressing a focused and predictably unfolding crisis, the situation in Iraq was different. Teams in Iraq needed to be able to communicate and work together in fluid, unpredictable operations against AQI.
2) An Intelligence Disconnect
The MECE structure also impeded operations at the headquarters level. On an inspection tour of the task force intelligence facility at the Baghdad airport, McChrystal found bags of unopened intelligence material (documents, computers, and cell phones) seized during commando raids, which had never been analyzed. By the time the backlog of intelligence was likely to be analyzed, it would be useless.
Because the teams collecting the material had no contact with the people analyzing it, the analysts didn’t know how to prioritize or organize it. While the teams could each come up with better individual procedures for handling the intelligence material, what they really needed was to communicate with each other so that the most important information could be quickly examined.
McChrystal found such chokepoints or disconnects between all teams. Instead of living and functioning...
PDF Summary Chapter 7: Introducing Systems Thinking
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A new associate administrator, George Mueller, realized that NASA’S silo-based structure wouldn’t get the job done. Lack of communication between independently functioning teams was partly to blame for past rocket failures. Meeting the extremely ambitious goal of a moon launch would require radical transparency and information sharing.
Mueller envisioned NASA as a single, unified mind working with shared information. He insisted that managers and engineers work together and communicate daily. Data was displayed in a central control room linked to field centers. He ordered the creation of a “teleservices network” that connected project control rooms to enable data sharing and teleconferences (this was pre-internet). He brought contractors in-house and shared information with them.
In two years, Mueller’s application of systems thinking, or connecting the parts to the whole through communication and shared information, transformed NASA from a collection of independent research teams to an effective development organization. Within six years, NASA put men on the moon.
In contrast, NASA’s European counterpart ELDO (European Launcher Development Organization) suffered numerous...
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PDF Summary Part 3: Reinventing the Task Force | Chapter 8: Changing Space and Culture
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Similarly, to facilitate information sharing at its new location, the task force in Iraq created a central open space referred to as the JOC or Joint Operations Center. A wall of screens displayed live video updates of ongoing operations. Key leaders worked at a U-shaped table, with other tables extending outward for different functions: air and artillery support, intelligence, medical evacuation, and so on. Off to one side was a Situational Awareness Room (SAR) where McChrystal and senior staff tracked global terrorism while the JOC focused on Iraq.
Along with facilitating a shared consciousness through transparency and information sharing, the open layout aimed to encourage emergent intelligence, in which ideas and solutions would bubble up organically. The task force further facilitated this by designating the entire facility as a “top secret” security space, so anyone could discuss anything openly.
Changing the Culture
The new headquarters environment by itself wasn’t enough to change how the task force functioned. **To change organizational culture, the task force adopted “extreme transparency,” or wide information sharing that provided every team with an...
PDF Summary Chapter 9: Scaling Up Trust
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The task force’s transparency policy, especially as practiced in the O&I, created an awareness of the need for and value of cooperating. But being the first to share or cooperate with another team was still a leap of faith. The key to encouraging cooperation was to build strong teamlike trust between teams so they started thinking of themselves as part of a network.
An Embedding Program Builds Trust
To scale up trust between teams accustomed to operating in silos, the task force established an embedding program, which assigned a team member to a different team for six months. The idea was to:
- Provide embedded team members with a view of the war from within a different team
- Build new personal relationships
- Consequently, create ties between teams
Special operations teams at first resisted the program—however, as a point of pride, each sent their best team member to represent them. The experience built understanding and trust as the embedded team members saw the other teams’ strengths and shared their new-found knowledge with their “home” team.
In a similar program to build ties with the external agencies (the CIA, NSA, and so on), the task force...
PDF Summary Part 4: Reconsidering Leadership | Chapter 10: Empowered Execution
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The military operated the same way, on land at least. During the Civil War in 1864, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant controlled where Major Gen. George Meade moved troops by communicating detailed instructions via letters and postal service.
However, naval operations were another matter—leaders lacked visibility and a communication line to naval commanders. So, a few years earlier, in 1852, President Millard Fillmore empowered Commodore Matthew Perry to do whatever was necessary to “open” feudal Japan as a trade gateway to Asia (foreigners couldn’t enter the country and the Japanese couldn’t leave).
Perry landed, then threatened Japanese officials with attack. He gave them a white flag with the explanation that if they fought, they’d lose, so they might as well keep the surrender option handy. They gave in and, after having threatened war, Perry took it upon himself to negotiate a trade agreement. However, since Perry’s time, communications advances have reduced the authority and autonomy of Navy commanders.
Task Force Empowerment
In 2004 Iraq, McChrystal set out to reverse the command-and-control model in military operations. He realized that running decisions up...
PDF Summary Chapter 11: A ‘Gardener’ Model of Leadership
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- Setting an example by practicing his policies, such as information sharing and frank conversation, particularly in the O&I videoconference. He also wore his combat uniform during the briefings to reinforce his commitment and focus to conference participants in Washington.
- At the O&I briefing, maintaining a balance among sharing, reporting, and Q&As. He also remembered and used the names of presenters to put them at ease, asked questions to show interest, and complimented them to build their confidence and investment in the work.
- Thinking out loud, summarizing what he heard, giving his analysis, and asking the presenter what action he planned to take to demonstrate empowerment.
- Avoiding anger and sarcasm, and saying “thank you” frequently to create an atmosphere that encouraged participation.
- Conveying the message that all problems could be understood and solved together.
The ongoing watering, raking, and fertilizing aspects of gardening are comparable to a commander’s visits (called battlefield circulation) to units. While typical visits are intimidating to the host unit, McChrystal tried to use them instead to nurture rather than control.
He viewed the...
PDF Summary Part 5: Putting the Pieces Together | Chapter 12: A New Organizational Model
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Finally, in mid-May, Allawi revealed the name of Zarqawi’s spiritual adviser, Sheikh Abd al-Rahman, with whom the terrorist leader had regular in-person contact. While this information was a critical breakthrough, finding Rahman wasn’t easy. He lived in chaotic Baghdad, where AQI-driven violence made surveillance difficult. Further, “black swans” (unexpected events) could arise at any time and derail task force monitoring.
When they located and identified Rahman, the task force faced another challenge that, in the past, would have hindered its efforts: Maintaining constant surveillance diverted resources from other task force operations, which could have prompted “tribal” competitiveness among units also operating against AQI targets. However, thanks to shared consciousness, trust, and transparency, everyone understood and united around the common purpose of taking down Zarqawi.
Patient Surveillance
After 17 days of 24/7 surveillance, the task force observed Rahman relocating his family to another residence, which (Allawi had told them) meant he was planning to leave the city to meet with Zarqawi.
With air surveillance, task force members in eight time zones watched...