PDF Summary:Surprise, Kill, Vanish, by Annie Jacobsen

Surprise, Kill, Vanish by Annie Jacobsen pulls back the curtain on the United States' use of covert operations as a tool of foreign policy. Beyond mere intelligence gathering, Jacobsen chronicles the CIA's evolution into conducting paramilitary strikes and targeted assassinations worldwide.

The book explores the origins of these clandestine capabilities tracing back to World War II, their expansion during the Cold War, and their transformation after the 9/11 attacks. Jacobsen examines critical events, both successes and unintended consequences, while addressing the murky moral and legal implications that persist around these secretive activities.

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The search for a partner in the Middle East epitomizes the shift in worldwide strategic initiatives orchestrated by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Jacobsen delves into the complex and at times contradictory measures the CIA employed to forge alliances in the Middle East, illustrating how their efforts to curb Soviet influence frequently involved collaboration with dubious regimes and terrorist organizations, leading to unpredictable consequences.

Collaboration with the Iranian ruler exemplifies how engagements with sovereign leaders can lead to enduring repercussions.

The CIA's support for Mohammad Reza Pahlavi is a prime example of how Cold War alliances, though beneficial at the time, can lead to lasting negative consequences long after they were established. Jacobsen elaborates on the unintended consequences of the CIA's participation in the 1953 coup d'état, which, while seemingly consolidating the Shah's grip on power, inadvertently fueled the rise of militant Islamic fundamentalism in the region. By undermining secular opposition and supporting the shah's tyrannical governance, the stage was inadvertently set for the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which resulted in the shah's ousting, the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini, and a profound shift in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

Working alongside organizations like Black September and the Palestine Liberation Organization can lead to unexpected and harmful consequences.

Collaborating with terrorists, such as the clandestine faction Black September which is affiliated with the PLO, underscores the perils of engaging with such groups to achieve short-term foreign policy goals. Jacobsen recounts how CIA case officer Robert Ames established a relationship with Ali Hassan Salameh, the head of Black September, aiming to safeguard American diplomats in Lebanon. The Israeli Mossad succeeded in eliminating Salameh, while Ames perished during the Hezbollah-led attack on the American embassy in Beirut in 1983.

Mullah Omar's rise to power and the Vietnam conflict exemplify how irregular warfare can transform into tyranny.

During the Vietnam War, the CIA seized the chance to execute clandestine activities, which were marked by efforts to quell insurrections and the tactical removal of Ngo Dinh Diem. Yet, Jacobsen contends that such endeavors frequently had the opposite effect, inadvertently fostering the growth of the very elements they sought to suppress, leading to increased instability in the area. Mullah Omar's metamorphosis from a self-proclaimed righteous warrior to a severe authoritarian ruler vividly demonstrates this quandary.

While achieving specific goals, the CIA's role in the removal of President Diem also triggered a series of unforeseen consequences.

The CIA's support for the 1963 coup that resulted in the ousting of South Vietnam's authoritarian leader, Ngo Dinh Diem, illustrates how covert operations can have unforeseen and harmful consequences. Jacobsen describes how the government's growing dissatisfaction with Diem's rule and their desire for a more pliable leader resulted in American authorities discreetly backing a coup. The killing of Diem not only signified the peak of his decline but also triggered a chain of occurrences that destabilized the South Vietnamese government, intensified internal disputes, and contributed to the intensification of the Vietnam War.

The evolution of Mullah Omar from a dedicated combatant to a despot underscores the paradox that secret missions aimed at resolving problems can occasionally intensify them, resulting in unforeseen outcomes.

Mullah Omar's ascent from a proclaimed moral combatant to a despotic leader sharply exemplifies how covert operations can inadvertently strengthen the very forces they were meant to debilitate. Jacobsen recounts how Omar, initially portrayed as a pious leader fighting against criminal warlords in Afghanistan, used CIA support during the Soviet-Afghan War to build up his Taliban organization. The assistance, initially intended to reduce Soviet influence, unintentionally empowered the Taliban, leading to their ascendancy and establishment of a regime characterized by severe religious persecution and human rights abuses in Afghanistan.

The pursuit of terrorists fundamentally transformed the operational tactics of the CIA.

Following the September 11th attacks, the CIA's operational strategies experienced a significant and enduring shift as they engaged in a global hunt for terrorists. Jacobsen explores the covert achievements of the CIA, detailing the prolonged surveillance and capture of Ilich Ramirez Sánchez, known infamously as "Carlos the Jackal." The book explores how the CIA's relentless tracking of Hezbollah operative Imad Mugniyah exemplifies the agency's evolving tactics and viewpoints in the shifting landscape of counterterrorism.

The capture of Carlos the Jackal illustrates the CIA's capacity to collect crucial strategic intelligence following the arrest of a terrorist.

The 1975 attack on the OPEC headquarters in Vienna, masterminded by the internationally notorious mercenary Carlos the Jackal, highlights the challenges of apprehending terrorists with a global presence. In her book, Jacobsen recounts how a clandestine CIA squad led by Billy Waugh in Khartoum managed to track down, keep under surveillance, and ultimately played a pivotal role in the apprehension of an elusive terrorist, which resulted in his transfer to the custody of French authorities. The capture of Carlos the Jackal was pivotal in unraveling the complex network of terrorist organizations, their operational tactics, and their connections to state sponsors, highlighting why it's crucial to capture terrorists for interrogation rather than solely focusing on their elimination.

The long hunt for Imad Mugniyah illustrating how covert operations can take years of reconnaissance, surveillance, and patience to achieve success

The relentless pursuit by the Central Intelligence Agency to locate and incapacitate key opponents is exemplified by Imad Mugniyah, the operations mastermind for Hezbollah who was notoriously difficult to capture. Jacobsen reveals that starting from the 1980s, the Agency compiled substantial information on Mugniyah, who had connections to the 1983 bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut along with a multitude of other attacks. For over two decades, the CIA and Mossad discreetly tracked Mugniyah's movements across various regions, culminating in his assassination via a car bomb in Damascus in 2008. Jacobsen argues that the operation exemplified advancements in both technological and strategic domains, and the persistent characteristic of modern selective assassinations, while simultaneously highlighting complex questions regarding the attribution of accountability for such acts.

Debate on the United States' worldwide strategy frequently revolves around the moral, ethical, and legal implications of engaging in clandestine activities and the deliberate elimination of specific individuals.

Jacobsen emphasizes the profound ethical and legal challenges that arise during the conduct of covert operations, particularly when they involve targeted killings to protect the security interests of the United States. The author examines how various governments have subtly circumvented the ban on targeted killings mandated by Executive Order 11905 by using euphemistic language, redefining terms, and exploiting the ability to deny involvement credibly.

The principle that forbids targeted killings has slowly been undermined through the employment of softening language and altered interpretations.

Jacobsen delves into how, despite Congress and executive orders consistently reaffirming the ban on assassination, this rule has been interpreted with significant flexibility, allowing for the elimination of specific targets under different pretenses.

An attempt embodied by Executive Order 11905 failed to restrict the actions of future presidents.

In 1975, President Ford's Executive Order 11905 explicitly prohibited any member of the U.S. Government from engaging in or conspiring to execute political assassinations. Jacobsen emphasizes that the directive was vague, failing to clearly delineate the boundaries between a legitimate act of self-defense and the permissible targeting of opponents during peacetime, as well as not specifying the exact nature of actions that would constitute an assassination. This uncertainty, according to Jacobsen, created an opportunity for future leaders to sanction targeted eliminations using different terms.

His advisers devised strategies to circumvent the ban on targeted killings.

The Reagan administration, in response to heightened concerns about international terrorism, set forth the doctrine that preemptive neutralization was a legitimate foundation for carrying out targeted assassinations, according to Jacobsen's account. The author highlights that this strategy is portrayed as a legitimate act of defense, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter's fifty-first article, with the intention of justifying the proactive disruption of terrorist activities. Jacobsen contends that the strategy of preemptive neutralization essentially eroded the foundational purpose of the ban on targeted killings, blurring the line between legitimate self-protective measures and the arbitrary termination of individuals deemed adversaries of the state.

Feigned ignorance is portrayed as a tactic employed to mask significant injustices while maintaining an appearance of ethical superiority.

Jacobsen explores the strategy of "targeted killing," praised for its precision in tackling terrorist threats, while also noting the intentional veil of secrecy that surrounds its more contentious elements. By focusing on technological capabilities and the minimization of collateral damage, public discourse, Jacobsen argues, masks the profound moral implications of state-sanctioned murder.

The CIA's manual on conducting precise eliminations transforms the act of taking lives into a set of procedural guidelines.

Jacobsen explores the disturbing outcomes stemming from the CIA's manual on deadly strategies, which, in her view, turns the act of killing into a systematic, dispassionate sequence of actions. The manual's detailed instructions on methods, readiness, and reasoning reflect how the CIA's approach to targeted killings has evolved from a last resort to a readily available alternative, reducing the once common moral and ethical qualms associated with using these methods.

The Phoenix program in Vietnam exemplifies the darker elements associated with the concept of maintaining a credible level of deniability.

Jacobsen delves into the concept of plausible deniability, which serves as a cover for contentious actions, and investigates the contentious CIA initiatives, including Operation AVIARY in Korea and the Phoenix program in Vietnam. While officially portrayed as attempts to suppress rebel activities, both operations relied heavily on unreliable intelligence and included the recruitment of local fighters with questionable loyalty, as well as the rapid execution of individuals suspected of aiding enemy forces. Jacobsen argues that the lack of supervision for covert activities has fostered a setting in which abuses of power and violations of human rights can occur with impunity.

The book explores a realm of ethical ambiguity, prompting questions that persistently defy straightforward answers.

Jacobsen delves into the moral quandaries that are intrinsic to combat, examining how the once straightforward concept of a morally defensible war often turns murky and contentious in the intricate realities of contemporary warfare, where distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants can be challenging, as can determining what actions are legal and what are not.

During his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize, President Obama expounded on how the principles of just war theory can justify ethically ambiguous actions.

In her analysis, Jacobsen proposes that the instance where President Obama delivered his Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech in 2009 exemplifies how the just war theory can be applied to justify actions that might be morally questionable. While acknowledging the adverse outcomes of warfare, Obama defended the escalation of the Afghanistan effort, characterizing it as a crucial step for self-defense, conducted with moral responsibility, limited in scope, and meticulously applying armed forces with the intention of protecting civilians. The author, however, questions whether the principles of "just war" are suitable when dealing with the unconventional warfare designed to prevent terrorist activities. The secretive aspect of covert operations, coupled with the difficulties in identifying foes and the ethical dilemmas encountered during combat, makes it extremely difficult to assess whether these missions adhere to the principles of a just war.

The stories from Ground Branch operatives in Afghanistan demonstrate how some combat situations can result in psychological strain.

Jacobsen sheds light on the intricate moral and societal challenges faced by CIA operatives engaged in covert military activities in Afghanistan, challenges that are in sharp contrast to the principles cherished by Americans. She emphasizes the intense internal conflict experienced by Ground Branch operatives as they carry out their duties in an environment devoid of rules.

The dynamic relationship between competition and collaboration within the secretive realms of the CIA and the U.S. military, especially during the Cold War era and following the events of September 11th.

This section of the text explores the evolving relationship between the CIA and the US military regarding their respective roles and authority in carrying out covert operations. Jacobsen explores how the tensions of the Cold War and the deficiencies observed in unconventional warfare methods throughout the Korean and Vietnam conflicts sparked competition among agencies for supremacy in controlling operations.

The framework was established during a time marked by the intense geopolitical competition between the Eastern and Western alliances.

During the Cold War, there was frequent competition between the CIA and the US military to take the lead in conducting covert activities. Each agency held the belief that it was the most adept at addressing the threat posed by the Soviets and executing the president's alternative strategy.

During the Korean War, there was a heated dispute over who would control secret operations, pitting the CIA's JACK against the Army's CCRAK.

Jacobsen argues that the fierce competition during the Korean War, involving the CIA's JACK and the Army's CCRAK, underscores the broader conflict for dominance in secret operations throughout the period of the Cold War. Although both agencies originated with a focus on irregular combat tactics and extensively utilized OSS veterans, their operational ideologies frequently conflicted. The Army's forte was its organized structure, logistical prowess, and a rigid hierarchy, whereas the Central Intelligence Agency concentrated on clandestine activities, ensuring plausible deniability, and employing unconventional tactics.

Post-9/11 Collaboration showcasing how the dynamic shifted

The collaboration between the CIA and the military experienced a significant but short-lived transformation following the September 11 attacks and the ensuing worldwide battle against terrorism. In response to the pervasive threat posed by terrorist groups, the United States adopted a covert strategy that included proactive measures, leading to the development of more cohesive strategies.

The issuance of the Memorandum of Notification on September 17, 2001, underscored the CIA's revitalized ability to conduct covert operations and signaled a wider effort to tackle terrorism.

Following the September 11 incidents, Jacobsen explains that President Bush swiftly sanctioned an escalation in covert CIA activities targeting Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. On September 17, John Rizzo composed the directive that sanctioned the use of paramilitary forces to carry out lethal missions in Afghanistan and additional sites. The Department of Defense would ultimately become a significant player in the fight against terrorism, but Jacobsen argues that this early boost to the clandestine abilities of the Agency marked a transition to prioritizing covert actions, underscoring its expertise in unconventional combat techniques.