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Every day, you make predictions, like when traffic will be heaviest on your route to work or whether the value of a company’s stock will increase or decrease. We use the information from these predictions to guide our decisions. But how can we ensure that we’re making the best predictions possible?

In Superforecasting, authors Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner explore that question by analyzing the strategies of 'superforecasters,' volunteer analysts who predict the likelihood of global events with impressive accuracy. In this guide, we’ll explore the traits and tactics that make superforecasters so “super” and how you can use them to improve your own predictions. We’ll also compare the authors’ approach to predicting the future to those of other influential thinkers like Nassim Nicholas Taleb.

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Trait 2: They Generate Multiple Perspectives

Superforecasters also rely on aggregated judgment (aggregation is the process of combining data from multiple sources). Tetlock and Gardner argue that aggregation is a powerful tool for forecasters because the aggregated judgment of a group of people is usually more accurate than the judgment of an average member of the group.

Superforecasters use aggregation by pulling from many sources and using many tools to produce an answer, despite being just one person. This skill doesn’t come naturally to most people—we struggle to even recognize that there are other perspectives beyond our own “tip-of-the-nose” view, let alone fully consider those ideas. This is part of what sets superforecasters apart.

How to Generate New Perspectives Like a Superforecaster

To think like a superforecaster, you need to look beyond the tip-of-your-nose view and find new ways of viewing a problem. Here are some tips to get you in the right mindset:

  • Reverse-engineer the problem. For example, if you’re asked to predict the likelihood of the U.S. raising the federal minimum wage to $15 per hour, pretend it’s already happened and work backwards from there. What would have had to change to lead to a change in the minimum wage?

  • Broaden your horizons. Commit to reading books and following news sources outside of your comfort zone. The more diverse perspectives you expose yourself to, the easier it will be to approach a particular problem from a different vantage point.

  • Try attacking your own conclusions. This is similar to the technique of “negative empiricism” that Nassim Nicholas Taleb describes in The Black Swan, which involves deliberately searching for evidence that will disprove your argument. For example, for the minimum wage question, if you ultimately conclude that the U.S. federal government will raise the minimum wage, go back and look for evidence that they won’t.

Trait 3: They Think in Probabilities

According to the authors, superforecasters are probabilistic thinkers. This goes beyond just phrasing their forecasts in terms of probability percentages. In situations where most of us think in terms of black and white, superforecasters think in shades of grey.

Most people’s mental “probability dial” has three distinct settings: yes, no, and maybe. By contrast, probabilistic thinkers have an unlimited number of settings. They’re more likely to answer questions in terms of percentages rather than “yes” or “no.” And this is not just in the realm of forecasting—this is how superforecasters normally think and speak in their everyday lives.

(Shortform note: Superforecasters’ emphasis on probabilistic thinking may help to explain the gender gap among superforecasters, who tend to be male. Young children perform about the same on tests of probabilistic thinking regardless of gender—however, by age 10, boys tend to outperform girls, a pattern that holds true for many other math skills. This could be because, as Sheryl Sandberg argues in Lean In, social norms discourage girls from pursuing math and science.)

Trait 4: They Think From the Outside In

Tetlock and Gardner argue that when superforecasters first encounter a question, they begin by looking at the wide perspective of that question before accounting for the specifics (in Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman calls that wider perspective the “outside view”). Compare this to the “inside view,” which describes the particular details of a situation.

For example, imagine someone tells you about their physician friend, Dr. Jones, and asks you to estimate the likelihood that Dr. Jones is a pediatrician. If you start with the inside view, you’ll analyze the specifics of Dr. Jones’s life and personality and make predictions based on what you find. The trouble is, specifics can often lead us to make random and extreme guesses. If we’re told that Dr. Jones loves children and worked at a summer camp for sick children during college, we might say it’s 80% likely that Dr. Jones is a pediatrician. On the other hand, if we’re told that Dr. Jones is a very serious, reserved person and has no plans to become a parent, we might swing to the other extreme and guess 2%.

In contrast, if you start with the outside view, you’ll ignore any details about the specific person. Instead, you’d try to answer the question “What percentage of doctors specialize in pediatrics overall?” This gives you a base rate from which to calibrate your prediction, which is more likely to lead to an accurate forecast than if you begin with a random “inside view”-inspired guess.

Master the Outside View With a Premortem

In Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman advises using a “premortem” analysis to avoid the dangers of inside-out thinking. A premortem analysis is a mental exercise in which you imagine that whatever you’re working on (be it a project or a forecast) has already come to fruition—and was a complete disaster. Your goal is to come up with as many reasons as possible to explain this hypothetical “failure.”

This approach is helpful because, by nature, the inside view makes a situation feel “special” because it predisposes you to focus on what makes the situation unique. That feeling can make it more difficult to notice biases in your answer because you might assume the current situation won’t abide by the usual “rules.” For example, most newlyweds probably don’t expect to ever get divorced, despite the 40-50% divorce rate. That’s because, from the inside, the relationship feels “special” or distinct from the relationships that ended in divorce.

The premortem technique can help you reorient to the outside view because assuming your answer is incorrect will likely force you to recognize that the specifics of this situation aren’t as important as the base rate. For example, if you’re predicting whether a startup will succeed, it’s tempting to take the inside view and make your forecast based on the business model or the founder’s previous business experience. However, if you try a premortem analysis, it will be easy to come up with reasons the company failed given that the failure rate for startups is roughly 90%. That sobering statistic can help remind you that even if the inside view looks like a recipe for success, the odds are stacked so strongly against new businesses that failure is much more likely.

Trait 5: They Have a Growth Mindset

Forecasting involves quite a bit of failure because forecasters are asked to predict the unpredictable. While no one enjoys being wrong, the authors argue that superforecasters are more likely than regular forecasters to see their failures as an opportunity to learn and improve. Educational psychologists call this a “growth mindset.” People with a growth mindset believe that talent and intelligence can be developed through learning and practice.

The idea behind the growth mindset seems intuitive, but in practice, the authors report that most of us gravitate towards a “fixed mindset” instead. The fixed mindset tells us that talent and intelligence are traits we’re born with, so practice can only strengthen the natural abilities that are already there.

Grow Your Own Growth Mindset

Like many other superforecaster skills, a growth mindset isn’t an inborn trait—it can be grown and developed with practice. In Mindset, psychologist Carol Dweck lays out a few concrete tips to help you transition from a fixed mindset to a growth mindset.

  • First, acknowledge and accept your fixed mindset. Most people call on both mindsets in different scenarios, so having a predominantly fixed mindset doesn’t make you a bad or inferior person. It’s just another way of thinking, and if you want to develop a growth mindset, you absolutely can.

  • Next, take note of the situations that trigger your fixed mindset. For example, you might notice yourself slipping into a fixed mindset when you’re overwhelmed by a demanding task or when a colleague gets promoted over you.

  • Think of your fixed mindset as a separate persona and give it a name. That way, when you catch yourself thinking, “I should give up; I’m just not talented at this,” you can say, “Oh, that’s just Rigid Rita acting up.” Assigning those thoughts to a separate persona will help you remember that you don’t have to believe those fixed-mindset thoughts; you can choose to respond with a growth mindset instead.

  • Finally, when you notice your fixed mindset persona taking over, remind that persona that you are capable of growth and that risk and effort are necessary parts of that.

Trait 6: They’re Intellectually Humble

According to the authors, superforecasting requires the humility to admit when you don’t know the answer and to acknowledge that bias might cloud your judgment. This is called intellectual humility, which is an acknowledgment of the power of randomness. It involves admitting that some things are impossible to predict or control, regardless of your skill.

Professional poker player Annie Duke describes this as the difference between “humility in the face of the game” and “humility in the face of your opponents.” In other words, Duke’s long record of success indicates that she is an exceptionally talented poker player and is probably more skilled than most of her opponents. But all of Duke’s skill and experience doesn’t mean she will automatically win every game or that she is even capable of fully understanding every possible intricacy. Like superforecasters, her skills allow her to beat her opponents but not the game itself.

To Foster Humility, Understand the Role of Luck in Success

Annie Duke’s distinction between “humility in the face of the game” and “humility in the face of your opponents” reflects author Nassim Taleb’s views on luck and success. In Fooled by Randomness, Taleb argues that, while skill is a good predictor of moderate success, luck is a better predictor of wild success.

Similarly, Duke understands that winning at poker requires a certain degree of luck; if she were extremely skilled but terribly unlucky, she’d be able to carve out a decent record, but she certainly wouldn’t be the champion player she is now. Therefore, Duke is able to remain humble because she understands that no matter how well she plays, she’s always one streak of bad luck away from a loss.

Trait 7: They’re Team Players

In forecasting tournaments, superforecasters work in teams to create forecasts. According to the authors, one feature of successful teams is the way they freely share resources with each other. Psychologist Adam Grant calls people who give more than they receive “givers.” He compares them to “matchers” (who give and take in equal measure) and “takers” (who take more than they give). Grant found that givers tend to be more successful than matchers or takers. Tetlock and Gardner argue that successful superforecasting teams tend to be stacked with givers.

Superforecasting Teams Are Optimally Distinct

In his book Give and Take, Adam Grant offers another clue as to what makes superforecasting teams so prone to generosity. Grant argues that we’re more motivated to help people who are part of our own social and identity groups (which can be anything from immediate family to school classmates to fellow football fans). Additionally, the more unique the group is compared to the dominant culture, the more inclined members are to help one another (this is called “optimal distinctiveness”). Participating in forecasting tournaments is a rare hobby, and superforecasters are a unique subgroup of forecasters; that uniqueness might strengthen their group identity and make them even more likely to share resources with one another.

Part 3: Can Forecasting Solve the Most Important Questions?

According to the authors, the field of forecasting is facing an important challenge: Namely, the idea that the questions people really care about and need to answer are typically too big for a forecaster to even attempt. For example, a solid superforecaster can predict the likelihood that China will begin closing any of its hundreds of coal plants (which experts say could help the country meet its environmental goals), but they can’t answer the real question people are asking: “Will we be able to prevent the most devastating effects of climate change?”

This is a valid criticism—luckily, Tetlock and Gardner argue that we can get around it by breaking big questions like “Will things turn out okay?” into a host of smaller questions that superforecasters can answer. This is called Bayesian question clustering. The answers to these questions contribute a small piece of the overall answer. Cumulatively, the answers to those small questions can approximate an answer to the bigger question.

For example, if we ask enough questions about factors that could contribute to worsening climate change, we know that the more “yes” answers we get to the small questions (for example, whether sea levels will rise by more than one millimeter in the next year, or whether the United States government will invest more money in solar energy), the more likely the answer to the big question is also a “yes.”

(Shortform note: This technique may help to answer a common critique of forecasting: that it is an example of the “streetlight effect,” or the equivalent of looking for your lost keys under the streetlight—even if that’s not where you lost them—because that’s where the light is best. This is related to black swan thinking—whatever future events you can predict (metaphorically shine a light on) won’t matter because the only truly important events are, by definition, unpredictable. To see the utility of Bayesian question clustering, we can change the metaphor a bit: If a forecaster searches for multiple puzzle pieces under the streetlight as opposed to a single set of keys, they may find enough pieces to at least see the gist of the whole puzzle—even if half the pieces are still lost in the dark.)

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PDF Summary Shortform Introduction

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Connect with Dan Gardner:

The Book’s Publication

Publisher: Crown Publishing Group, a subsidiary of Penguin Random House

Superforecasting was published in 2015. It is Tetlock’s fourth book (Gardner’s third) and is the most well-known book in both authors’ respective bibliographies.

Superforecasting builds on Tetlock’s previous book, Expert Political Judgment, in which he first described the results of the Good Judgment Project and...

PDF Summary Part 1: Forecasting Basics | Chapters 1-2: Can You Predict the Future?

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The Philosophy of Forecasting

To appreciate the value of forecasting, we have to frame it the right way. Tetlock learned this the hard way when the data from his pioneering research found that the majority of expert forecasts were no more accurate than chance (which the popular press misinterpreted to mean “forecasting is pointless”). Additionally, the predictions these experts made within their fields of expertise were less accurate than predictions they made outside their fields. In other words, intelligent analysts who invested time and effort into researching the issues were no more able to predict future events than if they’d guessed randomly.

(Shortform note: Why are experts so inaccurate, even within their own fields? Economics researcher Bryan Caplan points out one possible explanation of this core finding: Tetlock purposefully asked the experts challenging questions about their fields. Caplan surmises that when faced with these questions, experts become overconfident in their predictions, hence why they’re incorrect more often. He argues that if Tetlock had asked questions to which there...

PDF Summary Chapter 3: Measuring Forecasts

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Judging the “Worst Tech Predictions” of All Time

Hero Labs, a technology company, compiled a list of 22 of the “worst tech predictions of all time,” including Ballmer’s infamous quip. However, unlike Ballmer’s forecast, most of the other predictions on the list are specific enough to judge. Here’s why:

  • They use unequivocal language. For example: In 1946, Darryl Zanuck of 20th Century Fox said, “Television will never hold onto an audience.” His use of the word “never” makes it easy to judge this forecast as completely false—in 2019, the television industry was worth $243 billion (and that’s only traditional network television, not including television streaming services like Netflix or Hulu).

  • They provide a time frame. For example: In 1998, economist Paul Krugman said, “By 2005, it will be clear that the internet’s impact on the global...

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PDF Summary Chapter 4: The History of Superforecasting

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Foxes

Foxes, on the other hand, are “eclectic experts” who have a wide range of analytical tools at their disposal rather than a single Big Idea. The authors argue that this allows foxes to be more flexible, changing their approach based on the particular problem.

Foxes approach new information with a blank slate, allowing the data to shape their interpretation rather than the other way around. Because they are less clouded by bias, foxes tend to seek out information about a situation from all possible sources, including those they don’t personally agree with. This allows them to consider the problem from all angles, creating a more holistic picture of the situation and reducing the likelihood that they’ll fall back on reflexive biases to inform their predictions.

Foxes Make Better Forecasters, Hedgehogs Make Better CEOs

A fox mentality is not always preferable to a hedgehog mentality. In fact, in some fields, hedgehogs have a distinctive advantage. For example, while researching for the book Good to Great, author Jim Collins and his research team interviewed leaders of companies that vastly outperform other...

PDF Summary Part 2: Superforecaster Traits | Chapter 5: Superforecasters Think Like Foxes

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In the context of formal forecasting, the availability heuristic might come into play if a typical forecaster is asked to predict an event they have some previous mental association with. For example, if a forecaster who lived in New York City during the 9/11 terrorist attacks was asked to predict the likelihood of a terrorist hijacking an airplane, they may unknowingly predict a much higher likelihood because the question calls up visceral memories of 9/11.

(Shortform note: This is similar to the concept of frugality that author Malcolm Gladwell describes in Blink. Gladwell argues that the unconscious mind is “frugal”—that is, it automatically lasers in on the most significant details of a situation and ignores everything else. In the lion example, the unconscious mind automatically connects the dots between the sound of a twig snapping and the most significant possible meaning (a lion approaching). It temporarily ignores all other possible explanations that wouldn’t have life-or-death consequences.)

Confirmation Bias

Before making predictions, we often search for...

PDF Summary Chapter 6: Superforecasters Think in Probabilities

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The Two- (or Three-) Setting Dial

According to Tetlock and Gardner, there is a good reason that most of us are not natural probabilistic thinkers. For most of human history, the three-setting dial was reduced even further to two settings (“yes” or “no”). For our ancestors, this was an advantage. Early humans lived in a world where predators were a constant threat—but our brains and bodies aren’t designed for perpetual vigilance, and stress wears us down over time. Snap judgments became an evolutionary life hack: While the probabilistic thinkers were fretting over the likelihood that a strange noise came from a predator, the concrete thinkers had already landed on an answer and responded accordingly.

(Shortform note: As Daniel Kahneman describes in Thinking, Fast and Slow, this evolutionary mechanism also partly explains why we have such trouble understanding randomness. Our ancestors saved time and mental energy by making snap judgments about whether two things are related—like whether a sound is related to a predator’s presence, or whether seeing predators out hunting is related to the fact that it just...

PDF Summary Chapter 7: Superforecasters Start With a Base Rate, Then Update

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  • By contrast, if you take the inside view, you’ll focus on the unique details you learn about Dr. Jones—their personality, whether they have children of their own, and so on. You’ll really be answering the question, “Is this the sort of person who is likely to be a pediatrician?”

By nature, our storytelling minds gravitate toward the inside view. Statistics are dry and abstract—digging into the nitty-gritty details of someone’s personality is much more exciting. But that natural tendency can quickly lead us astray. If we’re told that Dr. Jones loves children and worked at a summer camp for sick children during college, we might say it’s 80% likely that Dr. Jones is a pediatrician. On the other hand, if we’re told that Dr. Jones is a very serious, reserved person and has no plans to become a parent, we might swing to the other extreme and guess 2%.

According to the authors, the problem with this practice is that we have no way of knowing how extreme those answers are. For that, we need a base rate to give us an idea of how common it is to specialize in pediatrics in general. In reality, [only about 6.5% of doctors specialize in...

PDF Summary Chapter 8: The Power of a Growth Mindset

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Superforecasters embrace the growth mindset and aren’t discouraged by failure. Tetlock’s research found that this commitment to constant personal growth was three times more important than any other factor in superforecasters’ success.

Grow Your Own Growth Mindset

Like many other superforecaster skills, a growth mindset isn’t an inborn trait—it can be grown and developed with practice. In Mindset, psychologist Carol Dweck lays out a few concrete tips to help you transition from a fixed mindset to a growth mindset.

  • First, acknowledge and accept your fixed mindset. Most people call on both mindsets in different scenarios, so having a predominantly fixed mindset doesn’t make you a bad or inferior person. It’s just another way of thinking, and if you want to develop a growth mindset, you absolutely can. In other words, avoid having a fixed mindset about having a fixed mindset.

  • Next, take note of the situations that trigger your fixed mindset. For example, you might notice yourself slipping into a fixed mindset when you’re overwhelmed by a demanding...

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PDF Summary Chapters 9-10: Forecasting Teams and Forecaster Leaders

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What Makes a Good Team?

Avoiding groupthink is an important part of building a successful team. According to the authors, this sets the group up for success by ensuring that each member of the group forms their own judgments independently and has an opportunity to present their thoughts to the team. This culture of openly sharing ideas is crucial for a successful superforecasting team.

To promote the free exchange of ideas, the authors believe that groups need to foster an environment that is “psychologically safe,” where all team members feel comfortable voicing opinions, challenging each other respectfully, and admitting when they don’t know the answer. For teams with leadership hierarchies, a psychologically safe environment is one in which everyone, regardless of status, feels comfortable offering constructive criticism to higher-ups without fear of repercussions. For example, in a psychologically safe business environment, a rookie employee could comfortably challenge the boss’s idea without worrying about being fired, and a boss can comfortably say “I was wrong” without worrying about losing the respect of her employees.

(Shortform note: Most of the research...

PDF Summary Chapter 11: Does Superforecasting Really Matter?

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Are “Black Swans” Totally Unpredictable?

If the term “black swan” only describes truly unpredictable events, then the authors believe there have been very few actual black swans in history. The most commonly cited black swan example is the 9/11 terrorist attacks. But even 9/11 was not completely impossible to predict—similar attacks had been thwarted in the past, and the intelligence community was actively examining the threat.

In practice, that evidence means that while it would have been extremely difficult to predict the exact date and time of the 9/11 attacks, it was entirely possible to predict a terrorist attack in which a plane was turned into a flying bomb, and several people actually did make this prediction before the event.

(Shortform note: Taleb would disagree that 9/11 was at all predictable. In fact, in The Black Swan, he argues that the 9/11 attacks weren’t just unpredictable—they happened because they were unpredictable (because if we’d been able to predict the attacks, we’d have prevented them happening in the first place). His concept of “successfully predicting” black swans seems to rely on...

PDF Summary Chapter 12: The Future of Forecasting

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For example, if we ask enough questions about factors that could contribute to worsening climate change, we know that the more “yes” answers we get to the small questions (for example, whether sea levels will rise by more than one millimeter in the next year, or whether the United States government will invest more money in solar energy), the more likely the big question is also a “yes.”

(Shortform note: This technique may help to answer a common critique of forecasting: that it is an example of the “streetlight effect,” or the equivalent of looking for your lost keys under the streetlight—even if that’s not where you lost them—because that’s where the light is best. This is related to black swan thinking—whatever future events you can predict (metaphorically shine a light on) won’t matter because the only truly important events are, by definition, unpredictable. To see the utility of Bayesian question clustering, we can change the metaphor a bit: If a forecaster searches for multiple puzzle pieces under the streetlight as...