PDF Summary:Shattered Sword, by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully

In the aftermath of World War II's decisive Battle of Midway, historians Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully uncover the deep-rooted traditions, internal frictions, strategic planning processes, and pivotal decisions that shaped Japan's wartime strategy. Their historical examination reveals how aspects like Japan's historical militarism, interservice rivalries, and rigid pre-battle planning ultimately undermined the nation's forces.

Shattered Sword dissects Japan's flawed oversight during the battle's formative stages—from overlooked logistical needs like submarine reconnaissance, to disagreements between Admiral Yamamoto and Naval General Headquarters, to missteps by Commander Nagumo amid the unfolding combat. Parshall and Tully recount how these factors, compounded by American resistance, methodically steered Japan toward its calamitous defeat.

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Other Perspectives

• While Japan's military strategy was indeed influenced by historical and cultural factors, it could also be argued that practical considerations, such as economic constraints and international politics, played equally significant roles.
• Japan's industrialization was not solely a defensive measure against Western imperialism; it was also driven by internal ambitions for economic growth and societal transformation.
• The Washington Naval Treaty's limitations may have spurred innovation, but it's also possible that Japan's technological advancements were part of a broader trend of military modernization that would have occurred independently.
• The emphasis on offensive strategies in Japanese militarism could be seen as a strategic choice rather than a purely defensive response, reflecting Japan's regional ambitions and the military doctrines of the time.
• The belief in victory through technological dominance may have been influenced by historical battles like Tsushima, but it could also be critiqued as an over-simplification that ignores other crucial factors such as intelligence, logistics, and human elements.
• The rivalry between the Imperial Army and Navy might have been detrimental, but some could argue that inter-service competition can also drive innovation and excellence.
• The limited allocation of naval resources due to obligations in China and Manchuria might be seen not just as a hindrance but also as a reflection of the complex balancing act required in multi-front warfare.
• The Navy's focus on pivotal engagements could be defended as a rational strategy given the historical context and Japan's resource limitations, even if it had its flaws.
• Yamamoto's significant role and the resulting strategic planning could be viewed as a consequence of strong leadership attempting to navigate through a highly complex and dynamic geopolitical situation.

The formulation and execution of Japan's Midway strategy, including its inherent flaws, intelligence-gathering techniques, decision-making processes, and the coordination of actions under pressure.

Yamamoto's strategy for the assaults on Midway and the Aleutian Islands was inherently unsound, primarily because of early errors in strategic judgment. The complex plan necessitated exact synchronization among widely dispersed forces, leading to the wasteful use of Japan's superior naval strengths. The strategy was undermined by the mistaken assumption that it was crucial to employ subterfuge to draw the U.S. Navy into battle. Nagumo's ability to respond to unforeseen occurrences was limited due to the potential of facing an opponent in the northern direction while he was deeply engaged in the Midway battle.

The strategy employed by Yamamoto in the Battle of Midway failed due to an overreliance on surprise, the dispersion of forces, and the creation of impractical timetables, leading to the squandering of the Japanese numerical superiority.

Admiral Yamamoto's strategic plan, according to Parshall and Tully, was overly intricate for its intended purpose. Under the guidance of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, the already intricate strategic landscape of prewar Japanese naval strategy became even more complex and multifaceted. His overall plan envisioned attacks on objectives in two theaters, which were to involve the services of nearly 200 warships, including 11 battleships, 8 carriers, and 21 cruisers. The surveillance duties of over a dozen task forces spanned an immense operational area, stretching from the Aleutians to Midway, encompassing an expanse greater than three million square miles, which is akin to the landmass of the continental United States. The Japanese sought to execute these maneuvers with remarkable precision, in part by adhering closely to the timetable prescribed by their commander, Yamamoto. His overarching strategy required meticulous synchronization, which in turn became a significant weakness. Should the initial operations at Tulagi and Guadalcanal not succeed, or if the maneuvers intended to divert attention in the Aleutians were unsuccessful, the entire timetable would be thrown off course. The quick opponent engaged with the extensively dispersed naval forces of Japan.

Yamamoto's mistaken assumption that the American forces were disheartened and already beaten resulted in an excessive focus on deception, which compromised the robust backing needed for a more audacious approach.

Yamamoto's plan was greatly undermined by his excessive focus on achieving surprise. The plan was based on the assumption that drawing the U.S. Navy out of Pearl Harbor was essential for a confrontation, and that a swift counteraction would be improbable even if they decided to respond. Believing that initial defeats had sapped the Americans' will to confront a powerful adversary such as the naval might of Japan was a grave miscalculation. Later developments made it clear that the evaluation of American determination was completely mistaken. Despite suffering losses that included both ships and aircraft, the resolve of the Americans remained steadfast. In the prior clash at the Coral Sea, aviators from the United States' carriers inflicted considerable harm on Japanese units. The American naval force was resolute in its pursuit to locate and engage the Japanese carrier group in combat. The initial error made by Yamamoto was his excessive confidence in the psychological effect on the adversary, a mistake that would have severe repercussions for Japan.

Yamamoto considered it essential to conceal the fleet's movements to lure the Americans away from Pearl Harbor. Consequently, he adopted a naval strategy that echoed the methods employed in the earlier global conflict. He spread out the Combined Fleet into various formations across a wide expanse, with the intention of luring the enemy into the range where the main battleship force could engage them. While Kido Butai progressed towards Midway from the northwest, Yamamoto's units were positioned to maintain their location roughly 300 miles westward. The Aleutian Islands were safeguarded by the strategic deployment of four battleships in the northern waters of the Pacific to thwart any potential enemy progression. A contingent of battleships and cruisers located south of Midway served as the forefront of the invasion force, their role being to divert the enemy's attention and conceal the full extent of the surrounding troops. The prevailing belief was that the U.S. Navy would regard their battleships as highly impactful in modern naval conflicts, reflecting the stance held by the Japanese.

Yamamoto's choice to scatter his troops in the face of a swiftly advancing enemy essentially nullified Japan's inherent advantages in naval and aerial warfare. The separation between the forces was so great that it precluded any possibility of mutual assistance, which left them vulnerable to unforeseen circumstances. The operations conducted in the Aleutian Islands serve as a clear example of this principle. The feint failed to achieve its goal, leading to the unwarranted engagement of key battleships in an area that did not correspond to Yamamoto's primary aim of destroying the American carrier forces. If the Japanese had been more perceptive in understanding that the key to victory lay in having a greater number of fleet carriers in the central battle zone, they could have reinforced their air defenses, enhanced their offensive air power, and expanded the reconnaissance capabilities for Kido Butai's main carrier group by reassigning the two carriers and their escorting cruisers that were originally deployed to the Aleutians.

The allocation of assets to the Aleutians, an area devoid of strategic importance, weakened the focus required for a decisive engagement with the formidable American carrier-based aircraft.

The authors highlight that the Japanese strategy was undermined by their efforts to also seize the Aleutian Islands, leading to a dilution of their resources and focus from the leadership. The Aleutians were never intended as a feint, although their capture was seen as preventing the use of islands like Kiska and Attu by American air and naval forces striking against northern Japan. The danger was, for all intents and purposes, essentially negligible. The island was characterized by its harsh landscape and had a limited supply of natural resources. The region's marine environment was notorious for its danger, as the climate remained extremely severe for the majority of the year. The considerable hazard posed by the American forces in the Aleutians stemmed from the possibility that submarines might depart from Dutch Harbor aiming to engage Japanese naval ships. The assessment of the threat was overstated, given that American submarines had not demonstrated a level of efficacy akin to that of their German equivalents in the Atlantic.

The strategy dubbed Operation AL, which at times contemplated the deployment of more than twelve cruisers in addition to a substantial portion of Japan's battleships and two of its fleet carriers, placed considerable pressure on Japan's naval logistics and support capabilities. Yamamoto and his team were compelled to allocate a significant portion of their strategic attention and planning efforts elsewhere, despite Midway being the central aim of their operational goals. The strategic equation was significantly impacted by the Aleutians, which, although not intended as a distraction, greatly affected the timetable that Nagumo and Kido Butai had to adhere to. It was imperative for the invasion forces to arrive at the islands prior to the onset of summer, owing to the harsh meteorological conditions prevalent in the northern regions. The incidental goal concerning the Aleutians unintentionally determined the timetable for the primary operation across the entire Pacific theater. The personnel of the Kido Butai might have logically considered that focusing their efforts and resources on maneuvers in the southern regions could have yielded better results.

Nagumo's capacity for responding to unforeseen occurrences was constrained by a rigid timetable that additionally impeded essential training.

The plan devised by Yamamoto was significantly compromised due to its reliance on a sequence of events that lacked flexibility and necessitated exact timing. In early June, Yamamoto firmly decided to launch attacks on Midway and the Aleutian Islands, aiming to expand the offensive into the South Pacific by no later than mid-July. Nagumo's forces had to execute strategic movements, engage the enemy, provide assistance, and reassemble with unwavering precision to guarantee that the battle unfolded exactly as the predetermined strategy dictated.

His chances of effectively dealing with unforeseen obstacles while maintaining a strict schedule of operations were significantly slim. The decision made by Yamamoto, influenced by his understanding of the opponent's schedule, unfortunately proved to be erroneous following the American air and submarine assaults on June 3rd and 4th. The Americans' earlier than anticipated maneuvers disrupted the Japanese naval forces' schedule, providing Spruance and Fletcher with a degree of tactical adaptability and the upper hand that Nagumo's forces could not equal. Kido Butai's capacity for movement was greatly diminished, hindering their ability to avoid being surrounded by forces from Midway and the United States. It would have also aided in preserving their limited air power and reduced the risks to their vessels by enabling Nagumo to empty the spaces where aircraft were stored.

The rigid timetable further exacerbated the constraints encountered by junior officers, such as Admiral Tanaka, responsible for the troops assaulting Midway, and Kurita, who led the Close Support Group. Yamamoto's strategy relied on the utilization of Tanaka's squadron, which included nearly twelve transport ships, to lure the Americans, while Kurita's heavy cruisers were ready to offer firepower support for the anticipated assault on Midway scheduled for the sixth of June. Yamamoto's strategy was to conceal his battleship force until the American fleet had embarked from Pearl Harbor. As a result, the forces under Tanaka and Kurita's command were left highly susceptible to the initial attack.

The writers emphasized that Yamamoto's rigid adherence to his prearranged timetable negatively influenced the events preceding the conflict. Nagumo informed his superior of a one-day delay in departure due to preparation setbacks on May 25. Strictly following the initial strategy, despite setbacks, led to Tanaka and Kurita arriving a day ahead of schedule, thereby increasing their susceptibility to attacks from adversaries.

Yamamoto's strict schedule imposed additional challenges for the readiness of the aviation units as they faced the upcoming conflict. Since the beginning of the conflict, Kido Butai's carriers had been relentlessly engaged, requiring a time set aside for retraining before undertaking a venture as hazardous as the upcoming battle in the Midway vicinity. The Japanese, confident in the proficiency of their air groups, faced a stark reality where their reduced number of aircraft necessitated the integration of novice aviators into their veteran squadrons. The effectiveness of the fleet's use of torpedoes differed widely. Yamamoto, steadfast in his opposition to any delays in carrying out the operation, had staked the Navy's future on his strategic vision, which had proven effective during the early planning phases. The consequences of these miscalculations were profoundly felt on the fourth of June.

The Japanese reconnaissance protocols' shortcomings resulted in incomplete intelligence about the adversary, which significantly delayed crucial decision-making.

The intelligence network that was pivotal to Yamamoto's plans for Operations MI and AL had been undermined by the dawn of June 4, 1942. The critical error was in the configuration and timing of the submarine defenses, which were mistakenly set up due to false assumptions about the route the American fleet would navigate from Pearl Harbor. The Japanese incorrectly estimated that it would take the American forces three to four days to arrive at Midway. The pivotal error affecting their strategic effectiveness necessitated having Japanese submarines in position by the beginning of June. The circumstances worsened due to inadequate leadership and a lack of proper direction from their commander, Vice Admiral Marquis Komatsu Teruhisa. Komatsu, who had strong ties to the Emperor and seemed to place Japan's aspirations to dominate the crucial maritime passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans ahead of properly allocating submarines for the Midway operation, was not present at the strategic discussions held on the Yamato in May and also neglected to communicate to the Combined Fleet staff the postponements affecting the preparedness of his submarine units. Before the conflict even began, Yamamoto's reconnaissance abilities had been significantly diminished.

The effectiveness of Japan's submarine defenses was undermined by flawed strategies in submarine warfare and subpar operational management.

Japanese submarines, carrying the formidable Type 93 torpedoes, adopted a rudimentary and predominantly ineffective submarine warfare tactic, particularly when compared to the advanced techniques utilized by the German navy. The Japanese did not completely understand the strategic importance of this armament, choosing rather to employ their submarines in providing operational support to their fleet.

The shortfall was partly due to an inadequate number of submarine assets. The poor handling of their deployment further reduced their effectiveness in operations. The evening prior to the battle, the Naval General Staff positioned a number of submarines along the expected path of the American fleet to guarantee prompt alerts regarding their advance toward Midway. The Japanese submarines designated for the operation were ill-suited for their assigned roles and were dispersed so haphazardly throughout their patrol zones that they did not come into contact with the American carriers.

The failure of Operation K to obtain up-to-date information regarding the situation at Pearl Harbor stemmed from an overreliance on just one method of reconnaissance, which was susceptible to being exposed.

The Japanese seaplane mission, scheduled for May 31 to survey Pearl Harbor, aimed to assess the primary base of the U.S. fleet's preparedness as a component of Yamamoto's plan for a decisive battle, yet it did not proceed as planned. The execution of Operation K faced setbacks due to inclement weather conditions and an unexpected encounter with American military planes in the area. Yamamoto continued to hold the conviction that the intelligence gains anticipated from Operation K outweighed the inherent risks.

The Japanese did not foresee that the Americans would set up their own countermeasures to this danger. In March 1942, seaplanes were temporarily positioned at French Frigate Shoals, which is located in the stretch of ocean that lies midway between Midway and Hawaii. Pursuant to Yamamoto's directives, the pursuit associated with Operation K was discontinued. The US forces quickly identified the tactics of Operation K and promptly bolstered their base as the Japanese advanced toward the conflict area. Upon leaving Wotje Atoll, the submarine I-123, tasked with refueling the flying boat, came across a U.S. seaplane tender conducting a patrol. Nagumo and Yamamoto were not updated with the most recent information regarding the American carriers at Pearl Harbor because Operation K was halted.

Genda's reconnaissance efforts were inadequate on the ground, partly due to overconfidence and partly due to the traditional reluctance of the Japanese military to use attack-designated aircraft for observational purposes.

The book offers a thorough critique of the way Nagumo's staff air officer evaluated the strategic planning of Commander Genda Minoru for the Kido Butai. Following the conflict, Fuchida leveled two primary criticisms against the Japanese approach to conducting reconnaissance. First, he faulted Nagumo and Genda for not having used a two-phase search, wherein aircraft would fly their search routes twice, with the second launch taking place after dawn so as to cover those sectors flown in darkness during the initial launch. Second, he argued that Nagumo could have compensated for the delay in launching Tone No. 4 by deploying a substitute aircraft from one of his other carriers immediately upon recognizing the setback. Parshall and Tully emphasize that in this phase of the war, Japanese naval tactics had yet to adopt the practice of conducting two-tiered reconnaissance, a method that would be established as a norm after the pivotal clash at Midway. Deploying a reserve aircraft from the deck, provided it was ready and fueled, would have required the same amount of time as launching the plane from Tone.

Parshall and Tully respond to and refute the criticisms put forth by Fuchida, then proceed to examine the search strategies employed by the Japanese. The tactical approach entailed sending out seven planes from ships including Haruna, Chikuma, Tone, and Akagi, which were to execute search formations spanning up to 300 miles distant from the naval group. The writers emphasize that the reconnaissance capability of these planes, flying between one thousand and fifteen hundred feet, was naturally limited and could be additionally hindered by cloud cover encountered en route. The postponement in deploying Tone No. 4 by half an hour further reduced the comprehensiveness of the search plan's scope. The authors are of the opinion that the expansive area of the search, which exceeded the dimensions of Sweden, rendered the use of only seven aircraft inadequate, regardless of how optimal the circumstances were.

The writers, Parshall and Tully, scrutinize the Japanese Navy for its hesitation to allocate sufficient resources to its advanced units to ensure a comprehensive search operation. Engaging in the Battle of Midway, the Kido Butai, even without the presence of Shokaku and Zuikaku, deployed a contingent of more than 200 aircraft. The decision to allocate merely a few extra aircraft for surveillance, in spite of the risk posed by an opponent capable of initiating attacks from six distinct points, among them three US aircraft carriers and Midway Island, underscores a grave miscalculation of the peril intrinsic to the task.

Nagumo's inflexibility in responding to fresh intelligence resulted in significant postponements that culminated in disastrous outcomes.

At the onset of hostilities, Nagumo, who held a commission, was dissatisfied with the duties assigned to him and the goals set by his superiors. He perceived himself ensnared in a command role that utterly conflicted with his capabilities. Yamamoto, who had already been scrutinized for perceived indecisiveness during the Pearl Harbor assault, was aware that expressing doubts about the Midway strategy could lead to further reproach. His pessimistic view left him almost incapacitated as the conflict advanced towards a disastrous conclusion. Despite overseeing an exceptionally large fleet of aircraft carriers, he lacked the necessary experience and confidence for decisive command.

Kido Butai's ineffective communication and coordination led to a sequence of haphazard, responsive actions when confronted with the opponent's decisive actions.

The authors additionally scrutinize Nagumo's decisions on June 4th, while also emphasizing the deficiencies in Japan's long-term strategic preparation and the insufficiency of their intelligence-gathering efforts. The authors contend that widespread shortcomings typical of Japanese carrier commanders shaped his poor choices, and his conduct also demonstrated a significant lack of flexibility and determination needed for the situation. Nagumo's command hierarchy was structured in such a manner that it significantly constrained his understanding of the wider tactical context.

This tendency is evident in Nagumo's response to the series of attacks by American torpedo bombers and land-based aircraft that began shortly after 0700. Although Nagumo's carriers remained unscathed after these assaults, the intensity and persistence of the attacks disrupted the rhythm of operations for Kido Butai's aircraft. Nagumo consistently reacted to each successive attack rather than formulating his own proactive strategies. The interruption of the reserve aircraft's readiness serves as a particularly illustrative instance. Informed at 0700 of the necessity for a subsequent assault on Midway, Nagumo commanded the fleet's reserves to swap their torpedoes for bombs. At 07:28, after his reconnaissance aircraft spotted the American task force, he first paused the orders and then, in less than twenty minutes, fully rescinded them. Nagumo, despite his apprehensions about the American military presence, continued with his intended attack on Midway at that point. He expected that further information gathered by his scouts would allow him to delay the assault on the American task force until a full-scale strike could be initiated. The hazardous choice resulted in catastrophic consequences for his troops, and this became glaringly apparent with the onset of the American attack at 1020.

Nagumo's indecisiveness highlighted a critical shortfall in achieving synchronized operations and unambiguous communication. Nagumo's grasp of the enemy's tactics was largely reliant on the communications received in the radio room of his flagship, the Akagi.

Other Perspectives

• The complexity of Yamamoto's strategy could be seen as a reflection of the multifaceted nature of naval warfare at the time, and not necessarily as an inherent flaw.
• The dispersion of forces was a common naval tactic to cover more area and create multiple threats, which could have been effective with better execution or luck.
• The focus on deception was a standard practice in military strategy and had been successful in previous engagements like the attack on Pearl Harbor.
• The allocation of assets to the Aleutians could be defended as a strategic move to protect the northern flank and create a diversion, which might have worked under different circumstances.
• The rigid timetable was a result of the need for coordination in a complex operation, which could have been successful with better intelligence or if initial operations had gone as planned.
• The shortcomings in Japanese reconnaissance protocols could be attributed to the limitations of the time's technology and the challenges of long-range naval operations.
• The strategies in submarine warfare and operational management might have been based on Japan's prior successful experiences and doctrines, which did not anticipate the American tactics and capabilities.
• Operation K's failure to obtain up-to-date information could be seen as a result of unforeseen operational challenges rather than a fundamental flaw in the plan.
• Genda's reconnaissance efforts and the reluctance to use attack-designated aircraft for observation could be seen as a reasonable adherence to the primary mission of these aircraft, which was to engage enemy forces.
• Nagumo's inflexibility and the ineffective communication within Kido Butai could be viewed as a consequence of the fog of war, where confusion and lack of information often lead to suboptimal decision-making.