{"id":29680,"date":"2021-03-31T22:49:41","date_gmt":"2021-04-01T02:49:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.shortform.com\/blog\/?p=29680"},"modified":"2021-04-01T00:07:23","modified_gmt":"2021-04-01T04:07:23","slug":"military-chain-of-command","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.shortform.com\/blog\/military-chain-of-command\/","title":{"rendered":"How Does the Military Chain of Command Work?"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

How does the chain of command work in the American military? What are its main limitations?<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The U.S. military chain of command has long been structured in a bottom-up fashion: information flows from the field up the chain of command, where decisions are made and orders are sent back down. While it allows for structured communication<\/a>, running decisions up and down the chain of command takes too much time and creates too much risk.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Keep reading to learn about the military chain of command in the US task force, its history, and key limitations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

The U.S. Military Chain of Command<\/h2>\n\n\n\n

In organizations, including the military, the chain of command is generally based on the centralized, bottom-up command-and-control model. This model of organizational management goes back to the mid-1800s, when a Taylor contemporary, Henri Fayol, developed a theory of business administration. He argued that the job of workers was to provide information to superiors, then await orders from them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The military chain of command operated the same way, on land at least. During the Civil War in 1864, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant controlled where Major Gen. George Meade moved troops by communicating detailed instructions via letters and postal service.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

However, naval operations were another matter\u2014leaders lacked visibility and a communication line to naval commanders. So, a few years earlier, in 1852, President Millard Fillmore empowered Commodore Matthew Perry to do whatever was necessary to \u201copen\u201d feudal Japan as a trade gateway to Asia (foreigners couldn\u2019t enter the country and the Japanese couldn\u2019t leave).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Perry landed, then threatened Japanese officials with attack. He gave them a white flag with the explanation that if they fought, they\u2019d lose, so they might as well keep the surrender option handy. They gave in and, after having threatened war, Perry took it upon himself to negotiate a trade agreement. However, since Perry\u2019s time, communications advances have reduced<\/em> the authority and autonomy of Navy commanders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Case Study: The Joint Special Operations Command<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n

In 2004, General Stanley McChrystal set out to reverse the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). He realized that running decisions up and down the chain of command took too much time and created too much risk. Enemy operatives were empowered to make decisions and act quickly, while task force staff had to follow protocols. So McChrystal began pushing decision-making<\/a> authority down, in a policy of empowered execution. Often, he didn\u2019t explicitly delegate\u2014instead, he created a general rule: If it advances the task force effort, do it (assuming it\u2019s moral and legal).<\/p>\n\n\n\n

His more self-assured officers made decisions and reported them at the O&I briefing, where McChrystal\u2019s public approval encouraged more people to act. The task force decentralized until it became uncomfortable, which McChrystal defined as the \u201csweet spot.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Of course, there was a learning curve: Subordinate officers had to become comfortable with not only making decisions, but also pushing authority down further. Partner agencies were initially confused and wanted verification that subordinate officers were acting with McChrystal\u2019s approval.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Soon though, empowered execution began paying off:<\/p>\n\n\n\n