What led to the creation of today’s Middle East? How did European decisions after World War I shape the region’s ongoing conflicts?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In A Peace to End All Peace<\/em>, David Fromkin reveals how Britain and France carved up the Ottoman Empire after World War I<\/a>, creating new countries and drawing borders that still spark tension today. He explores the complex alliances, secret agreements, and cultural misunderstandings that transformed the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Keep reading for an overview of this book that can help us understand the world.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n In A Peace to End All Peace<\/em><\/a>, David Fromkin provides an overview of how the modern Middle East came into being <\/strong>after World War I (1914-1918). He uses the term Middle East <\/em>to refer to the path Britain cleared to more easily reach its colonies in India. It includes Egypt, T\u00fcrkiye, Iran, Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and the territories within that perimeter. Before World War I, countries such as Israel, Jordan, and Syria didn\u2019t exist\u2014they were all part of the Ottoman Empire, which lost them following its defeat in World War I.<\/p>\n\n\n\n (Shortform note: In December 2021, the Turkish government requested that the United Nations refer to it as T\u00fcrkiye<\/a>, matching how the name is spelled and pronounced in Turkish. The government rebranded the country to better represent its culture and disassociate itself from Turkey, the bird.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin contends the modern Middle East arose from England and France\u2019s negotiations during and after World War I<\/strong>. Seeking compensation for the war\u2019s losses, these European powers reshaped the remnants of the Ottoman Empire into new countries with new leaders. <\/p>\n\n\n\n (Shortform note: Just like the modern Middle East\u2019s political geography, the term Middle East <\/em>is a European creation<\/a>. The British coined the term during the late 1800s to describe the area between the Near East (Arabia) and the Far East (India). Critics argue the term is Eurocentric because it labels the region from a European point of view<\/a>.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Europe\u2019s decisions created dilemmas the Middle East still grapples with<\/strong>, including which states are legitimate and where their borders should be. The book\u2019s title refers to the legacy of these decisions. While World War I was supposed to be the \u201cwar to end all wars,\u201d the postwar settlements made peace difficult throughout these regions. Fromkin credits Archibald Wavell, a British officer who fought in the war, with coining the phrase \u201ca peace to end peace\u201d\u2014words suggesting a lack of faith in the postwar peace processes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n (Shortform note: Wavell\u2019s phrase was a riff on \u201cThe war that will end war,\u201d an idealistic term\u00a0 author H.G. Wells used in 1914, believing that World War I would prevent future conflicts<\/a>.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n When researching this book (which was published in 1989), Fromkin examined previously secret official documents and private papers<\/strong>, which allowed him to differentiate truth from propaganda. He combined his findings from archival research with modern scholarship.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n (Shortform note: Before becoming a historian, Fromkin was a defense lawyer<\/a>. Perhaps his experience looking for evidence in documents and correspondence helped him uncover details other historians missed, such as the episode of the Turkish battleship.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n In his book, Fromkin doesn\u2019t deeply explore the war itself. He focuses instead on the negotiations related to the Middle East that took place during and after the war, which mainly involved Britain and France. For this reason, the book doesn\u2019t spend much time on the role of the US, which was highly involved in the war but not in these negotiations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This overview organizes Fromkin\u2019s findings into three stages: before, during, and after World War I. Within each stage, we explore some of the key decisions that shaped the modern Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Before World War I, Europe and Asia\u2019s major powers frequently shifted alliances. <\/strong>Fromkin notes that these changes paved the way for the conflict between the Allies (the British Empire, France, and Russia) and the Central Powers (Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary). These alliances contributed to the Ottoman Empire\u2019s collapse, reshaping it into the modern Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We\u2019ll discuss these shifting alliances in the context of the \u201cGreat Game,\u201d a 19th-century imperial competition among Britain, France, and Russia. We then examine Europe\u2019s policy changes toward the Ottoman Empire as the \u201cGreat Game\u201d evolved. This led the Ottomans to join the Central Powers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin argues that the pre-war period (late 19th and early 20th centuries) was the peak of imperialism for European powers. The British Empire\u2019s \u201cGreat Game\u201d aimed to block France and Russia\u2019s colonial objectives in the territories between India and England.<\/strong> The wealth of natural resources the British Empire was extracting from India made the region its crowning jewel\u2014and they protected it fiercely from competing empires\u2019 advances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Britain protected the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire to safeguard its Indian colonies, using the Ottomans as a buffer against Russian expansion. This strategy served British interests and helped the Ottomans defend against Russia. Once a major power, the Ottoman Empire flourished in the 16th century but began declining in the 17th century. Fromkin argues that the Ottomans were vulnerable to foreign intervention because they failed to shift from conquest to governance. The empire faced nationalist uprisings and lagged behind Europe in military, industrial, and administrative development, struggling to maintain peace and defend its borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin notes that Europe\u2019s view of the Ottoman Empire changed at the start of World War I<\/strong>. We\u2019ll explore these changes by describing Germany\u2019s role before the war, how the Allies\u2019 closer ties isolated the Ottomans, and how Ottoman land became a bargaining chip.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Europe\u2019s attitude shift happened as the threat of war grew. Germany\u2019s industrial and military rise challenged Britain\u2019s dominance<\/strong>, impacting strategic and economic dynamics. Fromkin explains that Britain\u2019s weakening industry and Germany\u2019s advancements in chemicals, tools, and railroads threatened British interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As Germany became a new imperial force, Britain sought alliances with old enemies, <\/strong>unsettling the Ottoman Empire<\/strong>. Britain and France solidified their alliance, while Britain resolved tensions with Russia through a 1907 treaty. Fromkin says this treaty alarmed the Ottomans, who feared losing British protection against Russia.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Compounding Ottoman concerns, the Allies began negotiating Ottoman territories<\/strong>, expecting these regions to become available postwar. As World War I progressed, Britain believed declaring war on the Ottoman Empire would allow it to divide its territories among smaller nations like Italy to lure them into joining Britain against Germany. Adding to the strategic considerations, Fromkin argues that Britain started considering controlling the region directly, without the Ottoman Empire as a middleman.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After losing Britain\u2019s protection, the Ottoman Empire formed a secret alliance with Germany<\/strong> in August 1914, joining the Central Powers. Fromkin identifies several reasons:<\/p>\n\n\n\n 1. The Ottomans sought alliances with other powers<\/strong> after they lost the British Empire\u2019s protection from the territorial advances of Russia and other European nations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 2. Germany sought strategic alliances<\/strong>, and the Ottoman Empire\u2019s size and location made it an attractive partner. Fromkin also found that the Ottomans offered Germany a powerful battleship to convince them of their military worth. However, the offer was likely a ruse: Britain had seized the British-made battleship earlier that day, which the Ottomans already suspected.<\/p>\n\n\n\n 3. Rising Turkish nationalism<\/strong> motivated the faction in power within the Ottoman Empire to assert its dominance. The Young Turks, the political faction ruling the Ottoman Empire, hoped that joining the war would help them reclaim Turkish-speaking regions from Russian control. This Turkish nationalist faction also asserted its dominance within the empire, with tragic consequences for minorities, especially Armenians. In 1915, Turkish officials massacred Armenians, accusing them of supporting Russia. The Ottoman government killed and forcefully deported the Armenians, leading to famine and the death of half the population.<\/p>\n\n\n\n World War I pitted the Allies against the Central Powers from 1914 to 1918. First, we\u2019ll discuss how shifting alliances set the course for the war. Then, we\u2019ll explore how those shifts informed two key decisions the Allies made:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin discusses the conflicting alliances during World War I<\/a>. These alliances complicated Britain\u2019s efforts to negotiate with any single group. In addition, Britain struggled to balance immediate goals, such as winning the war quickly, with long-term goals, such as placing British-friendly leaders in strategic places. We\u2019ll describe some of these alliances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Russia\u2019s alliance with Britain and France (\u201cThe Triple Entente\u201d) was in peril due to an economic crisis that led to the Soviet revolution. Vladimir Lenin, a Soviet leader who advocated for ending Russia\u2019s involvement in the war, seized control of the Russian government in 1917. Fromkin claims that Britain tried to stall Russia\u2019s exit from the alliance by appealing to the interests of Russian Jews, mistakenly thinking they held a lot of power in the government. Despite Britain\u2019s attempts, Russia signed a peace treaty with Germany in 1918 and left the Entente.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin argues that Britain\u2019s alliance with Zionism<\/em> during the war supported both their wartime and postwar goals<\/strong>. Zionism aimed to establish a Jewish homeland in Palestine so Jews could self-govern and live free from persecution. The British mistakenly believed that Jews in the US had significant influence and that supporting Zionism would give Britain political and financial backing from the US and Russia. Britain also aimed to control Palestine postwar to block German dominance of key routes to British colonies in Asia and the Pacific, such as India and New Zealand. An alliance with Zionism ensured Palestine remained friendly to British interests.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin notes that the Zionist movement arose amid 19th-century European nationalism<\/a><\/strong>, which advocated national freedom but fostered intolerance toward minorities. Jews in Western Europe faced hostility and questions about their national identity, while Eastern European Jews endured legal restrictions and violent pogroms (organized massacres of minority groups). These adversities led to calls for an independent Jewish state. Zionist leaders chose Palestine for its religious significance and the existing Jewish communities settling there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin reveals that the British were intentionally vague in their promises to Arabs and Zionists regarding Palestine, knowing they couldn\u2019t keep their promises to both groups. Also, he says the British government believed Middle Eastern leaders could help end the war more quickly by inciting rebellion within the Ottoman Empire. The British led and financed Arab uprisings to destabilize the region, promising their local agents they\u2019d be able to govern themselves. These revolts helped the British take over key cities across the Arab Ottoman territories.<\/p>\n\n\n\n At the same time, supporting any level of Arab independence<\/a> challenged France\u2019s regional objectives in Syria-Lebanon, whose Christian communities were under French protection. Fromkin argues that British officials thwarted French objectives in the Middle East. For instance, they supported an Arab leader in Syria despite the French wanting Syria for themselves.<\/p>\n\n\n\n According to Fromkin, the Sykes-Picot Agreement\u2014named after Mark Sykes and Fran\u00e7ois Georges-Picot, the negotiators for Britain and France\u2014marks a pivotal point in Middle Eastern history. Signed in 1916, this secret agreement between Britain and France attempted to resolve their tensions by outlining their plans for the Ottoman Empire after the war.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n The Sykes-Picot Agreement tried to balance France\u2019s goal to control some Middle Eastern territories and Britain\u2019s goals to maintain influence over the region and give some independence to Middle Eastern leaders. Fromkin explains that Britain and France agreed on the following arrangement:<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin argues that the Sykes-Picot Agreement laid the groundwork for many of the tensions and conflicts we see in the Middle East today. <\/strong>The agreement carved out new nations without much regard for ethnic or sectarian divisions. The arbitrary division of territories fueled resentment in the region toward Western powers. The agreement also overlooked Arab leaders\u2019 ambition for full independence, and its secrecy heightened their feelings of betrayal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n A year after the Sykes-Picot agreement, Britain made another decision that would change the trajectory of the Middle East: the Balfour Declaration supporting a Jewish state. The declaration took the form of a letter from Britain\u2019s Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild, a prominent Jewish man in London society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin argues that the Balfour Declaration built on the Zionist movement\u2019s momentum<\/strong> and was a result of the successful Zionist lobbying of British policymakers during World War I. Through the declaration, Britain hoped to secure Jewish support in the war and ensure that Palestine was under British influence after the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The letter marked the first time a major world power endorsed the idea of Jewish statehood.<\/strong> Specifically, it expressed British support for the establishment of \u201ca national home for the Jewish people\u201d in Palestine and paved the way for the creation of Israel. Fromkin explains that the letter\u2019s wording was intentionally ambiguous so as not to overcommit Britain. An initial draft, created in consultation with British Zionist leaders, stated that Palestine should be the<\/em> Jewish people\u2019s national home. After some back-and-forth with the government, it turned into a<\/em> national home for the Jewish people in <\/em>Palestine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n On December 11, 1917, British forces entered Jerusalem, aided by Arab tribesmen, Bedouin fighters, Ottoman prisoners of war, and Jewish-Palestinian spies. Fromkin explains this marked the end of Ottoman rule and the start of the British administration of Palestine<\/strong>. In 1920, the League of Nations Mandate for Palestine officially put the region under British control.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin notes that the Balfour Declaration was contentious from the start<\/strong>. It promised that Jews could have land already inhabited by an Arab majority, and it conflicted with earlier British promises to Arabs and the French. In 1915, Britain promised independence to their Arab allies in exchange for their help against the Ottomans. Britain also promised the French joint rule over Palestine through the Sykes-Picot agreement. Fromkin argues that French support for Zionism was aimed at keeping Zionist leaders involved in the war, not a commitment to a Jewish state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The Balfour Declaration stated that the British government would support efforts to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine without negatively affecting the religious and civil rights of the Muslim and Christian populations already living there.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin explains that Britain struggled to govern Palestine <\/strong>while balancing their goals with the interests of Jewish and Arab allies. British officials in Palestine delayed announcing the Balfour Declaration to avoid alarming locals. In contrast, the British Foreign Office set up a Zionist Commission to prepare for a Jewish homeland, which faced resistance from the Arabs.<\/p>\n\n\n\n By the end of the war, the Central Powers had lost and the Ottoman Empire was dismembered.<\/strong> Fromkin explains that many countries we think of today as part of the Middle East emerged from the postwar remains of the Ottoman Empire. The period between 1918 and 1923 was one of intense negotiations between European powers as well as unrest and bids for independence from Middle Eastern countries. It culminated in what Fromkin calls the 1922 settlement<\/em>, a series of agreements delineating new borders for the Middle East. However, Fromkin argues that Europe\u2019s agreements failed to ensure lasting stability in the region it tried to govern<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n We\u2019ll discuss why Europe failed to stabilize the Middle East after the war. Then, it will explore how Europe reorganized the region and how those agreements defined the lay of the land in today\u2019s Middle East.<\/p>\n\n\n\n While Britain and France thought they had solved the Middle Eastern \u201cproblem\u201d of who would rule the region after the Ottoman collapse, they created lasting conflict and instability<\/strong>. We\u2019ll describe two of Fromkin\u2019s explanations for Europe\u2019s failure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin argues that European leaders based the Middle Eastern boundaries they drew on their interests<\/strong>. They disregarded local preferences, leading to legitimacy issues and opposition. People didn\u2019t identify with their new nationalities, and neighboring countries had competing claims to the lands and peoples the Europeans reshuffled.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In addition, Europe imposed a Western state system on the Middle East without considering local cultures.<\/strong> Fromkin claims European policymakers <\/strong>didn\u2019t understand the regions they were trying to govern. They lacked accurate maps and cultural context about regional divisions and politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Fromkin explains that the West also reconfigured itself after the war<\/strong>, complicating its ability to stabilize the Middle East. Russia and the US distanced themselves from the Allies during the lengthy period of peace negotiations. This break conflicted with the British goal of sharing the expense and hassle of governing the region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Sharing the load was important because Europe\u2019s money and manpower were dwindling<\/strong> after the war<\/strong>. Fromkin writes that Allied soldiers were eager to return home, and army occupations were a drain on financial resources. Citizens back home demanded their money be spent rebuilding their countries\u2019 shattered economies rather than governing distant regions. This led Britain to establish puppet governments and rule by proxy to limit the costs of having a physical presence in all the Middle Eastern territories under their influence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n European powers drew up what Fromkin calls the 1922 settlement<\/em>\u2014a long list of agreements European powers and Middle Eastern leaders arrived at around 1922. <\/strong>The agreements determined which Ottoman Empire territories would become independent<\/a> countries and which would be absorbed by European empires such as Britain, France, and Russia. The agreements impacted the countries throughout the region, from Egypt\u2014which gained independence\u2014to Afghanistan. We\u2019ll focus on some of the most controversial decisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Regarding Russia, the settlement defined its political borders along the T\u00fcrkiye-Iran-Afghanistan line. Fromkin writes that the Russian proclamation of a Soviet Union in 1922 consolidated its control over Muslim Central Asia, quashing independent movements and integrating the territory into the new Soviet state.<\/p>\n\n\n\nOverview of A Peace to End All Peace<\/em> (David Fromkin)<\/h2>\n\n\n\n
Before World War I<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Essential Context: The Great Game<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Key Decisions: Europe\u2019s Policy Shift Regarding the Ottoman Empire<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Key Outcome: The Ottomans\u2019 Alliance With Germany (1914)<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
During World War I (1914-1918)<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
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Essential Context: Conflicting Alliances<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
The Triple Entente<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
The Anglo-Zionist Alliance<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Anglo-Arab Alliances<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
The Anglo-French Alliance<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Key Decision: The Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916)<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
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Key Outcome: Setting the Stage for the Modern Middle East<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Key Decision: The Balfour Declaration (1917)<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Key Outcome: The Israel\/Palestine Conflict <\/h5>\n\n\n\n
After World War I (1918-1923)<\/strong><\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Essential Context: Why Europe Failed to Stabilize the Middle East<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Europe\u2019s Self-Centered Choices<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
New Faultlines in the West<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Key Decision: The \u201c1922 Settlement\u201d<\/strong><\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Key Outcome: The 1922 Settlement Unsettles the Middle East<\/h5>\n\n\n\n