What did J. Robert Oppenheimer do after World War II? Were his political enemies successful?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Biographers Kai Bird and Martin Sherwin suggest that, after the war, Oppenheimer\u2019s life was marked by his consistent advocacy for transparency and regulation in nuclear policy. Then, a politically motivated hearing effectively ousted him from the upper echelon of the US government.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Read more to learn what happened to Oppenheimer after the bomb.<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
President Truman chose to use the atomic bomb on Japan, bombing Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki on August 9. According to Bird and Sherwin, Oppenheimer\u2019s initial reaction to the bombings was ambivalent; he proudly congratulated his team following Hiroshima, but friends report him consumed with qualms. Oppenheimer, after the bomb, became an increasingly outspoken advocate for nuclear regulation, earning him powerful political opponents who sought to excommunicate him.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
(Shortform note: To date, the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent the only wartime uses of nuclear weapons<\/a>. Since then, the closest the world has come to using nuclear weapons in combat was arguably in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962<\/a>, in which the US and the Soviet Union nearly engaged in nuclear warfare at the peak of the Cold War.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n We\u2019ll dig deeper into Oppenheimer\u2019s life in the wake of the bombing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Following the bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Oppenheimer became increasingly vocal about atomic policy. As Bird and Sherwin relate, Oppenheimer\u2019s proposed nuclear policy had two primary recommendations: The world should create an international commission to regulate nuclear weapons and scientists from all countries should speak freely with one another.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Bird and Sherwin write that Oppenheimer endorsed international regulation of nuclear energy in the Acheson-Lilienthal report to President Truman, a report written on behalf of Truman\u2019s nuclear advisory committee in 1946. As the report\u2019s author, Oppenheimer argued that all countries should submit to an international authority. He reasoned that an international body provided the best chance of avoiding nuclear war, as it would prohibit rogue nations from developing further nuclear weapons on their own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Meanwhile, Bird and Sherwin say, in a November 1945 speech to Los Alamos scientists, Oppenheimer proposed creating a system that would allow different countries\u2019 scientists to communicate openly. Such a system, he believed, would prevent countries from harboring secrets that could encourage a deadly nuclear arms race.<\/p>\n\n\n\n (Shortform note: Oppenheimer\u2019s vision of an international body regulating atomic weapons was realized 11 years later, in 1957, with the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency<\/a> (IAEA). While the IAEA has many responsibilities, today, most of those responsibilities center around the enforcement of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons<\/a>, an international agreement that encourages the disarmament of nuclear weapons. Moreover, although no concrete system exists to encourage scientists of different countries to communicate, the IAEA also seeks to promote free exchange between member countries regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Although Oppenheimer became an outspoken advocate of nuclear regulation, Bird and Sherwin maintain that he failed to successfully influence US nuclear policy<\/strong>. These failures were most obvious in two instances: Oppenheimer\u2019s meeting with Truman and the Baruch Plan formed in response to Oppenheimer\u2019s recommendations in the Acheson-Lilienthal Report.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bird and Sherwin relate that, in October 1945, Oppenheimer earned a meeting with President Truman, providing him the opportunity to express his concerns about a potential arms race with the Soviet Union. However, Oppenheimer didn\u2019t take full advantage of this opportunity, instead regretfully telling Truman \u201cI feel I have blood on my hands\u201d\u2014a statement Truman took as a sign of weakness. Later, Truman allegedly commented, \u201cI don\u2019t want to see that son-of-a-bitch in this office ever again.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n (Shortform note: In Christopher Nolan\u2019s blockbuster film, Oppenheimer<\/em>, Nolan presents a slightly dramatized version of this meeting\u2014in the movie, after President Truman ends the meeting, Oppenheimer hears Truman call him a \u201ccry-baby scientist\u201d to his aide. But, according to Bird and Sherwin, this detail was an embellishment. Truman did <\/em>call Oppenheimer a cry-baby scientist, but only in a letter to Dean Acheson written months later.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bird and Sherwin also note that, as mentioned above, Oppenheimer was a key author of the Acheson-Lilienthal Report directed to President Truman. This sweeping report recommended full transparency with other nations and developing an international committee that reduced individual nations\u2019 freedom to create nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n But, as Bird and Sherwin relate, President Truman\u2019s representative to the United Nations (UN), Bernard Baruch, gutted the proposal. Instead, Baruch submitted his own plan to the UN that, according to Bird and Sherwin, specifically targeted the Soviet Union by rescinding their veto powers and stipulating that any violation of the agreement be punished with a nuclear bombing. In turn, the Soviets rejected Baruch\u2019s plan, ultimately causing UN talks to stall and setting the stage for the coming Cold War.<\/p>\n\n\n\n (Shortform note: In the wake of the Baruch Plan\u2019s failure, an arms race began that saw the US and the Soviet Union develop massive nuclear arsenals. Indeed, by 1975 the US and the Soviet Union together possessed 47,000 nuclear weapons<\/a>, of which 27,000 belonged to the US and 20,000 to the Soviet Union. And even though both nations have disarmed significantly, the legacy of the arms race is noticeable today, with Russia and the US each having over 5,000 nuclear weapons<\/a> in their arsenal\u2014together almost 90% of the world\u2019s nuclear weapons.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n Though Oppenheimer had spearheaded the creation of the atomic bomb and served on various committees consulting the government on nuclear policy, he was often targeted by his political enemies after the atomic bomb for his past connections to communism. According to Bird and Sherwin, the animosity toward Oppenheimer culminated in December 1953 when he learned that the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) intended to revoke his security clearance<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The movement to revoke Oppenheimer\u2019s security clearance, Bird and Sherwin argue, was led by Lewis Strauss\u2014the chairman of the AEC. Bird and Sherwin write that Strauss\u2019s disdain of Oppenheimer was deep-seated; in his 1949 testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, Oppenheimer had embarrassed Strauss by sharply refuting Strauss\u2019s testimony about the importance of isotopes in developing nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n After many confrontations with Oppenheimer about nuclear policy in the early 1950s, Strauss began plotting to get Oppenheimer\u2019s security clearance revoked. According to Bird and Sherwin, he first contacted William Borden, the AEC\u2019s staff director who felt similarly about Oppenheimer and provided Borden access to Oppenheimer\u2019s security file. On the basis of this file, Strauss helped Borden compose a brief alleging Oppenheimer was likely a Soviet agent. Bird and Sherwin say that this brief led to an FBI report that convinced the Eisenhower administration to conduct an AEC hearing to revoke Oppenheimer\u2019s security clearance.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As the AEC\u2019s chairman, Strauss had the authority to decide the three members of the AEC panel that would judge Oppenheimer. In addition to this authority, Bird and Sherwin argue, Strauss consistently employed illicit tactics throughout the hearing to predetermine the verdict against Oppenheimer.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n First, Bird and Sherwin point out that even before the hearing, Strauss actively biased the panel against Oppenheimer<\/strong>. They write that Strauss arranged for the panel members to read Oppenheimer\u2019s FBI security file before the hearing\u2014in the presence of prosecuting attorney Roger Robb, at that. Without Oppenheimer\u2019s defense present, Robb personally guided the board through the most damning portions of Oppenheimer\u2019s security file. As Bird and Sherwin relate, this violated the basic legal principle of tabula rasa<\/em>\u2014that juries approach trials with a clean slate and no preconceived opinions of the defendant.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Further, Bird and Sherwin observe that Strauss handicapped Oppenheimer\u2019s lawyers by denying them a security clearance<\/strong> while providing one for the prosecuting lawyers. As a result, Oppenheimer\u2019s lawyers often lacked access to the evidence presented to the panel, making it impossible for them to respond to the prosecution\u2019s accusations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Finally, Bird and Sherwin write that Strauss had access to illegal FBI wiretaps of Oppenheimer\u2019s conversations with his lawyers<\/strong>. As a result, Strauss could predict the defense lawyers\u2019 legal tactics and relay them to Robb, the prosecuting attorney. These illegal wiretaps not only violated attorney-client privilege but also provided Robb with a strategic edge throughout the hearing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Bird and Sherwin contend that, in addition to underhanded tricks, the prosecution relied heavily on Oppenheimer\u2019s testimony about the \u201cChevalier incident,\u201d<\/strong> a conversation between Oppenheimer and Haakon Chevalier<\/a>, his close friend and fellow Berkeley faculty member, in late 1942.<\/p>\n\n\n\nAdvocacy for Transparency and International Regulation<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Oppenheimer\u2019s Unsuccessful Attempts to Influence Nuclear Policy<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Oppenheimer\u2019s Meeting With Truman<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
The Baruch Plan and the Acheson-Lilienthal Report<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
The 1954 Security Clearance Hearing<\/h3>\n\n\n\n
Strauss\u2019s Illicit Tactics Throughout the Hearing<\/h4>\n\n\n\n
Tactic #1: Biasing the Board<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Tactic #2: Handicapping Oppenheimer\u2019s Lawyers<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
Tactic #3: Illegal FBI Wiretaps<\/h5>\n\n\n\n
The Presentation of the Chevalier Incident<\/h4>\n\n\n\n